



NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

COURSE CODE : PCR 372

**COURSE TITLE:
INTRODUCTION TO EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS**

PCR 372

INTRODUCTION TO EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS

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INTRODUCTION

PCR 372: Introduction To Early Warning Mechanisms is a one semester course. It will be available for you to take as a core module of the Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Programme. This course is suitable for any student seeking to understand how to detect and prevent the degeneration conflict issues into violence. It will enhance the students' acumen in gathering intelligence and distilling intelligence from noise or opinions. This course consists of 16 Units, encompassing the following key areas; the anatomy of conflict, types of early warning, analysis of early warning, early warning, components of early warning, early warning monitoring agencies, conflict analysis in the context of early warning, definition of response, case studies, and contributions of governments amongst others. The course guide tells you briefly what the course is all about, what you are expected to know in each unit, what course materials you need to use and how you can work your way through these materials. It also emphasizes the necessity of tutor-marked assignments. There are also periodic tutorial classes that are linked to this course.

What you will learn in this course

PCR 372 Introduction to early warning mechanisms is to introduce you to the concepts and practice of early warning mechanisms identification as a fundamental way of preventing violent conflicts in human society. Some of the focus areas of this course include; complexity of conflicts, anticipation of conflict, role of governmental and non-governmental organizations in intelligence gathering, early warning analysis and how to ensure early response. Your understanding of this course will empower you to critically scrutinize information and conflict indices in order to enhance the design of early and right responses to prevent violence.

Course Aims

The aim of this course is to introduce students to the ontological meanings and empirical indicators of early warning signs of violent conflicts and how to design appropriate responses to nip impending conflicts in the bud.

Course Objectives:

On successful completion of this course, students should be able to:

1. Define and explain the meaning of early warning,
2. Identify indicators of early warning,
3. Distinguish between early warning and everyday noise of conflict,
4. Identify underlying risks, evolving dynamics and possess the skills to accurately describe all the fore-mentioned
5. Understand and be able to communicate with brevity ; specific contexts, actors and dynamics of volatile actions
6. Know the limit of preventive diplomacy
7. Know when military option is inevitable
8. Gather information based on specific indicators
9. Analyze information by contextualizing indicators
10. design best and worst case scenarios and response choices
11. Link up effectively with appropriate policy makers and implementers
12. Cognizant of the relationship between early warning and gender.

Working Through This Course

To complete this course you are required to read the study units, and read recommended books. Each study unit contains a self-assessment exercise, and at some points in the course, you are required to submit assignments for assessment purpose. At the end of this course is a final examination. Stated below are the components of the course and what you are expected to do.

Course Materials

Course Guide

Study Units

Textbooks and other Reference Sources

Assignment File

Presentation

In addition, you must obtain the text materials. They are provided by the NOUN. You may also be able to purchase the materials from the bookshop. Please, contact your tutor if you have problems in obtaining the next materials.

Study Units

There are sixteen study units in this course, as follows:

Module 1

- Unit 1: The Anatomy of Conflict
- Unit 2: Complexity of Conflict
- Unit 3: Anticipation of Conflict
- Unit 4: Definition of Early Warning/ Historical Background and Importance.

Module 2

- Unit 1: Types of Early Warning
- Unit 2: Early Warning Instruments and Models
- Unit 3: Perspectives on Early Warning Signs
- Unit 4: Gender Perspectives on Early Warning

Module 3

- Unit 1: Early Warning Monitoring Agencies

- Unit 2: Analytical Framework for Monitoring Early Warning
- Unit 3: Conflict Analysis in the Context of Early Warning
- Unit 4: Early warning and Conflict Prevention

Module 4

- Unit 1: Definition of Response
- Unit 2: Case Studies
- Unit 3: Governments, International Organizations and E.W.S
- Unit 4: Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning Signs

Module 5

- Unit 1: Importance of Early Response
- Unit 2: Approaches of Early Response
- Unit 3: Government and Early Response
- Unit 4: International Organizations and Early Response

Each unit contains a number of self Assessment exercise. In general, these self Assessment exercise enable you to determine your understanding of the materials you have just covered or require you to apply it in some ways and, thereby, assist you gauge your progress as well as reinforcing your understanding of material. Together with tutor-marked assignments, these exercises will assist you in achieving the stated objective of the individual units and of the entire Course.

Textbooks and References

Below are some books you can consult. You can also refer to other books related to the course.

John Paul Lederach, (1996) *preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Unversty Press,

Jonh W. Burton, (1990), *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*. New York, NY: St. Martins Press Inc.

Bush, K.D. (1997). *When two anarchies meet: international intervention in Somalia*. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 17(1), 55–78.

——— (1998) *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*. Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, ON, Canada. Working paper 1.

CMI–NCG (Christian Michelsen Institute; Nordic Consulting Group(1997)

Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique. Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Norway. Evaluation report 4.97.

Cohen, A.P. (1985) *The symbolic construction of community*. Tavistock Publications, London, UK.

Hornborg, A.(1994) *Environmentalism, Ethnicity, and Sacred Places:*

Reflections on Modernity, Discourse, and Power. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 31(3), 260.

Long, N.; Villareal, M. (1994) ‘The Interweaving of Knowledge and Power

in Development Interfaces’. In Scoones, I.; Thompson, J., ed., *Beyond Farmer First: Rural People’s Knowledge, Agricultural Research and Extension Practice*. Intermediate Technology Publications, London, UK. pp. 41–51.

Millwood, D., ed. (1996) *The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience: joint evaluation of emergency assistance to Rwanda (5 volumes)*. Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen

Moore, D.S. (1993) *Contesting Terrain in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands:*

Political Ecology, Ethnography, and Peasant Resource Struggles. *Economic Geography*, 69(4), 390.

Assignment File

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. In this file, you will find all the details of the work you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. Further information on assignment will be found in the Assignment File itself, and later in this Course Guide in the section on assessment.

There are many assignments for this course, with each unit having at least one assignment. These assignments are basically meant to assist you to understand the course.

Assessment

An assessment file and a marketing scheme will be made available to you. In the assessment file, you will find details of the works you must submit to your tutor for marking. There are two aspects of the assessment of this course; the tutor marked and the written examination. The marks you obtain in these two areas will make up your final marks. The assignment must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in

accordance with the deadline stated in the presentation schedule and the Assignment file. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will count for 30% of your total score.

Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

There are 20 tutor-marked assignments in this course. you do not need to submit all the assignments. The best three of what you have submitted will be recorded. Each assignment counts for 20 marks but on the average when the assignments are put together, the assignments will count 30% towards you total course mark. The Assignments for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your reference books, reading and study units. However, it is always, and demonstrate that you have a very broad and in-dept knowledge of the subject matter.

When each assignment is completed, send it together with a TMA (tutor-marked assignment) form to you tutor. Ensure that each assignment reached your tutor on or before the deadline given in the Assignment File. If for any reason you cannot complete your work on time, contact your before the assignment is due to discuss the date unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting such

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination for PRC 105: Introduction to Conflict Resolution processes i will be of tree hours' duration and have a value o 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions which reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the last unit and sitting for the examination, to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments and comment on them before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

Course Marking Scheme

The following table lays out how the actual course mark allocation is broken down.

Table 1: Course Marking Scheme

Presentation Schedule

The dates for submission of all assignments will be communicated to you. You will also be told the date of completing units and dates for examinations.

Course Overview/Presentation Schedule

How to get the most from this Course

You will be required to study the units on your own. But arrangements have been made for you to meet with your tutor for tutorials on regular basis in the study centre. Also, you can organize interactive sessions with your course mates.

In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way, a lecturer might give you some reading to do, the study units tell you when to read, and which are your text materials or set books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise. Each of the study units follows common formats. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have

achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course.

The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your textbooks or from a Reading section. The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

1. Read this Course Guide thoroughly, it is your first assignment.
2. Organize a Study Schedule. Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the Course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information, e.g. details of your tutorials, and the date of the first day of the Semester is available from the study centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
3. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
4. Turn on Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
5. Assemble the study materials. You will need your set books and the unit you are studying at any point in time.
6. Work through the unit. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.
7. Well before the relevant due dates (about 4 weeks before the due dates), check the Assignment File for your next required assignment. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot

by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.

8. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor.

9. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to pace your study so that you keep yourself on schedule.

10. When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for its return before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the Assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-marked assignment form and also the written comments on the ordinary assignments.

11. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

Tutors and Tutorials

There are 12 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. Information relating to the tutorials will be provided at the appropriate time.

Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must take your tutor-marked assignments to the study centre well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor if you need help. Contact your tutor if: you do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned readings; you have difficulties with the exercises; you have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment. You should try your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only chance to have face-to-face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefit from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn a lot from participating in discussion actively.

We wish you success with the course and hope that you will find it both interesting and useful.

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MODULE 1:

Unit 1: Definitions and Types of Conflict

Unit 2: Complexity of Conflict

Unit 3: Anticipation of Conflict

Unit 4: Definition of Early Warning

UNIT 1: DEFINITION OF CONFLICT

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Contents

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References/ Further Reading

Unit 1: Definition of Conflict and Early Warning

1.0 Introduction

There are several definitions of conflict which will serve as threshold for preparing Early Warning Mechanisms as the main thrust of this course. Conflict as a matter of fact, is an inevitable occurrence in human existence that has changed the human habitat to reveal existing problems and resolve unfolding personal or collective grievances.

Conflict ordinarily is assumed by many to be destructive in nature but recent investigations have shown that conflict does not only have bad aspect but also embedded with solution to stem ember of the crisis. Some of these underlying causative factors of conflict are adjudged to either be injustice over some group of people, cheating among individuals, competition, corruption, wickedness, selfishness, oppression among others.

It must be borne in mind that conflict does not have to be dysfunctional at all times. However, this has not been the case in many instances of inter-personal, inter-group and international relations. However, the fact that conflicts are sometimes planned and foreseen by the parties implies that it can be detected and prevented from breaking out. This why this unit this unit defines conflict and describes conflicts in a way that links it to early warning.

This is because the destructive effects of some of the intractable and protracted conflicts in our society have underscored the desirability of early warning mechanisms to prevent fierce conflicts.

This unit also introduces you to the anatomy of conflicts. The essence of this is to deepen your understanding of the concept and analysis of conflict which can greatly aid the design of early warning and its implementation.

2.0 Objectives:

At the end of this unit students should be able to:

- Know different definitions of Conflict
- Understand the concept of early warning
- Establish the causal relationship between anatomy of conflict and early warning

3.0 Main Content:

DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF CONFLICT

According to Hyden (2006), conflict can be seen from two angles; first from **latent** and **manifest** conflicts.

- **A manifest conflict** is characterized by the use of force, or violence that often results in human casualties.
- **Latent conflict** is embedded in societal cleavages which may or may not break into open confrontation and negative exchanges. As people are interested in designing

early warning mechanisms, we should be more interested in latent conflicts. This is why we need to really understand the social cleavages in a society. Hyden (2006) categorizes the social cleavages into **vertical** and **horizontal**.

- **The vertical cleavages** are based on ethnicity, race or religion all of which can be described as primordial ties.
- **The horizontal cleavages** are based on control of or access to economic resources.

Therefore, horizontal cleavages can be described more in terms of class.

As a concept, there are different perspectives of conflict which reveal the multi-dimensional nature of the conflict from conception to manifestation. The fact that conflict is a social reality cannot be overemphasized. However, this is not to posit that violent conflicts cannot be prevented. It must also be stated that the concept defies any fixated or static form of definition. Francis (2006) defines conflict as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by individuals and groups.

Galtung (1996) in a discourse of conflicts explains the concept from the intra-personal level and refers to it as a dilemma. Furthermore, he describes it at the inter-personal level as dispute. Simply put, the dispute occurs when two people are pursuing the same scarce goal, while a dilemma is when an individual is pursuing two incompatible goals.

The notion of dispute arises when one of the parties try to harm or hurt the other perceived as the obstacle to the attainment of the set goal and the dilemma may mislead one to self-destruction. Obviously, a dilemma type of intra-personal conflict can lead one to commit suicide in extreme cases. However, there are some attendant characteristics of these types of conflicts. One of these is the generation of energy by both the frustrated party and the aggrieved party.

Conflict means different things to different people across cultures. Associated words with conflicts include; *fight, argument, contest, debate, combat, war* and other equally evocative terms, (Tidwell, 1998). A proper definition of conflict will go a long way in

helping one to embark on an anatomy of the concept in a way that will aid early-warning mechanisms. Conflict can be defined in **two broad contexts**.

First, conflict can be defined in a subjective and individual-centered context.

- **The subjective nature** of conflict is well enunciated by Morton Deutsch. The presence or absence of conflict is never rigidly determined by the objective state of affairs. Apart from the possibility of misperception, psychological factors enter into the determination of conflict in yet another crucial way. Conflict is also determined by what is valued by the conflicting parties. Given, the classical example of what is conflict illustrated by the story of two starving men on lifeboat with only enough food for the survival of one loses its impact if one or both of the men have social or religious values that can become more dominant psychologically than the hunger need or the desire for survival. The point of these remarks is that neither the occurrence nor the outcome of conflict is completely and rigidly determined by objective circumstances, (Tidwell, 1998)

The expected struggle in the situation above should ordinarily be over the access and possession of the available food but the dominant effect of other influences such as religion may change the context of the conflict or prevent the occurrence of conflict between the two individuals in the above situation.

- **In the objectivist context**, conflict can also be objective when two or more parties perceive incompatible goals and then equally assume that interference from the other in their desire to achieve their goals. For example, the conflict between Muslims and Christians do not necessarily have to arise because they perceive incompatible goals, but because they are sure that the existence of the other's behaviour will interfere in their own goal and this often results to conflicts.

- The objectivists also hold that it is not a must that there must be two people for conflict to exist because once conflict is perceived by one person; we can posit that there is conflict.

Tidwell (1998) offers advices that conflict will be well understood and clarified if it is divided into *functional*, *situational* and *interactive types*.

The **functionalists**; hold that conflicts serve social functions; **Situationalists**; argue that conflict finds expressions under certain conditions. In other words if the situations are not present, there may be no conflicts. Such conditions could be acts of injustice, oppression or exclusive modes of allocating societal resources by the government. The **Interactionists**; define conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals. There is however a limitation in adopting an *interactionist* approaches for conflict definition in the context of early warning. This is because of the role of perception and dependence in the approach. While dependence may help as a variable in measuring the potentiality of conflicts in a relationship, perception may not be easily reflective.

The interactionist theory argues that conflict does not only occur when values or needs are objectively incompatible or when conflict is manifested in actions; it exists in as much as one of the parties perceives it. One side may perceive a conflict and it may not be known to the other party. This is known as the interactionist communication perspective of conflict. The limitation of the interactionist perspective is that the emphasis on interdependence may not be really underscored in the context of parties who live far apart from themselves and have heard about themselves but have negative perceptions of themselves. In as much as they are not interdependent, the mere fact that they have negative perceptions about themselves assumes the existence of conflict.

In another context, the objectivists posit that certain verifiable conditions must be present for one to allege conflict. These may be events, behaviours or situations that can create conflict. In contrast to what the subjectivist and the interactionists claim,

even if people do not perceive these conditions as conflict-generating, the mere presence of these conditions indicate that conflict must exist in such communities.

A leading scholar in objectivists' school of thought is Karl Marx. They argue that once there is class division, then irrespective of what people might think, there is bound to be conflict between the lower-order and the higher-order. This is because those in the lower-order will continually seek to acquire power while those in the higher order will seek to retain power. This may bring about a state of false consciousness because the people involved may actually not be conscious of it according to Karl Marx. According to Karl Marx, the workers or working-class are deceived to have false consciousness through the propaganda of the ruling class by making the working class to accept physical labour as their lot in life. The essence of this is for us to know that harsh labour relations can be an early warning and conflict index in any society though it may be a latent conflict due to false consciousness.

Some of them are structural, that is, they are institutionalized in the structure of the affected societies such as the perverted federalism that is being operated in Nigeria, while some of them are situational though sometimes directly resulting from such institutional defects such as low-level conflicts involving dissident groups, such religious extremist groups called the Boko Haram(Western Education is forbidden in Islam) in the Northern part of Nigeria, ethnic irredentists like the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) among other militant youths operating in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria.

Anatomy of Conflict.

As an aspect of behavioral science, the course, peace studies and conflict resolution requires some scientific analysis and this is one of the reasons the anatomy of conflict is essential.

ANATOMY OF CONFLICT: according to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, anatomy is defined as scientific of the bodily structure of something. In other words, it is an examination of what something is like; the way it works or why it happens (an anatomy

of conflict). It simply refers to as a careful examination of the ontological and pragmatic meanings of conflicts.

Galtung (1996) provides a very useful insight into the anatomy of conflict from the individual to the structural level which serves as guide and expose the frame work to students.

It must be understood that, what is causal factor in every conflict is a contradiction or a hindrance that obstructs the attainment of a specific goal set by some people. The contradiction or clash of interest can either occur between **individuals** or **group of people**.

When the clash of interest occurs between groups of people, it is known as **Dispute**; and between individual, it is a **Dilemma**. Dispute occurs when two people are pursuing the same scare goal and they are not ready to exercise patience in resolving their differences.

One of the common characteristics of a group or individual conflict is that, it **generates energy** from both the frustrated and the *aggrieved* party. The challenges facing the *students of peace and conflict resolution* is how best to channel the destructive energy generated in the courses of conflict into constructive one for the benefit of the concerned parties. It is evident that, there is danger and opportunity in conflict; it depends on how it is managed. In other words, in the context of early warning, conflict can be managed when anatomy of conflict is well understood.

Self Assessment Exercise

Differentiate with examples the following terms; dispute, dilemma, latent conflict and manifest conflicts.

4.0: CONCLUSION

Conflict is inevitable in the course of human interactions and that is why it must not only be seen as dysfunctional but also in the perspective of objectivity and subjectivity as a result of need for early warning mechanisms. Although, there are different types of perspectives on conflict, an anatomy of conflict must be as objective as possible in order to aid the process of designing early warning mechanisms.

5.0 SUMMARY

The unit discussed different definitions of conflict from different perspectives and also defined concept of conflict from different perspectives as well as the causal relationship between anatomy of conflict and early warning.

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Discuss the different perspectives of conflict studied in this unit.
2. Which perspective of conflict would you consider most appropriate to aid the designing of early warning mechanisms.

7.0 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

- Albert, I.O. (2005). *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa Essays in Honour of (Dr) Abdulsalami A. Abubakar.* (Ed). Ibadan. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
- Francis, D.J. (2006). 'Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts'. In: Best, S.G (Ed) *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in west Africa.* Ibadan. Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Galtung, J. (1996.) *Peace by Peaceful Means, Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization.* International Peace Research Institute, OSLO
- Tidwell, A.C. (1998). *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution.* London, Continuum.
- Hyden (2006). *African Politics in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Unit 2: Complexity of Conflicts

Contents

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Contents

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References and Further Reading

UNIT 2: INTRODUCTION

This unit takes you through the complexity of conflicts. It is designed to help student identify and classify actors in a conflict vis-à-vis the issues that bring them into disputes. It also takes you from the elementary understanding of conflicts to more complex analysis that aid you in planning for early warning response after detecting early warning signs of conflicts.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, students should;

- Be familiar with the complexity of conflicts.
- Understand the general notion of the complexity of conflicts.
- Appreciate how the complexity of conflicts can make or mar the designing of early response for early warning signs of conflicts.

3.0 MAIN CONTENTS

Complexity: Elementary and complex Conflicts

This section takes you to a higher level of conflict appreciation and analysis. You are enjoined to pay serious attention to this section as it serves as the main source that will

empower students to critically assess conflict issues and actors. The work of Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, serves as our guide.

In a bid to further give insight into complexity of conflict, it is essential to breakdown the number of actors in a conflict, and the number of issues or simply goals that characterize their (intra-actions) dilemmas and (inter-action) disputes into m and n . Intra-actions here refer to issues whose handling or resolution affect only one of the parties or groups in a conflict or relationship.

For example, at the individual level, a man or woman faces the need in choosing between spending his/her limited resources for holiday abroad or completing his house projects. The effects of the decision taken on either of these two does not go beyond an individual. Interactions at the group level refer to issues whose handling can affect the relationship or conflict involving more than one person or group. For example, the creation of borders can be an intra-ethnic issue between two states that share similar ethnic identity. For instance, the transfer of some oil-wells that hitherto belonged to Cross Rivers state of Nigeria and given to Akwa-Ibom State in the same Country can be described as an issue in the interactions amongst the parties involved, this is because the decision has reduced the amount of revenue accruable to the Cross River State from the Federation Account while that of Akwa-Ibom increases.

At this juncture a clarification of certain types of conflicts become necessary and this is divided into; **societal**, **structural** and **deep-rooted conflicts** in line with Thorson (1982). Intractable conflicts or deep-rooted conflicts that can not be resolved through dispute resolution mechanisms like the courts. This is because these conflicts according to Burton (1990:3) are:

Intractable conflicts or deep-rooted conflicts that involve deep feelings, values and needs (that) cannot be settled by an order from outside authority, such as a court, an arbitrator or a more

powerful nation. These conflicts which appear endless, erupting into emotional displays and even violence from time to time

Examples of such conflicts include the Arab-Israeli conflict, Northern Ireland, US race relations and the Muslim-Hindu conflict in India. These conflicts cannot be resolved by merely splitting the socio-economic pie or other externally generated solutions. Despite having many early warning signs of violence, the conflicts enumerated above are still raging because the issues involved are deep-rooted and seemingly intractable. It has been observed and agreed that most societal conflicts are deep-rooted. However, Tidwell (1998) argues that there can be deep-rooted inter-personal conflicts. So, deep-rooted conflicts can also occur in the inter-personal context. What is required is an analytical tool that is intellectually robust. In this direction, Burton and Dukes (1990) argue that:

If one is lost in a forest, trial and error could be a useful procedure. But trial and error applied to dispute or conflict resolution, in which the quality of life and life itself may be at stake, is unacceptable.

The contexts above reiterate the need for analytical tools that can aid early warning signs detection and designing of early response mechanisms. Galtung (1996) provides an illustrative example on how to analyse the complexity of conflicts. For illustrative purposes, we shall take letter c , represents a complexity, m represents the actors while n stands for the goals. We could now define the complexity, c , of a conflict as $m + n$, but we shall prefer the formula $c = m + n - 2$ (or $c = m \times n - 1$):

$c < 0$: structural conflict, neither actors nor goals (0, 0)

$c = 0$: one actor, one unrealized goal: frustration (1, 1)

$c = 1$: elementary conflicts: dilemmas (1, 2) or disputes (2, 1)

$c > 1$: complex conflicts (m, n).

From the above, it can be deduced that the complexity of structural conflicts is lesser than zero, meaning that complexity cannot be completely ruled out though structural conflicts have neither goals nor actors. In the following equation, complexity equals to zero because it involves only an actor with an unrealized goal which has resulted in the frustration of the concerned party. The third equation shows that complexity is equal to one in elementary conflicts that usually have one actor with a dilemma and two actors or persons over an issue. Galtung considers the complexity of this type of conflict as still elementary and equal to one. In the fourth equation, complexity is shown as greater than one where we have more than one actor and goals.

The above can also be adapted for early warning analysis because it shows the actors and the goals they sort to achieve in the conflicts. It also means that analysis of conflicts can also be done mathematically.

Self Assessment Exercise

Express your understanding of this unit so far by illustrating a conflict guided by the equations presented above

4.0 Conclusion.

From the contents of this unit, it is clear that the complexity of conflicts can emanate either from the individual or intra-group scenario and the inter-personal and inter-group scenario. This informed the presentation of different scholarly perspectives on the complexity of conflicts. The meaning of the complexity of conflicts was also presented and its' implications for early warning signs of conflicts discussed.

5.0 Summary

The unit has explained the concept of complexity of conflicts. A thorough grasp or knowledge of this concept becomes a tool for proper diagnosis of early warning signs. It has also shown how complexity of conflicts can be used as a tool for conflict analysis. Some scholarly perspectives on the complexity of conflicts were presented. Explanations

were also made on how the understanding of the complexity of conflicts can aid the designing of early responses to nip violent conflicts in the bud.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Pick a conflict and use the complexity of conflict equation presented in this unit to represent it.
2. Can there be complexity of conflict at the intra-level, whether intra-personal or intra-group levels? Present your answers graphically.

7.0 References and Further Reading

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Tidwell, A.C. (1998). *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. London, Continuum.

Unit 3: Anticipation of Conflicts

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Contents

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References and Further Reading

1.0 : Introduction

This unit discusses the anticipation of conflicts as another process that helps us to recognize the early signs of conflict. This knowledge helps us to detect early warning signs and how to come up with the appropriate response to prevent the occurrence or degeneration of such conflicts into violence. More so, it also shows how conflict anticipation prevents social conflicts that can destabilize social equilibrium, a good example is to draw empirical illustrations from multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities. The use of power-sharing or concessionary democracy as a tool of early warning will also be presented as a system that anticipates possible conflicts and seeks to prevent it by adopting an inclusive system of government targeted at giving a sense of belonging to sections of the country.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to

- Understand the meaning of conflict anticipation
- Consociational democracy as a tool of conflict anticipation

3.0 Main Contents

The devastating effects of violent conflicts on human and capital development in Africa since the end of the Cold-War have underscored the need to make conflict anticipation a concern for policy makers, academics and civil society activists. This is because the ubiquity of violent conflicts has not only affected countries where the conflicts began initially but also spread to neighbouring countries. Adekanye (2007) reveals that the first horrific situations that attracted international concerns in genocides in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra-Leone, Rwanda, and Burundi which were labeled as failed states. There were series of events in some countries that preceded the cases cited above. Adekanye (2007) describes these states to include; Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa and Mali. These are states that have struggled to transit from war not peace but to post-conflict phase and from authoritarian breakdowns to democratic commencement.

It is regretful to note that many of these conflicts did not come as sudden occurrences or an act of God to many discerning mind but the lack of mechanisms for critical and scientific conflict anticipation made them appear like natural disasters in some cases.

Conflict anticipation

It becomes appropriate to explain the meaning of conflict anticipation within the context of early warning. According to Doom (1997), “anticipation means that in a potential conflict situation an intercession or intervention is made in such a way that there is a change from the status-quo or status-quo-ante to a more desired position or the avoidance of an undesired position”. This is based on the assumption that the situation at the beginning can be lucidly described, as proper means to easily predict conflict.

However, it must be noted that not all these conditions are always present at the same time. Karl (1997) posits that anticipation must contain two elements;

1. The first one is that; a response is made to the signal which indicates that a conflict situation is building up.
2. The second element is that there is an effort to retrace steps back to the causes of the conflict.

In the context of large-scale social conflicts, this implies that structural intervention must take the form of well-directed action aimed at the center of power. The feasibility of this type of intervention can however be doubtful considering the fact that the urgent awareness of the long period it takes to achieve economic, political and social changes might be prolonged.

3.2 Power Sharing (Consociationary) As a Conflict Anticipation Tool.

Adekanye (2007) describes the concept as one of the most popular in the contemporary literature of conflict regulation in multi- ethnic societies. And within the context of study and definition of early warning, it can be correctly assumed that conflict can be anticipated in post-conflict state. This is because many states went into protracted wars because of reasons that touched on exclusion and marginalization of certain ethnic or religious groups. Power-Sharing or consociationary democracy can be defined as body of ideas about a particular set of strategies (but not including coercion) for regulating conflicts that could arise from the art of governance in badly divided societies.

In ensuring it as a strategy for conflict, anticipation and regulation in power-sharing or consociationary democracy must avoid repetitions of some pitfalls inherent in democratizing post-conflict states. Primarily, when considering majoritarianism, a concept based on what is known as “first-past-the-post by constituencies” rather than on rather than on proportional representation; a political party system inclined either toward one-party rule or two-party structure than to a multi-party system; an organization political, dividing people, groups, regions and indeed country into the format of “government” versus “opposition”; a process of authoritative allocation emphasizing “*winner-takes-all.*” The foregoing can only exacerbate conflicts in a badly divided society. This is why as a tool of anticipating conflicts; Power-Sharing must avoid the above listed potholes. Adekanye (2007) presents the characteristics of Power-Sharing according to Lijpjhart:

- A mixed or shared rule in which governmental power is exercised by a Coalition of all significant segments, or an All National Government, what is today known as the Government of National Unity;
- A measure of Regional Autonomy for the constituent groups/segments, whose administrative structure may range from devolution and local self-rule, through decentralization to federalism and sometimes even confederalism;
- Principle of proportionality implying some arithmetical formula in the distribution of the stakes of “high politics” among segmented groups, including especially those about legislative representation, civil service jobs, composition of armed and security forces, allocation of budgetary and developmental resources and benefits;
- Minority veto or minority rights.

Elsewhere, Lijphart quoted in Adekanye (2007) describes power sharing as based on:

- Executive power sharing among the representatives of all significant groups;
- A high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it
- Proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds
- A minority veto on vital national issues.

A good example is the plan of Federal Government to form a Government of National Unity by the Administration of late Yar’adua can best be described as a well-thought out step in the right direction even though an assessment of its success may be too early to ascertain. See also, (Faleti, 2006; Zeeuw & Kumar and 2006Abrahamsen, 2000).

Also, the attempt to reflect the Federal character in all major appointments by the regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo can also be seen as reflective of Power-Sharing or Consociational Democracy, meant to anticipate and regulate conflicts amongst the various ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. In the context of early warning, it can be posited that the anticipation of conflict has a far reaching effects on early warning and early response.

Self Assessment Exercise

Briefly explain how consociational democracy has affected inter-group relations in Nigeria since 1999

4.0 Conclusion

Anticipation of conflicts can be very supportive of early warning, as a result, it cannot be wished away for early warning to achieve the desired results. The anticipation of conflict take the form of Power-Sharing or Consociational Democracy in badly divided societies and it can also regulate conflicts.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented some countries that were plunged into conflicts due to the failure or absence of conflict anticipation which has characterized some post Cold-War states in Africa. The applicability of Power-Sharing or Consociational Democracy as a conflict anticipation tool in post-conflict states was also discussed.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Define and discuss conflict anticipation with empirical examples.
 - 2a Define Power-sharing
 - 2b. Illustrate your understanding of the relationship between Power-Sharing and Conflict anticipation with examples from any African country.

7.0 References and Further Reading

- Abrahamsen, R. (2000). *Disciplining Democracy Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*. London. Zed Books.
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Unit 4: Definition of Early Warning

CONTENTS

Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Contents

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

As the main thrust of this course, this unit introduces you to different definitions and scholarly perspectives on the definition of early warning and its mechanisms. This will include the perspectives from Africa and Europe based on differing experiences.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to

- Define early warning from a broad perspective
- Differentiate early warning as a concept from other similar concepts and its importance.
- Know the key players, their roles and limitations

3.0 Main Contents

Recent events in Nigeria and its attendant destruction to lives and property that were influenced by various conflicts in many parts of the world further reiterate the fact that, the importance of early warning can not be over-emphasized. The twilight of the twentieth century was characterized by unprecedented pattern and frequency of intra-state conflicts in many countries. Besides causing avoidable deaths of an average of almost one million people on yearly basis, the cost of these armed conflicts in the

context of missed developmental opportunities has been colossal (Ball, 2002). Based on these facts, the concept of early warning assumes a topical position in the quest of preventing violent conflicts. In the subsequent paragraphs of this unit, some definitions of early warning especially as it relates to the prevention of violent conflicts are presented. This is largely adapted from practical scenarios that cut across Africa and Europe.

3.1 Conflict Early Warning Systems: Basic Features

According to Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller (2006) the “concept of early warning” was first developed during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance the capacity of predicting potential (ballistic) attacks.

At the level of United Nations System, early warning was introduced as an instrument to forecast natural disasters such as droughts earthquakes among others. Nowadays, early warning is employed to predict or respond to both natural disasters and violent conflicts. Thus, early warning efforts do not intend to suppress conflicts, but to respond to the trajectory of a conflict. The objective of conflict in early warning and crisis prevention initiatives in this sense is to prevent the use of violence.

In the current discourse on conflict early warning, a variety of different understandings and concepts are employed, sometimes leading to inconsistencies. The term “early warning” itself is often used to describe activities such as conflict analysis and monitoring, data analysis, risk assessment or advocacy, which are related to early warning, but do not represent early warning approaches in the strict sense. Furthermore, some conflict early warning systems work with only one of these tools, whereas others combine them.

In this context, **early warning** is understood as “a part of mechanism that helps us to size up threats of early crisis by reporting such promptly to the appropriate decision-makers to take action. Failure to respond appropriately to stem the tide of the crisis might brew bigger consequences to manage.” (Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller, 2006). The main

concern is to detect the signs of conflict escalation or dysfunctional conflicts in due time (early warning) in order to initiate preventive measures (early response, early action). The term **early warning system** will be used to describe an “initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both, (Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller, 2006).

As a corollary to early warning, the term **early action** has been coined to refer to either ‘preventive actions’ or ‘early response actions’. The term is not limited in its range. It covers processes of consultation, policy-making, planning, and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict. These processes include diplomatic/political, military/security, humanitarian and development/economic activity **early response** is a category of proactive and re-active measures to reduce tensions and block conflict escalation. It involves early action focus on early prevention and early action. It can also take place at the intra-state level, inter-state and multilateral level.

Conflict early warning systems differ with regard to types of conflicts, geographic coverage, institutional levels and composition of stakeholders involved:

Types of conflict: Intra-Communal Conflicts, Inter-Communal Conflicts, Ethnic Conflicts, Religious Conflicts, Border Conflicts, inter-State Conflicts.

Geographic Coverage of some conflict: Local, National, Sub-Regional, Continental Levels

Institutions charged to respond to early warning: Governmental/Military Level, Academic/ NGO level.

Composition of Stakeholders Involved: Conflict Actors, Conflict Mediators, Security Forces, Politicians, Desk Officers, Administrators, Civil Society Actors, Academia, Research Institutes, Media Private Sector, Interest Groups, International Organizations and Donors.

Based on the above it is discernible that early warning would manifest differently in different circumstances depending on the composition of the issues and actors in the emergent conflicts. There would be different expectations on how early warning systems should perform and what they should achieve. This means that conflict early warning systems, early warning services, comprehensive early warning networks and complex early warning mechanisms have very different tasks and objectives. Thus, any given system cannot achieve more than what it was specifically designed for. Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller (2006) present the objectives of conflict early warning:

Objectives

- To continuously monitor the development process of potentially violent conflicts;
- To serve as a neutral source of information;
- To analyze any given situation to define and detect trends for future development;
- To introduce information regarding conflict into the public domain to encourage discussion and awareness;
- To influence the course of conflicts to prevent or de-escalate violence.

Conflict early warning systems are designed to provide reliable information on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in a timely manner. The information is analyzed to create scenarios, anticipate most likely developments and to propose appropriate response options designed to prevent and/or limit violent conflicts. Not all conflict early warning systems include response actions as an integral part of the system. An effective conflict early warning system should allow to:

- Identify the causes of conflict
- Anticipate possible directions in providing strategic advice to decision-makers in the escalation of conflict in order to help mitigate it.

For these objectives to be achieved there is need for concerted efforts on the part of stake-holders including non-state actors. Rupesinghe and Khan (1999) quoted in

FEWER/International Alert (1999) revealed the absence of consensus on what constitutes “good” early warning practice for conflict. It suggests the combining of quantitative and qualitative approaches to early warning draw on multiple information sources and use insider and local knowledge for analytical purposes.

The richness and advantage of networks have been underscored by Rupesinghe et al. because they are the most effective and strategic system for early warning, in so far as they permit pooling different information sources (dynamic, local, structural), methods of analysis (quantitative and qualitative, local and international), and the overall sharing of the burden (resources, risk) of early warning.

Practical experiences of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response

(FEWER) confirm that when the above principles are observed, “early warning” puts focus on the following:

- (a) Conflict generating factors (e.g. arms, poverty, corruption, etc.);
- (b) Agenda of the conflicting parties (e.g. armed struggle, etc.);
- (c) Peace efforts (overt or covert and their effectiveness). The broad simplistic equation is one where: the above submission can be multiplied to give a clear picture of the trends. It is clear that although an understanding of these submissions can be derived from external sources as well as from required analysis in local knowledge.

The extent of a critical and objective analysis of the above may determine the quality of the conclusion of the early warning in any conflict setting. However, the effectiveness of an early warning system is measurable by the response it elicits. Also germane in the process of linking warning to response are frameworks which enable ownership of the analysis among stakeholders and catalyze relevant and concerted preventive action at a number of levels, by multiple actors and in multiple sectors. The analysis of the conflict must not ignore or undermine perspectives as it will set the basis for action that local communities eventually have to live with. It also needs to be owned by different actors who can impact on conflict and peace dynamics in a given region.

Self Assessment Exercise

In your own word discuss what constitutes early warning

4.0. Conclusion

The concept of early warning can not be ignored considering the negative impacts of violent conflicts which can be avoided most of the time. An effective early warning must be broad-based, scientific and based on local perspectives in order to generate prompt response.

5.0 Summary

This unit has clearly defined early warning from a wide range of perspective. It also cautions against the erroneous notion that early warning prevents the occurrences of conflict. What should be understood about the relevance of early warning is that, it informs and warns the people on actual conflict and emphasizes on method of preventing the degeneration of conflicts into dysfunctional ones.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

Critically assess the veracity of the statement that early warning prevents conflicts.

7.0 References and Further Reading

Keyserlingk, N.V and Kopfmuller, S. (2006) *Conflict Early Warning*

Systems Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning

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Module 2

Unit 1: Intelligence and Early Warning Systems

Unit 2: Instruments of Early Warning

Unit 3: Perspectives of Early Warning

Unit 4: Component of Early Warning

UNIT 1: TYPES OF EARLY WARNING

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Body

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

Having defined the term **early warning**, its objectives and other related terms in the previous module, this unit introduces you to different types of early warning. There are different types of early warning systems that will be presented in course of this study. But the classification will be based on the activities and response of the stakeholders to the emergent conflicts, goals and actors. This would be done by taking cognizance of the relationship between intelligence and early warning systems.

In view of this, the available records showing certain pattern of violent conflicts in Nigeria can best describe what is transpiring in Africa as a show of lack of effective and proactive structure for early warning system. Reasons for this often include the Westphalian notion of security that places emphasis on the security of states or regimes while human security that is inclusive of all is relegated to a secondary position. .

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Distinguish early warning from intelligence

3.0 Main Contents

It is a fact that no two conflicts can completely be the same and this is why early warning systems of conflicts would clearly be based on the emergent goals and actors involved. It posited that early warning should be a function of the emergent signs and available information on the parties in conflict.

According to Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller, (2006), while intelligence is characterized by secrecy, early warning systems are expected to be an open information system.

Intelligence report procedure

	Intelligence Services	Early Warning Systems
Approach	Interventionist	Facilitative
Method	Quantitative	Qualitative
Goal	Prediction	Anticipation
Formulation	Universal Laws	Context
Results	Universal Patterns	Dynamic
Concerns	Strategic Security	Human Security
Information Base	Secret	Transparent
Institutional Base	Centralized	Decentralized

Source: *H. Adelman, CEWARN Workshop, Nairobi 6th May 2001*

From the table above, the clear cut differences between intelligence and early warning have been presented in general terms. Much as the focus of both intelligence and early warning are similar, the operational focus of the two differs. In the next section of this unit, the types of early warning systems will be presented based on what the state and

non-state actors do in response to different types of conflicts. Two types of conflicts and their attendant early warning signs will be analysed. These are genocide (ethno-cide) and political violence or electoral violence. This is because they can be regarded as reflective of the common types of conflicts in Nigeria and many African countries.

In order to deepen our understanding and clarity of early warning signs of violent conflicts some types of early warning systems are presented below.

3.3 Signs and Indicators

According to Fusato (2003), one of the frameworks of early-warning puts the markers of early warning into two categories; signs and indicators. The indicators include data which when studied over time give insight into economic and political conditions. They are long-term in perspective and include quantitative and qualitative information such as crime rates among certain groups, trends in unemployment, negative attitudes, forms of expression and political association.

Signs are more sudden and irregular but point to fundamental changes in the situation of a country or the worsening of inter-group relations. They include sharp increases in violent crime, vandalism, protests, threats or rhetoric as well as upsurge in ethnically and religiously motivated attacks. Fusato, (2003) presents types or variables that can indicate early warning signs of conflict in the classification below:

Demographic:

- Sudden demographic changes and displacement of people
- Increasing territoriality of groups/peoples

Economic:

- Short-term and long-term changes in economic performance of a country or region
- Increase in poverty or inequality
- Rise in unemployment rate
- Economic shocks or financial crises

Policy Related

- Deliberate acts of government against a specific group or region
- Destruction or desecration of religious sites
- Active discrimination or legislation favoring one group over another
- Potentially destabilizing referendums or elections
- Government clampdown

Public Opinion or Social Factors:

- A rise in “societal” intolerance or prejudice
- An increase in numbers or demonstrations and rallies

External:

- Intervention or support on behalf of one of the parties/groups by an external actor
- “Diffusion” or “contagion” of ideologies or conflicts in neighbouring regions
- An influx of refugees from a conflict in a neighboring country.

Presented below is a table containing various early warning signs of domestic violence that are observable and appropriate steps to be taken in response.

Self Assessment Exercise

What is intelligence?

What is early warning?

4.0 Conclusion

Considering the different types of conflicts treated in this study to expose early-warning signs. For more understanding, we need to take a cursory look at the application of such concepts like security, human security and intelligence as core to this discussion in order to avoid conceptual confusion. A look at the different types of early warning signs of violent conflicts also underscores the reality of the concept while emphasizing the need to put in place effective systems of monitoring and prompt response. There are also early warning signs of domestic violence which are observable and assessable.

5.0 Summary

The unit showed the relatedness of the concepts; security, human security and intelligence with the concept of early warning. The range of difference between the concept of intelligence and early warning was also presented. The types of early warning signs were also presented in detail both in domestic and social contexts.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Discuss with tabular illustrations the difference between intelligence and early warning systems.

Define the following terms;

- Security
- Human security
- Intelligence
- Discuss the types of abusive relationships and the signs of domestic violence

7.0 References and Further Reading

Alkire, S. 2003. *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*. Oxford. Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE. Working Paper N0 : 2.

Fusato, M. (2003). *Preventive Diplomacy and International Violence Prevention*. www.beyondintractability.org . accessed on 16-8-09

www.helpguide.org, accessed on 20-08-09

Unit 2: Instruments of Early Warning

Contents

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Contents

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

We need to understand that early warning is measured by some events which happen within communal or national context. The instruments used in measuring the unfolding events play a very crucial role in the credibility of early warning reports. Therefore, we must know the procedures for compiling early warning reports in order to make them credible and acceptable to stakeholders. This is why this unit exposes you to some instruments of early warning in order to deepen your understanding of the course.

2.0 Objectives :

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

1. Know some types of early warning instruments
2. know the use of these instruments

3.0 Main Contents

The tool for assessing early warning comes in two ways. The first one is **collecting** and **analyzing** the data that might have been generated and regarded as signal of potential violent conflicts. The second stage is the **transmitting** the signal to political decision makers who are expected to take the necessary preventive action to forestall out-break violent conflicts. Some models or instruments used for these are presented below:

- **Correlational Models:** These types of instruments employ the use of regression to test the strength of a postulated set of causal links among variables. This model entails the use of post-dictate testing that rely on the use of information on development and events that occurred in the past amongst the parties in conflict. In the context of early warning the limitations to this instrument is in the fact that patterns of causal relations may change over-time, which makes the regular appraisal of fresh data imperative and complementary.
- **Diagnostic Model:** this another type of correlational model formulated to sequel to the escalation of communal or intra-national crises. The background conditions that constitute the structural factors that determine the nature of grievances and the demands of communal groups, especially inequalities that are perpetuated by discrimination and repression. Gurr (1994) asserts that some of these background conditions must be present “at a medium or high level” in order to define a group or community as having potentials of violent conflicts.
- **Sequential Models:** These are very apt for the tracking of the progression of conflicts over-time. The sequential models seek for the junctures at which third-party intervention can likely make the most significant difference.
- **Conjunctural Models:** These models propose alternative scenarios. The different combinations of situations that may lead to different (violent and non-violent) results.
- **Information & Communication Technology:** This entails the use of computers that serve as banks for the information garnered. It can also make use of software to facilitate the making of projections on the basis of available data. Such data banks can analyse the high volume of available raw materials in order to produce a consistent narrative and analytical descriptions of key variables for early warning indicators.

The analysis of instruments used by operational agencies involved in the preparation of internal, interpretive reports for policy makers with attention on the substance of the assessment and the necessity to prepare the report in a way that brings out available policy options within the constraints on the agency's capacity to respond. Based on empirical findings of risk assessment and early warning models reveals that cases of state failures of 243 cases between 1955 and 1994 were divided into four categories as ; revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides and politicizes and adverse or disruptive regime transitions . The phases of the projects and the focus of each of these phases are presented below based on the work of Schnabel, A and Krummenacher (1998):

Phase 1: This phase of the project compared these with 339 matched control cases, 617 variables were evaluated as potential structural indicators, leading to identification of 31 demographic/social, political, and economic/environmental variables that were significant discriminators of impending state failure at least two years in advance. The best overall risk assessment model (using regression and neural net analyses, and about 70% accurate) combined three of these variables:

- i. Openness to international trade (best measure of a country's integration into the global economy, requiring respect for international norms and rule of law);
- ii. Infant mortality (best measure of quality of life); and
- iii. Democracy (measuring the conflict inhibiting effects of democratic governance, requiring responsiveness to popular discontents).

More specific models were developed and tested for the three more common forms of state failure: ethnic war, regime collapse and genocide/politicide. Inclusion of variables for the ethnic character of the ruling elite and for the existence of a demographic "youth bulge" improved accuracy of the ethnic war model to 72-78%, and similar levels of accuracy have since been achieved using more detailed and theoretically grounded models for ethnic war, regime crises and genocide/politicide.

Phase 2: This phase of the project focused on the development and testing of dynamic early warning models to supplement the structural models. These “accelerator” models are designed for use with cases that have been identified as high risk using the structural models, to track events in order to anticipate when an unstable situation is likely to escalate to full-blown crisis (war, genocide or adverse regime transition) in the following months. These models each allow accurate anticipation of when a crisis will erupt six months in advance, about 78% of the time. The genocide/politicide model is now being tested real time as a project of the Genocide Early Warning Center. More detailed versions of the ethnic war and genocide/politicide models, both structural and dynamic, are available (Gurr, 2000), with guidelines for measuring each variable. These procedures and findings, and details of the yet unpublished regime transition model, should also be available internally to USAID from the State Failure Project.

The structural model for ethnic war, for example, includes factors reflecting group incentives for collective action (lost political autonomy, active political, economic or cultural discrimination); group capacity for collective action (strength of identity, militant mobilization); and opportunities for collective action (recent regime transition, support from kindred groups). In contrast, the structural model for genocide/politicide includes factors such as: history of the regime’s reliance on coercion, international economic status, exclusionary ideologies, lack of constraints on security agencies, elite (and target group) fragmentation, and economic hardship that leads to differential treatment of disadvantaged groups.

Researches have also been conducted to test risk assessment models for other conflict related crises such as refugee and IDP flows (Schmeidl, 1998; Onishi, 1998) and environmental conflicts (Baechler, 1998). The more specifically targeted 5 models should allow greater accuracy, but require greater investment to the degree that multiple models are needed to anticipate the full range potential crises.

4.0 Conclusion:

The models or instruments of early warning systems and signs are not static and this is why new models besides the ones in this unit can not be foreclosed. As presented in this unit, instruments and models of early warning provide useful insight into the progression of conflicts and help to identify junctures of interventions and external influences on the emergent conflicts. As students of peace studies and conflict resolution, your mastery of these instruments would greatly help in planning your early response.

5.0 Summary

The unit emphasized the indispensability of the instruments of early warning in a proper analysis of the early warning signs from an emergent conflict. It also presented different types of instruments used in the monitoring and evaluation of early warning signs.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Identify and apply the early warning models in this unit to any conflict of your choice.
- Attempt a phased analysis of any civil war using the indices used in this unit.

7.0 References and Further Reading

Gurr, T.R (1994) 'Conceptual, Research, and Policy Issues in Early Warning Research: An Overview.' *The Journal of Ethno-Development 4:1*, beyondintractability.org

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Unit 3: Perspectives of Early Warning

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

This unit pointedly takes you to the main focus of this course which is early warning signs of violent conflicts and humanitarian crises resulting from such conflicts. This will be done as clearly as possible in order to equip you with the needed skills in the practice of conflict handling and designing of programmes to forestall violent conflicts. This is why the presentation of early warning in this unit will be limited to its use in the field of peace studies and conflict resolution alone.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Know what early warning means in the field of peace studies and conflict resolution
- Have a broad view of the different perspectives on the concept of early warning

3.0 Main Contents

The concept of early warning could mean different things to different people because the term early warning is applicable in fields such as medicine, environmental management and forecasts of natural disasters. The use of early warning as a means of predicting future events is not a very new phenomenon. According to the

earlywarning.wordpress.com/page/2, the following predictions were made way back in December 1900 in an article entitled “What may Happen in the Next 100 Years” by Elfreth Watkins in *The Ladies Home Journal*:

- There will be No C, X or Q in our every-day alphabet. They will be abandoned because unnecessary. Spelling by sound will have been adopted.
- There will be no street cars within our large cities. All hurry traffic will be below or high above the ground.
- Photographs will be telegraphed from any distance. If there is a battle in China in a hundred years hence, snapshots of its most striking events will be published in the newspapers an hour later.
- There will be airships, but they will not successful compete with surface cars and water vessels but they will be maintained as deadly war vessels by all military nations.
- There will be no wild animals except in menageries. Rats and mice will have been exterminated. The horse will have become practically extinct.
- Man will see around the world. Persons and things of all kinds will be brought within focus of cameras connected electrically with screens at opposite ends of circuits, thousands of miles at a span. American audiences in their theatres will view upon huge curtains before them the coronations of kings in Europe or the progress of battles in the Orient. The instrument bringing these distant scenes to the very doors of people will be connected with a giant telephone apparatus transmitting each incidental sound in its appropriate place. Thus the guns of a distant battle will be heard to boom when seen to blaze, and thus the lips of a remote actor or singer will be heard to utter words or music when seen to move.
- Wireless telephone and telegraph circuits will span the world. A husband in the middle of the Atlantic will be able to converse with his wife sitting in her boudoir in Chicago. We will be able to telephone to China quite as readily as we now talk from New York to Brooklyn. By an automatic signal they will connect with any circuit in their locality without the intervention of a “hello girl”.
- A university education will be free to every man and woman. Several great national universities will have been established.

- Pneumatic tubes, instead of store wagons, will deliver packages and bundles. These tubes will collect, deliver and transport mail over certain distances, perhaps for hundreds of miles. They will at first connect with the private houses of the wealthy; then with all homes. Great business establishments will extend them to stations, similar to our branch post-offices of today, whence fast automobile vehicles will distribute purchases from house to house.

The above is an indication of the forecasting or prophetic angle of early warning. Early warning has been described as the “The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of:

- a) Anticipating the escalation of violent conflict;
- b) The development of strategic responses to these crises; and
- c) The presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making” (FEWER, 1997:1).

In the field of disaster management, early warning exists to warn of tsunamis, hurricanes and floods. Similarly, conflict early warning systems can be developed to help warn for civil war, state failure and inter-state conflict. From the foregoing, it implies that early warning is indispensable for operational conflict prevention. Operational prevention seeks to prevent, contain or reverse the escalation of violent conflict by deploying the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and/or incentives, and/or military force. Early warning is said to be a prerequisite for operational prevention.

In contrast, structural prevention seeks to reduce “the risk of violent conflict in countries or regions by transforming social, economic, cultural, or political sources of conflict. According to a contemporary definition, “early warning is the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as the UN Security Council) to a new (or renewed) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage. A more general definition describes early warning as the proactive engagement in the early stages of a potential conflict or crisis, to prevent or at least mitigate violent and deadly conflict. As in preventive medicine, the ultimate goal is not to create fewer clients (sick patients) but to work toward diminishing the need for

curative approaches (such as relief for humanitarian emergencies). We maintain that the success of early warning should not be measured by accurate warnings but rather by the prevention of armed conflict. Indeed, as the sociologist Auguste Comte concluded over 200 years ago, “knowing to predict, predict to prevent.”

The concept can be described in other ways. Some scholars have identified a similarity between the concept of early warning and preventive diplomacy. This is because of the similarity in the objectives of the two which is the prevention of massive hostilities. Others consider the early warning as concerned with the early detection of developments that may result in the manifest expression of violence, just like preventive diplomacy. It is a specific aspect of the more general concept of conflict prevention that refers to situations in which conflicting goals are controlled in order to avoid the outburst of hostilities, (Rupesinghe, 1994). Based on this, early warning can be described as aimed at the prevention of any form of violent conflict.

4.0 Conclusion

The unit presented different perspectives of early warning. The unit also showed the theoretical and practical link between early warning and preventive diplomacy. It is clear that early warning seeks to prevent the break-out of violence just like preventive diplomacy.

Self Assessment Exercise

Discuss briefly what you understand as preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention at both local and international levels.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented different perspectives of early warning and showed the similarities between early warning and preventive diplomacy.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- According to this unit differentiate clearly the between structural prevention of conflicts and early warning.

7.0 References and Further Reading

Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (1997), fewer.org. accessed on 10-09-2009

Rupesinghe, K. (1994) 'Introduction'. In: *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, Kumar Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda, (Eds). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Watkins, E. www.yorktownhistory.org/homepages/1900_predictions.htm

Unit 4: Gender Perspective on Early Warning

Contents

1.0 : Introduction

2.0 : Objectives

3.0 : Main Contents

4.0 : Conclusion

5.0 : Summary

6.0 : Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 : References and Further Reading

1.0 : Introduction

The end of the Cold-War remains a watershed in human history for a lot of reasons. In our context as students of peace studies and conflict resolution we are concerned about how it has affected the pattern and intensity of conflicts on one hand, and how it has also introduced new approaches of handling conflicts at both the intra-state and inter-state levels.

One of the features of the post-Cold War era has been the increased attention given to the concept of gender targeted towards the enhancement of the role of women in decision making and elimination of all forms of gender based violence. This has been yielding results though not without its critics. The goal of this unit is to try to balance the perspectives on early warning by examining the effect of conflict on female gender perceived as weaker vessels in order to broaden your understanding and aid your practice.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to :

1. Know that there are gender perspectives on the concept of early warning
2. Become familiar with some of these perspectives
3. Have a broader view of perspectives on early warning

3.0 Main Contents

The notion of working to prevent conflicts at the initial level which was declared by the United Nations brought about the use of different approaches and more stakeholders expressing diverse opinions on how to stem the tide of violent conflicts around the world. According to Hill (2003), the United Nations was conceived by a war-torn generation convinced that conflict could be prevented by providing a venue where political developments would be routinely monitored, debated and acted upon, the founders of the United Nations projected that early warning signs would be heeded to prevent conflict. When the Security Council first debated its role in the prevention of armed conflict in November 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the International community to move ‘from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.’ Two years later, the Secretary-General issued a comprehensive report on conflict prevention that underscored the importance of early warning and gender equality.

Hill (2003) reveals that the Carnegie Commission Report on ‘Preventing Deadly Conflict’ in 1999 brought together eminent persons from a wide range of expertise. Their final document and the numerous papers and events that contributed toward it, created the foundation for the renewed contemporary focus on conflict prevention. The concepts of operational (immediate) and structural (root causes) prevention elaborated in this document have informed subsequent debates and it remains a key text in this field.

Furthermore, Hill (2003) in a review of selected articles sums up reasons why gender should be considered in early warning and conflict prevention. This is because incorporating gender-sensitive indicators into information collection and subsequent analysis allows for previously overlooked signs of instability to be taken into account and focus at early warning at the grassroots level. It is ideal anticipating for conflict before it spreads to high politics. Also, incorporating gender analysis and perspective into the formulation of response options ensures discriminatory policies are not perpetuated in post-

conflict situation, or new found freedoms reversed. It also ensures that response at a political and humanitarian level address the vulnerabilities specific to women and men".

Engendering early warning is not only concerned with including women into early warning system, but on gender mainstreaming or sensitizing the entire process through the training of both men and women on how to use gender analysis to fine-tune early warning and allow for a more appropriate and diverse range of response options equally benefiting both men and women, giving suggestions on engendering early warning and include these steps: collection of information, analysis of risk, formulation of best and worst case scenarios and response options, and communications to decision-makers. When considering the collection of information there are two points to consider: developing gender-sensitive indicators to allow for 'earlier' early warning and collecting gender-sensitive information through incorporating and consulting women and women's organizations. Compared to traditional approaches, gender analysis elicits different question about the causes and effects of conflict on different sectors within society, and their particular relationships and roles with each other.

On early warning, a variety of different types of indicators focus on systemic, proximate, facilitating and triggering factors. While these are important to consider, there is suggestion that new gender-sensitive indicators should be further developed and that data should be gender disaggregated. An example of a gender-sensitive indicator is examining the level of women's participation in the labour force. This could be used to interpret the extent to which women are integrated into the public sphere. It has been shown that the percentage of women in the labour force showed statistical significance in explaining state bellicosity [likelihood in being involved in violent conflict]. Increasing the proportion of women in the labour force by 5 percent for example, renders a state nearly five (4.95) time less likely to use military force to resolve international conflicts. This in turn will enhance the chances of a more peaceful world. Examples of gender-based early warning indicators include:

- Sex-specific refugee migrations;
- Sex-specific unemployment;
- Increase in single female-headed households;
- Upsurge in acquisition, transportation, concealment and training in weapons by men, women and children;
- Propaganda emphasizing and encouraging militarized masculinity (often in defence of a violated or threatened femininity);
- Crime reports and eye-witness accounts of women about the types of weapons being used;
- Making a scapegoat of women, accusing them of political or cultural betrayal;
- Disruption of women's cross-border trade activity;
- Engagement of women in a shadow war economy;
- Resistance to women's participation in peace processes and negotiations;
- Lack of presence of women in civil society organizations; and
- Growth of fundamentalism

In order to analyze the full potential of Security Council Resolution 1325 and to survey women affected by conflict, UNIFEM appointed two Independent Experts to travel the world's war zones. Elisabeth Rehn of Finland and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia generated a 10 chapter book which reviewed existing knowledge and offered 64 recommendations which was launched on 31 October 2002, the second anniversary of the passage of Resolution 1325. The Experts summarized the gender components of early warning as including:

- propaganda emphasizing hyper-masculinity
- media scapegoating of women accusing them of political or cultural betrayal
- sex-specific refugee migrations
- engagement of women in a shadow war economy

- sex-specific unemployment
- resistance to women's participation in peace processes and negotiations
- lack of presence of women in civil society organizations
- growth of fundamentalism
- increase in single female-headed households

Citing stories they were told by women about weapons accumulation and foreknowledge of actual attacks, the Independent Experts concur with Piza-Lopes and Schmiedl's finding that assessing the affects of conflict on women provides new information that may lead to fresh analysis and response options. While practitioners in the field emphasise the need for accurate and timely information, the experts posited that this perspective overlooks a rich source of information that is not being utilized. They discovered in their meetings with conflict-affected women that they spontaneously describe and refer to early warning indicators, which differ from country to country. Listening to women in these zones would be of enormous advantage to those collecting and analyzing information, according to the Experts, who recommended that the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) develop and test gender based early warning indicators in field based pilots.

UNIFEM has started implementing this recommendation, pursuing a collaborative approach to developing common indicators for early warning, taking into account women and gender issues in partnership with the UN system, especially UN Funds and Programmes and with NGOs, regional and sub regional organizations. The first step, developing a set of gender-based early warning indicators for testing in three field-based pilots, has required adapting conflict analysis tools—including situation profiles, analysis of the causes, actors and potential scenarios of the conflict—that have been traditionally gender blind. The organization has generated lists of gender-specific characteristics of conflict including signs forthcoming in the latent-formation of conflict, as well as the stage of

escalating tension, or low or high intensity violence. The obvious indicators relate to the feminisation of poverty and the increased economic burden placed on women during conflict, increases in forced or voluntary prostitution, the decline in women's access to health, education, employment, credit and land.

Self Assessment Exercise

Why and how do you think a gender perspective should be a plank of early warning ?

4.0 Conclusion

There has emerged a very strong advocacy for the mainstreaming of gender analysis into the processes of collating, analyzing and communicating early warning signs to policy makers. This has received attention and support from many institutions such as the United Nations because it has huge potentials for the prevention of violent conflicts and for the protection of the weak and vulnerable groups. Flowing from the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325, it can be said that significant progress has been made in this direction.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented a chronology of arguments that reinforce the need to ensure that a gender perspective is incorporated into every stage of the early warning processes. This is supported by convincing scholarly assertions that reveal the potentials of such not only for men but for men as well. There were filed reports that lend credence to the assertion that a gender bias against women actually exists and this does not help the conflict prevention posture of the United Nations. It also brought to the fore, the different activities of UNIFEM in knowing the extent of women marginalization in the early warning process.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Can we actually posit that conflict prevention is cheaper than conflict management? Does gender play any role in either of the two?

2. Can gender mainstreaming support early warning ?
3. Do women have role in the early warning process?

7.0 References and Further Reading

Hill, F. (2003) *The Illusive Role of Women in Early Warning and Conflict Prevention*. www.unifem.org (accessed on 20-09-2009).

Woroniuk, B. (2002) *Women-Peace and Security gender and early warning*. woroniuk@magma.ca. accessed on (18-09-2009)

Cathcart, D. *References on Early Warning Peace and Security*, (accessed on 19-09-2009)
Gender and Disarmament <http://disarmament2.un.org:8080/gender.htm> Page of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs that contains general information on disarmament and gender, links to the Briefing Notes and description of the department's activities on this topic.

International Alert, Women Building Peace <http://www.international-alert.org/women/new2.html> Project working to place the issues of women, peace and security firmly onto the international agenda; site includes case studies on women's experiences in peace-building, and publications such as *Mainstreaming Gender in Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action*.

The Men's Bibliography <http://www.xyonline.net/mensbiblio/#fairuse>

A searchable bibliography of writing on men, masculinities, gender and sexualities.

Peace Women <http://www.peacewomen.org>

The PeaceWomen Project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom monitors and works toward rapid and full implementation of United Nations Security Council

Module 3

Unit 1: Agencies and Institutions of Early Warning

Unit 2: Analytical Framework for Monitoring Early Warning

Unit 3: Conflict Analysis in the Context of Early Warning

Unit 4: Early warning and Conflict Prevention

Unit 1: Early Warning Monitoring Agencies

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

The need to make early warning effective in all ramifications has made it necessary for non-state actors to be involved in the monitoring of early warning. This is also informed by the fact that some state actors are principal culprits in the (1)violation of human rights (2) political insecurity, and (3)the economic woes of their countries through pervasive corruption, acts of injustice and socio-economic and political discrimination. In as much as early warning is about the early detection and prevention of violent conflicts, it can be said that prior to the presence of colonialists on the African soil there had been institutions performing the functions similar to the cardinal objectives of early warning. Also, the advent of western-styled system of government has given further room to the creation of agencies to perform such functions. However, the performance of these

agencies can be a subject of dispute amongst policy makers, academics and members of the civil society.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

1. know the agencies responsible for gathering early warning and communicating to the appropriate quarters;
2. the role of non-governmental institutions and organizations in collating and communicating early warning signs

3.0 Main Contents

The focus of this unit will be on some agencies and institutions with the responsibility of detecting and communicating early warning signs of violent conflicts to the appropriate quarters for the right responses to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts in Nigeria. The focus on this unit will be on the State Security Service (SSS), the Police, the traditional institutions, the press and the NGOs.

The SSS: according to the mandate of the organization that was established on the 5th of June 1986 subsequent upon the dissolution of the National Security Service (NSO), its mission is to protect and defend the Federal Republic of Nigeria against domestic threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of Nigeria, to provide leadership and criminal justice services to both federal and state law-enforcement organs. The SSS is also charged with the protection of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, State Governors, their immediate families, other high ranking government officials, past presidents and their spouses, certain candidates for the offices of President and Vice President, and visiting foreign heads of state and government. Although, what the SSS does could as well be described as intelligence, it still falls within the precincts of early warning because it is with the intention of preventing the outbreak of violence within the country. For instance prior to the unleashing of terror in certain parts of

northern Nigeria, the SSS had compiled intelligence on the notorious religious sect which could as well have passed as the compilation and communication early warning signs of conflicts. According to several newspapers reports in the wake of the Boko-Haram violence in some northern states of Nigeria the State Security Service, SSS had uncovered Boko Haram as a ‘deadly religious group’ since December 2006 and submitted a comprehensive report to the Presidency in 2007. “The truth is that the SSS had in the last two years discovered the Boko Haram sect. One of the findings of the service was the fact that many of their members trained in Algeria” a highly-placed source told our correspondent. “They have link with a guerilla group in Algeria called GSPC (otherwise called Jamatul Salafia), which is based in the desert in Algeria. One Khalid Barnawi, an Algerian is identified as the sponsor of the sect in the country.

The Press: historically the Nigerian press has a very vocal and conspicuous organ of the civil society persistently opposed to all forms of oppression, exclusion and marginalisation of the weak or dominated in the society. Similarly, in the context of collation and communicating early warning signs to the government and sometimes to the public, the fourth realm of the state in Nigeria has been up and doing. It is remarkable that the press in fulfilling their social responsibilities have not limited their early warning compilation to violent conflicts alone. This is because of the way they call attention to impending and often avoidable disasters touching on politics, environment and crime. As stated above the dastard activities of the Boko-Haram had earlier been reported by certain sections of the Nigerian press without any follow up action by the relevant agencies. Besides the cited instance, the Nigerian press has been alive in reporting the likelihood of electoral violence during election periods. (see references section at the end of this unit for some of these instances)

The Police: The Nigerian police since 1999 have been playing an active role in the prevention of violence in many communities across the country. However, in some

instances they have also been part of the problem. Nonetheless, it can not be ignored that the institution is being repositioned to be closer to the community. This is evidenced in the adoption of the Community-Policing initiative which according to findings is not limited to the prevention of crimes alone. It is not uncommon to see the police now playing meditative roles in matters of potential violence in communities across the country as part of the Community-Policing initiative.

Traditional Institutions: As an integral part of the socio-political life of that has endured since the colonial invasion of the continent, traditional institutions occupy a strategic role in the maintenance of peace and security in many African societies including Nigeria. This is because they serve as the link between their communities and elected officials of the State. Their early warning activities can be best appreciated in the context of conflict prevention. In many communities they play both meditative and adjudicative roles in communal disputes in order to prevent these issues from leading to break down of law and order in their communities. However, many of these noble activities go unnoticed or recorded. According to an official of the State Security Service (SSS) working in local government in one of the southwestern states of Nigeria, there have been many effective interventions by the traditional ruler in his area of operation that prevented issues that could have snowballed into destructive conflicts. See (Nwolise, 2006 and Olaoba 2006).

Civil Society/NGOS: One of the many features of the post Cold-War world has been the proliferation and interactions between NGOs as organs of civil society across the world. Although, they now feature virtually in all spheres of public endeavours, our concern is their activities relating to the compilation and dissemination of early warning signals of violent conflicts. In this context we also have international Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). Well known in this category is the Médecins Sans Frontières which created in 1971. According to information available on its website, it was initiated

by a small group of French doctors shortly after the Nigerian Civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970.

They believed that all people have the right to medical care regardless of race, religion, creed or political affiliation, and that the needs of these people supersede respect for national borders. The organization is known in most of the world by its French name or simply as *MSF*, but in the United States, Canada, Australia and Ireland the name 'Doctors Without Borders' is often used instead. The organization has earned reputation in its humanitarian activities in war-torn countries and developing countries combating endemic diseases. Others INGOs include the International Crisis Group (ICG), Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), International Alert (IA) and many others. Within the country, a number INGOs and NGOs operate. Some of these include the Academic Associates for Peace Works (AAPW) and the Conflict Resolution Network (CRESNET) just to mention a few.

Self Assessment Exercise

In your own opinion how would rate the performance of institutions involved in early warning presented in this unit.?

4.0: Conclusion

This unit has provided you with different addresses of agencies that are involved in monitoring early warning signs of violent conflicts, wars and other humanitarian emergencies. These addresses point to the fact that the world is realizing that conflict prevention is indeed cheaper and strategic than conflict management or resolution. Therefore, it is advisable that you visit some of these sites to enrich your knowledge.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented addresses of agencies committed to the monitoring of early warning signs around the world. Also, it contains a detailed list of conflict prevention terms.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1.0 From your study of this unit, can it be emphatically said that the world has become a global village?

2.0 Can access to internet aid peace studies? Discuss based on what you have studied in this unit.

7.0 References and Further Reading

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Unit 2: Analytical Frameworks for Monitoring Early Warning

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

The task of monitoring early warning is a very challenging, arduous and delicate one. This is because of the fact that a lot of emergent conflicts are sometimes amorphous which makes them difficult to track. As a result of this, it becomes imperative to have in place, frameworks that will make the monitoring of early warning signs systematic, credible, reliable and communicable. As students of peace studies and conflict resolution, familiarity and use of some of these frameworks will sharpen your skills and enhance your capacity to convert knowledge into action when the need arises. In this unit, besides the presentation of different models and mechanisms for monitoring early warning, addresses of the websites of some institutions committed to the development of models and monitoring early warning signs. The main contents of the this unit will emphasize the need to develop analytical framework for the analysis of early warning signs in order to ensure that accurate steps are taken in the bid to ensure that escalation of conflict is prevented.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Know what constitutes a framework for monitoring early warning
- Different types of frameworks for monitoring early warning

- How to design frameworks for early warning
- Why early warning systems have to be monitored.

3.0: Main Contents

‘Early warning systems’ for the prevention of violent conflict are recent innovations compared with their application in other fields (Krumenacher et al 2001). The foundation of such systems dates back to the 1950s and lies in intelligence and military reconnaissance. In a second phase, early warning systems were established in the fields of natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, gross human rights violations, the spread of diseases and economic crises. Since the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has undertaken efforts to forecast political-humanitarian crises. Within the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, several early warning projects led to the establishment of a ‘Humanitarian Early Warning System’ in the context of which ReliefWeb and the Integrated Regional Information Network were established, (Wulf and Debiel 2009).

The concept of early warning system for monitoring signs that posed threats to peace and security was conceived basically to prevent the escalation of potentially violent conflicts. Wulf and Debiel (2009) inform that there are broadly quantitative and qualitative frameworks at the UN level but with limited efficiency largely due to bureaucratic constraints hindering the activities of the agencies, departments and the UN Security Council. The spate of violent conflict has also compelled the other regional bodies to come up with organs charged with the responsibility of designing early warning systems. One of such models is the Political Instability Task Force. According to Marshall (2008) the models applied by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) meanwhile claim to have a predictive capacity of between 80 and 90 percent. Secondly, several regional organizations, especially in Africa, have engaged in establishing EWR mechanisms, partly on the insistence and with the assistance of donor organisations, while others, especially in Asia, have abstained from such commitments. However, a problem arises since all too often

early warning systems do not result in early preventive action. This is why an analysis of some frameworks for the monitoring of early warning signs can be very useful. This will help in evaluating the extent to which early warning frameworks have been effective.

This is why a revisit to the concept of early warning is apposite. From an academic perspective, Austin (2004) defined an early warning system as: ‘any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both.’ (Austin 2004). Within early warning, three components can be differentiated:

- ‘(1) Estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats,
- (2) Analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and
- (3) Communicating warning analyses to decision makers.’

In this unit, early warning systems or mechanisms are taken as parts of a grand plan for crisis prevention which Adelman (2008) argued that:

‘Early Warning is intended to detect rising tensions headed towards violent conflict and, therefore, is complementary to conflict prevention when it focuses on tensions that are already rising but has little to do with preventing tensions from rising at all. Early Warning does include not only the gathering of data but the analysis of that data to develop strategic options for response but does not include the responses themselves which come under conflict prevention.’

The quotation above makes a clear distinction between early warning and conflict prevention. The succinct point being made is that early warning can not prevent the generation of tension but it is meant to detect these tensions, suggest possible workable responses and communicate these to the appropriate quarters. Some common types of early

warning systems are the qualitative and quantitative methods. At this juncture, there is need to define and differentiate between qualitative and quantitative types of early warning systems.

3.1 Qualitative Analysis

As stated above, qualitative analysis is necessary for maintaining a context-specific understanding of countries monitored and for anticipating even minor changes that can be initiated by local, regional, and international actors. The features of qualitative according to the FAST analysts are enhanced by the following set of supportive tools:

Constant Monitoring of Events and Developments

Aside from tracking relevant literature and secondary sources for analytical purposes, it is essential to stay abreast of developments in the countries under observation through daily monitoring of events and developments based upon information from various news agencies or gained from the "local information network" (detailed description follows). Early warning, and thus monitoring of countries, needs to be a constant and on-going process. Crises can emerge seemingly out of nowhere, which means that *ad-hoc* analyses may miss crucial developments at a conflict's early stages. Jongman (2000), for example, in a study showed that five of the conflicts classified as low-intensity conflicts escalated into high-intensity-conflicts within the past year. These are Chechnya, East-Timor, Kashmir, Kosovo, and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Notably the *coup d'etat* in Fiji during May 2000 was not predicted by the world community, as nobody paid very close attention to this small island. The foregoing shows that detailed monitoring of events in countries that are under observation must be uninterrupted.

Local Information Network

In areas poorly covered by international news media, FAST uses local information networks where indigenous analysts track and report relevant information on a specific set of indicators that feeds into graphs called tension barometers (this aspect is discussed in more detail in the quantitative section). However, the local networks also provide a

different way of interpreting events and thus also function as external advisors or experts in the context of the FAST team of analysts.

Expert Network

Frequent exchange with external experts (from both the target region and other internationally renowned individuals) is a crucial part for the FAST analysis in order to discuss information received, analytical insight, case scenarios, and response options. This leads to synergy between local understanding and outside expertise and results into a very nuanced analysis. The practice of balancing internal assessment with outside opinions helps FAST counter the problem of "mental blindness" that traps many analysts and is considered a major obstacle of early warning. Aside from psychological reasons or even fears, "mental blindness" can also be caused by political considerations or fear of failure. It could also mean the fear of being relegated in social reckoning or relevance. "Because policy choices in a crisis are often so difficult to make, individuals (as well as small policymaking groups and organizations) may discredit information that calls into question existing expectations, preferences, or policies" (Lundin, : N.D).

Fact-Finding Missions

In order to obtain hands-on-knowledge, assess the situation on the ground, and make contact with local analysts, FAST analysts travel once a year to the region they cover. These fact-finding missions are of particular importance in countries with difficult outside access by international news media (*e.g.*, Kashmir in Pakistan, Northeast India) and countries with a potentially one-sided view by Western news media (*e.g.*, Afghanistan). In addition, visits to the clients' local projects allow for a better formulation of targeted response options. This prevents the preparation of biased or jaundiced views.

3.2 Quantitative Analysis

This basically entails the collation of data on events in the identified countries or violent conflict spots in cases of domestic or intra-national crises. This can be very useful

as a complementary tool for the qualitative analysis. The FAST team of analysts make use of what it refers to as; **Automated Event Data Analysis**. This system is supportive for early warning due to its consistency, transparency, speed, and interactivity. Automated event analysis gives timely evaluation of information that is extremely important for early warning purposes.

The basic logic of event-data analysis is that all relevant events are codified by identifying the initiator and recipient of action, the action itself, and the time and scope of action. Each action is equal to a specific event-type (indicator), and in this is assigned a numeric value. By aggregating all relevant events on a weekly or monthly basis, there can be an accurate picture of overall conflict potential or stability in a given country. The advantages of event-data analyses (especially for early warning) are presented below:

- Event data allows speedy tracking of specific violent or cooperative incidences over time and supports qualitative assessments.
- A multitude of information is broken down in its component parts and depicted in easy-to-read graphs, demonstrating aspects of conflict and cooperation within and between countries.
- Event data counts and respective graphs provide checks –and balances against desensitization toward violence and/or media hypes.
- "Event-data analysis challenges the analyst's perception so that he or she might become aware of his or her own 'blind spots', biases, and assumptions" (Krummenacher and Schmeidl 2001:110). This is another way to counter the problem of "mental blindness" discussed earlier.
- Event data graphs permit comparison among countries.
- Event data analysis, if further developed, enables forecasting conflict trends.

Currently, event data is provided for FAST by an automated coding method developed by Virtual Research Associates (VRA®), a Harvard-based group of academic analysts (see Bond, Bond, Silva, and Oh, 1999 for a more detailed description). There is a

multiple set of individual events depicting conflict and cooperative behavior within and between countries. These events feed into tension barometers as raw data but also as composite measures. A summary of some of the graphs currently used by FAST are listed here:

- **Cooperation**: captures various forms of accommodative or cooperative behavior between diverse domestic or international actors. Such behavior can vary from verbal agreements, meetings to specify joint efforts, or operations to promote mutual benefits between domestic actors.
- **Conflict**: captures contentious or conflictive interactions (*e.g.*, antagonism, contradictory action, or disagreement) between diverse domestic or international actors. The type of conflict can vary from verbal antagonism, disagreements, or contradictory action to outright physical exchanges of hostilities. Automated monitoring of events (social, political, and economic) has emerged over the last decade as a viable approach to early warning, spurred in large part by pioneering efforts of the Kansas Events Data System or KEDS (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994).
- **Conflict Carrying Capacity (CCC)**: reflects the stability of the system or polity rather than a particular regime or administration.
- **Forceful Action (FA)**: refers to the proportion of any and all uses of physical force and any associated manifest violence by any actor

However, the automated data currently generated by VRA using Reuters ® news service has certain draw-backs, the major one being lack of satisfactory coverage in all the world's countries due to the following reasons (for more detail, see Wulf and Debiel 2009):

- The VRA parser can only read English-language news wires at present.
- **Event-data analysis** is based on the principle of daily logging, news dispatches often tend to be based on the principle of interval reporting. The intensity of coverage may increase as a crisis occurs ("blood sells") but is weak or non-existent during more peaceful times (thus not all important events leading up to conflict escalation may be Reported.

• **International journalism** is based on the principles of covering events believed to be of general interest to the rest of the world (not all countries and regions are). As a guiding principle, Reuters only needs to report those events with a greater connotation at the national level. Yet this eliminates possible important events at a district or provincial level that can also be of importance – especially since early warning tries to track those tensions that could escalate later. In light of these constraints, the event-data principle of no report meaning no event does not hold true in countries or regions of lesser interest to (English-speaking) news-services. It may simply mean that no English-speaking journalist was present or that on-going events were deemed to be of no particular international interest or importance. This was to some degree the downfall in Rwanda, as journalists focused on South Africa and only reported about Rwanda on the side (for more detail, see Schmeidl and Bond, 2000). It follows that the sole use of news-service coding provides clear drawbacks for early warning requirements. Thus event-data analysis will remain a supportive element for early-warning efforts for a long time at best.

FAST had to tackle precisely these problems, as many countries its monitors are not covered sufficiently by Reuters. Central Asia, for example, is covered well by media in the Russian language, but this would require analysts (or machines) to read Russian. Similarly other language news-wires (French, Portuguese) may be more relevant for certain parts of Africa than English ones are. Thus the English-language requirement for the current VRA parser is clearly something event-data analysis can improve upon. However, other language news sources may nevertheless adhere to the same principle of English-language news – "blood sells" – so it might be difficult to overcome this particular problem of sensational information production in general; unless one uses other input than news services.

Hence FAST chose a second option to improve upon Reuters' data feed. In collaboration with VRA, it created an alternative news feed in the form of local information networks of field-monitors that log relevant information after the same

principles as the VRA parser (to allow for compatibility of data). Currently all Central Asian countries monitored have such a network, and Pakistan has just reduced its news feed to two underreported provinces. Networks are also being currently set up in Mozambique and Madagascar, and a proxy network for Afghanistan is being implemented from Pakistan (using refugees, other migrants, and traders as sources).

This system's experience has shown better coverage overall in numerical terms as well as diversity of events reported. For example, the local information network for Uzbekistan logged 53, 126, and 196 events for the months of March, April, and May 2001 respectively. By contrast, Reuters only logged 9, 5, and 4 events respectively, making efforts of statistical analysis obsolete.

In light of the above, while human-assisted field coding clearly allows use of local expertise (and also provides the aspect of capacity building), automatic coding improves upon the speed of digesting information and allows impartial assessment, as the machine does not make interpretations beyond indicators it has been programmed to track. A combination of both allows for optimum data-feed. Thus event-data generation based on a local information network seem an excellent solution to the early-warning information problem, one that needs to be further strengthened. However, it does not solve all analytical problems linked to forecasting conflict escalation or de-escalation processes. These are some challenges that must still be met before FAST can place greater reliance on event-data analysis for its assessments and use tension barometers to their maximum potential. Other types of mechanisms for monitoring early warning systems are:

- ***Operational prevention*** – short-term efforts using political or military means to prevent a conflict or forestall escalating violence;
- ***Structural prevention*** – efforts through developmental or economic tools to address the root causes of conflict, aiming at risk reduction and to call for better regulatory frameworks; Leiden University's Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) tried to build up a mapping of Gross Human Rights

Violations (GHRV) with the potential for an early warning system in the 1990s, but this project has not been continued. New data related to GHRV are being provided by the Human Security Report, but do not claim to have predictive qualities.

- *Systemic prevention* – tries to reduce conflict on a global basis and goes beyond mechanisms focused on any particular state (Marshall, 2008).

Structural and systemic prevention both target underlying causes of conflict with a mid- to long-term perspective. However, they could be inadequate in an upcoming or even acute crisis that requires early action.

4.0 Conclusion.

The framework for monitoring early warning systems of violent conflict is a device meant to complement preventive diplomacy by offering the necessary pieces of advice to the right quarters so that the right steps can be taken to nip emergent conflicts in the bud. There are various means of doing this and some of them have been presented in this unit. The unit has also shown that these frameworks can be complementary. For example, the quantitative and qualitative frameworks discussed in the unit can serve complementary purposes because one can guide the other towards making an objective and informed decision.

5.0 Summary

The unit identified different frameworks for monitoring early warning signs at both domestic and international contexts of violent conflicts. Some frameworks were also presented. Qualitative and quantitative frameworks for monitoring early warning signs of violent conflicts were also presented.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- What are the features of the qualitative framework of monitoring early warnings of violent conflicts studied in this unit?
- Discuss the limitations of international journalism as a framework for monitoring early warning signs of violent conflicts.

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Unit 3: Conflict Analysis in the Context of Early Warning

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Conte

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

The analysis of conflict is very crucial for any meaningful and successful intervention to take place. This is because the analysis of the conflict just like a medical diagnosis determines the type of therapy to be applied and in this case the kind of suggestions to the appropriate quarters by the agency monitoring the early warning signs of conflict. Though, there are many types of conflict analysis and various tools for carrying it out, conflict analysis will be presented in its relatedness to the discerning of early warning signs based on emergent trends in relationships between or amongst parties in dispute in this unit. Please bear in mind the types of models or frameworks such as qualitative and quantitative models for analyzing early warning signs of violent conflicts in the previous unit because they are going to be useful in this unit.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Know the link between conflict analysis and early warning
- Know how conflict analysis aids early warning
- The different objectives of conflict analysis
- What constitutes conflict analysis

3.0 Main Contents

The expression; conflict analysis ordinarily elicits certain impressions. The main impression given is that there is a conflict. The conflict may however be an emergent one or a full blown one. In another context, it may be ripe or unripe for intervention or resolution. The analysis of conflict in the context of early warning is however specific and contextualized as the analysis of conflict for the prevention of violence.

At this juncture it is necessary to ask ourselves why we need to embark on conflict analysis. Reasons for conducting conflict analysis include but may not be limited to the following. Conflict analysis helps us to:

- Understand the background or history of the conflict
- Understand the history of the relationship of the actors
- Identify the primary and shadow parties involved in the conflict
- The interests, needs and positions of the parties involved
- Have an insight into the perception of the parties about the conflict and themselves
- Understand the progression of the conflict in order to determine the mode and means of intervention.

From the above it can be posited that analysis of conflict helps us to comprehend the multi-faceted, multi-layered, multi-dimensional nature of conflict. Without analysis our response can become counter productive exacerbating instead of mitigating violent expression of conflict. The lack of understanding and evidence based analysis involving local actors has caused outside actors to erroneously define conflicts and promote the wrong strategies. This phenomenon of bad responses is common place. States, experts, humanitarian, development, peace building, and human rights organizations are all guilty of intervening in conflicts on the bases of no, poor or hasty analysis. The benefits of good analysis cannot be overemphasized. We proceed by providing a framework for conflict analysis based on the following sub-themes.

PEOPLE OR STAKEHOLDERS

- The life and dynamics of conflict depend on the emotions, personalities, perceptions, culture, interests or agendas, and relative influence of the people in the conflict.
- Stakeholders can be primary, secondary, or interested.

CORE PROBLEM OR ISSUE

- The contending issue that results in the clash between the people. It is often multi-dimensional. By resolving one part does not necessary end the conflict.
- Problem sometimes has root causes. It is important to understand all the dimensions and sources of the conflict.
- Problem is dynamic. It changes or multiplies or decreases during the life of the conflict

PROCESS

- Process is how the parties are responding to the conflict
- There are two main responses though they are expressed in several forms—violence and nonviolence
- Process also changes overtime; either violence intensifies or the parties see reason and turn to nonviolent means.
- Societies have evolved ways of responding to conflict. Each society has unique nuances relevant only to their context

CONTEXT

The context refers to conditions that embed a conflict situation. They can be crosscutting conditions: prevailing perceptions, geographic location, demographic composition, and historical or sectoral: political, social, economic, religious, etc.

- What are the geographical boundaries?
- What natural resources are serving as incentives for the conflict?
- How do local, national and international actors define the context?

Based on the framework above, the next step to take is to ask some questions in order to understand the context in which the conflict is emerging or unfolding. Some of these questions are:

- *Why is there conflict? What is it about?* This leads us to exploring the meaning carried by those engaging in or observing the conflict? How is the meaning informing their behaviour and attitude towards the conflict?

- *What* social, political, economical, religious root or systemic conditions feed the conflict?
- *Where* is the conflict located (Geography—border, scope, topography, vegetation, climate, etc.);
- *What* in history drives the conflict (past historical relations, myths)
- *Who* is involved and/or affected by the conflict? What are their roles and conditions? Demography and categories of people—women, children, elderly, cultural groups, number, population density, quality of life?

According to Shanahan, (2002:33) provides an illustration of contextual analysis of conflict that takes into consideration geography, demography, history, economy, politics, Geography : A small country of about 7 million people on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, Guinea Conakry is bordered by Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Guinea Bissau.

Demography: The largest ethnic groups are the economically dominant Fullah or Peul with approximately 35 percent of the population, the Sousou with approximately 30 percent of the population, and the Malinke with approximately 25 percent. Members of the Malinke group are also found in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, and Liberia. Guinea is also home to a number of forest tribes—the Guerze or Kpelleh, Manon or Kono, and Kissi.

History: In the 13th century, the Malinke established hegemony in the region, including Upper Guinea, and by the 14th century, Guinea in its entirety was absorbed into the

powerful Empire of Mali. In contemporary times a French colony, a landmark in Guinea's fight for independence came in 1958, when Sékou Touré urged Guineans to refuse "quasi" independence from France. Touré's position was epitomised in his words: "We prefer freedom in poverty to riches in chains." De Gaulle's colonial administrators prepared to leave as Sékou Touré declared, in 1958, the independence of the second African colony, after Ghana (who negotiated and gained independence from Britain in 1957). In 1984 Sékou Touré's reign ended abruptly with his death from heart failure while visiting the United States. Just three days after his burial, Guinea's armed forces staged a bloodless military take-over.

Economy: In 1985, a few months after the military take-over, the Military Council announced revolutionary measures aimed at revitalising an economy exhausted by 26 years of isolation. With the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a structural adjustment program was initiated, and the economy began an upward trend, according to the IMF reports.

Political: In 1991, after considerable national and international pressure, the Conté-led military government agreed to reinstate multi-party political system. Eight candidates competed for the presidency elections in 1993, including the incumbent Col. Conté. The pre-election period was tense, marked by incidents of violence between government and opposition supporters. Conté won under doubtful circumstances by a slight majority of just over 50 percent. The legislative elections of 1995 were also characterized by allegations of fraud, vote rigging, and violence. By decree in 2001, Conté conducted a referendum that now allows him to have a third term. Many believe that the passive nature of the Guinean people coupled with increased security threats, especially from the government of Liberia, and the international community's support for the Conté regime as a key ally in the Mano River basin, gave the president a free hand to violate Guinea's democratic and constitutional processes with impunity. From the above, the following questions arise:

1. Which of the factors listed above have the most influence on the current conflict?

2. Which factors when combined will affect the conflict significantly?

Task:

Consider the demography of the conflict. Who are the people? Where are they located?

What is their relationship? Is there a demographic tension? To do this, use the guide below

Contextual Factor

Population Size

Gender Distribution

Ethnic Distribution

Geographic Distribution

Relationship between Groups

Impact of Environment on People and vice versa

Population Density

Gender Distribution

Demography (People & Distribution)

Concluding Questions:

1. Which of the factors listed above have the most influence on the current conflict?

2. Which factors when combined will affect the conflict significantly?

Also, Shahanan (2002:34) raises posers on the following issues that invite us to consider the Historical context of the conflict? What important events in history relate to or feed the current conflict? Are these events being exploited and/or used as an excuse to trigger or exacerbate conflict?

Contextual Factors

Historical Events that Generate Conflict

Historical Events that Mitigate Conflict

Events Currently Exploited

Historical factors

Concluding Questions:

1. Which of the factors listed above have the most influence on the current conflict?
2. Which factors when combined will affect the conflict significantly?
3. How do the past and the present combine in determining the future?

Furthermore, when analyzing the economic context the following questions were raised:

- Consider the economic context. What is the state of the economy? List the economic factors that prevail in the society. How do they inform the conflict?

In addressing the above, examine the following as contextual factors:

Primary Exports

International Debt and loans

Economic events that Generate Conflict

Impact of Economy on People Workforce

Education Resources Currently Exploited

Concluding Questions:

1. Which of the factors listed above have the most influence on the current conflict?
2. Which factors when combined will affect the conflict significantly?

In the political context of the conflict consider what are the current political conditions and situations using the following as contextual factors?

Elections Governance Security Legitimacy

State & Society Relations

Other

Political Factors

Concluding Questions:

1. Which of the factors listed above have the most influence on the current conflict?
2. Which factors when combined will affect the conflict?

Furthermore, Shahanan (2002:40) illustrates with different parts of a tree in explaining conflict analysis which can also be useful in the context of early warning:

The roots:

What are the structural or causal factors. Although they are the invisible contents of the tree, the roots are the anchor and source of life for the tree. Examples of root causes are injustice, poverty, economic deprivation, ignorance, ethnic prejudice and intolerance, corruption, poor governance both at state and traditional levels. Just as all roots left in a soil do not necessarily produce a tree, roots of conflicts only provide potentials for conflict. Other contributing factors like good soil, a gardener, etc. will be needed to produce the *Conflict Tree*.

The Trunk

Is the largest visible content of the tree. It is where all of the roots have converged. It is difficult to distinguish the link of the trunk to a particular string of the roots. The trunk gives onlookers some clue about the name and nature of the tree. However, the tendency to associate conflict only to the visible core problem can be deceptive since this is just a converged expression of many roots with particular differences. As a convergence of the roots, the trunk comprises dimensions of the conflict. Depending on who is analyzing the conflict and from what vantage point the analyst who is conducting the study may emphasize a particular dimension of the conflict over the others.

The Branches, leaves and fruits

Are the multitudes of smaller conflicts or dimensions of the conflict emerging out of the trunk. They are sometimes referred to as effects of the conflict. For example, conflicts between ex-combatants and their communities, the rise in prostitution, family conflicts emerging out of long years of separation, chieftaincy disputes as a result of two or more chiefs being appointed by the different authority who occupied the communities during a civil war, land disputes as a result of lands being sold by different so-called owners, etc are all branches from a Conflict Tree.

Over an extended period of time the effects or fruits of a particular conflict can fall into the fertile soil, germinate and develop another tree separate from the original tree.

Once this has happened one may need to address problems associated with the new tree outside of the earlier one. Sometimes the old tree is even dead and gone but the new tree grows in strength. This illustrates some of the complex dynamics of conflict.

In another vein, Fisher et al (2000) posit that the analysis of conflicts have different stages which can be useful for early warning systems. These stages are closely related with the context or setting where the conflict is unfolding. The stages are identified are as follows:

- i. The first is the **pre-conflict** stage, a period when goals between parties are incompatible, which could lead to open conflict. At this stage, the conflict is not well known because parties try to hide it from public view, but communication is undetermined between them.
- ii. The second stage is the stage of **confrontation**, at which point the conflict becomes open or manifest. This is characterized by occasional fighting, low levels of violence, search and mobilization of allies by parties, mobilization of resources, strained relations and polarization.
- iii. The third stage is the stage of **crisis**, which represents the peak of the conflict. In violent conflict, this is the stage of war and intense fighting, leading to killings, injuries, large scale population displacements, and the use of small arms and light weapons, etc.
- iv. The fourth is believed to be the **outcome** stage. There is an assumption that all conflicts will pass through this stage, one way or the other. Either one side wins and another loses, or a ceasefire may be declared; one may surrender, or the government or other third party intervening forces stronger than the warring parties intervene to impose a solution and stop the fighting. The critical issue at this stage is that the

violence is decreased, which allows room for some discussion to commence, or alternative means of settling the conflict.

- v. The fifth is the **post-conflict** stage. At this stage, violence has either ended or significantly reduced, and the parties have gone past the crisis stage. This is the stage to address the underlying causes of the conflict, those incompatible goals which created the conflict in the first instance, such as the needs and fears of the parties. If they are not tackled at this stage, the conflict cycle may be re-enacted and a return to the pre-conflict stage, with consequent re-eruption of violence, is a possibility. These conflict stages are also referred to by other names, such as “conflict process” or “conflict progression”. All of them constitute useful points of conflict analysis.

4.0 Conclusion

The unit one more reiterates the usefulness of informed conflict analysis as a sine-qua-non for effective prevention of violent conflicts. In carrying out the analysis, there are various tools some of which were discussed in the unit.

5.0 Summary

The unit provided tools of conflict analysis in a graphic and lucid manner.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Pick a conflict of your choice and use the conflict tree show how conflict analysis can aid early warning.
- Using the Nigerian civil war as an illustration apply the framework for conflict analysis that combines some aspects of the framework for conflict analysis presented in this unit.

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Unit 4: Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: Reference and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

In this unit, we shall be focusing on demonstrating how early warning and conflict prevention work in practice. The essence of this is to deepen your understanding of the two concepts as you move on in your study as students of peace studies and conflict resolution. This is because at this stage, you should be able to merge practice with theory in order to provide efficacious solutions to emergent and protracted conflicts.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Understand the empirical link between conflict prevention and early warning.
- Identify the points at which early warning feeds into conflict prevention.
- The role of stake-holders in this process.

3.0 Main Contents

The relationship between early warning and conflict prevention has been well documented. These have informed the consensus that early warning is basically an

instrument of preventive diplomacy which involves both state and non-state actors at different stages in a complementary manner. This unit will also clearly show how early warning differs from conflict prevention. According to Meier and Lanotte (N.D), conflict prevention is generally understood as encompassing operational prevention and structural prevention. The former comprises early warning analysis and preventive diplomacy while the latter typically draws on capacity building and development. It is well recognized that an integral component in the process of conflict prevention is early warning.

Meier and Lanotte (N.D) also share the view that defined early warning as laying the ground for proactive engagement in the *early* stages of a potential conflict or crisis, to prevent or at least mitigate violent and deadly conflict. Evidently, “early warning is not simply the sharing of information about an impending crisis, let alone the wail of a siren announcing the immanence of such a crisis.” Early warning goes beyond the continuous collecting and sharing of information to include both continuous analysis of the information and the formulation of appropriate response strategies for which promptness is essential. The two concepts of early warning and conflict prevention also have similar it can be posited that while early warning takes a proactive approach to make recommendations on the structural and behavioural causes of conflicts, conflict prevention takes practical actions to carry out the recommendations from early warning. Hence, early warning stops where conflict prevention takes off.

3.1 Issues and Constraints of Conflict Prevention

Based on the common saying that prevention is better than cure, the saying is also applicable in the context of Conflict Prevention and we may rightly posit that that is the spirit behind early warning. This must have informed the upsurge of interest in the activity by Governments, NGOs, international organizations and many research institutes devoted to the concept. Analysts believe that preventive action taken before a conflict becomes

violent could save not only lives and suffering, but also money. The efforts of the international community in peace-building and peace-enforcement are rather costly, especially those efforts that are mounted after a conflict has reached a violent phase. The recent conflict in Kosovo cost NATO 22 billion dollars in military expenditure until July '99. Many people believe that conflict prevention would have been cheaper. But how can we prevent conflict? And how do we convince governments and other funding institutions to financially support the prevention of conflict when success or positive results are not very visible?

The 'CNN' factor

One of the problems of conflict prevention through the use of mass media apparatus such the electronic and print media is that it does not make for very 'hot' headlines: "Conflict avoided between Romania and Hungary over minorities through preventive diplomacy" apparently sells less newspapers than something like: "Another 40 civilians feared dead in Kosovo". Conflict prevention efforts are often considered 'non-events' and are difficult for the media to cover. The 'CNN factor' comes into play when a conflict only seems to exist if the media pay attention to it. Kosovo was CNN-ified, Sudan was not, though it is a larger and longer lasting conflict with over 2 million casualties in the last three decades. Some of the episodes of violent clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the last few years have had over 10.000 casualties per clash; more than the (controversial) amount feared dead in Kosovo. This shows that the constraints such as the location, ownership and other consideration may hinder the objective performance of functions associated with early warning and conflict prevention.

Difficulty of conflict prevention

The difficulty of conflict prevention is often that we can predict the eruption of violence, "Early Warning," but that adequate "Early Action" is not taken. Many current so-called ethnic conflicts had been predicted, including the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, etc. Balkan specialists have been predicting violent conflict in Kosovo for over 10 years (!), since at least 1989. Books from the end of the eighties or Tadeus Mazowiecki's UN Human Rights reports from the beginning of the nineties illustrate this. Reading about Kosovo-Serbian tensions one gets the feeling of looking at someone who is waving a chainsaw closely to a thread holding the Damocles sword. For a variety of reasons however very little money was invested in these countries/areas for conflict prevention work. Reasons for this may be the perception and values of those in authority in the affected countries.

New organizations

During the last couple of years many governments and researchers have come to the logical conclusion that:

1. Conflict prevention is necessary from a moral point of view.
2. It is a lot cheaper than trying to resolve conflict once it has reached a violent stage.
3. That many non-state actors are well located in conflict areas to perform conflict prevention activities.

With this in mind, new organizations have been established to try to predict and take action to prevent conflicts from moving into the violent conflict phase. One such organization is the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response ([FEWER](#)). It is a global, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary network of over 25 organizations with a stated goal of providing early warning and pooling expertise to prevent violent conflict and civil wars. Another organization is the [European Platform on Conflict Prevention](#) (a group of European NGOs

working together to improve co-operation in the area of conflict prevention and resolution). [The Conflict Prevention Network](#), CPN (in Ebenhausen near Munich) provides the EU with policy input on conflict prevention.

Also, many other existing organisations have paid serious attention to conflict prevention. The [OSCE](#), [The Carnegie Corporation](#) and the [OECD](#) have made conflict prevention initiative core elements in their policies and activities or written reports and recommendations on the subject. Many foreign ministries have 'crisis-' or 'conflict-prevention' units now. Many foreign policy think tanks have research programs on conflict prevention, like the [Clingendael Institute](#) in the Netherlands.

3.2 LINKING EARLY WARNING WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

The main challenge in this context is matching early warning. The salient questions are: How to find the right audience for the right warning message? How to find the most suitable recipient bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic levels to the warnings? How to estimate case-by-case the suggested policy response levels? In the context of ethno-political early warning there are bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic response levels to these early signs but how can the early warning signs be communicated to them to bring about the desired response. After trying to identify the root-causes of ethno-political problems the next step is directed to the identification of different bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic levels of the early warning system. For this purpose the already existing structures of authority and non-authority service can be used as frameworks for determining the possible targets of the warning message.

Suggested bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic response levels to ethnic early warning message

inter-personal	informal groups, opinion-formers, eminent personalities
small community	local-government, legitimate political representatives, church ecumeny
Communal	local-government, social-cultural organizations, NGOs, women organizations
Regional	Foundations, Institutions, NGOs
intra-state	ombudsman, United Nations High Commissioner on National Minorities
inter-state	Governments, The Hague International Court of Justice, OSCE Vienna Conflict Prevention Center, UN High Commissioner on National Minorities

The practical uses of the different stages above are discussed below:

On small community level: one of the suggested response levels to warnings are the local governments. This is because they are the closest to the grassroots where majority of the population of many third-world nations reside and high potentials for violent conflicts especially in multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. This lends credence to the need to have structures for monitoring and promoting peace in at all levels of social settings.

On communal level : one can highlight the role of religious organizations such as churches and mosques. In some cases third party intervention (e.g. non-governmental organization) played an important role in initiating joint activities between churches which

have had long lasting conflicts. The Prague based NGO, the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly has been successful in the role of intermediator during a seminar on religious minorities held in Bucharest, Romania in 1992.

On inter-state level : the role of the ombudsman/ombudswoman cannot be underestimated, however, the proper institutional framework and attitude must be present for it to serve our objective in this context. For example, there was the ombudsman during the dark days of military rule in Nigeria and despite that, there were many cases of flagrant abuses of human rights that generated tension and conflicts in many multi ethnic and multi-religious societies. The role of High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities is of key importance both on intra-state and inter-state levels for having a specific and explicit early warning mandate and capability of contributing substantially to conflict prevention. This is very instructive in settings with history of inter and intra-groups animosities.

In using early warning systems for the prevention ethno-political conflicts, some experts, like Michael Lund suggests the use of both 'soft' (including diplomacy, building of local institutions) and 'hard' preventive tools (military force) while other experts are in favour of either the one or the other from the two above mentioned tools.

Suggested policy response levels to early warning signs of ethno-political conflicts

inter-personal	citizens' diplomacy, mediation, civic education, police reform
small community	citizens' diplomacy, fair representation in local government's decision-making, police reform, human rights education

Communal	citizens' diplomacy, managing differences, distributive policies, problem-solving workshops, inter-communal trade, human rights education, power-sharing arrangements
Regional	Trans-boundary-co-operation of local governments, trans-boundary economic and environmental co-operation, transnational mediation, targeted development assistance
intra-state	media literacy, minority broadcast, multicultural education, legal reforms, human rights monitoring, mediation, leadership training, training on conflict management through mediation
inter-state	preventive diplomacy, track-two diplomacy, OSCE Human Dimension mechanism, exchange programmes, bilateral agreements, economic integration, non-official facilitation, joint training programs on environmental issues, natural resources management, good offices, unilateral good will gestures, open-sky agreements, non-official facilitation

In understanding the table above, we start by examining the inter-personal level of relationships in the context of conflict prevention. Since individuals are very central and crucial to the escalation or prevention of violence, it thus follows that conflicts can be reduced to inter-personal level as depicted above. At this stage as well as on small community and communal level one of the suggested policies is citizens' diplomacy. By citizens' diplomacy, we refer to civic initiatives by private individuals or non-official organizations, all attempts to reconcile tensions between different ethnic groups through exchange of programs, informal meetings and mediation programs.

In recent times, due to its global capacity, the media is becoming one of the most powerful and influential factor in ethno-political conflict situations, so one of the suggested policies already on communal but more particularly on regional, intra-state and inter-state levels is positive journalism. The aim of positive journalism is to counteract hate-journalism and to stimulate give room for productions and publications which emphasize peaceful resolutions of conflicts, collaborative problem-solving, a balance of different opinions between target groups and stimulate the identification of common ground.

At intra-state and inter-state levels preventive diplomacy offers hope if included both in the domestic and foreign policy of the countries in with volatile inter and intra-ethnic relations. According to Michael Lund 'Preventive policy means a pro-active engagement in at the early stages of low-level potential conflicts or related crisis, involving governmental or non-governmental, political, economic or other efforts to keep states or communal groups from threatening or using armed force or coercion as the way to settle political disputes that arise from the destabilizing effects of national or international change. It aims to discourage or minimise hostilities, reduce tensions, address differences, create channels for resolution, and alleviate insecurities and material conditions that

attempt violence.’ The preceding are aimed to assist the systematic activity of the early warners while identifying the audience, exchanging information on specific crisis situations, contributing to monitoring the development process and in initiating the most appropriate preventive measures.

4.0 Conclusion

Conflict prevention is very germane to early warning systems and this why thus unit has given it the desired attention. The effectiveness of any early warning system is measurable by the extent to which it can prevent violent conflict. Therefore, conflict prevention is a process that needs valid and reliable early warning to be effective.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented the intrinsic relationship between early warning system and conflict prevention. Illustrations were given on how to prevent ethno-political conflicts after identifying the early warning signs of conflicts. The constraints encountered in the process of preventing violent conflicts b individuals and organizations working at different levels from the individual to the international levels.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Describe the relationship between early warning signs and conflict prevention citing examples.
- How can ethno-political conflicts be prevented in multi-ethnic state.

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Module 4

Unit 1: Response in the Context of Early Warning

Unit 2: Case Studies

Unit 3: Contributions of Governments, Regional/Continental Organizations and UN to various Early Warning Information and Conflict Management.

Unit 4: Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning Signs

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

This unit takes you further in your study of the early warning system of conflict which is aimed basically at preventing the escalation of violence. This unit dwells extensively on the meaning of response in the context of early warning systems of conflict. This will be aided by the use of empirical instances to corroborate earlier postulations or descriptions in the preceding units and there will also illustrations with empirical instances. The word response in this context will be explained based on the way early warning systems are used to elicit responses to prevent the escalation of conflict. This unit takes you through some scholarly explanations on the objectives as enumerated below.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- know the meaning of response in the context of early warning
- know the types of responses
- know how to respond to early warning signs of conflicts at different levels
- what qualifies one to initiate a response to early signs of conflict

3.0 Main Contents

Responses to conflicts by outsiders and insiders are not new at both the international and national levels by both state and non-state actors. However, it must be borne in mind that despite the fact that conflicts and early warning signs of conflicts get responded to in one or the other, we still witness the escalation of violence. This brings us to the need to clarify the ideal response required for the prevention of violence in order to distinguish responses by conflict entrepreneurs who are often shadow parties in most emergent conflicts. This unit empowers you on how to make use of early warning signs. As a practitioner, you must be able to interpret early warning signs in way that will make you respond adequately and appropriately to prevent the escalation of violence. According to wilsonceter.org (8-9-2009) certain steps must be taken to ensure that early warning signs must be lucidly understood in order to bring about the desired prevention of violence and stability.

3.1 TOWARD BETTER USE OF EARLY WARNING SIGNS

However a policymaker responds to warning, that response entails costs and risks of its own: indeed some responses could even be quite harmful. There is clearly a need to search for responses to warning that are useful in the situation without posing unacceptable costs. Even ambiguous warning, for example, gives policymakers more time to consider what to do: to increase efforts to acquire more information about the situation, to rehearse the decision problem that they would face if the warning proves to be correct, to spell out the likely consequences if the equivocal warning to which low probability is assigned proves to be genuine, to review their commitments and contingency plans, and -- not least

in importance -- to seize the opportunity to avert a possible dangerous crisis. Thus, even ambiguous warning provides an opportunity to deal with the conflict situation and/or the misperceptions associated with it before it leads to a violent conflict.

Nevertheless, it is a truism to note that policymakers prefer to receive unequivocal warning before deciding whether and how to respond. But, as noted earlier, high-confidence early warning is seldom available, and it can be highly disadvantageous if policymakers defer action altogether until more conclusive warning is available. It is precisely because unambiguous warning is so difficult to obtain that policymakers must confront the question of what types of response are useful and acceptable, even though the warning is uncertain or equivocal.

As noted earlier, once the problem of warning is linked with its implications for action, it becomes significantly redefined. Early warning of a possible crisis is meant to serve as a means to an end by providing decision makers with an opportunity to make a timely response of an appropriate kind that might be otherwise impossible. Warning gives the decision maker time to decide what to do and how to do it. Warning provides an opportunity to avert the imminent crisis, to modify it, or to redirect it into some less dangerous and less costly direction. For example, the recent onslaught of the Nigeria Police against an Islamic sect known as (Boko Haram) that detests Western Education in northern Nigeria was intended to modify a predictable religious violence that would have engulfed the whole northern part of the country. On occasion, warning may provide an opportunity to deal with a conflict-of-interest situation or misperceptions before they lead to a military conflict.

Consideration of the warning-response problem requires that we introduce another dimension into the analysis at this point. Since response to warning is never without cost or risk, the development of warning-response systems, contingency response options, or *ad*

hoc responses requires careful consideration of the possible costs as well as of the expected benefits of each option, weighed, of course, against the costs and benefits of inaction. At the same time, there are undoubtedly some responses to early warning of an equivocal and ambiguous character that are less costly than others. One could, for example, quietly intensify the collection of intelligence and/or begin discreet consultations with selected allies in order to clarify an uncertain situation before "going public" with more assertive measures, such as placing forces at increased readiness.

Some low-cost responses may make only a limited or uncertain contribution to dealing with a troublesome situation. There may be, in other words, a trade-off between responses that promise a great deal but are costly and risky and responses of a more modest but still useful kind that does not pose large costs and risks. The experience with trade-offs of this kind in dealing with the problem of surprise attack may be suggestive. In part, the trade-off dilemma in these cases can be dealt with by developing a calibrated warning-response system, one in which the level-of-readiness response increases with the level or urgency of warning.

Response Steps to Early Warning Signs of Conflict

1. **Gather more information about the situation.** Step up collection of intelligence and public information.
2. **Reduce vulnerabilities.** Alert forces and citizens abroad to reduce their exposure and susceptibility to attacks of all kinds. Increase readiness of standby forces and alert Special Forces for contingency operations.
3. **Reinforce commitments.** Strengthen deterrence, whenever necessary, by signaling credible "red lines" that should not be crossed, using diplomatic means and, if necessary, military demonstrations.

4. **Engage the targeted state in *sustained* dialogue.** Establish clear and reliable channels for exchange of communications.
5. **Take measures to reduce potential political/diplomatic/economic costs that could result from the emerging crisis in the domestic or international arena.**
6. **Conduct consultations with key states and allies.** Raise the issue in the United Nations and other appropriate international forums.
7. **Undertake a public information campaign to inform populations at home and abroad of the unfolding circumstances.** Prepare publics for possible coercive diplomacy or military action.
8. **Conduct a decision rehearsal, i.e., rehearse the decision problem that one would be confronted with if the warning proved justified.** A rehearsal involves (a) assessing the damage to important interests should the crisis erupt (something that policymakers have done very poorly in some past crises); and (b) anticipating the political and psychological pressures that are likely to be brought to bear upon policymakers should the crisis occur.
9. **Consider and, if necessary, clarify one's commitment to take action should the crisis emerge.** Warning can have the useful function of encouraging policymakers to identify and assess the complex interests that may be jeopardized if the crisis develops. Such a review may also result in a timely redefinition or clarification of existing commitments, identifying and separating issues that are peripheral and negotiable from those that are central.
10. **Review, update, and rehearse existing contingency plans.** Improve new policy options tailored to the emerging crisis, taking into account potential actions of other states with interests at stake.
11. **Initiate formal negotiations, efforts at conciliation, or mediation.** On many occasions, for example, the UN secretary-general's office responds to early warning by sending out fact-finding missions or by extending "good offices."

The preceding list of response options is not sacrosanct or applicable to all situations but they are meant to serve as illustrations. It is best to develop situation-specific approaches to incipient conflicts. Logically, different types of incipient crises will require identification of different response options. This brief list should not obscure the implied steps that each measure entails. For example, using military demonstrations to underscore one's seriousness of purpose must be balanced against the desire to control the level of engagement (and avoid a "slippery slope").

So much of this list seems like straightforward policymaking. What we mean to emphasize, however, is the need for an explicit effort to map various responses to anticipated developments -- before those developments occur -- and to associate particular response options more closely with foreseeable cues.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Those who call attention to failures to take timely, appropriate actions in response to early warning of an emerging crisis often refer to them as missed opportunities. The clear implication is that it might well have been possible to avoid or limit the development of a major crisis such as a violent ethnic or religious conflict, a humanitarian catastrophe, or a gross human rights violation if only the international community or an external actor had intervened and in the case of domestic or intra-national context if the appropriate agencies have responded pro-actively.

The assertion that a missed opportunity occurred is an example of counterfactual reasoning, a practice that is very frequently resorted to in everyday life as well as in serious analysis of historical outcomes. However widespread and indeed indispensable, counterfactual analysis is recognized to be a very weak, problematical method. This is not the occasion to discuss recent efforts by scholars to identify requirements for more

disciplined uses of counterfactual reasoning. Suffice it to say that statements that missed opportunities occurred in cases of failure of preventive diplomacy must be evaluated carefully to distinguish highly plausible from implausible or barely plausible claims. Efforts to do so are necessary not merely to improve historical analysis of cases in which preventive diplomacy was not attempted or was ineffectual; more rigorous counterfactual analysis is necessary also to draw correct lessons from such failures.

A useful start in this direction can be made by distinguishing different types of missed opportunities. The following is a provisional (no doubt incomplete) listing:

1. Cases in which there was *no response* to warning by policymakers, who either ignored the warning or regarded it as insufficiently reliable, too equivocal, or uncertain (Example: Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait).
2. Cases of *inadequate analysis* of ample warning indicators, and, thus, an inaccurate forecast of what was to occur (Examples: the 1979 Iranian revolution; the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950).
3. Cases of *inadequate response* to warning, either too slow or too weak (Examples: slow international response to the developing crisis in Somalia; slow, graduated sanctions against Serbia).
4. Cases of *misused opportunity* involving responses of a misconceived, harmful, inappropriate character (Example: European Union recognition of Croatia without securing a prior guarantee of the rights and interests of its substantial Serbian minority).
5. Cases of *inconsistent responses* (Example: In the crisis in Yugoslavia, European countries were often at cross-purposes, such as in 1991 when they tried to serve as mediator between Serbia and Croatia while pushing international recognition of Croatia and the imposition of sanctions on Serbia.)

6. Cases of *incomplete response* to a complex crisis (Example: Somalia, where the international community undertook to deliver humanitarian assistance but refused to engage in peace enforcement efforts.)
7. Cases of *contradictory responses* (Example: Efforts by some states to install peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh undermined by other states opposed to such a move.)

In addition to some such typology of different types of possible missed opportunities, we need, as noted earlier, some way of assessing the merits of claims that there was indeed a missed opportunity to avoid the disaster that followed. Counterfactuals are a way of rewriting history (exploring the possibility of an alternative outcome) by conducting a mental experiment i.e., "if only this rather than that had been done, the outcome would have been quite different." Some counterfactual assertions are more plausible than others. Those of us who believe in the necessity for timely responses to early warning may inadvertently exaggerate the plausibility of a missed opportunity in cases that developed into major conflicts or severe humanitarian catastrophes.

Several suggestions can be made for assessing the plausibility of assertions of a missed opportunity. A basic distinction needs to be made between two connotations of "opportunity." One use of the term implies that a significantly better/good outcome would *surely* have been achieved if it were not for . . . , or if only this rather than that had been done. A weaker connotation of the term "opportunity" is that a better outcome was *possible*; it *might* have been achieved if . . . A still weaker connotation states merely that a better outcome was possible but without indicating what might have been done to secure it. In making assertions of a missed opportunity, and of course, in evaluating such claims, it is important to keep this distinction in mind. Frequently, critics who identify a missed opportunity blur this distinction.

It is often difficult to judge the degree of confidence that can be ascribed to what appears to have been a missed opportunity. Practitioners who engage in efforts at preventive diplomacy based on early warning may well regard these distinctions as an academic exercise. It must be recognized that those who engage in preventive actions often do so without demanding of themselves that they be able to predict outcomes with high confidence; they make what they regard to be appropriate efforts and use what leverage they have to influence the course of events. They reason that when the stakes are high, one must make efforts to influence the course of events even when prospects of success are highly uncertain. It is only human to believe that adverse outcomes might have been avoided or moderated, if only actions had been taken early enough to prevent the unwanted happening.

Such explanations for what may be dubious claims on behalf of a particular missed opportunity leave us with the task of developing reasonable ways of evaluating them. To construct a good counterfactual analysis of a missed opportunity one needs to start with a good explanation of the actual outcome of the case at hand. This step is important, obviously, because the counterfactual changes what are thought to be the critical variable(s) that presumably accounted for the historical outcome. If one has an erroneous or unsatisfactory explanation for it, then the counterfactual analysis that argues that a better outcome was possible, "if only . . .," is likely to be flawed. Both the historical explanation and the counterfactually derived alternative to it are likely to be more correct or plausible if they are supported by relevant generalizations (and theory).

In formulating hypothetical missed opportunities and in evaluating them, at least two questions need to be addressed: First, was the alternative action possible at the time and known to be possible, or was it something that one sees only in retrospect. If the latter, then the claim of a missed opportunity is weakened since it rests on the argument that alternative action could have and should have been seen at the time. Missed opportunities

that rest too heavily on hindsight carry less plausibility but, of course, such claims should not be dismissed if one wants to draw useful lessons from such experiences. An after-the-fact identification of an action or strategy not known or considered at the time can still be useful in drawing lessons.

Missed opportunities differ, too, depending upon whether the alternative is a simple, circumscribed action or whether it is a sequence of actions over time. In the latter case, counterfactual reasoning involves a long, complex chain of causation involving many variables and conditions, all of which would have to fall into place at the right time for the missed opportunity to be realized. The plausibility of a missed opportunity is enhanced, in contrast, when the chain of causation is shorter and less complicated. A missed opportunity is obviously less plausible when it rests on the belief or expectation that a different set of actions could have occurred over time and overcome a series of obstacles, thereby achieving a successful outcome.

The second question: Was there at least one or a few decisive turning points? Those who take a "path dependent" view of history point to the importance of "branching points" in a developing situation. At such points, once events start down a certain path, all possible future outcomes are not equally probable. If an analyst who asserts that there was a missed opportunity does not provide a plausible scenario of how the outcome would have been more favorable, then it is not yet a strong candidate for a plausible missed opportunity.

Those of us interested in assessing possible missed opportunities more rigorously may find it useful, if not indeed necessary, to keep such distinctions in mind. At the same time, we believe that the difficulties of assessing missed opportunities should not discourage us from efforts to do so. It is not that we are interested in rewriting history per se. However, careful study of possible missed opportunities is necessary if we are to learn from experience and to ensure correct responses to early warning signs of conflicts.

Self Assessment Exercise

In your opinion and based on what you have learnt so far, how would you describe response in the context of early warning?

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit posits that policymakers must cultivate an integrated strategy that develops potential responses with anticipated warnings. The need to do so will only increase as publics increasingly expect their governments to do something about crises that they surely see coming. Considering the extant reality of the world as global village it has become implausible for Western governments to claim that they "didn't know" that something on a scale of Bosnia or Rwanda could happen. Similarly, claims that "nothing could be done" ring hollow when coming from such advanced, wealthy states. These states cannot prevent every conflict, but they would do well to strengthen their ability to act responsibly and in a timely manner. They could also help enhance the capacity of the security and other appropriate agencies of these countries to respond to early warning signs of conflict.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented response to early warning signs of conflict from the policy position. It also enumerated the steps to be taken to ensure response to early warning signs of conflict while cautioning that the listed steps are sacrosanct in sequence because steps must be developed based on specific features in each incipient conflict. The notion of missed opportunities was also explained vis-à-vis counterfactual reasoning.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Explain what is meant by missed opportunities in the context of response to early warning signs of conflict.

- Identify a war or violent conflict in history and discuss it in the context of missed opportunities
- Enumerate and explain some of the steps that would guide you in initiating a response to early warning signs of conflict.

7.0References and Further Reading

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Unit 2: Case Studies

Contents

1.0 : Introduction

2.0 : Objectives

3.0 : Main Contents

4.0 : Conclusion

5.0 : Summary

6.0 : Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 : References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction

This unit takes to the empirical aspect of this course which is aimed at empowering you to be effective practitioner in the field of early warning and conflict management. The essence of these case studies is to give a broad view of empirical instances of early warning in order to know how it works in practice and for you to avoid pitfalls in the field.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- You should be able to know how early warning works in practical instances
- You would have seen the effects of early warning on conflict prevention and conflict management
- You would have seen the limitations of early warning on the prevention and management of conflict
- You would be familiar with how to prepare early warning reports

3.0: Main Contents

Case studies help us to learn by sharing experiences. For academic and policy purposes case studies can be of immense use because they offer a wide range of instances

with varied experiences to guide in making informed decisions and recommendations as at when necessary. Globally, there have been many types of conflicts with varying intensities in terms of casualties and destructions. In Africa, there have been instances of destructive conflicts that could have been prevented if early warning systems that would detect the signs and report to the appropriate quarters had been put in place. It is more worrisome to not that these conflicts are sometimes similar in the pattern of occurrence which leads one to prescribe the need for examination and comparison of case studies of early warning signs in different conflict theaters. For example, there is a similarity between the Algerian conflict of 1993 and the Kenyan debacle of 2007. The horn of Africa offers a basket case. The case studies are presented for you to study in order to know assess and learn.

3.1 Case Study 1: The Rwandan Crisis

This is a crisis that attracted global attention not in preventing it but when it started recording unprecedented and unbelievable human catastrophe. This is presented below based on a thematic line of the phases that characterized the genocidal war and the role played by different stake-holders. The focus is on how early warning fared in the crises. Adekanye (2007) offers a very instructive insight into the different dimensions of the crises and how early warning was used or misused in the conflict.

The puzzle

The puzzle as indicated above asks certain questions. Did those charged with the responsibility for making decisions in the various agencies and states that comprise the international community know that the assassination of Hutu political opponents and genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda would take place? No. virtually no-one anticipated the swiftness, scale, thoroughness and unique character of the genocide as it unfolded. In its horrific enormity, it took almost all international observers by surprise.

If they did not draw such an extreme conclusion, did those with the capacity to prevent and mitigate the genocide have the information upon which such a conclusion could be drawn? Yes. Many knew that organized extremist forces existed; increasingly,

they even gave public proof of their existence by words and deed. A pattern of violence was discernable, and the state apparatus itself was clearly implicated in arms distributions to paramilitary groups and extremist propaganda advocating the need to rid Rwanda of all Tutsi and their supporters. By early 1994, specific information about plans and conspiracies towards this end by the UN system, most significantly in the notorious Black File of January 1994.

Close observers commonly interpreted this information in the Rwandese context to mean that largest scale ethnic violence against civilians was likely if the civil war renewed, as seemed likely in early 1994. However, in the higher echelons of state and international agencies, the early warning signals were hardly heard at all, and news of the genocide was an even greater surprise. But pieces of information were available to permit policy-makers on any level to draw the more radical conclusion that both politicide and genocide might occur on a scale quite different from patterns of "just" hundreds or thousands of victims.

Should the alarming indications have resulted in more thorough assessments and preparations? Absolutely, given the political commitment and actual involvement of the UN in Rwanda, the large-scale violence expected by close observers, and the possibility of genocide. The legal right and the normative obligation to act to prevent genocides according to the Geneva Convention, and the enormous cost of a miscalculation, made contingency planning clearly imperative. Then why did states, international organization and other parties who had assumed some responsibility for regulating the Rwandese conflict and had the capacity to act not draw the appropriate conclusions, Since close observers did anticipating mass violence and advocated swift interventionist action, analyzing the problems that afflicted the central decision-makers is critical to understanding the failure to act. The problems of receiving even clear and unequivocal signals are found in four areas: contradictions in the international system; the UN structure; attitudes of senior officials towards messengers and inadequacies in the messages sent; and interference.

3.2 Contradictions in the international system.

Neutrality and Intelligence Gathering

Further, Adekanye (2007) contends comparatively that unlike nation-states, the United Nations does not collect and analyze information to protect itself from ostensible enemies. The world organization has no clear-cut security agenda and is supposed to be a neutral body. Yet in matters of threats to international peace and security, the neutrality principle is not unbendable, as in Chapter VII enforcement actions. By the same logic, the UN should not be neutral towards genocide, or towards parties threatening civilians whom the UN has placed under its sprouted action. Moreover, once the UN assumes responsibility for conflict management, it needs a capacity for collection and analyses dealing with military and political issues of member states. Nevertheless, member states are reluctant for reasons of national security to let the UN develop such an intelligence function. This affected the Rwandan crises because the conflict did not attract sufficient concern at the incipient stage from the world super powers.

3.3 Financial, Remote and Regional Interest

Adekanye (2007) posits that in the area of conflict management, the UN is particularly beholden to the United States, which pays almost a third of the budget for peacekeeping. When regional states and organizations, which are closer to the conflict and its consequences and in this case, were willing, indeed eager, to involve themselves, they were not given the wherewithal to do so, including a structure to gather and analyze information. The OAU, which was intimately involved in the diplomatic process to settle the conflict, only had a skeletal staff for these purposes. The lack of resources also characterized Tanzania, in this case the most non-partisan regional state. The major motive of Tanzania was to regulate the conflict, rather than further one party's interests. Zaire has access to the Rwandese regime but no interest in collecting, let alone sharing, any information that could be against the Rwandese government. As a result Zaire could be described as shadow party in the conflict. Uganda had such an interest, and through the

RPF also had access to information, built its early warning capacity supported the RPF. RPF early warning could be dismissed as propaganda. France had both interest in and a significant capacity for intelligence collection on Rwanda, but its interests were clearly partisan and led to defining the role of the RPF in adversarial terms. (This includes even the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was committed to the Arusha process).

The United States also had the capacity, but it was initially truly disinterested, in the sense of being both objective and remote, and utilized its capacity only sporadically. The CIA undertook a January 1994 desk-level analyses of the Rwanda situation a worst-case projection of the course current events, which included scenarios of details in the other half a million casualties. This indicated that specialist analysis that focused on a problem area could use current information to develop reasonably accurate scenarios covering a country of marginal concern to the US. The report was not distributed widely, nor did it reach the higher decision-making echelons. As there was no "smoking gun" or verification from personnel on the ground, it was not taken seriously. Moreover, since Rwanda poses only a hypothetical problem rather than being an actual crisis, there was little inclination by higher officials to pay attention.

For the EU, both the interest and capacity to cover a crisis in a peripheral state are critical. Caught between the absolute disinterest of the major powers and the need to alter to dominant financial interest, the UN has been unable to establish the appropriate balance between disinterestedness and utilizing regional interest to advance the peace process.

3.4 Structure and Culture

Though the UN was inhibited from systematically collecting and analyzing critical information and communicating the analyses to those with the power to take action against the genocide, the Secretary General has had a mandate to engage in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping even in intra-state conflicts. He has also been given an explicit mandate to engage in early warning, (Adekanye, 2007). That mandate can be easily extended to

cover the analysis required for preventive diplomacy and effective peacekeeping. Why has this capacity not been appropriately developed?

The reasons are that individual relevant units are not sufficiently staffed, given the exponential increase in global responsibilities expected of the UN. For instance, Adekanye (2007) reveals that only one person in DPKO (Department of Peace-Keeping Operation) consistently monitored Rwanda, and that person carried heavy weight of operational responsibilities. But there are other reasons for the failure. With a changed mandate since 1990, the Secretary-General reorganized the Secretariat but in so doing, sacrificed an independent information and strategic analytical arm separate from any operational functions by dissolving the Office for Research and Collection of information (ORCI), because of its shortcomings. The secretary-general distribute is responsibilities among the political, humanitarian and peace-keeping affairs Departments, while the Office of for Human Rights monitors, there was no central unit into the Secretariat or elsewhere charged with collecting even "soft" intelligence, including the information available in the vast structure of UN agencies and organization to translate assessments into policy options and strategic planning,. As the DHA task force evolved into focal point for early warning in the UN system for mitigating the consequences of conflicts, there was no parallel too to generate early warning signals required for contingency planning in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. SPA, which was expected to undertake this task, was too understaffed and had no systematic link to strategic planning.

In addition, the cultural milieu of the Secretariat had reverted to being politicized in two senses. In the Rwanda situation, the DPKO at a critical juncture seemed to be too subservient to the concerns of the major powers. In this case, the DPKO proposed only "what the traffic would bar" in the Security Council, as they put it, not what the situation on the ground demanded.

3.5 Messengers

In spite of these deficiencies resulting from the current mandate of the UN and its structure problems, UN headquarters did receive crucial information that should have led it at least to undertake some contingency planning. However, the UN Secretariat had a propensity to discount the information and warnings received from within its own system while paying inordinate attention to media analysis, if the Secretary-General's April report, which prepared the ground for UNAMIR's withdrawal, is any indication. Using information on the various humanitarian organizations obtained from their own field operatives, an inter-agency task force in Geneva was assigned the task of sharing information about impending human disasters. According to Adekanye (2007), it had many problems. It was *ad hoc* each of the agencies showed an understandable reluctance to collect and divulge sensitive political information that might jeopardize its operations in a country. More importantly, the inter-agency task force was oriented towards anticipating the humanitarian consequences of crisis (e.g. population movements, the requirements of relief operations etc.) rather than development of the crisis itself. The task force had no access to the source of political-military information so critical in discerning escalating conflict. Nor did it have adequate support from qualified analysts. As a result, while the UN system has an early warning capacity, this capacity is inappropriate to questions of early warning for conflict management purposes.

Even greater suspicion was cast on the human rights organizations, which discerned patterns of violence they characterized as genocide. Part of the problem was the manner in which the warnings were conveyed. These organizations did not put human rights abuses in a political context necessary for understanding the nature of probable evolution of the conflict, including its likely points of culmination, or translate them into strategic operations further; the human rights machinery of the UN itself was virtually irrelevant to the early warnings process, (Adekanye, 2007). The UN not only lacked the capacity to relate human rights violation to a dynamic analysis of the social forces that produced them,

it also had challenges utilizing a monitoring process that was sporadic and provided no follow-through on reports.

Within the UN secretariat, far too little attention was paid to early warning emanating from human right organizations. The secretary-general's report justifying withdrawal on 21 April reflected misrepresentation of the media rather than the analysis of informed or more professional observers of Rwanda. When the secretary -general by mid-May did perceive the situation correctly, he lacked the widespread and sustained support for policy engagement that adequate media coverage can generate. With a few notable exceptions, the media in general perpetuated the misrepresentation of the slaughter in Rwanda as one of anarchic ethnic violence. It took almost a month for most of the media to "get the story straight". This is one of the limitations of relying solely on the media for early warning signs because they could be biased or confronted with limited accessibility to the true nature of the emergent conflict.

The import of the messages from the Rwandese media was downplayed. Hutu extremist calls in the hate media to rid the country of Tutsi were interpreted by some foreign observers as efforts to put pressure on the RPF to make concessions at Arusha, or as exaggerated rhetoric. Even members of the RPF politburo now acknowledge in retrospect that they underestimated the significance of the extremist.

3.6 Interference factors

Functional contradictions and structural deficiencies worsened by discounting some messengers and exaggerating the value of others are only part of the explanation. The Rwandese Patriots Front was closest to the scene, with networks in Rwanda to provide information and was in close contact with human rights and refuge originations as well as its own Diaspora around the world. If any party had a stake in anticipating mass murder and its extent, and with developing contingency plans to prevent, or, at least, mitigate such a disaster, this Tutsi-dominated rebel organization surely did. True, the leadership issued public warnings to the government of severe human rights violations and identifying those

responsible for killings in 1992 and 1993 as guilty of genocide. But leading Front members acknowledged in retrospect that they did not anticipate the magnitude of the genocide and the RPF did not develop contingency plans for such an eventuality. Why not?

Five factors are suggested that afflicted everyone involved in the Rwanda crisis to different degrees: incredulity, mind-blindness, shadows, noise and desensitization.

Incredulity

Genocides are rare. Its path of development was unfamiliar and difficult to discern especially in that part of the world. Many associated the concept of genocide with the highly mechanized Nazi holocaust. The idea that hundreds of thousands could be slated for execution in a poor, agricultural society, and that this could be carried out in a short time, seemed incredible.

Mind-blindness

RPF leaders admit that on the eve of their 1990 invasion they expected that thousands of Tutsi might be killed in retaliation, as had happened in the early 1960s. But to consider genocide as both a possibility and one they had very limited ability to mitigate, let alone stop, would have either frozen them into impotence or forced them to accept that they had a measure of historical co-responsibility in the slaughter. Hence, a sort of mind-blindness developed, i.e. an inability to use the information available to deduce the appropriate conclusions. A similar blindness (but in the nature of "wishful thinking") may help to explain the failure of more remote actors to anticipate the genocide. For the French government to acknowledge that genocide was in prospect would be to accept a far greater degree of responsibility for its own involvement in backing the Habyrimana regime and its connected extremists. For the United States, it meant having to confront the fact that it had a legal right and a moral responsibility to intervene. For the UN Secretariat it would have meant preparing for a very different kind of mission in Rwanda at a time when its first principle of action was "not to cross the Mogadishu line". The UN mind-blindness carried a double level of guilt and denial by instilling a false sense of confidence among the Tutsi

in Rwanda, who could not imagine that the world in general, and the UN in particular, would flee the scene when a UN peacekeeping force was already in place.

Shadows

The tardy and inadequate response of the UN and its leading members was also influenced by external blinkers, by previous events that haunt decision-makers, distort perceptions and constrain their willingness to act. These are in the nature of shadows.

One such blinker was the shadow of hope. Arusha became an inertial force. The peace accords so preoccupied almost all the players that they tended to shift into the background the growing organization of extremists' intent on undermining that peace. The pursuit of the agreement, the hope invested in its effectiveness, and the eagerness to see it implemented dominated their attention right up until 6 April. The other blinker was the shadow of despair and the propensity to read the present through traumas of the past. Somalia certainly directly colored the American propensity to view (and deform) the Rwandese operation through the Somalia lens. The issuance of PDD 25, a new directive in May of 1994 strictly limiting American involvement and funding of peacekeeping, was a culmination of the Shadow of Somalia. But Rwanda was not a failed state; on the contrary, it was an example of a state that, having been taken over in an extremist *coup d'etat*, was executing a massive genocide. In the shadow of Somalia, the American and UN observers misinterpreted events on the ground and exaggerated difficulties into an impotence to respond effectively. Not only were the wrong lessons learned from Somalia, the right ones ignored, in fact, the lesson of Somalia should have been that too few forces inserted tardily can undermine a whole operation.

Noise

This is a standard element often used to explain intelligence failures. At the same time as the situation was particularly tense in Kigali in March 1994, the UN was preoccupied with a long list of crises or problem areas - in Russia, Angola, Burundi, EL Salvador, Georgia, Haiti, Liberia, Nagorny Karabakh, Somalia, South Africa, Tajikistan,

Eritrea-Sudan, Mozambique, Hebron, North Korea, and especially the former Yugoslavia (including the security and safety of UNPROFOR) Because of Rwanda's peripheral relationship to the major issues and structures of international relations, the signals from Kigali were weakly heard. In a context crowded with actual crises, it was particularly difficult to get busy decision-makers to shift their attention to a potential crisis.

Confusion about message

Noise may overwhelm a message, but this propensity is exacerbated when the message itself is confusing. At various points, different actors monitoring the conflict - Human rights organizations, the RPF, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights-Used the term "genocide". But the term conveyed different meanings, which created confusion among the listeners. The problem with the term "genocide" as a signal caused the different implications and illustrations of the two uses of the term. The use of the legal definition of the term in an accusatory sense arguably diminished the impact of the term in its function as a warning signal. If the killing of 300 Tutsi constitutes genocide (in the legal sense), then warnings about potential genocide signal the potential death of a few hundred more. The linking of the deaths of 300-1000 people to the terms "apocalypse" and "genocide" diminished their impact as warnings. While significant in and itself, early warning about genocide defined in legal terms lead to very different thinking about consequences and reaction than would a clear signal of an impending genocide as defined in the popular sense.

In the popular consciousness, the concept of genocide is linked to the massive slaughter of Armenians by Turkey at the turn of the century, the extermination of million of Jews in Europe by the Nazi regime, and the wiping out of an entire generation and class of people by Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The numbers involved in each of these cases are measured in the hundreds of thousand or millions. Unfortunately, events propelled Rwanda into the same tragic class.

Desensitization

Only six months before the genocide occurred, massacres in Burundi claimed the lives of an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 persons. There was no worldwide outrage and little response. This failure of the international system to be startled or to respond reflected a pre-existing propensity to expect disasters out of Africa. The threshold for international response seemed to increase accordingly: if 100,000 persons could be killed with impunity, the possibility of another massive slaughter did not seem so extraordinary, nor did it require particular responses. Hence, there developed a mental indifference to the possible consequences of the rising tensions in Rwanda. This was reinforced by the tendency to view the struggles within Rwanda as the recurrence of ancient conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi rather than as a product of a centrally led, political murder machine. According to one Belgian official: "We've learned from our experience that whenever there is trouble in Rwanda, the Hutu and the Tutsi kill each other." This reinforces the mind set that any conflict in Rwanda was a rehash of the rivalry between the Hutus and Tutsis.

4.0 Conclusion:

The unit has presented two case studies. The first one showed that there was no consideration at all for early warning and early response despite the palpable signs of violent conflicts in the country. In the second case study, the gap between early warning and early response was identified by a Non Governmental Organization and recommendations were made to all the stake-holders.

5.0 Summary

The study of case studies enhances our understanding a purpose which this unit attempted to serve. The unit presented the Rwandan crises as a case of early warning failure while the case study was based on Kenya. The Kenyan case study was derived largely for the outcome of a report by an NGO which provided useful recommendations to all.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Could the Rwandan crises have been averted if there had been effective early warning system in place.

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Unit 3: Governments, International Organizations and E.W.S

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction

As a concept or process, early warning systems can not work independently or in isolations unit. At this juncture, it is necessary for us to examine how governments and international organizations treat early warning systems and reports on one hand and the activities of international organizations in three contexts. These are in the contexts of observing trajectories of early warning, communicating these early warning signs to the appropriate quarters and implementation of early warning. While most governments are impeded by bureaucracy and mind blindness as discussed in previous units, the international organizations are better suited to carry out the development and dissemination of early warning signs more objectively. This is what this unit attempts to present in order to get you acquainted with the realities in the field.

: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- Understand the attitude of governments to early warning reports
- The roles of international organizations in the compilation, monitoring and implementation of early warning signs.

3.0 Main Contents

One remarkable thing about the triumph of liberal democracy and market economy is the fact that it has been able to make openness a norm in the conduct of state businesses although some condemn it as encouraging interference and challenging the sovereignty of independent states. However, in the context of early warning, the hitherto practice of the Cold-War era in which states perpetuated human rights abuses and hides under the cover of alignment to either of the two major powers then has become unpardonable in contemporary times. This now brings to the issue of governments and early warning signs of wars or violent conflicts.

In analysis of the causes of war at the international level Gleditsch (2001) argues that the values of leaders of countries could sometimes determine the propensity of such countries for war or otherwise. Although, the fact that going on a war for a democratic nation typically involves the approval of the legislatures serves as a check on this tendency. Nonetheless, there have emerged many international organizations that now relate with governments at different levels to communicate early warning signs of wars or violent conflicts to them in order to reduce the rate of occurrence of wars and violent conflicts. The description on governments and early warning systems or signs will be done by selecting some countries for examination. The presentation in this unit is based on an African perspective that based on position of the Africa Union.

3.2: Governments and E.W.S

It has been a since the 1990s to see the more stable and prosperous nations in the northern pole offering assistance to the more troubled and unstable ones in the southern pole. In Africa, the frequency of violent domestic conflicts and the trans-border effects and humanitarian crises it creates have attracted attention of the stronger nations as it now affects their foreign policies. The advanced nations now directly or indirectly through agencies and NGOs intervene in different areas to prevent the outburst of violent conflicts in these countries. The fact that many of these third world countries are now described as

failing, failed or vulnerable states for reasons such as insecurity, poor welfare and poor service delivery have underscored this intervention.

Nonetheless, some regional and sub-regional organizations have been making efforts institutionalize functional frameworks for early warning systems. One of such is the Africa Union (AU), which succeeded the Organization of Africa Unity, (OAU).

3.3 The Africa Union and CEWS

The instrument setting up the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) was formulated at a meeting of governmental experts held in South Africa under the auspices of the Africa Union in 2006 emphasized the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa. It is, therefore, essential that the CEWS be designed to meet the requirements of the continent. The CEWS should be need-based, and all efforts should be made to mobilize the resources required. In particular, it had recommendations on the following issues:

(i) Data collection, analysis, and indicators module

It recognized the need to adopt a pragmatic approach towards early warning that would allow the AU to undertake preventive diplomacy within the framework of the relevant principles enshrined in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol. In this regard, the meeting recalled that the collection and analysis of data relevant to the prevention of violent conflict is a major task of the relevant AU structures, in particular the Conflict Management Division and its Situation Room. The meeting reiterated that the collection and analysis of data should be done in a systematic manner, using a specific framework in accordance with the provisions contained in the PSC Protocol. The meeting discussed the need for institutional linkages between the AU and the RECs to ensure mutual assistance of their early warning systems, as well as the possibility of incorporating inputs from existing early warning systems, whether on conflict or other issues. The meeting further recalled the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol that call for

collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research institutes, academic institutions and NGOs.

The meeting recognised that the effective functioning of the CEWS requires that data be obtained from multiple sources, with emphasis on African sources, including the AU, the RECs, Member States, research centres, including the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, academic institutions, NGOs, the media, as well as the United Nations and its agencies, and other relevant international organizations, as provided for by the PSC Protocol. The meeting underlined the need to ensure accuracy, reliability, transparency and objectivity in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data. At the same time, the meeting stressed that sensitive information should be treated with the appropriate level of confidentiality, and should be transmitted through secure channels.

The meeting accepted the development of the module of generic indicators in line with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol, which call for a common framework of political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators. It noted that the module was based on existing OAU/AU documents adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and other organs of the AU, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Framework Document, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) process, the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, and other relevant AU instruments, taking into account best practices and lessons learned in conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.

The meeting requested that the indicators module and subsequent analysis and generation of response options be gender-mainstreamed, in accordance with the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women and UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The meeting also recommended that the generic indicators be clustered according to

the categories under article 12(4) of the PSC Protocol, and that other categories, such as environmental indicators are considered when relevant to conflict prevention.

It was observed at the meeting that, while the immediate focus of information gathering and analysis should be on significant threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators' module should also focus on the root causes of conflicts. The meeting stressed that early warning required continuous monitoring, not only to prevent the outbreak of conflict but also to warn of escalation or resurgence of conflict. The meeting further stressed that policy options can only be developed based on strategic analysis of trends and dynamics, and their significance in specific contexts. The meeting recognised that the indicators' module, while not comprehensive or exhaustive, could be adapted to particular conflict situations for which specific and easy-to-monitor indicators can be developed. The meeting recommended the adoption of a realistic approach that will focus attention, in the short-run, on a limited number of cases, namely: (i) situations likely to escalate into violent conflict in the immediate future, (ii) situations of ongoing crises or conflicts, (iii) and post-conflict situations.

The meeting emphasized the importance of ensuring that the staff tasked with early warning functions (data collection, verification, analysis and the provision of policy options) possess the requisite analytical capability, expertise, and experience. The meeting also recognized that the efficient management of data and information should include adequate collection, compilation, management and distribution systems, and that some level of automation may be required in light of the complexity involved in dealing with considerable amounts of information. The meeting agreed that all efforts should be made to strengthen the relevant capacities (human, financial and technical) at the AU and the RECs, to ensure the effective functioning of the CEWS.

(ii) On Early Action and Engagement with Decision Makers

The true test of the CEWS will be its ability to generate not only timely analysis but also effective response options – an inextricable link to early action is a core principle of

an effective early warning system. Consequently, there is need to tailor the CEWS to the requirements and specific needs of its end users, and decision-makers, in particular the Chairperson of the Commission and the Chair of the PSC, as well as other organs and structures such as the Panel of the Wise, the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Moreover, and in view of the wide range of stakeholders involved and the information that should be communicated, the meeting stressed the need to ensure the provision of appropriate reports for the various categories of AU decision-makers.

Assuring quality (comprehensiveness, accuracy, reliability and relevance), efficiency (timeliness), objectivity, diversity and appropriate formatting in the presentation of analysis and options for response by the CEWS are critical. The meeting recognized that the full implementation of the CEWS would entail improving the quality of existing products and the development of new ones such as Early Warning Reports, which would be the subject of appropriate consultations between the Commission and the country (ies) concerned, drawing on lessons learnt from the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism.

The meeting stressed that the development of means of engagement with all decision-makers is a priority, and fully endorsed the recommendations put forward in the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS in this regard. These include, inter alia, the production of regular Reports of the Chairperson to the PSC on the overall peace and security situation in the five regions of the continent, with a strong early warning component; the inclusion, where appropriate, of early warning focused sections in the regular Reports of the Chairperson to the PSC; the strengthening of the PSC and the Chairperson's bi-annual reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the state of peace and security in Africa. The meeting agreed that these reports should identify different response options, including preventive diplomacy, appropriate sanctions and intervention, if necessary, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutive

Act. In this regard, the meeting called upon the RECs/Regions to accelerate the operationalization of their regional standby brigades.

The meeting noted that the full operationalization of the CEWS would strengthen the engagement of the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights with the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC in conflict prevention, as provided for in the PSC Protocol .The meeting underlined the need for the above-mentioned organs to address the PSC on a regular basis. The meeting underlined the critical role that should be played by the Panel of the Wise in conflict prevention. In this regard, the meeting urged the Chairperson of the Commission to swiftly operationalise the Panel.

(iii) On Co-ordination and Collaboration

Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are important components of the overall peace and security architecture of the AU. Synchronization, coordination, collaboration and harmonization between the AU and the RECs are essential for the effective functioning of the CEWS. The meeting noted the considerable progress that the AU and the RECs had achieved in coordinating their activities and collaborating on matters of peace and security in Africa.

However, in light of the varying levels of development and implementation of regional early warning systems, there is need to support the RECs through financial and technical assistance, to finalize the process of developing their respective systems. This is especially important in view of the requirement of the PSC Protocol for observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly, through appropriate means of communication, to the AU Situation Room for the purposes of transmission of data, information and analysis.

The meeting endorsed the various recommendations contained in the Roadmap for strengthening the relationship between the AU and the RECs, including: a system of regular exchange of information and the establishment of secure website to that end; the

convening of periodic meetings on early warning; exchange of experiences; joint training and capacity building actions; the systematic participation of RECs and other relevant regional mechanisms in discussions on issues brought before the PSC and of interest to them the establishment of liaison offices; and the commencement of joint activities in early warning and conflict prevention as soon as possible. The meeting further recommended that guidelines and benchmarks be developed in consultation with the Regional Mechanisms, to enable the harmonization of systems in the short term and enhance synergies and complementarity.

The meeting called for the swift conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, which would help to streamline the relationship and establish a framework for the effective flow of information. The meeting also welcomed the recommendation in the Roadmap to strengthen the cooperation and continued interaction with the United Nations and its agencies, and, in particular, the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General. In particular, the recommendations regarding the exchange of information, the holding of periodic meetings and consultations on peace and security, and the possibility for organizations of the UN system to address the PSC were regarded as critical. The meeting equally welcomed the recommendations for collaboration with other relevant international organisations.

The meeting stressed the importance of involving and closely collaborating with civil society organisations, including community-based organisations, women's and youth organisations, the academia, think-tanks and research centres, whose active participation in providing relevant information, making recommendations for the development of specific policy options and addressing the various AU organs, particularly the PSC, as well as contributing, where appropriate, to early response, owing to their proximity and/or presence in affected areas, is essential in order to ensure the effective functioning of the CEWS, as called for by the PSC Protocol.

In this regard, the meeting welcomed the proposal by the Commission for an accreditation mechanism for CSOs and relevant private sector actors, specifically tailored to the purposes of the CEWS and based on transparency. The meeting underlined the importance of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) in complementing the CEWS, particularly in the process of data collection and verification.

c) The Way Forward

The meeting urged the AU Commission and the RECs, working together with the stakeholders identified in the PSC Protocol, to take all necessary steps to implement all of the above-mentioned observations and recommendations, within a timeframe of three (3) years, to ensure that the CEWS is fully operational by 2009. In this regard, the meeting requested the Commission to submit regular reports on progress made and challenges faced to the relevant AU organs (the PSC, the Executive Council and the Assembly). The meeting urged all Member States, as stipulated in article 7(4) of the PSC Protocol, to “extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the PSC for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts”. The meeting further urged Member States, as well as AU partners, to provide the necessary assistance to facilitate the timely operationalization of the CEWS. The meeting recommended that the AU Commission convene another meeting of Governmental Experts, within two years, to review the progress made and chart the best way forward.

3.4 The United States and Early Warning

In move that indicates a clear departure from the bully-like approach of the tenure of his successor George Bush, the current president of the most powerful and influential nation on earth, Barack Obama while addressing the United Nations Summit on the 23rd of September 2009 declared that his administration will pursue a policy of engagement instead of confrontation in its foreign policy. This portends great incentives for international peace and security. It is in the context of the above statement that this unit situates the activities of the United States and early warning systems.

In a paper by Lute (2000) the US should use her foreign policy as an instrument of pursuing peace and preventing violent conflicts and wars around the world through the reinforcement of early warning systems. This informed the preference for a need-based approach over a national interest-based approach. It begins with a persuasion that at this moment in U.S. history, core needs, rather than national interests (however “vital”) should ground U.S. foreign policymaking. These core needs, elaborated below, are: a) a safe and secure homeland; b) a dynamic economic engine capable of generating new wealth; c) strong friends and allies; and d) predictable relations with others. Meeting these needs requires at a minimum that the United States devise self-regarding strategies to manage its growth, promote prosperity, protect against dangers, and help strengthen others to act constructively on their own behalf and cooperatively in collective efforts.

In this regard, development assistance – even in its current, hobbled, earmarked state – plays an essential role in U.S. foreign policy. It is the only major U.S. policy that takes the longer view of circumstances abroad and of the longer term strategies likely to improve those circumstances by helping to create markets, reduce threats, encourage self-reliance, and promote rule-based regimes. In so doing, development assistance directly and uniquely serves each of the core U.S. needs noted above. Moreover, this distinctive focus on the longer term allows development aid to play a pivotal role in U.S. foreign policy more generally by reconciling two, perhaps overarching, strategic U.S. objectives:

- Maintaining U.S. preeminence and economic dynamism in
- A world changing for the better.

The conclusion in the paper by Lute (2000) paper is that to achieve maximum value for the dollars spent, development assistance should help prevent the emergence of mass violence via strategies of structural engagement. That is, the goal of development assistance should be to help create capable states. Capable states are characterized by several factors: representative governance based on the rule of law, market economic activity, and a thriving civil society. In these states, essential security, well-being, and

justice are available to all citizens. The societies of such states are not only better off they tend not to resort to violence to broker differences. Moreover, these states tend not only manage their own affairs in relative peace they also manage their relationships with neighbors and others in relative peace as well.

In a paper by USAID (2009), the organization argues that a vision with no plan is an aspiration with no reality and that the United States lacks an early warning alert system of potential conflict. It describes the current system in place as focusing on traditional threats that can be addressed through military means. Pointedly, the organization canvasses that a different approach is needed to redefine threats in terms of the core needs of the American public. This allows one to better anticipate and respond to emerging threats. The interests-based approach is only concerned with the present; it reflects, not drives, strategies. A need-based approach, on the other hand, endures. Core U.S. needs rather than national interests should ground foreign policy. They are:

- A safe and secure home land.
- A dynamic economic engine capable of generating new wealth.
- Strong friends and allies.
- Predictable relations with others.

The above is no doubt a candid reference for the United States to improve her assistance to other countries in the enhancement of early warning capabilities. Putting the foregoing especially the fourth point within the perspective of the statement made by President Barack Obama, one can posit that the United States under the present leadership is poised to substantially increase the support given to all measures that would prevent the occurrence of violent conflicts in different parts of the world.

In the case of Nigeria the country has no verifiable system for collating early warning signs of violent conflicts in the country besides the intelligence gathered by security agents

who oftentimes place regime security above human security. Even checks on the website of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution offer no clue into the existence of any for of such systems in place. Little wonder then that when violent conflicts erupt the security agencies themselves are usually caught napping.

4.0 Conclusion

This unit has exposed you to the attitude of international organizations and some countries to early warning. The findings reveal the yawning gap between early warning systems as a concept and the attitude of governments to the instrument. Much as international organizations like the USAID harp on the need for increased support between the governments and international organizations for early warning systems, the results have not been exceptionally impressive but for continued promises being made intermittently by some of the stake-holders. Back home in the in Nigeria, the effects of the absence of early warning systems to complement the efforts of the men of the security agencies are too obvious to be ignored. All the foregoing justify the need for improved support for the institutionalisation and operationalization of early warning systems through a more cooperative approach by both governments and international organizations.

5.0 Summary

The unit has presented the attitude of governments and international organizations to early warning systems using the United States, Nigeria and the USAID and the Africa Union as illustrations. An indication of hope can be seen based on the deliberations of the Africa Union as presented in the unit but empirical findings pour water on the prospects of such moves. Nevertheless, hopes of a more concerted approach to support the operationalization and institutionalization of early warning systems are rising.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Discuss some of the steps taken by the Africa Union to put in place a Continental Early Warning System.

- Compare and contrast the attitude of the United States as a superpower to early warning supports under the administration of George Bush (Jnr) and Barack Obama.
- Using Nigeria as a case-study, discuss the effects of favouring intelligence gathering by security agents over the institutionalization of an effective early warning system.

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Unit 4: Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning Signs

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Objectives

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

The peace and conflict impact assessment and early warning signs or systems of conflict actually mutually interact in practice because they can be quite complementary. As students and practitioners in the field peace studies and conflict management, it is incumbent on you to be adept in carrying out conflict impact assessment. This is because it substantially aids the use of early warning as a conflict preventing strategy. This unit will answer questions on what constitutes conflict impact assessment, why and when does it become necessary and for whom it is intended. These questions will take us deeper into how it can be applied as a complementary tool of early warning.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to :

4. know the meaning of peace and conflict impact assessment
5. Know how to carry out peace and conflict impact assessment with substantial precision.
6. Have insight into the relationship between peace and conflict impact assessment on one hand and developmental projects on the other hand.

3.0 Main Contents

We shall proceed in this unit by first of all asking to know the logic behind the whole idea of peace and conflict impact assessment. This will lead us into what brought about the concept and why the two are related. According to Bush (N.D) the peace and conflict impact assessment covers both the pre-conflict stage and the post conflict stage. This is why it is essential to grasp the logic behind the ideas. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment serves as a means of evaluating the likely impact of any intervention meant to promote peace and to stem violence. This can be done at the post-conflict stage when hostilities might have ceased or to prevent violent conflagrations based on analysis of early warning. It can serve dual purposes of examining the impact of proposed programmes on the following as enunciated by Bush :

- Those structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict,
- Those structures and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means. Where necessary, *ex ante* assessments of projects should consider alternative project designs (including the "no-action" alternative), as well as mitigation measures or "peace and conflict safeguards" that could be incorporated into a project's design to offset potentially adverse impacts.

The assessment would be most useful when initiated at the earliest stage of project design to ensure from the outset that aid projects are sound and sustainable. The peace and conflict impact assessment of development projects differs from "evaluation" in the conventional sense because its scope extends far beyond the *stated* outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives of conventional development projects or programmes. Rather, it aims to discern a project's impact on the peace and conflict environment — an area it may not have been designed explicitly to affect. Thus, it is quite possible that a project may fail

according to limited developmental criteria (*e.g.*, irrigation targets, health care delivery, literacy levels) but succeed according to broader peacebuilding criteria.

For example, an education project may fail to produce students able to pass state-wide exams, but may succeed in reducing tensions between particular social groups by creating and institutionalizing a non-threatening and constructive environment that increases neutral contact and decreases misunderstanding by dispelling stereotypes and misconceptions through interactions that take place in such institutions.

Unless there is sensitivity to the peacebuilding and social reconstruction achievements of this hypothetical project, then it would be cast as a failure. The converse also holds true. It is possible that a project may succeed according to pre-determined developmental criteria but fail in terms of a beneficial impact on peace. To continue with the hypothetical example above: an education project may indeed succeed in the state-wide examinations, however, if the bulk of those students are members of one particular social group, then the project may exacerbate inter-group tensions by underscoring the perception that one group is being privileged at the expense of another. Until we develop and apply the appropriate means to recognize such impact, our ability to understand (let alone reinforce) the positive linkages between development initiatives and peacebuilding will be hampered. At the most elemental level, both the *ex ante* peace and conflict impact assessment and the *ex post facto* peace and conflict impact evaluation, may be distilled down to a single — but far from simple — question: *Will/did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease to likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict?* To respond to this question, we must have an idea about where to look for possible impact; we must have a sense of the structures and processes that sustain peacebuilding or peace destroying systems.

As noted above, this requires us to look beyond the stated parameter of most projects. This study identifies five broad dimensions or categories of possible impact. While there

may be others, these five are judged to be the most immediate and important pieces of the peacebuilding puzzle. Projects may have a variety of impacts within and across categories.

Areas of Potential Impact

- Institutional Capacity Military and Human Security
- Political Structures and Processes
- Economic Structures and Processes
- Social Reconstruction and Empowerment

In the next sub-section we provide possible reasons on why we need a PCIA.

WHY DO WE NEED A PCIA?

This unit is premised on a central, underpinning assumption: *any* development project set in a conflict-prone region will *inevitably* have an impact on the peace and conflict environment — positive or negative, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional. The operational implication of this is that *not all development projects require peace and conflict impact assessments, only those in areas "at risk."* In very practical terms, any development worker active in these areas already conducts his or her own peace and Not all development projects require peace and conflict impact assessment, only those in areas of risk. The central criterion for determining whether to undertake a PCIA is the location of a project, rather than the type of project. conflict impact assessment intuitively. However, there is a need to formalize and systematize this process in order to be able to compare risk and impact across projects. The costs of not doing so are extremely high in financial, institutional, programming, and most importantly, human, terms.

The benefit is that it will enable us to "do" our development work more effectively and sustainably. It should help us to avoid undertaking development projects which undercut the peacebuilding process. For example, the consideration of the peace and conflict dimensions of a proposed project or programme helps us to consider whether it might contribute directly or indirectly to the violation of internationally accepted

conventions governing human and civil rights. The need to fashion and employ some form of PCIA is sharpened by the fact that:

- we are seeing increased opportunities to contribute to the developmental dimensions of peacebuilding as a number of long-standing militarized conflicts appear to be winding down (*e.g.*, Mozambique, Eritrea, South Africa, Guatemala, and Palestine) and;
- Development actors are choosing to stay and work under conditions of militarized conflict that previously would have forced them to close down operations. The continued presence of development actors under such conditions is important in its own right.

However, their continued presence also helps to build operational and institutional linkages between humanitarian work driven by the imperative of responsiveness, and development work which places a priority on national and local capacity-building.

FOR WHOM IS THE PCIA INTENDED?

Ideally, a PCIA would be used by all development actors involved in decision making in conflict-prone regions — although different types of actors might rely on it in different ways. International donors might rely on it to guide project selection, funding decisions, and monitoring, whereas implementing or operational agencies might well use it to design projects and to guide operational decisions. The PCIA may also be used by communities themselves within violence prone regions as a means of assessing the utility, relevance and efficacy of outside-sponsored development initiatives. Thus, it may serve to enable them to engage more effectively with formal development actors in the peacebuilding process by providing a common framework for dialogue and cooperation.

There is a clear danger that communities may be excluded from international development initiatives in post-conflict settings (particularly large scale initiatives). This is certainly the assessment of a group of community-based organizations in the San Marcos region of Guatemala on the border with Chiapas which published a statement in the

national press expressing concern that current initiatives are exacerbating existing “socio-economic contradictions” — some of which originate in the era of militarized violence of Guatemala, and some of which predate it.

The PCIA might be employed by such groups as one means to articulate interests and to express dissent when confronted with efforts to impose inappropriate development projects.

WHEN AND WHERE SHOULD IT BE APPLIED?

We need to be clear about when and where it would be appropriate to undertake a PCIA. It would be burdensome, unnecessary, and perhaps counter-productive, to expect PCIA's for all projects. If we understand peacebuilding to be an impact rather than a type of project., then the central criterion for determining whether to consider undertaking a PCIA is the *location* of a project, rather than the *type* of project. If a project will be located in environments characterized by the following conditions, then we ought to consider whether or not a full Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment may be necessary. Ultimately, the decision boils down to the judgement of the development workers involved, based on their understanding of past and evolving conditions within which a project is situated. **Settings characterized by latent or manifest violent conflict (particularly in the so-called "post-conflict" or "transition" settings)**

The phrase "settings characterized by latent or manifest violent conflict" covers a staggeringly large range of cases. At first glance, it appears easier to identify those environments "characterized by manifest violent conflict" than those characterized by "latent violence." A list of cases of manifest violence would include both those that appear regularly

in the pages of our newspapers (Algeria, Bosnia, the Great Lakes Region), as well as those that are less evident in the media (Sudan, Northern Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, Eastern Turkey). A list of examples of latent violence might include Northern Ireland, South Africa, Mozambique, and Kenya. Typically, these are areas which are at risk of sliding

back into the protracted militarized violence of the recent past. While violence may not be as pervasive, it is the variations of violence within cases (across time, and across space) that opens up the possibilities for development projects to have constructive peacebuilding impacts. Collective experiences of violence serve to inscribe or burn political significance and meaning onto and into the physical landscape. or systematic as it once was in these cases, the structures which nurtured such violence in the past remain present and liable to explode suddenly. Even this short list of countries above suggests a number of essential points about the nature of violent conflict:

- the considerable variation *between cases*, (for example, differences in the levels, patterns, dispersion, intensity, and dynamics of violence, as well as variations in group impact); and
- the ebb and flow of violent conflict over time *within cases*, so that conflicts in the "latent" category today, may well shift to the "manifest" category tomorrow (*e.g.*, Cambodia).

Equally important, though perhaps less apparent if we rely too heavily on media reports, is the variation in peace and conflict conditions that exists *within* each of these cases at any given point in time. In Uganda and Sri Lanka for example, we see a rigidly compartmentalized form of militarized conflict, where large military operations and intensive fighting are spatially concentrated in the northern regions of each country. In such cases, the line or interface between the war zone and non-war zone is sharp (the Nile River in Uganda, and until recently, Vavunya in Sri Lanka).¹⁴ In other cases, conditions within conflict zones may vary depending on time of day, day of week, or the season.

It is the variations of violence within cases (across time, and across space) that opens up the possibilities for development projects to have constructive peacebuilding impacts. In other words, even in the most extreme cases, violence is neither undifferentiated nor impenetrable.

Territory which is contested or politically and legally ambiguous

Like the condition above, the phrase "territory which is contested or politically and legally ambiguous" requires elaboration. In violent conflicts, geography is unavoidably politicized. The fact that the individual and community experience of violence is rooted in place — *where* one is from, *where* one is living, *where* one was taken to, *where* an event took place. Collective experiences of violence serve to inscribe or burn political significance and meaning onto and into the physical landscape. In some cases the political sensitivities (or political "valence") of a particular location may not be immediately obvious to the outside observer, for example the site of a particular atrocity or a neighbourhood known for its resistance to, or allegiance to, particular political-military forces. Such political demarcations create areas which become sites for social, political, and economic contestation. *Social contestation* would include ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, eastern Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. *Political contestation* would include the deadly confrontations for control over neighbourhoods between African National Congress (ANC) supporters and those of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which dominated many of the townships surrounding Durban, South Africa, in the late 1980s. *Economic contestation* would include the competition between military and paramilitary groups to benefit economically from their control of a particular regions, *e.g.*, the battles for control over natural resources and drug trafficking in the border areas of Thailand and Cambodia, and the "taxing" of inhabitants by paramilitaries around the world from Belfast to Jaffna.

Additionally, territory may be contested legally, for example over the question of the ownership of, or access to, land and the resources associated with that land. This includes the whole question of land tenure and the possible tensions between the interests of government, business, and small scale farmers. In some instances, land may be contested both politically and legally, as in parts of Palestine, and large tracts of land in North America claimed by aboriginal peoples and the governments of Canada and the United States.

4.0 Conclusion

Although, a plethora of materials on the concept of peace and conflict impact assessment, this unit has presented the concept as lucidly as possible based on a combination of theoretical and empirical illustrations. The essence is to show the intrinsic relationship amongst some of the issues raised in this course as a whole and this unit in particular.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented the concept of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment as very useful tool to complement early warning in order to forestall the reoccurrence of violent conflicts. Different useful guides on how to use the concept were also presented.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Explain what you understand by the term Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.
2. Based on what you have learnt in this unit when and where is PCIA necessary.

7.0 References and Further Reading

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Module 5

- Unit 1: Approaches to Early Response
- Unit 2: Evaluation of Early Response
- Unit 3: Government and Early Response
- Unit 4: International Organizations and Early Response

Contents

- 1.0: Introduction
- 2.0: Objectives
- 3.0: Main Contents
- 4.0: Conclusion
- 5.0: Summary
- 6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

It no gainsaying that the compilation and communication of early warning signs of violent conflicts to the appropriate quarters without the deserving response will not only render the totality of efforts put into the activity a worthless one, it will also bring about the continuation of violence intermittently without abating. This is why equal attention must be given to both the preparation of early warning and early response. By evaluating early response we are attempting to identify the responses to early warning signs and incipient conflicts as the case may be. In this unit, this will be done by examining the responses of the Nigerian state in order to ascertain whether these responses have been effective or not. The conflicts to be used as illustrations will be religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts and electoral. These are conflicts that intermittently threaten the integrity of the country.

3.0 Main Contents (Religious Conflicts)

The history of religious conflicts in Nigeria is a reminder of sadness, pain and agony based on the attendant woes that arise from such conflicts across the country. But the question to ask is whether like Tsunamis, these conflicts happen without any early warning signs, if these signs are communicated to the right quarter and if we have been having the appropriate responses to these conflicts. Considering the litany of violent religious conflicts in the country, one of these shall be used as illustration to evaluate the response of the Nigerian state to early warning signs and incipient conflicts.

Nigeria has experienced over 34 violent religious conflicts since the first one in 1980. According to Lawal (2009) a chronicle of violent religious conflicts in Nigeria shows that since the first violent religious conflict led by Maitatsine a Camerounian from the Kotok extraction who built a notorious religious community in Kano, there have been 36 other incidents of violent religious conflicts. Out of these, 34 occurred in northern Nigeria, mostly in Kano, Kaduna, Borno, Bauchi, Plateau and Kwara states. Two occurred in the southwestern cities of Osogbo in Osun state in 2001 and Saki in Oyo state in 2000.

3.1 Early Warning and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Case of Boko-Haram

According to Lawal (2009) there had been the existence of a religious sect that goes by the name Yusufiyah and in local parlance known as Boko-Haram meaning Western Education is sinful for Muslims. This sect started in Maiduguri the capital of Borno in northern Nigeria. This unit identifies the failure of intelligence and negligence of early warning signs by the authorities as remote causes for the blood bath that started on the June 11, 2009 in Maiduguri following a gun duel between members of this sect and the Nigeria police. In the shoot-out, the police lost about seven men and over 150 members of the sect were killed while the members of the sect burnt over thirty vehicles. However, available reports indicate that the activities of the sect started since 2001. According to Lawal (2009) the residents knew since 2001 that the state was sitting on a keg of gun powder as the security agencies were undermining them and postponing the evil day. As an

isolated incidence of religious conflict, it can be described as negligence of apparent early warning sign and failure of intelligence. We can see from this that the response to early warning signs in by the concerned authorities have often been reactive, destructive and laden with human rights abuses as in the case under review.

Also, in a special report contained in The Guardian Newspaper on Sunday, 10 January 2010, the proceedings of a conference held between October 1 and 3 2009 organized by the Dithcley Foundation in the United Kingdom that had as its theme: *The Prospects for Nigeria*, revealed that there was an increase in Christian fundamentalism in the middle-belt area of Nigeria. Interestingly, this is the area that has been the hotbed of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. This revelation really serves as an early warning of likely balance of terror between Christianity and Islam in the region with severe implications for peace and security in the country. According to the proceedings; religious symbols were becoming much more visible than tribal ones and the more radical groups were emerging from the grass roots. This serves as an early warning sign because hitherto Christian Fundamentalism was not heard of in Nigeria. Equally Therefore, in addressing this scourge, the early response must be broad and give adequate attention to both religions.

3.2 Early Warning and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: The Debacle on the Plateau

Ethnic conflicts are not new in Nigeria. In fact, ethnicity can not be divorced from the Nigeria civil war. One of the worst hit States of the country by this human-made disaster is Plateau State that has Jos as its capital city. The conflict in Plateau state has persistently pitched the hosts against the settlers in a manner that gives resonance to the issues of citizenship and the national question as basis of inter-ethnic contestations and violence in Nigeria. This unit is particularly addresses how early warning has fared or failed the nation in the management or response to the litany of ethnic conflicts in the state. Simbine (2004) provides a cursory look into the conflict history of Plateau state. According

to her, inter-ethnic relations was cordial until the around 1980 when the people stepped up their agitation for freedom alongside other groups in that were in the Middle Belt Region for freedom from the political apron strings of the Hausa-Fulani typified by the *Kaduna Mafia or Northern Oligarchy*. Simbine (2004) informs further that the killing of Mohammed Marwa while he was taking refuge in Jos shattered the religious harmony in the state. Since then political and religious issues have conflated together in a mutating manner that has made violent inter-ethnic conflicts a recurring decimal in the state. The spate of these conflicts calls to question the capacity and sincerity of the concerned authorities to detect and nip incipient conflicts in the bud. This exposes the lack of a functional early warning and early response system in place despite the fact that the state is a known flashpoint of violent conflicts.

3.3 Approaches to Early Response and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Accounts and analysis of political violence in Nigeria's history abound. See (Anifowose, 2003; Usman, 2002; Ayorinde, 2007; Olurode (Ed), 2006; Sanni, 2007 and Animsawun 2009). All these aforementioned scholars analysed, lamented and condemned the dominance of brawn over brain and the preference for the logic of force over the force of logic on the part of political gladiators in their quest for political power. In the extant fourth republic, this has assumed a more horrendous dimension. However, there is a clear cut difference between acts of violence targeted at political opponents at periods other than election periods. In the case of electoral violence, it can be described as a predictable one because it takes an interval of usually 4 years before elections are held. Therefore, as part of preparations for elections, sufficient attention should be paid to ensuring there is early response to all detected cases of electoral violence.

In Nigeria, electoral violence has assumed a major threat to the consolidation of democracy because of its torpedoing effects on peace and development. Consequently instead of democracy and elections to promote peace and development they have constituted needless obstructions to meaningful progress in this context. However, it is also

sickening that despite the apparent indications that are always present as elections approach, electoral violence still constitutes avoidable humanitarian disasters during elections. In responding to early warning signs of electoral violence it is evident that the Nigerian state has not been able to get on top of the menace because. This indicates a plausible ineffectiveness either on the part of the authorities or agencies concerned.

Since the commencement of the fourth republic all the successive elections since 1999 have witnessed an increasing rate of violence including the last one held in 2007. a graphical representation of this would show that these acts of violence have been moving in upward manner since 1999. Therefore, it would have been expected that adequate measures were put in place in the period preceding and during the elections of 2007. However, all available reports based eye-witnesses accounts agree that the elections of that year were the most flawed because they were characterized by brazen acts of violence and rigging. To buttress this, the late President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria owned publicly on this.

4.0 Conclusion

The realities of flawed early responses to the three categories of conflicts in this unit underscore the need to continuously evaluate and re-tune the early response mechanisms that have been used so far to make them more efficacious in forestalling the occurrence of future conflicts especially in the contexts discussed above.

5.0 Summary

The unit highlighted the necessity of having effective early response mechanism in place. This was illustrated by three types of conflicts that have been prevalent in the country. These are religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts and electoral violence. It advocates for a continual evaluation and fine-tuning of the existing response mechanisms to make more pro-active and responsive. This is because of the seeming lack of any verifiable or effective response to early warning signs of violent conflicts in the country.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Considering the spate of avoidable violence in Plateau state, how do you think early warning can be linked to early response?
- How can early response to early warning prevent electoral violence?

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Unit 2: Evaluation of Early Response

Contents

- 1.0: Introduction
- 2.0: Objectives
- 3.0: Main Contents
- 4.0: Objectives
- 5.0: Summary
- 6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction

In order to prevent pit-falls and misleading conclusions, it is necessary to learn how to evaluate early response as students of peace studies. This is because early warning serves a lot of useful purposes for the prevention of violent conflicts and preventive diplomacy. As a measure meant to prevent the escalation of conflicts, early response can be measured based on steps taken by appropriate authorities in response to early warning signs and intelligence because the two are usually available for those in authority. However, in the evaluation of early response, there are certain limitations confronting us because the full measures of early response may not be available because most information sourced by intelligence agencies are classified documents not meant for the general public. Nevertheless, evaluating approaches to early warning signs in this unit will be based on empirical and verifiable steps taken by the concerned authorities in nipping incipient conflicts in the bud.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Measure the efficacy of some of these steps based on examples
- Evaluate and recommend accordingly more appropriate early responses.

3.0 : Main Contents

By early response steps we refer to steps taken by the appropriate agencies of the state to prevent the outbreak of violence or breach of public peace based on information on early warning signs of conflicts at their disposal. In this regard an assessment of the responses to incipient and emergent conflicts by the Nigerian specifically the federal government will be presented for evaluation. In evaluating the measures of early response by the Nigerian State, we inadvertently dive into an evaluation of the agencies saddles with such responsibilities. At this juncture, we must be mindful that we are imagining pre-conflict scenario, that is, a situation in which we have not witnessed full-blown exchange of violent hostilities.

At present, the agency saddled with the responsibility of analysing and proposing appropriate measures to address conflicts within the country is the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in the office of the president. Through the series of intensive activities undertaken through collaboration with international donors (DFID, UNDP, USAID and World Bank) between July and October 2002, the IPCR came out with a comprehensive report on the strategic assessment of conflicts in Nigeria. The assessment contains a detailed analysis of issues that have engendered violent conflicts. The report also points out the inadequacy of state-led approaches viewing them as escalating rather than mitigating the conflicts.

The report as well categorises government responses to conflict as; *security* response, - often reactive and based on force ignoring the root causes of conflict. Although, this is helpful in checkmating parallel economies on which militias usually rely on (Wennmann, 2005). Also, the limitation of such security approach that relies only on force

has been exposed by Wennmann (2005) this is because organised armed groups change their methods if existing strategies no longer look effective and external variables change. It is therefore illusory to think that, when one method of financing is cut, a belligerent could ask for mercy, accept a peace plan and reintegrate to civil society. Organised armed groups such as the Niger Delta Development Force (NDDF), which has metamorphosed into the Movement for The Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria are able to adapt to other circumstances and mobilize for renewed violence (Wennmann 2005) largely due to the force-based security approach adopted by the Nigerian state.

The second response is *relief* response this basically entails distribution of relief materials, which sometimes worsens the conflict because of the discriminatory or disproportionate way it is done. The *political* response is when commissions of inquiry are set up. However, their recommendations hardly get published or implemented. Another type of political response includes the creation of new administrative units which sometimes renames the conflict. For example, the buffer zone created by Colonel Peter Ogar one time military governor of Kwara State as one of the measures to address incessant border disputes between the Erin-Ile and the Offa communities in Kwara State provided the setting for a recent social conflagration in the state (Oni, 2006; Jegede, 2006). Nwolise (2006) describes a situation like that as government inconsistency which exacerbates conflicts. According to Nwolise (2006) failure to implement the first white paper from a judicial commission of inquiry headed by Justice Nweje set up by Colonel Attah paved the way for the devastating war of 1999-2000 in Aguleri and Umuleri. This shows the fragility that trails most State led approaches without the complementary support of other stakeholders especially NGOs.

Economic response has informed the establishment of parastatals or commissions like the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC). In Nigeria it can also be observed that this has not fulfilled its objective in most cases. The most apparent of such places is

the Niger–Delta region of the country. Since 1961 when the Niger Delta Development Board was constituted, successive economic responses have not met the needs of the people and neither has it changed the adversarial relationship between the people of the region and the federal government of Nigeria. *Social* response includes activities of organisations like the National Orientation Agency (NOA) alongside the government; however, this often has minimal effect on the parties in conflict. There are also political Non-Governmental responses usually anchored by traditional rulers within the context of social response.

The FGN (2003) pays little attention to conflict issues that do not have anything to do with resource-based conflict. This is indeed a lacuna cognisant of the intricacies, trajectories and effects of conflicts that touch on identity, ideology or value-based conflicts characteristic of communal conflict.

An evaluation of these responses would lead us to the conclusion that practically nothing gets done at the institutional level before the escalation of conflicts based on early warning signs of conflicts. Even, in evaluating the responses how late they may be, they can not be described as producing the desired results in the prevention of conflicts.

4.0 Conclusion

This unit presents instances of responses to conflicts by the Nigerian state and the conclusion is that most of these responses are late. This indicates that nothing practically is done to pro-actively nip incipient conflicts in the bud. Evaluation of these responses further shows that the state is more reactive than pro-active to early warning signs.

5.0 Summary

The unit discussed the evaluation of early responses and cited empirical examples of the responses by the Nigerian state to violent conflicts with a conclusion that most of these responses are reactive rather than being pro-actively for them to effectively nip incipient conflicts in the bud.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Discuss the appropriateness and effectiveness of responses to conflict by the Nigerian state.

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Unit 3: Government and Early Response

Contents

1.0: Introduction

2.0: Objectives

3.0: Main Contents

4.0: Conclusion

5.0: Summary

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 : Introduction

One of the statutory responsibilities of the government is the protection of lives and property. This also includes the provision of peace and security for all within her borders and the maintenance of peaceful relations with other sovereign nation-states. So, it is compulsory for the managers of the affairs of the state to ensure that measures are put in place to guarantee the safety of lives and property in their. So in order to adequately perform the afore-mentioned functions the state must be ensure there is an effective early response in place. This is because conflict is inevitable in our lives. This unit will acquaint you with the responsibilities of government in providing early response to early warnings of violent conflicts especially in divided societies. This is why this unit will focus on the provision of early response domestically by nation-states. In presenting or discussing government and early response, a number of variables must be taken into consideration. Also, the context must be specified to distinguish early response at the intra-state level and early warning at the inter-nation-state context. This will help in shaping our thoughts and give clarity to illustrations. Some of these variables include the type of political leadership

in place whether it military or civilian, this is because different political authorities will have different perceptions of what should constitute early response. Also, the extent of plurality of the society would also play a role in determining which early response measure to be put in place by the government. In this unit, the focus will be on government and early response in intra-national conflicts.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Understand how certain governments view early response
- Know how early response serves as a conflict prevention measure

3.0 Main Contents

The focus of this unit will be Nigeria because it is a plural country with features that have become conflict-generating but which are yet to receive effective responses. The two leading variables in this context are ethnicity and religion. Therefore, we attempt to examine the actions of government in putting in place structures and mechanisms to serve early response purposes. Early response in this context is taken as; the institutionalization activation of structures to address early warning signs of conflicts pro-actively before they degenerate into chaos or peace threatening occurrences. In this context we shall therefore concentrate on early response to early warning signs in distinction to the preceding unit where focus was on early response to conflicts. However, in understanding how a particular government views early response, the attitude of the government to early warning and intelligence must be understood. This can however be done only by a critical examination of the frequency of violent conflicts in such communities and what such states do to analyse, detect and prevent the repeated occurrence of same types of conflicts.

The creation of Nigeria and its prevalent structure has been described as fundamentally flawed because it is skewed in favour of a particular section of the country,

(Osghae & Onwudiwe, 2007 and Ayoade, 2009). According to Ayoade (2009), the mistake of 1914 (amalgamation) became a northern advantage. However, the Federal Character was adopted as a measure to address the imbalance. But in reality this has given more empowerment to the north in federal civil service. This is because the federal character implies equal representation of states in the organs of the federal government. This resulted in a ratio of 19: 17 (52.8%), an arithmetical injustice that has perpetuated socio-political injustice. This is despite the fact that the country has well over 300 distinct ethnic groups. This implies that conflict is inevitable considering the limited nature of resources and innate nature of man to compete for resources. Resources in this context include political, economic, environmental and spatial. Therefore, early response must be put in place at both administrative and structural levels.

The adoption of consociational democracy as both an early response and conflict management strategy has been well discussed in previous units. Therefore, this unit will shift attention to other instruments put in place to serve as early response in preventing the feeling of alienation or exclusion by constituents of the country. As multi-ethnic country and as expected, there has been frequent competition for spatial, economic, social and political advantages which sometime get fierce. One of these instruments is the practice of federalism. According to Wheare quoted in Ojo (2009: 11):

“Federalism or federal government ...is the method of dividing power so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere to co-ordinate and independent... the delimited and co-ordinate division of the government functions. Any system that does not conform with this criterion, has no claim to call itself federal.”

Therefore, the extent of Nigeria's federalism can be measured against the above definition. From this, we can posit that Nigeria's federalism has been substantially federal, (Adebanwi, 2004; Yaqub 2004 and Agbaje, 2003). This in turn has had a negative effect on inter-ethnic relations and sometimes serving as the remote and immediate causes of violent conflicts in the country.

Nevertheless, there are institutions in place for the management of the country's diversity since the pre-independence days. Ojo (2009:72)

1. Amalgamation: This marked the first attempt to integrate the disparate peoples of Nigeria. However, there are many critics of this idea, (Adebanwi, 2007). Most criticisms of the idea premised their disagreement on the fact that it was intended to ease the administration of the British imperialists and not basically for integrating the people.
2. Nigerianisation Policy: This was meant to replace foreigners or expatriates as they were known who held top positions of prominence in the public service and bureaucracy with Nigerians.
3. National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme: Established after the civil war to create interaction amongst the emerging elites with the assumption that if the they were brought together to interact they would have a better understanding and appreciation of the Nigerian state. However, there have been several criticisms of the scheme. These have been informed by corruption and embezzlement. An example was the case of an ex-director who corruptly enriched himself with #7. 23 million within a year. According to the Special Military Tribunal, Obasa, the said director had surrendered #7.23 million to including 47,000 pound sterling withdrawn from his account at the Barclay's Bank in London. Also, many corp-members have been killed during

- ethno-religious conflicts in different parts of the country. All of these detract from the lofty and integrative potentials of the scheme.
4. Unity Schools: This is another strategy evolved by the government to promote national integration which qualifies as an early response initiative because it intends to prevent feelings of prejudice and make young ones to appreciate diversity. However, the admission policy into these schools has been a clog in progress of the scheme.
 5. National Language Policy: clause 54 of the Independence constitution of 1960 states that the business of the parliament shall be conducted in English. On 21 November 1961 Mallam A.T Balla moved a motion urging the government to introduce the teaching of Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and other languages into institutions of higher learning throughout the federation with the a view that one of them will be later adopted as the official language. However, this idea has been confronted with emotional and practical problems because which of these will be relegated or chosen as the official language without reactions.

4.0 Conclusion

It is clear from the preceding that the government has put in place a number of structures and institutions in early response to anticipated conflicts from the socio-cultural and religious plurality of Nigeria. However, an evaluation of these structures leaves much to be desired because they can not be said or seen to have enhanced inter-ethnic and inter-religious cooperation and peaceful co-existence going by the spate of violent conflicts around the country that seemed to have turned the plurality of the country into a burden. Therefore, there is an urgent need to re-tool or reinvent more efficacious policies that will effectively serve the purpose of early response and reduce the frequency of violent conflicts around the country.

5.0 Summary

The course unit discussed early and defined early response. Using Nigeria as a reference, it also presented and pointed out the flaws and challenges of some of these instruments currently in place to serve the purpose of early response.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Evaluate the practice of federalism in Nigeria as form of early response to anticipated conflicts from Nigeria's plurality.
- What are the flaws of any 2 of the instruments or structures of early response presented in this unit?

7.0 References and Further Reading

Adebanwi, W. (2007). 'Clashing Cymbals: The Nigerian Press and the Narratives of the National Question'. In: Osaghae, E.E & Onwudiwe. E. 2007. (Eds) *The Management of the National Question in Nigeria*. Okada, Igbinedion University Press.

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Agbaje, A. (2003). 'The Historical Antecedent of the Phenomenon of Ethnic Militias in Nigeria'. In: *Urban Violence Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria* (Ed) Tunde Babawale. Lagos. Malthouse Press Limited.

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- Ojo, E.O (2009). *Mechanisms of National Integration in Multi-Ethnic Federal State The Nigerian Experience*. Ibadan. John Archers
- Osaghae, E.E. and Onwudiwe, E. (2007). *The Management of the National Question in Nigeria*. (Eds) Okada. Igbinedion University.
- Yaqub, O.N. (2004). 'The Travails of Federalism'. In: Agbaje A.B.A, Diamond. L and, Onwudiwe. E (Eds) *Nigeria's Struggle For Democracy And Good Governance; A Festschrift For Oyeleye Oyediran*. Ibadan .Ibadan University Press.

Unit 4: International Organizations and Early Response

Contents

- 1.0 : Introduction
- 2.0 : Objectives
- 3.0: Main Contents
- 4.0: Conclusion
- 5.0: Summary
- 6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations have become ubiquitous in the socio-political and economic landscape. They have been involved in humanitarian services, international mediation and negotiation, peace-building assistance and providing early response assistance. This unit takes you through the early response activities of some of these international organizations including selected international non-governmental-organizations, (INGOs). The unit will also present you to the challenges confronting these international organizations in the collation and dissemination of early warning signs and early response.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- Know some major international organizations
- Know the activities and challenges of these international organizations

- Know the challenges confronting these international organizations.

3.0 Main Contents

Since the dawn of a seeming borderless world, international organizations have taken advantage of this freedom and have been actively making their presence felt in virtually all spheres of human endeavour. These international organizations have also been actively involved in the compilation, monitoring and communication of early warning signs of conflicts. The activities of these international organizations have been immensely aided by the revolution in Information and Communication Technology, (ICT). Although, there are many international organizations functioning in different fields, the focus of this unit will be on those working in the field of early warning and early response.

The “Declaration by United Nations” of January 1, 1942 after an earlier proclamation of its Charter on August 14, 1941 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of seeking peace in troubled zones of the world, (Satow, 1956). Although, it has many agencies performing different several humanitarian functions, many international organizations have since emerged. However, most of these are international non-governmental-organizations. This unit provides a list and addresses of some international organizations involved in early warning and early response to disasters, democratic reversals or break-downs, violent conflicts and human rights abuses.

Since 1991, African leaders have been brainstorming on how to have in place an effective early response mechanism to violent conflicts in the continent. According to Aderinwale, (N.D: 26-29) a proposal was submitted to Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) containing the Kampala Document on a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa. On security, the proposal contains the following recommendations that are equally synonymous with early response:

- Serious attention must be paid to measures to prevent or contain crises before they erupt into violent confrontations;
- Internal and external security of Africa must derive from a framework of common and collective continental security;
- African governments must individually and collectively be guided by the principle of good neighbourliness and peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- National/continental self-reliance in certain strategic areas is vital for Africa's security and must cover both military and non-military aspects.

The policy recommendations of the proposal encouraged the setting up of the following:

1. Mechanism for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration;
2. Peace-Keeping Operations based on the following:
 - A). Identification of authorizing body for mandating the establishment, extension and termination of peace-keeping-operations;
 - B). Command and control measures;
 - C). Administration and logistical support arrangements;
 - D). Financing and funding systems;
 - E). Procedures for enlisting troops;
 - F). Raid deployment modalities.
3. Non-Aggression Pacts
4. Lowering of Military Expenditures
5. African Elders Council for Peace

Presented below is a list of some agencies and international organizations involved in early warning and early response.



International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning

← PPEW Home

UN/ISDR headquarters

UN/ISDR Africa

UN/ISDR Latin America and the Caribbean

ISDR Asia Partnership

Early warning actors

[Main participants in early warning systems](#) - [United Nations authorities](#) - [Links to early warning organizations and issues](#)

Links to early warning organizations and issues

This list will be progressively developed by PPEW - if your site is relevant to early warning of disasters, or if there are corrections, updates or additions to be made, please email us at isdr-ppew@un.org

Categories of links

UN Agencies and Organizations		
Division for Sustainable Development (DSD), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA)	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Wide range of documents sorted by topic.	http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	FAO main site gives access to crop monitoring and food security information (see GIEWS).	http://www.fao.org/
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	Funds projects and programs that protect the global environment.	http://www.gefweb.org/
Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS)	A first global one-stop shop for early warning information for all natural hazards and for socio-political developments that provides systematic, credible and real-time early warning. This web site is an IASC common tool, managed by WFP.	http://www.hewsweb.org/
Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR)	Main source for disaster risk reduction information.	http://www.unisdr.org/
Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA)	UN coordination of space activities - space-based observations are important to monitoring and early warning.	http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Disaster response and relief coordination; includes early warning activities	http://ochaonline.un.org/

(OCHA)		
Relief Web	Comprehensive and up to date news on natural disasters.	http://www.reliefweb.int/
Small Island Developing States Network (SIDS)	The global network for small island developing States.	http://www.sidsnet.org/index.html
UN System-wide Earthwatch	United Nations System-wide Earthwatch mechanism is a broad UN initiative to coordinate, harmonize and catalyze environmental observation activities among UN agencies for integrated assessment purposes.	http://www.earthwatch.unep.net/
United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD)	The Disaster Management Planning Hyogo Office site provides information mainly on earthquakes.	http://www.hyogo.uncrd.or.jp/index.htm
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	Early warning signs for desertification.	http://www.unccd.int/
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	UNESCO concerned with disaster prevention and education; also has divisions on earth sciences and water issues.	http://www.unesco.org/
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	Base for exploring topics related with UNEP. For early warning matters see the Division of Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA).	http://www.unep.org/ http://www.unep.org/dewa/index.asp
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	UNFCCC web site informs about climate change policy processes.	http://unfccc.int/
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)		http://www.unhabitat.org/
United Nations University/Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)	Started operations in 2004, has initial focus on flood risk.	http://www.ehs.unu.edu/
World Food Programme (WFP)	Is concerned with food security and food aid, has its own early warning and assessment capacity.	http://www.wfp.org/
World Health Organization (WHO)	Early warning of epidemics and disaster related information on nutrition and post disaster situation reports.	http://www.who.int/en/
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)	Main site of WMO with links to national weather services, and special programs, such as Severe Weather Information Center	http://www.wmo.int/
World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP)	Looking at the complete overview of global water issues.	http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/

Other international Organisations		
DIPECHO	European Commission department concerned with disaster prevention including early warning.	http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/field/dipecho/index_en.htm

Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)	GDACS provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including news, maps and V. OSOCC. It is managed by OCHA and provides near alerts immediately after the occurrence of sudden-onset disasters and automated impact calculations. GDACS links other web-based disaster information systems to provide consolidated disaster information in a one-stop shop. These systems include: ReliefWeb, Virtual OSOCC, UNOSAT (customised satellite images on demand), ASGARD (European Commission's tool for automated impact calculation and alert dissemination), and HEWS	http://www.gdacs.org/
International Red Cross-Disaster Reduction	Information on their work, including disaster preparedness and early warning.	http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/
ProVention Consortium	Information on DRM, links and partners	http://www.proventionconsortium.org/index.htm
The Virtual OSOCC	The Virtual OSOCC is managed by OCHA facilitates decision-making for international response to major disasters through real-time information exchange by all actors of the international disaster response community. There are some 5000 users from over 100 countries and organisations. Personal accounts can be configured to receive SMS and E-mail notifications in case of urgent situation developments or new sudden-onset disasters.	http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc/
World Bank, Disaster Management Facility (DMF)	DMF provides technical support to World Bank operations to promoted disaster prevention and mitigation as integral parts of programs.	http://www.worldbank.org
World Bank, Hazard Risk Management (HRM)	Information on HRM, links, and partners.	http://www.worldbank.org/hazards/index.htm

Regional and National Organisations		
African Development Bank		http://www.afdb.org/
Agency for Monitoring and Forecasting of Emergency Situations in Moscow, Russia Ministry of Emergency Situation	Information on forecasting of mainly seismic events, minor on fire and flooding.	http://www.ampe.ru/english/index.shtml
Asian Development Bank	ADB supports several early warning-projects	http://www.adb.org/default.asp
Asian Development Preparedness Center (ADPC)	ADPC supports various early warning programs, especially related to use of EI Nino information.	http://www.adpc.net/dms/AGDR2.html
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	CDB intends to be the leading Caribbean development finance institution.	http://www.caribank.org
CENAPRED	Mexico's national center for national	http://www.cenapred.unam.mx/

	disasters.	
Centro de Coordinación para Prevención de los Desastres naturales en América Central (CEPREDNAC)	CEPREDENAC is a Central American coordination centre for the strengthening of disaster prevention related capacities in the region.	http://disaster-info.net/ceprede/nac/04_temas/04_index.htm
Department for International Development (DFID)	DFID is the UK government department. focusing on sustainable development and poverty reduction.	http://www.dfid.orggov.uk/
Deutsches Komitee für Katastrophenvorsorge e.V. (DKKV)	National platform for disaster risk management in Germany. One focus of their work is on early warning.	www.dkkv.org
European Avalanche Service	Information platform for avalanches in the Alps as well as extensive link list for international avalanches warning services.	http://www.slf.ch/laworg/map.html
German Federal Foreign Ministry Section: Humanitarian Aid	One of the most important tasks of the Federal Foreign Office is bringing help to people who are in desperate need due to natural disaster, armed conflict or civil unrest.	http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/humanitaere_hilfe/index_html
Inter American Development Bank (IADB)	Projects and publication on early warning.	http://www.iadb.org/
PLANAT national platform for natural hazards	Natural hazard center of Switzerland, information on natural phenomena and climate change.	http://www.planat.ch/index.php?userhash=7755142&l=e&navID=154
The Andean Development Corporation (CAF)	CAF is a multilateral financial institution that promotes the sustainable development of its shareholder countries and regional integration.	http://www.caf.com/view/index.asp?ms=11&pageMs=13330
The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)	Warnings on storms and volcanic activity. The program "Caribbean Hazard Mitigation Capacity Building Programme (CHAMP) is a special activity.	http://www.cderra.org/index.php

Research Centers		
Benfield Hazard Research Centre	Focus on natural hazards, source for information and useful publications.	http://www.benfieldhrc.org/
Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology	Website informs about the current research projects, wide link list.	http://www.cedim.de/
Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology (CEDIM)	CEDIM informs on various ongoing projects concerning all type of natural hazards.	http://www.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/~gd202/www.cedim/english/seite_13.php
Centre for Natural Risks and Development	An Interdisciplinary Network for Social Science Oriented Disaster and Risk Research in Developing Countries. The Centre for Natural Risks and Development Bayreuth, Germany (ZENE) serves as a social	http://www.zeneb.uni-bayreuth.de/home.htm

Bayreuth	science oriented research network on risks and disasters in developing countries.	
Disaster Risk Center Newark	Research on early warning, presenting several projects on early warning.	http://www.udel.edu/DRC/
Experimental Climate Prediction Center (ECPC), USA	ECPC undertakes research to identify coupled land-atmosphere-ocean linkages, to develop routine experimental forecasts and apply forecast information.	http://ecpc.ucsd.edu
Geo Forschungs Zentrum Potsdam (GFZ)	Section Natural Disaster working mainly on seismologic projects.	http://www.gfz-potsdam.de/pb2/pb21/index_e.html
International Institute for Disaster Risk Management	Early warning and disaster management is one focus of the IDRM.	http://www.idrmhome.org/index.html
International Research Institute for Climate Prediction	Research on climate prediction and its applications, with forecasts and information on El Nino.	http://iri.columbia.edu/
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center University of Colorado	Information source on natural disaster. Extensive link list.	http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/
USGS Earthquake Hazard Programme	Information on earthquakes in the US.	http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/index.html
World Institute for Disaster Risk Management	Several projects on DRM and prevention.	http://www.drmonline.net/

Meteorological Services		
See World Meteorological Organization website for links to all National Met-Services at: http://www.wmo.ch/web-en/member.html		
African Center of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD), Niamey, Niger	ACMAD coordinates the activities of the National Meteorological and Hydrological Services of 53 African countries.	http://www.acmad.ne/
Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD)	Information on weather forecast in general and up-dated hazard maps and links to natural disaster warning provider (world wide).	http://www.dwd.de/en/en.htm
EUMETNET the Network of European National Meteorological Services	EUMETNET is a network grouping 19 European National Meteorological Services.	http://www.eumetnet.eu.org/
European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF)	Medium-range weather forecasting for distribution to Member States; scientific and technical research; meteorological data.	http://www.ecmwf.int
Japan Meteorology Agency (JMA)	JMA issues warnings, advisories and forecasts, provides advice on issues such as global warming and ozone depletion, and provides information on earthquake	http://www.kishou.go.jp

	and volcanic activity.	
Meteorological Service of Canada (MSC)	MSC monitors water quantities, provides information and conducts research on climate, atmospheric science, air quality, ice and other environmental issues.	http://www.msc-smc.ec.gc.ca
Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Center	Weather service mainly focused on the Atlantic.	https://www.nlmoc.navy.mil/home1.html
World Weather Watch Programme (WWW)	WWW of WMO combines observing systems, telecommunication facilities, and data-processing and forecasting centers.	http://www.wmo.int/web/www/www.html

Storm		
ESCAP/WMO Typhoon Committee	Provides regional coordination and direction on typhoon early warning and preparedness.	http://www.wmo.ch/web/www/TCP/ESCAP-Typhoon-Com.html
Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC)	JTWC provide tropical cyclone warnings to local scale forecasts for the various political entities that exist in the geographical region known as Micronesia.	http://www.npmoc.navy.mil/jtwc.html
National Severe Storms Laboratory	Scientific research on severe storms.	http://www.nssl.noaa.gov/
NOAA Tropical Hurricane Center	Authoritative information centre on tropical weather and hurricane risks..	http://www.nhc.noaa.gov
Storm Center Communications, Maryland, USA	Provides monitoring and visuals on environmental issues to the media, government agencies and emergency managers.	http://www.stormcenter.com/terms.php
Tropical Cyclone Programme	TCP basis site of WMO's World Weather Watch Applications Department regarding typhoons, hurricanes and tropical cyclones.	http://www.wmo.ch/web/www/TCP/TCP-home.html
Tropical Storm Worldwide	Information about current tropical storm probabilities.	http://www.solar.ifa.hawaii.edu/Tropical/

Flood		
Dartmouth Flood Observatory	The Observatory provides current information on flooding. Uses satellite technology and archives the obtained cartographic information about flooded lands into a global atlas of flood hazard.	http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/index.html
Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM), Nepal	Responsible for hydrological and meteorological activities in Nepal. Provides regular forecasts and warnings.	http://www.dhm.gov.np/index.shtml
Environment Agency	Flood Warning Programme.	http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/?lang=_e
International Flood Network (IFNET)	Multi-partner effort provides information on flooding and will soon establish a global flood alert map.	http://www.internationalfloodnetwork.org/index_e.html

Mekong River Commission (MRC)	MRC coordinates basin water management and provides flood and weather forecasts.	http://www.mrcmekong.org/index.htm
The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM).	Joint mission between NASA and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) to monitor and study tropical rainfall.	http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/

Drought

Drought Monitoring Centre, Harare (DMC-H)	The DMC-H monitors drought and other climatic conditions in the Southern Africa and provides early warnings and advice to governments and others.	http://www.dmc.co.zw/
Drought Monitoring Centre, Nairobi (DMC-N)	The DMC-N monitors drought and other climatic conditions in the Greater Horn of Africa and provides early warnings and advice to governments and others.	http://www.dmcn.org/
International Drought Information Center (IDIC), University of Nebraska, USA	IDIC strives to improve communication about prediction, monitoring, impact assessment, adjustment and adaptation, and planning and response to drought.	http://www.drought.unl.edu/
The Reference Centre for Applications of Meteorology and Climate for Sustainable Development of Africa	ACMAD provides short average term weather forecasting, climate outlook, seasonal forecast and its applications.	http://www.acmad.ne/

Fire

Global Fire Monitoring Center (GFMC), Freiburg, Germany	Global portal to extensive information on wild land fire - monitoring, current status, regional networks, fire models, management, training and research.	http://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de
Global Observations of Forest and land Cover Dynamics (GOFCGOLD)	GOFC/GOLD provides a forum for international information exchange, observation and data coordination, and a framework for establishing the necessary long-term monitoring systems. Their Fire Mapping and Monitoring Theme aims to refine and articulate the international observation requirements and making the best possible use of fire products from the existing and future satellite observing systems, for fire management, policy decision-making and global change research.	http://gofc-fire.umd.edu/
FireNet	Special interest network and on-line information service for those concerned with rural and landscape fires.	http://www.csu.edu.au/firenet/firenet.html
NOAA National Fire Weather Page	Information on fire risk areas in the US.	http://fire.boi.noaa.gov/
NOAA Storm Prediction Center -Fire Weather forecast	SPC informs on fire risk areas in the US. Extensive link list.	http://www.spc.noaa.gov/products/fire_wx/
Ukuvuka – Operation Firestop, South Africa	Work programme to cut fire losses through better warning and action, including public awareness campaign.	http://www.ukuvuka.org.za
Wildland Fire Assessment System	WFAS informs on fire risk in the US.	http://www.fs.fed.us/land/wfas/welcome.htm

Volcanic Eruption		
University of North Dakota	List of current volcanic eruption with links to the several volcanic topics.	http://volcano.und.nodak.edu/vwdocs/current_volcs/current.html
USGS Volcano and Hydrologic Monitoring	Mainly technical information on volcano monitoring. Has useful link list.	http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Monitoring/framework.html
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC)	Provides forecasts and worldwide warnings and advisories to aviation interests regarding volcanic ash hazards.	http://aawu.arh.noaa.gov/vaac.php
World Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVO)	WOVO is the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior Commission.	http://www.wovo.org

Earthquake		
Detection of Electro-Magnetic Emissions Transmitted from Earthquake Regions	DEMETER forecasts earthquakes with satellite data.	http://smc.cnes.fr/DEMETER/index.htm
Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute, Bogazici University, Turkey	Graduate program trains specialists in geodesy, geophysics and earthquake engineering.	http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/defaulteng.htm
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering	Earthquake engineering to increase the resilience of communities to earthquakes.	http://mceer.buffalo.edu/default.asp
University of Washington	Extensive link list of earthquake institutes all over the world.	http://www.geophys.washington.edu/seismosurfing.html

Tsunami		
International Coordination Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ICG/ITSU)	News, links and background information on tsunami related issues.	http://ioc.unesco.org/itsu/
International Tsunami Information Center (ITIC)	Tsunami messages, background information, information on the organisation and extensive library.	http://www.prh.noaa.gov/itic/more_about/itsu/itsu.html
Japan Meteorological Agency	JMA monitors earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic activities and issues information on the monitoring results in order to prevent/mitigate disasters.	http://www.jma.go.jp/JMA_HP/jma/jma-eng/activities/seismo.html
National Geophysical Data Center	The tsunami database provides information on tsunami events from 49 B.C. to the present in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas, and the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.	http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/tsu.shtml
Pacific Tsunami Museum	Tsunami information for the interested public.	http://www.tsunami.org/
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC)	PTWC provides warnings for tele tsunamis to most countries in the Pacific Basin as well as to Hawaii and all other US interests in the Pacific outside of Alaska and the US West Coast.	http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/
PMEL Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory	Main page of PMEL - transferring to projects lead by PMEL.	http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/

Tsunami Research Program		
The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Programme	Extensive links on tsunami	http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard/links.html
Tsunamis and Earthquakes, Tsunami Research at the USGS	Background information on tsunamis, animations, etc.	http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/tsunami/
UNESCO/IOC Indo tsunami	Aims to keep the audience informed about the progress in developing a Regional Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for the Indian Ocean.	http://ioc.unesco.org/indotsunami/paris_march05.htm
University of Southern California, Tsunami Research Group	TRC is involved in tsunami research; inundation field surveys, numerical and analytical modeling, and hazard assessment, mitigation and planning	http://cwis.usc.edu/dept/tsunamis/2005/index.html
University of Washington	The site provides an extensive link list to tsunami related web sites.	http://www.ess.washington.edu/tsunami/index.html
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Tsunami Warning Center	YSTWC has responsibility as National Tsunami Warning Center to provide tsunami warning service for any tsunami impacting Russia national interests.	http://www.science.sakhalin.ru/Tsunami/
West Coast & Alaska Tsunami Warning Center	Main site of the WCATWC, displaying recent messages and background information on tsunamis.	http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/
Western States Seismic Policy Council	Extensive links on tsunami.	http://www.wsspc.org/TsunamiCenter/2004IndianOceanTsunami.html
World Tourism Organization (WTO)	The Tsunami Disaster Tourism Recovery section of WTO informs about the recent activities related to the 26 December Tsunami 2004.	http://www.world-tourism.org/tsunami/eng.html

Locust		
Dessert Locust Information Service	Useful links and information on locust.	http://www.fao.org/news/global/locusts/Locuhome.htm
International Society on Pest Information (ISPI)	The ISPI web site provides a database on locust and other biological disaster.	http://www.pestinfo.org/

Food Security		
Environmental Analysis & Remote Sensing (EARS)	Drought & desertification, crop yield forecast.	http://www.ears.nl/index.htm
FAMINE Early Warning Systems Network	Information on drought, flood, cyclone, climate, HIV/AIDS, Vegetation, Prices Desertification in Africa and Afghanistan.	http://www.fews.net/networks/
Food Assessment by Satellite Technology (FAST)	Monitoring & Early Warning.	http://www.earlywarning.nl/earlywarning/ew_index.htm
Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS)	Information on Food Security with useful links to databases.	http://www.fivims.net/publication.jsp?lang=en#mon
Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)	FAO programme in support of member states, for food and agriculture.	http://www.fao.org/giews/english/index.htm

Global Monitoring for Food Security (GMFS)	GMFS displays very good links for food security.	http://www.gmfs.info/
Monitoring of Agriculture with Remote Sensing (MARS)	Food security and crop Monitoring.	http://mars.jrc.it/
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)	The SADC Regional Early Warning Unit operates as an integrated project, comprising a Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU), and autonomous National Early Warning Units in each of the ten original SADC member states.	http://www.sadc.int/index.php
Regional Remote Sensing Unit (RRSU), SADC, Harare, Zimbabwe	Capacity building and support of national and regional capabilities in remote sensing and GIS for early warning for food security and natural resources management.	http://www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/rrsu/rrsu.htm
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Remote Sensing Unit	Remote Sensing and GIS in support of early warning for food security and natural resources management.	http://www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/rrsu/rrsutxt.htm

Data		
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)	Online database	http://www.fao.org/giews/english/indexonl.htm
Inventory of Early Warning Systems	Data base of Early Warning Systems. Searching for EWS by country and hazard type.	http://database.unep.dkkv.org/default.asp
National Climate Data Center (NCDC)	NCDC maintain global climate databases.	http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ncdc.html
Natural Disaster Reference Database, Data base of NASA	Abstracts to natural hazards.	http://ndrd.gsfc.nasa.gov/
UNEP.NET	Good data source for several kinds of disasters.	http://www.unep.net/

Media		
Accu Weather	Hourly weather forecast and warnings for USA and background information on severe weather events.	http://www.accuweather.com/
BBC Weather	BBC weather provides UK and world weather forecast.	http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/
CNN Weather forecast	Worldwide weather forecast	http://www.cnn.com/WEATHER/
National Weather Service	Weather service for the USA by NOAA	http://weather.gov/
NOAA Weather Radio	NOAA weather radio for USA and Canada	http://www.intac.com/%7Emherson/wx_list.html
Wunderground	Wunderground provides world wide weather information.	http://www.wunderground.com/

4.0 Conclusion

The importance of early warning and early response to world peace, stability, security and development can not be left to nation-states alone. This is why the efforts of international organizations, agencies and INGOs can not be ignored with a sleight of hand. This has also not been lost on African leaders who have since 1991 been brainstorming on how to ensure that insecurity arising from armed conflicts is confronted.

5.0 Summary

The unit encapsulates the focal point of early response and provides a list of international organizations, agencies and INGOs involved in early warning and early response.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- How can the efforts of nation-states be complemented in the task of early warning and response?

7.0 References and Further Reading

Aderinwale, A. (undated). *CSSDCA: An African Agenda for Peace and Prosperity*. (Ed).

Ota. Africa Leadership Forum.

Satow, E. (1956). *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. London. Longmans.