**POL 871
THEORIES OF CONFLICT, PEACE AND STRATEGIC
STUDIES**

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is designed to give students an in-depth understanding of the Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies as an interdisciplinary field of study with a commitment to the non-violent management and resolution of conflict from the local to the international level through using strategic ideological perspectives. To pursue this goal, core political concepts such as power, order, violence and justice are theorized in distinctive ways. This course will guide an understanding of key theoretical approaches in conflict, peace and strategic studies research, and enable students to understand the relevance of theory to practice in this field. Students will engage in critical dialogue on questions such as how we identify actors in peace and in conflict, and how we can work against differing forms of violence and reconstitute just and participatory social and political order in the wake of violence.

CONTENTS **PAGES**

INTRODUCTION

POL871: Theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies is a one–semester 3credit units' course. It is available for students as a prerequisite towards a M.Sc. in Political Science. This course will consist of 4 modules, and it has been developed using both global and local examples.

The Theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies is an interdisciplinary field of study with a commitment to the non-violent management and resolution of conflict from the local to the international level. To pursue this goal, core political concepts such as power, order, violence and justice are theorized in distinctive ways. This course develops an understanding of key theoretical approaches in conflict, peace and strategic studies research, and enables students to understand the relevance of theory to practice in this field.

This Course Guide will tell you what this course is all about, what materials are relevant, and how to use them. It also provides you a guide on how much time to use in order to successfully complete the course. It gives you some guidance on Tutor –Mark Assignment (TMA's) and Student Self-Assessment Exercise (SAE) and other University academic activities.

COURSE AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The general aim of this course is to give you an insight into how Theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies using various relevant materials from various global contexts. What does it mean in globalization and particularly regional interests? How can insights gleaned from these different contexts be used to help each other? The course will provide a wider view of issues relevant to theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies, through the lens of three areas of Political Science, International Relations and Peace Studies, with the sole aim of providing the right tools and the necessary level of commitment to effect a change for the better in terms Peace Studies and Strategic Studies at all levels.

The Specific objectives are as follows:

- Introduce students to understand the theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies as curricula that teach concepts of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies and also nonviolent methods of addressing problems.
- To make students analyse the purpose of Strategic studies, Conflict and Peace as better option that take peoples or society engaging in to crisis or war to move in to a culture of peace and stable society.

- To expose student to examine some theoretical background that supports its fundamental insights, questions and the ethics of wars and peace.
- Review some of the strategic approaches adopted by USA intervention in various war in different parts of the world.

WORKING THROUGH THE COURSE

To complete the course, you are required to read the study units and other related materials. You will also need to undertake practical exercises for which you need a pen, a note-book, and other materials that will be listed in this guide. The exercises are to aid you in understanding the concepts being present you will be required to give an attempt to self-assessment exercise (SAE) submit three (3) online Tutor Mark Assignment for assessment purposes. At the end of the course, you will be expected to write a final examination.

THE COURSE MATERIAL

In this course, as in all other courses, the major components you will find are as follows:
1.   Course Guide
2.   Study Units
3.   Textbooks
4.   Self-Assessment Exercise (SAE)
5.   Online Tutor Mark Assignment (TMA's)

STUDY UNITS

There are 16 study units in this course. They are:

MODULE 1 CONFLICT, PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
Unit 1 Definition of Concepts, Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies
Unit 2 Understanding War and Other Related Issues
Unit 3 Conflict Theories
Unit 4 Strategic Theories

MODULE 2PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES LINKAGE
Unit 1 Rules of Understanding: the key features of Strategic Studies
       Theory
Unit 2 The Application of Peace Studies in Conflict Resolution
Unit 3 Concept and Process of Mediation
Unit 4 Methods in Conflict Resolution Amongst States in West Africa
       since 1960s

MODULE 3 STRATEGIC STUDIES AND ITS IMPACT IN THE WORLD POLITICS
Unit 1 The State Centered Focus
Unit 2 Strategic Studies as an academic Area of study
Unit 3 Understanding Strategic Theories
Unit 4 Understanding the nature of Strategic Environment

MODULE 4 RESOURCES IN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Unit 1 Professionalism in Strategic Studies
Unit 2 Strategic Studies and National Interest
Unit 3 Strategic Studies Functional Areas
Unit 4 Resources in Strategic Studies

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

These books are recommended for further reading. There are more references at the end of each unit:

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may wish to consult as the need arises. However, I encouraged you, as a Postgraduate student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, be sure to consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Amoo, Sam G. (1997). 'The Challenge of Ethnicity and Conflicts' In Africa: The Need for a New Paradigm. Emergency Response Division United Nations Development Programme. New York.

Animasawun, G. A. (2008) PCR 274: Introduction to Conflict Transformation

Bartlett, S., Burton, D., Peim, N. (2001). Education Studies London:

Boutros-Ghali, B(1992). An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations.Paul Chapman.

Campbell, A (1997), Western Primitivism; African Ethnicity. A. Study in Cultural Relations. London: Cassell.

Faleti, S. A. (2006). 'Theories of social conflict in Introduction to peace and conflict studies in West Africa. Best, S.G. (ed). Ibadan: Spectrum.

Galtung J. (1990). 'Cultural violence: Journal of Peace Research 27:

Gould, C.C.(2004) Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. New York: Cambridge

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: The Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your understanding of the course content. Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

At the end of each unit, you will find self – assessment exercises. The self-assessment exercises are provided in each unit. The exercises should help you to evaluate your understanding of the material so far. These are not to be submitted. You will find all answers to these within the units they are intended for.

As mentioned earlier, there are Tutor-Marked Assignments; in handling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The tutor-marked assignments are now being done online. Ensure that you register all your courses so that you can have easy access to the online assignments. Your score in the online assignments will account for 30 per cent of your total coursework. At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for POL 871: Theories of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies will be of two hours' duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of pen on paper questions which will reflect the self-assessments exercises and tutor-

marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed. It is important that you use adequate time to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course. You therefore need to revise your course materials beforehand.

COURSE OVERVIEW/PRESENTATION SCHEME

There are 16 units in this course. You are to spend one week on each unit. One of the advantages of Open and Distance Learning (ODL) is that you can read and work through the designed course materials at your own pace, and at your own convenience. The course material replaces the lecturer that stands before you physically in the classroom.

All the units have similar features. Each unit begins with the introduction and ends with reference/suggestions for further readings.

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Course Guide			
Module 1	**CONFLICT, PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES**		
Unit 1	Definition of Concepts, Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Understanding War and Other Related Issues	Week 2	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Conflict Theories	Week 3	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Strategic Theories	Week 4	Assignment 1
Module 2	**PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES LINKAGES**		
Unit 1	Rules of Understanding: the key features of Strategic Studies Theory	Week 5	Assignment 1
Unit 2	The Application of Peace Studies in Conflict Resolution Processes	Week 6	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Concept and Process of Mediation	Week 7	
Unit 4	Methods of Conflict Resolution Amongst West African States Since 1960s	Week 8	Assignment 1

Module 3	**STRATEGIC STUDIES AND ITS IMPACT TO WORLD POLITICS**		
Unit 1	The State Centered Focus	Week 9	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Strategic Studies as an academic Area of Study	Week 10	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Understanding Strategic Theories	Week 11	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Understanding the Nature of Strategic Environment	Week 12	Assignment 1
Module 4	**RESOURCES IN STRATEGIC STUDIES**		
Unit 1	Professionalism in Strategic Studies	Week 13	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Strategic Studies and National Interest	Week 14	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Strategic Studies Functional Areas	Week 15	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Resources in Strategic Studies	Week 16	Assignment 1
	Revision	Week 17	
	Examination	Week 18	
	Total	18 Weeks	

WHAT YOU WILL LEARN IN THIS COURSE

This course builds on what you have learnt in your undergraduate course related to Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies. It will be helpful if you try to review what you studied earlier. Secondly, you may need to purchase one or two texts recommended as important for your mastery of the course content. You need quality time in a study-friendly environment every week. If you are computer-literate (which ideally you should be), you should be prepared to visit recommended websites. You should also cultivate the habit of visiting reputable physical libraries accessible to you.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your tutor-marked assignments promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your self-assessment exercise, tutor-marked assignment or the grading of an assignment. In any case, you are advised to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE?

1. There are 16 units in this course. You are to spend one week in each unit. In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suites you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do. The study units tell you when to read and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you in a class exercise.

2. Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chance of passing the course.

3. The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your reference or from a reading section.

4. The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

5. Read this course guide thoroughly. It is your first assignment.

6. Organise a study schedule – Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information; e.g. details of your tutorials and the date of the first day of the semester is available at the study centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.

7. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it.

8. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind in their coursework. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please let your tutor or course coordinator know before it is too late for help.

9. Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.

10. Assemble the study materials. You will need your references for the unit you are studying at any point in time.

11. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.

12. Visit your study centre whenever you need up-to-date information.

13. Well before the relevant online TMA due dates, visit your study centre for relevant information and updates. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination.

14. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.

15. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the course guide).

CONCLUSION

This is a theory course but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to political issues in domestic and international arenas.

SUMMARY

This course equips students with the theoretical and conceptual tools necessary to think critically about key issues in Peace, Conflict Studies and Strategic Studies. Attempts to understand the causes of war and peace are by no means new: in the field of International Relations (IR), there is a long tradition of thought devoted to this topic. However, scholars of IR have tended to focus on understanding war. As a result, the equally, if not more difficult task of understanding peace is sometimes overlooked. Peace and Conflict Studies is a field of scholarship that seeks to redress this: it is committed to the nonviolent resolution of conflict, and engages with the difficult practicalities of achieving lasting and durable forms of peace.

Under contemporary conditions of intensifying inequalities and conflict in global politics, questions of war and peace increasingly confront issues related to identity, difference and gender. In POL871, we will explore how the field of Peace, Conflict Studies and Strategic Studies has attempted to address these issues outside the state-centric focus of IR. The course examines how the field has sought to engage with the difficult task of achieving peace whether through particular understandings of violence and peace, or rethinking the broader structural forces through which our lives and the lives of others are shaped. It provokes critical reflection on the core assumptions of many theories through which war and peace are understood by drawing attention to the kinds of ideas we have about human potential and ourselves as promoters of a more peaceful and just world.

This course will provide students with:
- An understanding of why we need theory in peace, conflict and Strategic studies - and why we need to be careful about how we use it.
- Tools for thinking critically about core concepts in the field of peace, conflict and strategic studies.
- An opportunity to engage in key debates about the factors that shape (and are shaped by) dynamics of peace and conflict.

MAIN COURSE

MODULE 1   CONFLICT, PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Unit 1   Definition of Concepts, Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies
Unit 2   Conflict and Peace Studies
Unit 3   Conflict Theories
Unit 4   Strategic Theories

Unit Structure

1.1   Introduction
1.2   Learning Outcomes
1.3   Main Course
      1.3.1   Meaning of Peace
      1.3.2   Meaning of Conflict
      1.3.3   Causes of Conflict
      1.3.4   Types of Conflict
      1.3.5   Stages of Conflict Circle
      1.3.6   Conflict Phases
      1.3.7   Meaning of Strategic Studies
      1.3.8   The Concept of Theory
1.3   Summary
1.4   References/Further Readings/Web Sources
1.5   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises

1.1   Introduction

It has been argued by scholars that there is no absolute meaning of peace that can be asserted to be better than another, but there is a general sense supported by a degree of consensus, of what constitutes peace or disagreement that is conflict and how do we use strategic process to address the problems of war or crisis. Similarly, there will never be one optimal way to bring about peace; it requires a host of complementary concepts and strategies. For the purpose of this material how we can connect the three concepts of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies in order to provide a peaceful and secured society in the World.

1.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
•   Define Conflict and peace from various perspective.

- • Explain the relevance of theory in Conflict Management.
- • Discuss strategy as a concept.

1.3.1 Peace

Just as human nature is often portrayed as innately violent, peace is often portrayed as a tranquil, uncomplicated end state. This is a constricted and oversimplified view of peace. Peace is only partly the absence of war (*negative peace*) or a state of harmony and justice (*positive peace*). Fundamentally, peace is a long-term and gutsy project that seeks to bring about lasting and constructive change in institutions that maintain society (Haavelsrud, 1996)''. This was further asserted differently, by another scholar view peace is "a dynamic social process in which justice, equity, and respect for basic human rights are maximized, and violence, both physical and structural, is minimized" (Reardon & Cabezudo, 2002).

From the above definition of peace by scholars we can understand that the concept of peace means requires social conditions that foster individual and societal well-being. Achieving and maintaining these social conditions, in turn, requires grappling with the inevitable conflicts that challenge peace using processes that are nonviolent, collaborative, and life enhancing. Just as conflict surfaces differing perspectives and needs, peace building is an opportunity to rethink and reshape the prevailing status quo.

''Peace is concerned with the elimination of violence where violence is an act or process which impedes people from realizing their potential (Baunet 2001 in Galtung 1969)'' so violence is much more than causing physical harm i.e. direct violence, it is also the absence of social justice and includes the monopolization and manipulation of knowledge. Achieving could be therefore said to have both a negative and a positive dimension.

''Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence that causes physical harms, and positive peace refers to the absence of structural violence manifested as the uneven distribution of power and resources. Negative peace is reactive in nature in that it seeks the cessation of actual or impending conflict. This is most frequently understood as peace as the absence of war, enabling peace to be narrowly interpreted as 'anti-war' and creating a perverse logic of unreason whereby, through the idea of deterrence, military and strategic planners can refer to themselves as 'peace planners. Positive peace, on the other hands, is proactive in nature. It seeks to remove the underlying structural imbalances that present risks and vulnerabilities to people in short as well as the long term. (Galtung 1969 in Barnet 2001)''

We should understand the concept of both negative and positive peace are contiguous with each other, at least in theory. Even though the workability of the two concepts can be inter connected or separated to some certain degree or level, let us further discuss level of at both macro levels as post graduate student to able to distinguish peace categorization.

- **Peace at the Macro Level**

The term 'macro' describes the concept looking at peace from various levels of international, multinational or national level. The term 'micro' refers to conceptualization of peace from local or social perspectives from structures such as schools, community places or even religious formations. Peace can be sustaining or form at macro level using either traditional or social structures.

At this level let us look the views of some scholars looking at the multi-dimensional scope of peace, ''Whaley and Piazza -Georgi (1997) claim that the term 'peacebuilding' gained international credibility as a result of the 1992 UN Secretary-General's 'An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping'. In that document, peacebuilding was defined as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. Macro-peacebuilding efforts focus on comprehensive rehabilitation of social, political, economic and ideological structures (pro-human rights orientations) necessary to support and sustain both negative peace (absence of direct violence) and positive peace (absence of indirect violence) in a post-conflict community. In the context of the 1992 UN 'An agenda for peace', peacemaking was conceptualized as third-party action to mediate hostilities between two parties. Peacekeeping was defined as the deployment of UN troops in order to deter violence, to prevent conflict and to promote peace''. Here, let us look at UN, operational framework of peace at various level from International. Regional, National or local level.''

- **Peace at the Micro Level**

At the micro level, Berlowitz (1994)'' added three tools for thinking about peace education in schools: peacekeeping (peace through strength); peacemaking (peace through dialogue); and peacebuilding (peace through creating conditions necessary for peace: attitudes; dispositions; nonviolent interpersonal communication). Strategies for promoting peace can be structured in accordance with the previous three peace action-orientations.''

Harris (1999) was of opinion that '' that peacekeeping in a school can be understood as peace through control; this mode of promoting peace may be problematic. Harris elaborates, 'This punitive approach blames youth for the dysfunctional behaviors they have adopted from the environment that surrounds them' (Harris, 1999, p. 30)''.

Harris &Synott (2002) suggested that '' mental violence should also be eliminated. For the purposes of this materials, indirect violence can be understood as bullying, intimidation, and fear of harm. When indirect violence9 becomes the focus of peace education efforts, positive peace may be incrementally actualized by building 'soft infrastructure'-the values, beliefs and attitudes related to peaceful action orientations (Brantmeier,2005) Micro-peace building initiatives should build the soft infrastructure that will promote mutual understanding, trust and the diversity affirmation necessary to sustain positive relationships among people with diverse backgrounds.''

Another important issues we should understand at Postgraduate level is the major class perspective interpretation of peace that is the Instrumentalist and functionalist interpretations. Interpretations from two perspectives have their view from those who are functionalist see peace as a product of social function or formidable social structure, this expert has been identified as functionalist while the Instrumentalist viewed peace as a means to an end. From this we can view peace from political, social, economic, cultural and legal perspective.

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 10 minutes.
1.   Define the Concept of Peace in Your own word?

1.3.2   Meaning of Conflict

Conflict is inevitable that occurs at various human lives endeavor in our own society for example misunderstanding between individuals or groups in the society may trigger the escalation of conflict in the society. The disagreement between states on political, economic or technological issues has raised to various types of International Conflicts.

''Although violence is sometimes described as innate, 20 scientists, authors of the *Seville Statement on Nonviolence* (UNESCO, 1986), argued that organized violence does not have biological roots: "Biology does not condemn humanity to war. … Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men,' peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. "Rules and technologies of war clearly change over time and vary between traditions, illustrating that social learning and culture influence how conflict is understood and enacted''

From the above definition of violence by UNESCO, has view violence as a biological condemn to humanity to war which has begun in minds of men as well as the peace also was rooted in the mind of men with history and tradition of peoples that shows ideally that mismatch in social relations between individuals or groups and states is a great source of the emergence of Conflict in the society.

''The word Conflict is derived from the Latin word "confligere" meaning to "strike together". Lexically, Conflict means "to strike, to dasy. A fight, struggle or battle, clash, contention, confrontation, a controversy or quarrel, active opposition, strife or incompatibility, to meet in opposition or hostility, to contend, to be contrary or to be at variance". *(Webster Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1971)''*

Conflict as a concept has a notion with contradiction arising from differences in interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, beliefs, perceptions and tendencies. Although, conflict is a normal, natural and inevitable phenomenon in any interactive situation of human life. The contradictions exist at all levels of the society – intra – psychic/personal, interpersonal, intra – groups, inter – group, institution, intra – national and international. Conflict is not necessarily negative in itself. It is often a by – product of social change and may lead to constructive transformation.

Many scholars have come up with different definitions of conflicts looking at the parameters from political, economic and cultural factor to demonstrate the root causes that link to disagreement, misunderstanding and contradiction.

Quicy Wright (1990:19) defines conflict ''as opposition among social entities directed against one another, it distinguished from competition defined as opposition among social entities independently striving for something of which the supply is inadequate to satisfy all. Competitors may not be aware of one another, while the parties to a conflict.''

Wright also opines that,'' war is a species of conflict, thus by understanding conflict we may learn about the probable characteristics of war under different conditions and methods most suitable for regulating, preventing, and winning wars". Wright proceeds to give two senses in which war could be understood, that is, in the legal sense, war is considered a situation during which two or more political groups are equally entitles to settle conflict by armed force. Whereas in the sociological sense, which is of ordinary usage, war refers to conflicts among political groups carried on by armed forces of considerable magnitude. ''

Kriesberg (1973:17) simply defines conflict as "…… a relationship between two or more parties who…. <u>believe </u>they have incompatible goals".

Stagner defines conflict as … "a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceived as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both… each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation, and each party perceives the other as a barrier or treat to that goal".

Ross (1993: 6) notes that: "If disadvantaged groups and individuals refuse to consider open conflict, they deny themselves what sometimes is their most effective means for bringing about needed change". Rose therefore saw nothing wrong in conflict, he saw it as a natural and inevitable human experience and as a critical mechanism by which goals and aspirations of individual and groups are articulated, it is a channel for the definition of creative solutions to human problems and a means to the development of a collective identity. What Ross is to infer is that without conflict we cannot have change. ''
From the above views of scholars in trying to define the concept of conflict it makes us to understand what cause the disagreement, misunderstanding and contradiction between individuals, groups and states over some certain issues as a basic tool that link to the breakup of conflict.

1.3.3 Causes of Conflict

As earlier mentioned, conflict is inevitable once individuals or group of peoples interact their tendencies of the emergence of conflict because of natural character of human being to dominate and control others. For the purpose of this class let us look at the following categories of the causes of the emergence and escalation of conflict in our society at various level in to four groups.
• Conflicts over resources
• Conflicts over psychological needs
• Conflicts involving values
• Conflicts over inadequate information

• **Conflicts over Resources**

This is a type of conflict as result of either scares, non-availability, unjust allocation or domination of resources among the competing individual or groups. The competition of controlling or dominating resources may assume negative or destructive dimension when the available resources is not evenly and judiciously distributed. The relatively deprived would always struggle to improve their lives. This view synchronizes with Marxian theory of conflict, which posits that the more the rate of unequal distribution of scarce resources in the society, the greater is the basic conflict of interest between its dominant and subordinate segments. He also says that when practices of dominant

segment create "alienation dispositions" the more the subordinate segments of a system become aware of their collective interest interests and question the distribution of scarce resources, the more likely they are to join in overt conflict against dominant segment of a system.

- **Conflict over Psychological Needs**

This is a kind of reason of emergence of conflict over psychological needs of groups and individuals where conflict has directly affected the psyche of the individual and group self-actualization, need for individual and group respect, attempt to project one's group to be better than the others. With particular reference to Maslow's theory, he points out that when an individual psychological need is achieved or satisfied, such an individual becomes dominated by a drive for the other unsatisfied needs through a process he calls "Fulfillment Progression".

- **Conflict Involving Values**

This is one of the serious causes of conflict as result of contradiction over abuse of cultural value system such as religious belief, ideological values and cultural system in the society. Conflict involving values are the most difficult to understand and resolve because most times people could die for what they believe in. According to Weaver, who likens culture to an iceberg, he says "internal culture", is implicitly learned and difficult to change. With this we can understand that belief and values are key stone that can damage or reconcile the cultural disagreement, difference and misunderstanding between individual, groups and society. This can be managing through dialogue and mind set change to change the behavior of individuals or groups from attacking the opponent culture or value without respect and recognition.

- **Conflict over Information**

Information is a one of the key causes of conflict in the society where information use can be either destructive or reformative in the society. The information system can be tampered with in different ways. This can be in form feeding people with lies or giving the right information at the wrong time. In our contemporary societies, the quantity and quality of information vary dramatically and are dependent on wide range of factors, form level of literacy to social cohesiveness and stability to available technology. Central to the availability and quality of public information is the media (print, audio and audio-visual).

Also, in a deeply divided societies, the media can also shape opinions and decisions related to the nature and scope of conflicts, as well as the potential alternatives to conflict, where social, political and economic

conflict have degenerated into widespread violence, the role of information in mitigating the effects of violence or in presenting alternatives can be crucial. Because communication is an integral part of conflict, it comes as no surprise that those participating in organized violence often make use of the media to attack opponents, and "spread disinformation or misinformation" and "rally external and internal support."

1.3.4 Types of Conflict

It is important that we know types of conflict we encounter in our day-to-day activities. There are numerous kinds of conflicts but we will limit ourselves to the following:

- **Intra-Personal Conflicts**

The type of conflict that occur within an individual. Examples of such are use of time, choice of partner, moral questions, goals and aspiration.

- **Inter-Personal Conflict**

Conflict between two or more individuals over an issue.

- **Intra-Group Conflicts**

Conflicts between individuals, or faction within a group.

- **Inter-Group Conflicts**

Conflicts between groups such as club, class versus class, family versus family.

- **National Conflicts**

Conflicts within a nation, involving different groups within the nation. This could be interethnic, inter-religious, or competition for resources.

- **International Conflict**

Conflicts between nations. This could be for ideological reasons, territorial claims, political competition.

1.3.5 Stages of Conflict/Conflict Cycle

Conflict tends to progress from one place to another when the stakeholders (the oppressed and the oppressor) become more aware of a conflict of interest, means to act and then mobilize to alter the prevailing situation to each group advantage. In the course of altering the situation or addressing the injustice being faced by the oppressed, a sporadic violence can erupt if either party should fail to adopt positive approach of conflict management.

1.3.6 Conflict Phases

The following are the various stages of conflicts phases:

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                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │ Formation Stage  │─────╲
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│ Transformation   │                │ The Escalation Stage │
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│ Improvement Stage│                │    Crisis Stage      │
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
Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network (CRESNET) Training Manual 2001.

STAGES

- **The Formation Stage**

This is the first stage of conflict whereby a problem emerges and acts or things, or situations that were previously ignored or taken for granted now turn to serious issues. The obvious antagonistic shifts in attitude and a behaviour pattern are a clear indication of the early warning signs of conflict formation which need to be addressed if further escalation is to be avoided.

- **The Escalation Stage**

This stage is characterized by the formation of enemy images. People begin to take sides, positions harden, communication stops, perception becomes distorted and parties begin to commit resources to defend their position, leaders begin to make inflammatory public statements regarding their positions and street demonstrations intensity.

- **The Crisis Stage**

At this stage, parties in conflict now begin to use physical barricades to demarcate their territories. Attempts to defend or expand territories or interests lead to direct confrontation and eruption of violence. Stockpiled weapons or arms are now freely used in an attempt to

dominate or have upper hand leading to breakdown of Law and order and essential. Services are virtually disrupted and people begin to experience discomfort due to lack of water, food, electricity and other essential goods and services.

- **De-escalation Stage**

This is the stage at which parties in conflict begin to experience gradual cessation of hostility arising from conflict weariness, hunger, sanctions or external intervention.

- **Improvement Stage**

At this stage, stakeholders begin to have a rethink, shift ground and needs for dialogue are recognized and efforts are made towards attaining relative peace.

- **Transformation Stage**

All causes of conflicts have been removed at this stage and reconciliation has occurred. This stage is the most difficult stage to attain in any conflict situation, though desirable, attainable and accomplishable.

1.3.6 Conflict Cycle

It is now generally believed that conflict most times evolve in a cyclical pattern that are closely related.

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                        ┌──────────────┐
                        │ Latent Phase │
                        └──────────────┘
                                        ↘
┌──────────────────┐
│ Resolution Phase │
└──────────────────┘                ┌────────────────┐
        ↑                           │ Manifest Phase │
┌──────────────────┐                └────────────────┘
│ Mitigation Phase │                        ↓
└──────────────────┘                ┌────────────────┐
        ↑                           │ Violence Phase │
┌──────────────────┐                └────────────────┘
│  Contain Phase   │                        ↘
└──────────────────┘
        ↖               ┌──────────────────┐
                        │ Escalation Phase │
                        └──────────────────┘
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Background Paper for the Danida Conference on Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa 2001 Prepared by Bjorn Moller.

- **Latent Phase**

This is the first phase of the conflict cycle where a conflict is dormant and barely expressed by the conflicting sides that may not even be conscious of their conflicting interests or values. At this phase, a conflict can easily be "nipped in the bud" through a preventive action on the basis of early warning in principle. Although, latent conflicts are difficult to detect with any degree of certainty – and their presence and absence may be hard to verify. Despite that, we can still identify various indicators of impending conflicts, such as inequality, growing poverty, frustrated expectation, unemployment, pollution and a growing tendency to view problems in "us versus them – terms" etc.

- **Manifest Phase**

At this phase, conflicting parties express their demands and grievances openly, but only by legal means. It is easier to identify both problems and stakeholders, at this stage while preventive action can still be taken to prevent conflict escalation or degeneration into violent confrontation. Despite limited time available, exhibit conflict behaviour and regroup themselves in opposing camps. Mediation efforts geared towards compromise solutions still stand a reasonable chance of success provided violence has not occurred.

- **Violent Phase**

This phase is characterized by direct physical attacks and confrontations leading to spilling of blood and loss of life of both conflicting parties and innocent people and thereby produce additional motives for struggle elongation, if only to "get even" or escape retribution for atrocities committed. Moreover, people having their various private agendas and that are personally benefiting or profiting from the continuing crisis often usurped the initial/existing leadership structure in order to have influence and control over their groups.

- **Escalation Phase**

Under this phase, violence breeds further violence, producing an escalatory momentum. Moreover, the longer the struggle has lasted, and the more destructive it has been, the more do the warring parties (and especially their leaders) have to lose by laying down their arms. Only victory can justify the preceding bloodshed, hence the proclivity to struggle on as long as there is even a slight hope of prevailing, thereby attaining the power to set the terms. Neither the violence nor the escalation phases therefore leave much scope for peaceful intervention, mediation or negotiations. On the other, embarking on military

intervention at this stage could be regarded as a risky enterprise despite the fact that it might make a difference.

- **Contained Phase**

It is a stage at which escalation comes to a halt, which could be due to the fact that the conflicting parties have temporarily exhausted their supply of weaponry, leading to lower intensity. At this stage, there appears hope for negotiations and mediation efforts by the intervention of a third party aiming towards a truce. Most times peacekeeping forces can be introduced to protect each side against the possible breaches of the truce by either of the conflicting parties. The truce agreed upon allows for the provision of humanitarian aid to the civilian victims without supporting either of the warring sides.

- **Mitigated Phase**

Mitigated stage of any conflict is the period during which the basic causes of conflict remain in place, but the conflict behaviour and attitude has been significantly changed with reduced or less violence and more political mobilization and negotiation. At this stage, the ray of post-conflict recovery can easily be read and felt in the minds of political leaders on opposing sides, while external factors are at the advantage of gaining new leverage, that is, serving as potential (but not unconditional) provider of aid.

- **The Resolution Phase**

This phase is the most perceived critical stage of all the phases, as success or failure of "post-conflict peace-building will determine whether the conflict will flare up again. For a tangible and enduring or sustainable success to be accomplished, both the underlying causes of the conflict and its immediate consequences must be addressed. This include, reordering of power relationships, bringing some of those responsible for the preceding blood shed to trial and facilitating reconciliation between the opposing sides as a precondition of future coexistence. At this stage, the importance of external actors is very crucial in the following areas such as provision of various forms of assistance and support to the emerging civil society after the resolution of the conflict, and to support programmes for disarmament, demobilize

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 10 minutes.
1.   Identify three and discuss only two causes of conflict?
2.   With relevant examples analyses the stages in conflict formation

1.3.6   Strategic Studies

In simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others.

Strategy is defined in Joint Publication as "the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."

Both of these definitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role and complexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. At these levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances.

Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means.

Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategy allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understanding its logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises, substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, and methods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify the theory as appropriate.

1.3.7   Theory

A theory as defined by Encarta 2004 in Faleti (2006) is an idea or belief about something arrived at through assumption and in some cases a set of facts, propositions or principles analyzed in their relation to one another and used, especially in science to explain phenomena. However, even when scholars have agreed that whatever is described as theory needs to be more than a collection of facts, it is still the case that not all statements that go beyond facts are theories. A theory thus, would have little or no value if all it does is to provide facts which people believe to

be true about particular past or current events. For a theory to have any value at all, it must explain or suggest ways of explaining why a subject matter has certain characteristic. In other words, a theory must have explanatory, predictive and problem-solving values and not just an intellectual exercise that simply seeks to provide new sets of categories or paradigms. Faleti (2006) suggests that there are generally four types of theories, these are: analytic, normative, scientific and metaphysical.

- Analytical theories are found mostly in logic and mathematical sciences providing mostly statements of facts upon which other facts are based.
- Normative theories propound a set of ideals, which should be desired by human beings. These include ideologies, principles e.t.c.
- Scientific theories have universal applications: they are empirical, verifiable, observable and predictable because they explain the relationship among events and actions mostly in a causal manner.
- Metaphysical theories are not always testable or predictable, they rather rely more on rational judgment for testability and validity. Faleti (2006) in Animasahun (2008) illustrates this with the theory of natural selection a metaphysical theory, which state that: if the specie survives for long, then it must possess certain characteristic which are well adapted or are adaptable to a particular environment in which it thrives. If, on the other hand, the species fails to survive or thrive for long as other species within the same environment, then, it must possess characteristics that are not suitable for its adaptation.

The above quotation is not derived from any scientific test but simply based on rational inference. However, the inability to test most metaphysical theories does not render them invalid, because they can be combined with other theories in understanding and analyzing problems.

Self-Assessment Exercises 3

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 15 minutes.
1.   Strategy is an art and science of calculating objective to achieve national development, discuss.
2.   In your own understanding how do you perceived the concept of theory?

1.6   Summary

In this unit, you have been introduced to the issues surrounding the concept of Conflict, Peace and Strategic Studies and these three concepts cab be link together at various level of structure to manage the escalation of War or crisis in the society.   This unit we have discussed peace and it various attributes we have equally given various definitions of the concepts from, Sociological philosophical and political perspectives. We equally discussed theory and various types of theories in their normative contexts before shifting focus to strategic studies and its meaning.

1.7   **References/Further Readings**

Animasawun G. A.(2008) PCR 271: introduction to conflict transformation. National Open University of Nigeria, Jabi, Abuja.

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Faleti, S. A. (2006) 'Theories of Social Conflict'. In introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, Best, S.G. (ed). Ibadan; Spectrum books.

Galtung J. (1990). 'Cultural Violence'. In Journal of Peace Research 27:3.

Bertlett Steven (2002) Introduction to Education Studies. London, Paul Chapman Publisher.

1.8   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. 'Peace is concerned with the elimination of violence where violence is an act or process which impedes people from realizing their potential (Baunet 2001 in Galtung 1969)'' so violence is much more than causing physical harm i.e. direct violence, it is also the absence of social justice and includes the monopolization and manipulation of knowledge. Achieving could be therefore said to have both a negative and a positive dimension.

Answer to SAEs 2

Q1. • Conflicts over resources
• Conflicts over psychological needs
• Conflicts involving values
• Conflicts over inadequate information
1.   Conflict over resources as result of competing demand among individuals or groups towards allocation the little resource, this can make conflict emerge.
2.   Conflict over inadequate information as result of passing information that may be either negative or positive that one also led to the emergence of conflict in the society.

Q2. Stages of Conflict
A. The Formation Stage
This is the first stage of conflict whereby a problem emerges and acts or things, or situations that were previously ignored or taken for granted now turn to serious issues. The obvious antagonistic shifts in attitude and a behaviour patterns is a clear indication of the early warning signs of conflict formation which need to be addressed if further escalation is to be avoided.
B. The Escalation Stage
This stage is characterized by the formation of enemy images. People begin to take sides, positions harden, communication stops, perception becomes distorted and parties begin to commit resources to defend their position, leaders begin to make inflammatory public statements regarding their positions and street demonstrations intensity.

Answer to SAEs 3

Q1. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means.

Q2. A theory as defined by Encarta 2004 in Faleti (2006) is an idea or belief about something arrived at through assumption and in some cases a set of facts, propositions or principles analyzed in their relation to one another and used, especially in science to explain phenomena.

UNIT 2   UNDERSTANDING WAR AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES

Unit Structure

2.1   Introduction
2.2   Learning Outcomes
2.3   Main Course
        2.3.1   Definitions of War
        2.3.2   War and State of Hostilities/Conflict
        2.3.3   Causes of War
        2.3.4   Theories of War
        2.3.5   Applicability of theories of Just War
2.6   Summary
2.7   References/Further Readings/Web Sources
2.8   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises

2.1   Introduction

The ideal situation for peace to be sustained is for people, nations or states to be at peace with one another. But since the inception of nineteenth century to date, the whole world has been turned into battle field with groups, nations, or state rising against one another, stemming from disagreement over issues, values or beliefs or competition over scarce or limited resources. However, series of non-violent conflict later degenerated into very violent ones due to ineffective regulatory or conflict management mechanisms adopted in the past. War is not only more prevalent between nineteenth and twenty first century than in earlier centuries, it is more violent and destructive and has continued to drain the energy and manpower resources of countries or states and emasculate governance.

2.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Define and explain what war is
•   Explain war and state of hostility
•   List and explain causes of war or reasons for war
•   State relationship between conflict and war.

2.3.1 Meaning/Definition of War

War like any other social phenomena, has various definitions which are often masked by a particular political or philosophical stance paraded by the authors. The Black's Law Dictionary, taking a cue from Gitlow V Kiely D.C.N.Y., 447. 2d 279,233 define war ''as a hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers or between citizens in the same nation or state''.

Webster's Dictionary has also defined ''war as a state of open and declared hostile armed conflict between states or nations, or a period of such conflict.'' From the definition we can understand the concept of war from the disagreement between states and the war declaration which in essence destroyed many lives and properties.

With reference to the above given Webster's definition, J. J. Rousseau arguing this position, opines that "war is constituted by a relation between things, and not by persons…war then is a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state…." (The Social Contract) Cicero defines war broadly as "a contention by force"; Hugo Grotius adds that "war is the state of contenting parties, considered as such"; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: "By war is meant a state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued"; Denis Diderot comments that war is "a conclusive and violent disease of the body politic"; for Katl von Clause Witz, "war is a continuation of polities by other means", and so on.

''The Military Historian, John Keegan offers a useful characterization of the political – rationalist theory of war in his A History of War. It is assumed to be an orderly affair in which states are involved, in which there are declared beginnings and expected ends, easily identifiable combatants, and high levels of obedience by subordinates. As noted above, we can see that there are several schools of thought on war's nature other than the political – rationalist account, and the students of war must be careful, not to incorporate a too narrow or normative account of war. In a nutshell, each definition has its strengths and weaknesses, but often is the culmination of the writer's broad philosophical views or positions. War can simply be defined ''as a situation of armed conflict consequent upon hostile relations with the objective of producing the winner and the vanquished in the pursuit of an objective or objectives for which the war is fought (Aderibigbe, 2010)''

''St. Augustine who lived between 354 and 430 A.d. writes. "just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when nations or city

against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it. Further, that kind of war is undoubtedly just which God himself ordains. (Aderibigbe, 2010)"

2.3.2   War and State of Hostilities/Conflict

''It thus becomes imperative or necessary to clarify or point out that states may be involved in hostilities including hostilities involving armed confrontation or conflict and yet not be in a state of war. Hostilities therefore, vary in nature, which can range from minor skirmishes to extensive military actions or operations, yet a state of war be said not to have been brought about. For example, a case study of a situation of hostilities – a non-war armed conflict, was the Sues Canal zone hostilities in October – November 1956. It was in consequence of the non-war state that the British Lord privy seal on 1 November 1956 said: "Her Majesty's Government do not regard their present action as constituting war… There is no state of war, but there is a state of conflict".

It important to differentiate between State of War and Conflict or Hostility with regards to the consequences of each one of them which are as follows:
- War brings about termination of diplomatic relations and recognition of some treaties between the belligerent states whereas conflict/hostility do not.
- (ii) A state of war may have economic consequences. It may therefore create enemy status and trading with the enemy and internment of enemy subjects.

It is therefore no longer fashionable to draw a distinction between just and unjust war or between Legal and Illegal War. It is better to speak in terms of non-promotion and prohibition of war and amicable means of resolving conflicts peacefully at the early stage before it degenerates into violent confrontation and possibly war.

- The extent or dimension of the conflict of it. If it falls short of war, it will amount to hostility or conflict.
- The intention of the contestants – The parties determine whether they regard the position as a war situation or a situation of hostilities or conflict. There may be a problem where one of the disputing states feels that a state of war has not arisen, as in case of India – Pakistan hostilities of September 1965. Ordinarily, a unilateral declaration of war by one of the contesting states is regarded as a notice of a claim of belligerent rights. The

expectation is that third states will observe neutrality. A unilateral denial of war works the other way.

- The attitude and reaction of non-contestant states should be noted especially where their rights and interests are involved or violated. Where the hostilities are very extensive in nature, belligerency may be recognised or a declaration of neutrality whatever may be the intention of the contesting states.

Belligerent rights may be asserted against the third state by any of the contesting states, as in the case of Israel – Lebanon /Isbolar where Israel usually point accusing finger at Syria, Iran and some other Arab nations while other Arab nations do often accuse United States of America of backing Israel. It should be noted that the right of the contesting states in this regard cannot be challenged (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

2.3.2 Causes of War

''It is evident that in a situation where peaceful resolution to a conflict or hostilities is unachievable war or violent confrontation becomes inevitable. In every man, of course, a beast lies hidden – the beast of rage, the beast of lustful heat at the screams of the tortured victim and the beast of lawlessness let off the chain. That is, man's appetite sometimes or perpetually overwhelms his reasoning capacity, which results in moral and political degeneration and triggers war's causation. Be that as it may, a nation may be engaged in war with another for the following reasons, among others:

- **Ideological Reason**

The Cold War era was marked by antagonistic, ideological, strategic and military rivalry which existed between the proponents of Marxist – Leninist communism, led by the Sino – Soviet block and their opponents who doubled as the proponents of liberal democracy, the West comprising Western Europe and North America, led by the United States of America.

A typical example is the Soviets' planting of missiles in Cuba which was perceived as an attempt for the establishment of a nuclear umbrella for extensive subversive activities and the propagation of communism in Latin America, which to the United States would amount to an assault on her security and the hemispheric exlusivism propounded in the Monroe Doctrine.

The defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R) now Rossia claimed to have embarked on that major offensive missile threat during the late summer and fall of 1962 by pointing out or stating that their intentions were as defensive as the US missiles surrounding the Soviet Union (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Religious Factor**

''Throughout the 1950 – 1996 period, religious conflict was believed to have constituted between 33 and 47 percent of all global conflicts. Religious conflicts were discovered to have escalated dramatically since the onset of the Cold War. However, since the end of Cold War, non-religious conflicts have declined more than religious conflicts.

Religion is increasingly being seen both as an identifiable source of violence around the world and simultaneously so deeply interwoven into other sources of violence – including economic, ideological territorial, and ethnic sources – that is difficult to isolate. The rationale for religiously motivated violence exists in Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism and others. No major religious tradition has been or is a stranger to violence from its extremists. Sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer coined the phrase "Cosmic War" to describe the world view of religious adherents who have resorted to violence in defence of their faith (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Ethnic Reason**

''Thomson (2000:58) defines an ethnic group as "… a community of people who have the conviction that they have a common fate based on issues of origin, kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language". Toland (1993:3) shares with Thomson in her conception of an ethnic group, but takes it one step further by adding a sense of belonging on the individual level "…. [ethnicity is] the sense of peoplehood held by members of a group sharing a common culture and history within a society. The concept ethnicity is not the problem perse, but the people [elite] using it as tools to achieve or accomplish their personal and selfish agenda on interests. Paul R. Brass argues "ethnicity and nationalism are not 'given but are social and political constructions. They are the creation of elites, who draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from the culture of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political or economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves… this process invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between the political elite class and leadership groups both within and among different ethnic categories (Kruger 1993:11)''.

Nigerian Civil War (Biafra), genocide in Sudan, Northern Ireland Conflict, Niger Delta crisis and host of other conflict had ethnic affiliation.

- **Pressure of Democratization**

''Many states in present day Africa, have been saddled with authoritarian, corrupt, self-perpetuating oligarchies and one – person rulership, which have come under pressures from both domestic social forces and external forces interested in the democratization (liberalization) of their structure of governance and replacement of existing systems of authoritarian rule and give way to a more accountable and grassroots – based ones, that it devoid of unnecessary discrimination on the basis of one's ethnicity, race, religion, sex or other social identities, political persecution, and rising abuses of human rights(Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Poverty and Neglect of Basic Human Needs by the Authority**

''Most African states' economies are characterized by agricultural or primary producing activities leading to structural imbalance of most of the economies and the Western World, coupled with heavy borrowing aimed at sustaining both their import and investment needs. The debt – service obligations have been imposing on the generality of African countries a cutback in social spending, rising prices of commodities, upsurge of unemployment, collapse of real earnings of individuals, drastic reduction of the purchasing power of national currencies, a great decline in general standards of living and increasing poverty for the majority or (impoverishing the general populace) are therefore the factors fostering social tensions, conflict, crises and war (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Colonial Legacy**

''The institutional legacy of the colonial masters' rule, though indirect rule, divide – and – rule tactics and the blocking of any political development, fostered localized disposition and planted a great seed of discord among diverse ethnic/political groups which later prevented the forging of a common national identity (and thus a nation-state) predicated on commercial concession (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **It is not possible to state exhaustively the reasons, why a state may adduce for the purpose of engaging in war with another state.**

''Be that as it may, the following are among other reasons that may force a nation to engage in war with another.
- For the assertion of her sovereignty;
- For the purpose of protecting her boundaries;
- For the purpose of achieving independence;
- To protect her citizens;
For the purpose of arms control;
- As a show of strength;
- For the purpose of re-claiming lost territories;

• To serve as deterrence and hosts of other reasons that we could think of (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. What is war
Q2. Discuss any two causes of war

2.3.3. Theories of War

In this part we are discuss various types of theories of war for us have a clear understanding on the issues of conflict and strategic studies in other hand.

• **Biological Theories of War**
''The theories center upon man's innate drives of which the analogies are drawn from animal behavior. They are developed by ecologist, psychologists and psychoanalyst. (Aderibigbe, 2010)''

• **Ethnology Perspectives**
''The ecologists derived their persuasive argument from the study of anima war fare which they perceived may contribute towards an understanding of war as employed by man. They assert that the behavior monkeys and apes in captivity and of young children, for example, show basic similarities. In both cases it is possible to observe that aggressive behavior usually arises from several drives: rivalry for possession, the intrusion of a stranger, or frustration of an activity. They also opine that the major conflict situations leading to aggression among animals, especially those concerning access of males to females and control of a territory for feeding and breeding, are usually associated with patterns of dominance (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Contrary to the analogies drawn by many ethnologists of animal to human behavior, their several more restrained colleagues as well as by many social scientists questioned the assertion. The term aggression, for example, is imprecisely and inconsistently used, often referring merely to the largely symbolic behavior of animals involving such signals as grimaces (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''They further argued that observed animal behaviour can be regarded as a possible important source of inspiration for hypotheses, but these must then be checked through the study of actual human behaviour, which has not been adequately done. The advanced hypotheses are seen to be having little foundation and are merely interesting ideas to be

investigated. Further, human behaviour is not fixed to the extent that animal behaviour is, partly because man rapidly evolves different patterns of behaviour in response to environmental factors, such as geography, climate, and contact with other social groups. The variety of these behaviour patterns is such that they can be used on both sides of an argument concerning, for example whether or not men have an innate tendency to be aggressive (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Ethnologists study two particular interesting subjects of which the effects of <u>overcrowding</u> on animals and animal behaviour regarding territory are the first one. The study of overcrowding is perceived incomplete, and the findings that normal behaviour patterns tend to break down in such conditions and that aggressive behaviour often becomes prominent are subject to the qualification that animal and human reactions to overcrowding may be different. Ethnologists have also advanced plausible hypothesis concerning biological means of population control through reduced fertility that occurs when animal population increase beyond the capacity of their environment. Whether such biological control mechanisms operate in human society, however, requires further investigation (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Furthermore, findings that have to do with the "territorial immature" in animals – that is, the demarcate and defence against intrusion of fixed area for feeding and breading – are even more subject to qualification when an analogy is drawn from them to human behaviour. The analogy between an animal territory and a territorial state is obviously extremely tenuous. In nature, the territories of members of species differ in extent but usually seem to be provided with adequate resources, and use of force in their defense is rarely necessary, as the customary menacing signals generally lead to the withdrawal of potential rivals. This scarcely compares with the sometimes-catastrophic defense of the territory of a national (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Psychology Perspective**

''One school of theorists postulated that the major causes of war can be found in man's psychological nature. Such psychological approaches range from very general, often merely intuitive assertions regarding human nature, to complex analysis utilizing the concepts and techniques of modern psychology. The former category includes a wide range of ethical and philosophical teaching and insights, including the work of such figures as St. Augustine and the 17th – century philosopher Spinoza (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Modern writers that believe in psychological approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man.

Others focus on public opinion and its influence, particularly in times of tension; while others stress the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and training (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Most believe that an improved social <u>adjustment</u> of individuals would decrease frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the likelihood of war. All of them believe in the importance of research and education. Still, the limitation of such approaches derives from their very generality. Also, whether the psychological premises are optimistic or pessimistic about the nature of man, one cannot ignore the impact upon human behaviour of social and political institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil propensities and to impose restraints upon him (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Social Theories of War**

''Despite the fact that psychological explanations of war contain much that seems to be valid, they are insufficient because man behaves differently in different social contexts. Hence, many thinkers that subscribe to this context, focuses either on the internal organization of <u>States</u> or on the international system within which these operate (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

The theories attributing war to the nature of the state fall into two broad streams namely: Liberal and Socialist.

- **Liberal Analyses**

''Three basic elements were distinguished by the early or classical liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries in their analysis – individuals, society, and the state – and regarded the state as the outcome of the interaction of the former two. They assumed that society is self-regulating and that the socioeconomic system is able to run smoothly with little interference from the government. Economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental control were the classical liberal's main concerns, as shown particularly in the writings of John Stuart Mill. They accepted the necessity of maintaining defense but postulated the existence of a basic harmony of interests among states, which would minimize the incidence of wars. Economic cooperation based upon an international division of labour and upon free trade would be in the interests of everybody – commerce would be the great panacea, the rational substitute for war (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''Liberals emphasized a variety of factors in their explanation of war that never be or occur. First, they focused on autocratic governments, which were presumed to wage war against the wishes of peacefully inclined people. It thus became a major tenet of liberal political philosophy that war could be eliminated by introducing universal

suffrage because people would surely vote out of office any belligerently inclined government. From the early American pamphleteer Thomas Paine onward, a major school of liberal supported republicanism and stressed the peaceful impact of public opinion. Although, they could not agree about actual policies, they stressed certain general ideas concerning relations between states, paralleling their laissez – faire ideas of the internal organization of the state with ideas of a minimum amount of international organization, use of force strictly limited to repelling aggression, the importance of public opinion and of democratically elected governments, and rational resolution of conflicts and disputes. Later in the course of the 19th century, however, and especially after World War 1, Liberals began to accept the conclusion that an unregulated international society did not automatically tend toward peace and advocated international organization as a corrective organ (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss your understanding on psychological theory of war?

2.3.4   Applicability of the theories of Just War

''The Just War theory is simply a doctrine of military ethics studied by moral theologians, ethicists and international policy makers which holds that or asserts that conflict/war can and ought to meet some conditions or criteria of philosophical, religious or political justice, provided the laid down conditions or criteria are met. In the present-day era, warfare has become a legal institution, which organizes and disciplines the military, defines the battle space, privileges killing to debate the legitimacy of waging war – down to the tactics of particular battles (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''The term 'just war' refers to the set of norms or criteria for assessing whether government recourse to force is morally justified. The just-war tradition is expressed in many forms such as international law, national military forces, moral philosophy and theology.

war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought, which can be either theoretical or historical in nature. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethical justifying war and forms of warfare, which the historical aspect, or the "just war tradition" deals with the historical body of rules or agreements applied (or at least existing) in various ways across the ages (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''The doctrine of the just war was believed to have been developed by Augustine in Civitas Dei, via the use of a comprehensive framework tagged. The City of God, in reaction to the "barbarian" invasions of the Western Roman Empire in the fourth century. Drawing upon ancient Greek philosophical principles, Augustine developed the theory as a middle way between the absolute pacifist strains of Christian ethics typified by certain Gospel passages which include "Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. and the Roman Imperial imperative to conquer military enemies of the state (Mathew: 5:39)''.

- The "just war" doctrine can best be understood in the context of the "pacifism vs. just war" debate which continues to divide Christian and other ethnical theorists, although it can profitably be compared to other theories which attempt to justify war, such as Realism (Realpolitik).

  ''The Just War Theory was most recently asserted as authoritative Catholic Church teaching by the United States Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter. "The Challenge of Peace God's Promise and Our Response", issued in 1983. "Just War Theory" encompasses modern political doctrines which promote the view that a specific war is just given satisfactory conditions.

- The history of just-war tradition is also perceived to be as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting revealed that some moral considerations were used by warriors. This included consideration of women and children or the fair treatment of prisoners. Some acts in war have always been deemed dishonorable, whilst others have been deemed honourable. Considerations of honourable acts differ with time and place, the very fact of one moral virtue has been sufficient to infuse warfare with moral concerns (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

''The just war theory also has a long history. Whilst part of the Bible hint at ethnical behaviour in war and concepts of justice cause the most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the Summa Theologicae Aquinas presents the general outline of what became the just war theory. He discusses not only the justification of war, but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war. Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand. Among the most important or prominent scholars are: Francisco de Vitoria (1486 - 1546), Francisco Suarez (1548 - 1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1637-1704), Christian Worlff (1679-1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767). The twentieth century just war theorists or scholars of contemporary texts include Michael Walzer's Just and

Unjust Wars (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill The Ethic's of War (1979), Richard Norman Ethics, Killing, and War (1995), Brian Orend, War and International Justice (2001) and Michael Walzzer on War and Justice (2001), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth Anscombe "War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the journals Ethnics, or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

I.   Criteria of Just War Theory

Just War Theory is made up of two set of criteria in explaining justification of war or conduct of war. The first establishing jus ad bellum, the right to go to war; the second establishing just in bello, right conduct within war.

The Jus Ad Bellem Convention

- **Just Cause**

''The principles of the justice of war are commonly believed or held to be having just cause. OR The reason for going to war needs to be just and can therefore be recapturing things taken or punishing people for the wrong done.

Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of jus ad bellum. Most theorists are of the view or hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. This proscription remains open-ended unless 'aggression' is defined. For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical injury (e.g, a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against national honour), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic activity), or even to a neighbor's prosperity (a violation of social justice). The onus therefore lies on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons of why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defence against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat (interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against wrong already committed (e.g., to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an anticipated attack(Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Comparative Justice**

''In a situation where there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to override the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other. Some theorists such as Brain Orend omit this term, seeing it as fertile ground for exploitation by bellicose regime.

- **Legitimate Authority**

Only duly constituted public authorities may use deadly force or wage war. Most just war theorists are of the view that the notion of proper authority resides in the sovereign power of the state. The concept of sovereignty therefore, raises a plethora of issues, which are as follows. If a government is just, i.e., it is accountable and does not rule arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to declare war is reasonable. However, the more removed from a proper and just form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its sovereignty disintegrates. A critical example of such happened in 1940 when Nazi Germany invaded France and set up Vichy puppet regime of which the people of France did not have any allegiance under its precepts and rules (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Right Intention**

''It is generally believed that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretest of fighting aggression. Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose – correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Probability of Success**

''The just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. Although, arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success, whilst force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted. (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

- **Proportionality**

''The final guide of jus ad bellum is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. That is, the anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms. This principle is also known as the principle of macro-proportionality, so as to distinguish it from the *jus in bello* principle of proportionality (Aderibigbe, 2010)''.

II.   The Principles of Jus In Bello

In a situation whereby war becomes inevitable and has begun, the just war theory also directs how combatants are to act: (just in bello). The rule of just conduct falls under the two broad principles of discrimination (distinction) and proportionality.

- **Principle of Discrimination (Distinction)**

The principle of discrimination or (distinction) concerns who are legitimate targets in war. It says that the acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians. In the course of waging war, it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since non-combatant or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper.

Although, there is a problem in defining who is a combatant and who is not because combatants usually carry arms openly while guerrillas disguise themselves as civilians. On the other hand, being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target. For example, if an individual or a civilian citizen in a country happen to be the one and only individual that possess the correct combination that will detonate a device or operate a highly technically sophisticated war equipment. This then makes such an individual become not only causally efficacious in the firing of weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target.

His job, skill or technical know-how therefore effectively militarises his status. On the other hand, the role being played by civilians in supporting an unjust war could be considered in order to ascertain to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets? This invokes the issue of collective versus individuality responsibility that is in itself a complex topic.

Another typical example was the war between Israeli and Isbolar Terrorists group of Palestine in year 2007, in which the Isbolar guerillas located their war machine in the mist of civilian population and was attacking or firing their missiles/rocket luncher into the Israelis territory. The Isbolar adopted the war strategy based on the assumption that Israelis would obey the international law by not attacking the civilian population. At a deeper, stage, Israel was forced or was left with no

option than to attacked Isbolar indiscriminately regardless of consideration for the civilian populace.

- **Principle of Proportionality**

Just war conduct is usually being governed by the principle of proportionality. The principle requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimise destruction and casualties. It seeks to minimise overall suffering, emphasizes that the force used must be proportional to the wrong endured and to the possible good that may come. The more disproportional the more suspect will be the sincerity of belligerent nation's claim to justness of a war it fights.

- **Military Necessity**

Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.

III.   Jus Post Bellum: Ending a War

Some theorists, such as Gary Bass, Louis Iasiello and Brian Orend have proposed a third category within Just War theory in recent years Jus post bellum has to do with justice after a war, which include peace treaties, reconstruction, war crimes trials, and war reparations The following principles were proposed by Orend:

- **Just cause for Termination**

A state may terminate a war if there has been a reasonable vindication of the rights that were violated in the first place, and if the aggressor is willing to negotiate the terms of surrender. These terms of surrender include a formal apology, compensations, war crime trials and perhaps rehabilitation.

- **Right Intention**

A state must only terminate a war under the conditions agreed upon in the above criteria. Revenge is not permitted. The victor state must also be willing to apply the same level of objectivity and investigation into any war crimes its armed forces may have committed.

- **Public Declaration and Authority**

The terms of peace must be made by a legitimate authority, and the terms must be accepted by a legitimate authority.

- **Discrimination**

The victor state is to differentiate between political and military leaders, and combatants and civilians. Punitive measures are to be limited to those directly responsible for the conflict.

- **Proportionality**

Any terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated. Draconian measures, absolutionist crusades and any attempt at denying the surrendered country the right to participate in the world community are not permitted.

IV. Alternative Theories of Just War

- **Militarism**

Militarism- is the belief that war is not inherently bad but can be a beneficial aspect of society.

- **Realism**

The core proposition of realism is skepticism as to whether moral concepts such as justice can be applied to the conduct of international affairs. Proponents of realism have the belief that moral concepts should never prescribe, nor circumscribe, a state's behaviour. But rather, a state should place an emphasis on state security and self-interest. One form of realism- - descriptive realism – proposes that states cannot act morally, while another form-prescriptive realism – argues that the motivating factor violate Just War Principles effectively constitute a branch of realism.

- **Revolution and Civil War**

Just War Theory states that a just war must have just authority. To the extent that is interpreted as a legitimate government, this leaves little room for revolutionary war or civil war, in which an illegitimate entity may declare war for reasons that fit the remaining criteria of Just War Theory. This is less of a problem if the "just authority" is widely interpreted as "the will of the people" or Similar-Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions side –stops this issue by stating that if one of the parties to a civil war is a High Contracting Party (in practice, the state recognised by the international community), both parties to the conflict are bound "as a minimum, the following (humanitarian) provisions". Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention also makes clear that the treatment of prisoners of war is binding on both parties even when captured soldiers have an "allegiance to a government or an authority not recognised by the Detaining Power".

- **Absolutism**

Absolutism holds that there are various ethical rules that are absolute. Breaking such moral rules is never legitimate and therefore is always unjustifiable.

- **Pacifism**

Pacifism is the belief that war of any kind is morally unacceptable and/or pragmatically not worth the cost Pacifists extend humanitarian concern not just to enemy civilian but also to combatants, especially conscripts.

Self-Assessment Exercises 3

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss the concept principles of discrimination

2.6   Summary

This unit examined different types of meanings/definitions of war, the relationship between war and hostility and then discussed various causes or reasons of war that are evolving day in day out diving the course of interaction and diplomatic relations between states or within the territorial integrity of a particular state

2.7   References/Further Readings

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2.8 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. War can simply be defined ''as a situation of armed conflict consequent upon hostile relations with the objective of producing the winner and the vanquished in the pursuit of an objective or objectives for which the war is fought''(Aderibigbe, 2010)

Q2. **(i) Ideological Reason**

The Cold War era was marked by antagonistic, ideological, strategic and military rivalry which existed between the proponents of Marxist – Leninist communism, led by the Sino – Soviet block and their opponents who doubled as the proponents of liberal democracy, the West comprising Western Europe and North America, led by the United States of America.

A typical example is the Soviets' planting of missiles in Cuba which

was perceived as an attempt for the establishment of a nuclear umbrella for extensive subversive activities and the propagation of communism in Latin America, which to the United States would amount to an assault on her security and the hemispheric exlusivism propounded in the Monroe Doctrine.

The defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R) now Rossia claimed to have embarked on that major offensive missile threat during the late summer and fall of 1962 by pointing out or stating that their intentions were as defensive as the US missiles surrounding the Soviet Union.

(ii) Religious Factor

Throughout the 1950 – 1996 period, religious conflict was believed to have constituted between 33 and 47 percent of all global conflicts. Religious conflicts were discovered to have escalated dramatically since the onset of the Cold War. However, since the end of Cold War, non-religious conflicts have declined more than religious conflicts.

Religion is increasingly being seen both as an identifiable source of violence around the world and simultaneously so deeply interwoven into other sources of violence – including economic, ideological territorial, and ethnic sources – that is difficult to isolate. The rationale for religiously motivated violence exists in Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism and others. No major religious tradition has been or is a stranger to violence from its extremists. Sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer coined the phrase "Cosmic War" to describe the world view of religious adherents who have resorted to violence in defence of their faith.

Answer to SAEs 2

Q1. **Psychology Perspective**

One school of theorists postulated that the major causes of war can be found in man's psychological nature. Such psychological approaches range from very general, often merely intuitive assertions regarding human nature, to complex analysis utilizing the concepts and techniques of modern psychology. The former category includes a wide range of ethical and philosophical teaching and insights, including the work of such figures as St. Augustine and the 17th – century philosopher Spinoza.

Modern writers that believe in psychological approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man. Others focus on public opinion and its

influence, particularly in times of tension; while others stress the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and training.

Answer to SAEs 3

Q1. **Principle of Discrimination (Distinction)**

The principle of discrimination or (distinction) concerns who are legitimate targets in war. It says that the acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians. In the course of waging war, it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since non-combatant or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper.

Although, there is a problem in defining who is a combatant and who is not because combatants usually carry arms openly while guerrillas disguise themselves as civilians. On the other hand, being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target. For example, if an individual or a civilian citizen in a country happen to be the one and only individual that possess the correct combination that will detonate a device or operate a highly technically sophisticated war equipment. This then makes such an individual become not only causally efficacious in the firing of weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target.

His job, skill or technical know-how therefore effectively militarises his status. On the other hand, the role being played by civilians in supporting an unjust war could be considered in order to ascertain to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets? This invokes the issue of collective versus individuality responsibility that is in itself a complex topic.

Unit 3   CONFLICT THEORIES

Unit Structure

3.1   Introduction

This unit seeks to provide for you a more detailed background on the concept of Peace, theory, Strategic Studies. Theories as earlier discussed are statements of facts that are often derived from a scientific process for the purpose of explaining phenomena, although theories are not peculiar to the sciences alone. However, not all facts are borne out of theories. The purpose of theory is to explain what has happened and to provide an insight into how to address future occurrence of such happenings. This unit will attempt to present conflict theories and explain why conflict occur.

3.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Know conflict theories in Peace Studies
•   Understand different types of conflict theories.
•   Use theory to explain any type of conflict

3.2.1   Conflict Theories in Education

''Conflict theorist have viewed education as preparing people for a placein society. However, rather than the consensus envisaged by functionalism i.e. system must be maintained if society is to survive. Conflict theorists, Marxists for example, see education as reinforcing a class system. Marxism perceives a conflict of values in society. With those of the capitalist ruling class being dominant. The education system

by reinforces these values. It helps to keep the working class in their place while preparing middle-class pupils to legitimately take over the powerful positions held by their class. They saw a close correspondence between how schools treat pupils and the later experiences they can expect at work. This plays an important part in preparing working-class youth for menial form of unemployment (Bowless and Gints ,1976).''

''Bourdien and Passeron (1977) used the concept of cultural capital to explain how the middle class are able to maintain their position in the process of social reproduction while making this inequality legitimate. By claiming to be a meritocracy the education system helps to keep social order and perpetuate the existing inequalities. This is, for the classic Marxist analyst, the purpose of formal education''.

''Many conflict theorists would consider if possible for subversive elements to work within the system to and some may hold an image of a young idealistic revolutionary teacher or lecturer but, generally, Marxists see capitalize as too powerful to be threatened by individuals. Idealists working within education to change society will, in the long term, become incorporated into the system themselves. In fact, by helping individual working-class to succeed, these features or lecturers may ultimately be perpetuating the myth of a meritocracy. They are in the end legitimate the very education system, which is helping to sustain the existing structure inequalities (Bowless and Gints ,1976).''
''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. In simple from analyse Marxism Conflict Theory

3.2.2 Theories of Conflicts

''A good number of scholars have proposed different theories of conflict from the level of the individual to the level of the society. Conflict does not always start between two parties. Even within one individual, there can be conflict. This type of conflict theory is known as the Dilemma type of conflict i.e. ''one person, or actor pursuing two incompatible goals'' (Galtug, 1996:70). When two parties or actors pursue the same goal, this is described by Galtug (1996) as the Dispute theory of conflict formation. The later theory has a sharp semblance with a zero-sum game or fixed sum game according to Anatal Rapport (Nwolise, 2004).'' In this context, actors hold antithetical objectives or desires. What one party wins means defeat or loss to the other party. For example, in a world cup final, when two teams contest for a trophy, once a team wins, the other team loses completely.

''Galtug (1996:73) also presents Actor conflict and structure conflict. The emphasis here is to show that there can be latent conflict and there can be manifest conflict. The fundamental difference between the two is the extent to which the conflict has become not only pronounced but also demonstrated''.

''The conflict formation theory of Galtung (1996:80) explains basis of the emergence or manifestation of conflicts. A formation or setting can be harmonious or symbiotic (meaning co-life enhancing) so far as the attainment of a goal by a party is correlated with the goal attainment of the other party. A harmonious marriage should have this feature, the satisfaction of one party going together with the satisfaction of the other. However, if the reverse is the case, then there is disharmony. Nevertheless, we should not be blind to the cooperative and harmonious aspects that may actually be the foundation for conflict transformation''.

'' Ayoade and Oloruntimehin (2002) provide theories on causation of conflicts. The first one is the additive theory, when the statements of the actors have no logical or intelligible link to the triggers of the conflict. The cumulative theory describes a situation where actor's actions are delayed till the situation gets unbearable, most social unrests involving especially the urban poor fall into this category. The consecutive causation theory describes a situation where each perceived action is enough to spark social turmoil largely due to deep-seated real and imagined grievances though actors hardly accept these reasons as they feel they are obsolete. There is also the micro-macro causation theory of conflict. This is played out when minor disagreements that could have been settled amicably are used as an excuse to violently replay the hostility between or among larger ethnic groups or organizations by individuals at lower levels''.

''There is also the *community relations theory* that assumes that conflict is caused by continued polarization, mistrust and hostility between different groups within a community. The *principled negotiation theory* posits that conflict is caused by incompatible positions and a fixed-sum or zero-sum view of conflict by the parties. *Human needs theory* opines that deep -rooted conflict is as a result of insatiable basic human needs physical, psychological and social. Security, identity, recognition, participation and autonomy cited in this context. *The identity theory* assumes that conflict stems from feelings of threatened identity. This is usually rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering. Incompatibilities between different cultural communication styles had informed the *inter cultural miscommunication theory,* (Fisher at al, 2000)''

''The structural conflict theory with two branches comprising the radical structuralists and the liberal structuralists. According to Faleti (2006), the radical structuralists are mostly from the Marxist dialectical school comprising the likes of Marx, Engel and Lenin. The liberal struturalists include Ross (1993), Scarboroug (1998), and Galtung (1990). The structural theory of conflict assumes that social conflicts arise due to imbalance in the structure of social system in a given locale. This has strong leaning on Marxists' theory of historical materialism. The structuralist opine that societies with unjust and exploitative organization that makes one class subservient to another, especially when the subservient constitute the majority are prone to conflicts (Gultang,1990)''.

This has been traced to the discrimination and imbalance inherent in the access to The means of production, which favours the few at the expense of the majority. Most capitalist societies characterized by the exploitation of the proletariat are referred to by Marxists and radical structuralists as prone to social conflicts. They argue that such structural imbalance can only be solved through a revolution or a civil war spearheaded by the proletariat. The liberal structuralists advocate the removal of exploitative structure through new policies with human face.

''The realists also theories on the cause of conflict based on strong reservation for the idealists. Morgenthau (1973) prominent realist flaws idealism for relying on rational political order hinged on universally valid abstract principles. The realist theory of conflict faults the idealist theory for believing that human nature is malleable and good (Faleti, 2006)''.
The realists trace the cause of conflicts to the inherent flaws in human nature because the human nature is selfish, individualistic and naturally conflictive. At the inter-state level, the realists opine that in the pursuit of national interest therein lies the inevitability of conflicts among states.

'' In the global view of the realist, the wars or conflicts burst out among states not only because some states opt for war in preference for peace (such as Hitler's Germany in 1939) but because of the unenvisaged and unintended consequences of the actions of those who prefer peace to war as they try to improve on their security. This is because in trying to enhance their security some states threaten the security of other states. Levy, describes World War I as an "inadvertent war'' between states that did not desire war but found themselves entangled in war because they could not constructively manage their differences. (Levy 2001)''

Furthermore, Levy (2001) theories that ''there can be also be destructive conflicts among states based on what he described as; systemic-level

sources, societal-level sources; and individual-level sources of international conflicts. At the systemic-level, the prevailing system regulating the conduct of international relations at any point in time at the international level can precipitate conflicts.''

''This is illustrated by the description of the world-wars and the European war against Napoleon a century earlier as wars fought to achieve the balance of power which led to the birth of a military coalition to checkmate the aspiring leviathans. All these led to wars because of the prevailing system at the time that favoured the balanced of power concept. (Aderibigbe,2010)''

At the societal-level, wars or conflicts break-out at the international scene because of attempts by one or some countries to impose or spread their own political or economic ideology though this also enhances peaceful relations amongst states. This illustrated with the concept of democratic peace, which assumes that democratic state hardly goes to war against one another. According Levy (2001), the "democratic norm and culture model'' implies that democratic state are naturally opposed to war and have developed the attitude and the ability to constructively prevent the generation disputes into conflicts because of the norms of peaceful conflict resolution that evolves from such democratic political culture. Empirical evidences, however, suggest that democratic states are prone to wars just like the authoritarian states. This is because some of them still fight imperial wars and worse-still they have been initiators of war in some cases even against the authoritarian states perhaps under the guise of spreading the frontiers of democracy. Therefore, it may be posited that the concept of democratic peace is still not a guarantee for global peace because it has not stopped wars between the democracies and the authoritarian states on one hand and neither has obliterated occasional tension and upheaval within the democracies.''

Levy (2001) observes that ''international conflicts can also be explained by the theory of individual-level sources of international conflict. This theory argues that the belief system of individual political actors, their philosophies of world politics, their perception of information and decision making, and their emotional states and personalities can cause differently in the same situation due to the afore-mentioned features. Unlike in the systemic and societal-level theories, individuals also make the difference in the interpretation of state foreign policy behaviour. This is because these variables have differing effects on individual leaders in their preferences for foreign policy goals, their construction of the enemy, and their beliefs on the best strategies for achieving foreign policies including how to address threats.''

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This

> *should not take you more than 5 minutes.*
> 1.   *Explain Galtung Theory of Conflict Formation?*

3.5   Summary

In this unit we have discussed conflict theory opportunity in educational system as practices and ideas that have a determining influence on behaviour, identity and belief. At the center of this difference is the question posed by Marxism and neo-marxism of the relations between the material base of society and the ideological superstrnucture in society. We equally discussed various kinds of conflict theories i.e. from Galtung Actor and structure conflict theory to democratic norm and culture models.

3.6   References/Further Readings

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3.7   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. Conflict theorists, Marxists for example, see education as reinforcing a class system. Marxism perceives a conflict of values in society. With those of the capitalist ruling class being dominant. The education system by reinforces these values. It helps to keep the working class in their place while preparing middle-class pupils to legitimately take over the powerful positions held by their class. Bowless and Gints (1976) saw a close correspondence between how schools treat pupils and the later experiences they can expect at work. This plays an important part in preparing working-class youth for menial form of unemployment.

Answer to SAEs 2

Q1. The conflict formation theory of Galtung (1996:80) explains basis of the emergence or manifestation of conflicts. A formation or setting can be harmonious or symbiotic (meaning co-life enhancing) so far as the attainment of a goal by a party is correlated with the goal attainment of the other party. A harmonious marriage should have this feature, the satisfaction of one party going together with the satisfaction of the other. However, if the reverse is the case, then there is disharmony. Nevertheless, we should not be blind to the cooperative and harmonious aspects that may actually be the foundation for conflict transformation.

Unit 4   THEORIES OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Unit Structure

4.1   Introduction

This unit dwells on the Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Good strategy demands much of the military professional whether at its formulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Only few do it well. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindset and adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This is particularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when a successful military strategy must be closely integrated with and may depend on other national strategies of the interagency community. A theory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professional and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles to perform. This course unit on a theory of strategy will provides you with essential terminology and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of the strategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. The environment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and the implications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinction being made between strategy and planning mindsets. The typical problems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategy are discussed.

4.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- Enumerate the relevance of Strategy in addressing global insecurity
- Identify causes of war and its implication to humanity.

4.3.1 Theories of Strategic Studies

The terms, ''strategy'' at all levels is the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others this can give a room for strategist to pull out skill in handling issues.

Strategy is defined in Joint Publication as "the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (Joint Staff, 2004)''
However, again William, M (2004) was of the view that '' Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern what is possible.''

''Both of these definitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role and complexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. At these levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means (Harry, 2006)''

''Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategy allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understanding its logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises, substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, and methods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify the theory as appropriate.'' (Gregory,1990)

Why study do we need to study theory of strategy? There is no may reasons for this action but theory's value lies not in a prescription for success but in how it helps us expand and discipline our thinking. As Clausewitz reminds us, theory should be for study, not doctrine.

''Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls. . .. Theory exists so that one

need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander. . .. (Carl,1976)''

A theory of strategy train the strategist's mind to deeply think on complex and volatility situation that need a critical mind to think out of the box in the time of threat, fear and opens windows for hopes and opportunities.
''The theory encourages us to rethink our own assumptions and prejudices, but it also encourages us to consider the possible assumptions and prejudices of our adversaries and other actors. Strategic theory opens the mind to all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those of our adversaries, allies, and others. On another level, theory allows the members of the military profession and the interagency community to communicate intelligently in regard to strategy. It serves as a common frame of reference for the development and evaluation of an appropriate strategy and the communication of it to those who must implement it. A disciplined theory of strategy also allows the professional to evaluate the merits of a particular strategy and critique it in meaningful terms for those who determine policy and make decisions. (Harry,2006)''

''Strategic thinking is difficult. It is best viewed as both an art and a science. The framework of theory provides a methodological basis for a disciplined thought process to assist the strategist in developing strategy, and it also serves as a guide for others to follow in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing the merits of a particular strategy. While theory is an important aid for educating the mind, it is not a substitute for "genius" as described by Clausewitz. History's great strategists possessed "a very highly developed mental aptitude" for both the art and science. They had the ability to perceive the realities and relationships of their environment, and apply them successfully in developing strategy. (Clausewitz, pp. 100-102.)

'' True genius is rare, and some say that it is no longer applicable in the modern, complex world. It is, they argue, too difficult for a single person—even a genius—to comprehend all the nuances of the modern world, and they propose that strategy is better served by an organizational process. In spite of these views, however, strategies often are linked to individual personalities in the public eye, and some individuals appear to have a particular talent for this art and science. (Colin, 1999)

''It is important for us at this level to consider the roles of strategists today. At the U.S. Army War College, three roles for strategists are

considered: leader, practitioner, and theorist. Each of these roles requires a distinct set of skills and competencies. The leader provides the vision, inspiration, organizational skills, direction, and personal impetus necessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner. The practitioner thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy and their relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policy guidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success. The theorist develops theoretical concepts through study and thought and teaches and mentors others. A master of the strategic art is proficient in all three of these areas and may approach Clausewitz's genius. (Richard,1995)''

'' Strategists function at different levels or in different roles within the state's organizational hierarchy, but they all need to understand comprehensive strategies and communicate them effectively among themselves and to the leadership, the planners, and the people who make up the organizations that ultimately implement strategy. Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as the state moves through a complex and rapidly changing environment into the future. Strategists thoroughly examine the environment and develop a strategy that identifies objectives, concepts, and resources required to accomplish the goals established by policy. Theory disciplines strategic thinking by explaining strategy's inherent logic; it serves to remind all involved with strategy neither to promise too much nor fail to consider any of the attributes of strategy. A coherent theory also helps leaders, planners, and others to evaluate and execute strategy. (Harry,2006)

From the above discussion by expert in the area of strategic studies and war, we can simply understand the importance of the application of the theory in strategic studies which demonstrate the capability power of thinkers on a serious complex issues to identify means of addressing problems during a difficult situation that was of the reason USA has taken a lead in having a strong military structure because of the application of strategy in their own security architecture.

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1.Briefly discussed the importance of strategic studies in military formation

4.3.2   A Theory Stated: Strategy's Logic

According David, (1995) has argued that ''there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.''

''Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to achieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time. In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own— possibly conflicting—objectives. (David,1995)''

''In other words, it is the application of the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of the state toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive strategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes and differs from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can be understood and applied. (Harry,2006)''

''An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that all nation-states and nonstate actors have interests they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end states categorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorable world order, and enduring national or group values. Interests are derived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategic environment and can be stated more specifically in the context of issues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or advance national or group interests. Resources are applied through the use of instruments of power. (Harry,2006)''

''The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests—which are achieved through the application of the instruments of power to specific objectives to create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policy guidance—is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner. Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition and determines how best to get there. In doing so, strategy

confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors; and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then some factors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen. (Foster, pp. 47-48)''

''Rational choices, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies, and competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm. Strategy is inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favorably influence the complex and volatile strategic environment by providing direction for the judicious application of power toward achievement of policy-driven objectives. (Foster, p. 50)''

4.3.3   Stages of Strategic Studies

Arthur, (1989) has further argued that ''the strategic process is all about *how* (concept or way) leadership will use the *power* (resources or means) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve *objectives* (ends) in accordance with state policy.''

 ''Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive, but it is not predictive. Strategy assumes that while the future cannot be predicted, the strategic environment can be studied, assessed, and, to varying degrees, anticipated and manipulated. Only with proper analysis can trends, issues, opportunities, and threats be identified, influenced, and shaped through what the state chooses to do or not do. Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shape the future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails to properly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive. (Harry,2006)''

A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy; this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz' famous dictum, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. (Clausewitz, p. 87)''

''Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. In its finest form, policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more objectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance regarding resources, limitations on actions, or similar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidance yields strategic objectives. Objectives

provide purpose, focus, and justification for the actions embodied in a strategy. (Foster, p. 50)''

''Achievement of the objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired end state. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives determined by the political purpose. Yet, as Clausewitz notes, that does not mean that policy is a tyrant. The development of strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategic environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy of the art of the possible. (Clausewitz, pp. 86-87, 607-608)''

''A third premise is that strategy is subordinate to the nature of the strategic environment. Strategy is developed from a thorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the nature of the strategic environment. The strategic environment possesses both physical and metaphysical attributes. It has both domestic and external components. The international environment is the external component, consisting of the physical geographic environment, the international system, and other external actors—and their cultures, beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal physical realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles at play within the United States. Indeed, within the United States, there are groups that have worldviews significantly different from those of the national leadership, which makes the domestic element of strategy formulation even more complex. Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the status quo and initiate a search for a new equilibrium. Stability within the environment resists change; instability within the environment urges adoption of a new strategy. The nature of the strategic environment can be described as an interactive, chaotic, complex system of systems. Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment in its formulation and execution. (Harry, 2006)''

''A fourth premise is that strategy is holistic in outlook. It demands comprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategist may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis in order to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended purpose at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at all levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy. In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect, objective, concept, and resource has effects on the environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, third-, etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of

those above, below, and on the same level with him, whether they be friendly, adversary, or indifferent actors. The strategist's efforts must be integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, coordinate, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically—that is, comprehensively. They must be cognizant of both the "big picture," their own organization's capabilities and resources, and the impact of their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy is never developed piecemeal or in isolation. (Harry,2006)''

''A fifth premise is that any strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors. (Robert,1997)''
 ''Any strategy, once known or implemented, introduces change into the strategic environment, even when it seeks to maintain the status quo. Change can occur on multiordered levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatens the existing equilibrium or status quo in the strategic environment, raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing are better or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategy can anticipate the future though the pursuit of proper objectives, but strategy cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, neither the achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences of achievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether the attainment of the specified end justifies the risks of initiating action, and the strategist must also consider how other actors may react. (Harry,2006)''

Comprehensiveness of Strategy

National Interests
Desired End States in External Environment

Grand Strategy
(All elements of power but rarely documented and published.)

National Policy
External Environment
Domestic Environment

National Security Strategy
All Elements of Power

National Military Strategy
Military Element of Power

Theater StrategyTheater StrategyTheater Strategy
Operational Art   Operational Art   Operational Art
Tactics   Tactics   Tactics

Figure 1.

Strategy thus poses a dilemma for the strategist and other states and actors.

''A sixth premise is that strategy is grounded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished—strategy cannot be formulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The strategist must know the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfully focuses on a desired or preferred end state among an array of possible end states in a dynamic environment. Strategy provides direction for the persuasive or coercive use of the instruments of power to achieve specified objectives to create strategic effects leading to the desired end state. It is essential that the strategist analyze and fully understand the desired end state in the context of the strategic environment (both domestic and external) in order to develop appropriate objectives in regard to the desired end state. Hence, before proper objectives can be determined, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, the intent of the policy, and the nation's aggregate interests as determinative of necessary and appropriate strategic effects.(Harry,2006)''

''A seventh premise is that strategy is an inherently human enterprise. Not solely a consideration of objective factors, "strategy involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable. (Murray and Grimsley, pp. 1, 13; Clausewitz, pp. 86, 89.)''

''The role of belief systems, worldviews, and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the formulation of strategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductive bias while ensuring the strategy meets criteria of acceptability at home and abroad—compensating for differences as appropriate. (Harry,2006)''

''An eighth premise is that friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction is the difference between the ideal strategy and the applied strategy—how it is supposed to work versus how it actually unfolds in execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic and complex nature of the strategic environment, chance, and human frailty. (Stephen,2001)''

 Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood and accounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in the formulation of the strategy.

''A ninth premise is that strategy focuses on root causes and purposes. Such primary foci make strategy inherently adaptable and flexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empowering subordinate levels. Strategy incorporates learning from experience and is sufficiently broad in its construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary's countermoves. (AY, 2005)''

'' Strategy addresses linear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is largely cause and effect, strategy is a process interacting with the strategic environment: strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. Process is facilitated by constructing strategy with flexibility and adaptability in its component parts. Strategy's focus on root causes and purposes ensures that the direction provided to subordinate levels is sufficiently broad to allow adaptability and flexibility while not deviating from strategic purpose. (Harry,2006)''.

''A 10th premise is that strategy is hierarchical. The political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence over the instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of state strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lower levels. Generally, strategy originates at the top as a consequence of a grand strategy (often undocumented), national security strategy or other stated national-level strategies and policy statements in regard to specific issues. Grand and national security strategies lay out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. National policy provides broad strategic guidance from political leaders, generally articulating the national interests as they relate to specific strategic circumstances. From these strategies and policies, the major activities and departments develop subordinate strategies. For the military, a National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy are derived from the National Security Strategy. In turn, the National Military Strategy leads to theater strategies. (Harry,2006)''

The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02) defines the levels of strategy as they pertain to the military element of power within the state as:
''*Grand Strategy*. An overarching strategy summarizing the national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all the instruments of national power in order to accomplish the grand strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster national economic prosperity; and promote national values. Grand Strategy may be stated or implied. (AY,2005)''

''*National Security Strategy* (also sometimes referred to as Grand Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (*Joint* Publication 1-02, p. 360.)''

''*National Military Strategy*. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (*Ibid.*, p. 359).''

''*Theater Strategy*. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Donal,2005)

From the above statements of the scholars in the area of strategy we can understand the concept of strategy has its effectiveness from functional planning and finding out the root cause of a problem in a given particular environment. Strategy, also has a power premises on the power leadership in an environment to solve problems of either solving a given particular problem or dominating a certain power control in a societal or global circuit.

4.3.4   Other Level of Strategy

''Other levels of strategy, such as *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, may be inserted in the hierarchy by leadership at various times.26 The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control. It provides a logical means of delegating responsibility, authority, and accountability within the senior leadership. It also suggests that if strategy consists of objectives, concepts, and resources, each should be appropriate to the level of strategy and consistent with one another. Thus strategy at the national military level should articulate military objectives at the national level and express the concepts and

resources in terms appropriate to the national level for the specified objective. (Harry,2006)''

''At some level, thinking and action fall below the strategic threshold. Under the National Military Strategy, the Combatant Commanders develop Theater Strategy and subsequent campaign plans. At this juncture, the line between strategy and planning blurs with campaign planning that may be either at the theater strategic level or in the realm of pure operational art. Graphically, the relationship between strategy and the levels of war is shown in Figure 2. (Harry,2006)''

Levels of War and Hierarchy of Strategy

National Security Strategy

National   National Defense Strategy   Military
Strategy   **Strategic Level**

Theater Strategy
Campaign Planning

Operational Level
JTF's & Corps

**Tactical**
Corps, Divisions & Below Tactical Planning

Figure 2.

''Strategy differs from operational art and tactics in functional, temporal, and geographic aspects. Functionally and temporally, tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of relative short duration that can be as small as a firefight between two small units or as large as a battle between corps. Operational art is the domain of the campaign, a series of battles taking place over a longer period of time. Strategy is the domain of war which encompasses the spectrum of conflict among nations and other international actors. Tactics concerns itself with the parts or pieces, operational art with the combination of the pieces, and strategy with the combinations of these combinations. Geographically, tactics are very narrowly defined, the operational level is broader and more regional in orientation, and strategy is theater-wide, intercontinental, or global. The time horizon is greater at the strategic level than at the operational and tactical levels. However, it is worth noting that with the advances in transportation and communications, there has been a spatial and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Increasingly, in part due to increasing communications capabilities, events at the tactical level have strategic consequences (Foster, pp. 56-57)''.

''An 11th premise of strategic theory is that strategy has a symbiotic relationship with time. A key component of strategic competency is thinking in time—the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices with the past and the consequences of their intended and unintended effects in the future. A strategic choice must have continuity with the past as it bridges to the future. Strategy must account for the past in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction and history within the strategic environment. A strategic action that has characteristics contrary to the past experience or culture of the society it affects is less likely to be successful. The strategist extrapolates the possible futures from the present strategic circumstances with a clear sense of the long past from which these possible futures flow; he then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeks to shape a more favorable future. Deciding when to undertake a strategy is also critical. If the historical timing is correct, then small actions can have large strategic effects. If the timing is wrong, results invariably take larger efforts and cost more in terms of tangible and intangible resources. The strategist is concerned with continuities and change, with both history and the future. History suggests the right questions to ask and provides perspective for the future consequences of the available choices (Murry, 1986)''.

''A 12th premise is that strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative; once enacted, they become a part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulative from several different perspectives. It is cumulative from the perspective that once implemented, a strategy becomes part of the continuities of the strategic

environment. Regardless of whether it is successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change and interaction in the strategic environment, and its consequences must be considered in any future strategy. Strategy is cumulative from a stratified perspective also. The effect of a policy is the summation of the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interaction related to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of the parts. It is also possible that the value of one level of strategic efforts might be negated by the effects of another level. Strategies at different levels interact, with the cumulative effects influencing the success of higher and lower strategy and planning over time. (Harry,2006)''

''A 13th premise is that efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. This is not to say that efficiency is not desired. Good strategy is both effective and efficient, but the purpose of strategy is to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favor the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Strategy must emphasize effectiveness because failure, however efficiently executed, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated multiordered consequences. Concepts and resources serve objectives without undue risk of failure or unintended effects—efficiency is necessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. (Robert,2003)''

''A 14th premise is that strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought at its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well as contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally and externally. Thus qualitatively, a National Security Strategy (NSS) objective seeks to achieve the desired effect using any of the necessary and appropriate instruments of power available to the state—the qualitative questions ask whether achieving the objective will produce the strategic effects and whether the effects will justify the objective chosen, the methods used, the resources required, and the social and political costs incurred. A National Military Strategy will identify at the national level appropriate military ends using national military concepts and resources. The National Military Strategy is bounded by the NSS and is subject to the qualitative questions, but the state cannot logically ask the military to do what it is incapable of accomplishing because of lack of ability or resources—which are qualitative relationships. In a similar manner, a theater or combatant commander would have appropriate theater-level

objectives for which he would develop theater concepts and use resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, concepts might include the integration of other than military instruments of power, if they can be integrated and capabilities and resources are available. (Harry,2006)''

''The levels of strategy, as well as war, are distinct but interrelated because of the hierarchical and comprehensive nature of strategy and war. Hence, operational or tactical concepts achieve operational or tactical objectives and cannot be elevated to a strategic level even though operational or tactical objectives contribute to the cumulative nature of strategy, and actions at these levels on occasion create strategic consequences. In a similar manner, strategic objectives and concepts have a proper relationship within a strategy, but must also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourced with the appropriate types and quantity of resources. From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves suitability and acceptability—the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. The synergistic balance also achieves feasibility—the strategic concept is executable with the resources made available. (Harry,2006)''

''The 15th and final premise of strategy is that risk is inherent in all activity. The best we can do is seriously consider the risks involved, producing a favorable balance against failure. Strategy is subject to the nature of the strategic environment, and uncertainty is inherent in that environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and interaction with other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigated by questioning the thinking behind the strategy. For example, what assumptions were made in developing the strategy, and what are the consequences if an assumption is wrong? What internal or external factors are the bases for this strategy? What changes would enhance or detract from this strategy? What flexibility or adaptability is inherent in the components of the strategy? How can the strategy be modified and at what costs? Nonetheless, no matter how probing the questions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either the failure to achieve one's own objectives, thus providing a significant advantage to one's adversaries, or creating unintended adverse effects. (Harry,2006)''

''In sum, strategy has an inherent logic that can be understood and applied. It is distinct from planning and serves a unique purpose. It differs from planning in its attributes, scope, assumptions, and premises, but provides the overall structure and parameters for more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability,

feasibility, and acceptability. Good strategy is founded in a proper understanding and analysis of the strategic environment and national interests and policy, and an understanding of the theory and role of strategy. The strategist accepts that the future cannot be predicted, but believes that it can be anticipated and shaped in favorable terms through creation of judicious strategic effects. Strategic theory guides and disciplines the development and execution of good strategy. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.

Q1 .Discuss your understanding on the 14th premises of strategy.

4.4   Summary

In this unit, effort has been made to identify some of the critical strategies obtained in the application of the theory in strategic studies which will helps in this transition by educating the professional and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monograph advances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminology and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of the strategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy studies application.

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1.6   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. 'A 14th premise is that strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought at its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well as contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally and externally. Thus qualitatively, a National Security Strategy (NSS) objective seeks to achieve the desired effect using any of the necessary and appropriate instruments of power available to the state—the qualitative questions ask whether achieving the objective will produce the strategic effects and whether the effects will justify the objective chosen, the methods used, the resources required, and the social and political costs incurred. A National Military Strategy will identify at the national level appropriate military ends using national military concepts and resources. The National Military Strategy is bounded by the NSS and is subject to the qualitative questions, but the state cannot logically ask the military to do what it is incapable of accomplishing because of lack of ability or resources—which are qualitative relationships. In a similar manner, a theater or combatant commander would have appropriate theater-level objectives for which he would develop theater concepts and use resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, concepts might include the integration of other than military instruments of power, if they can be integrated and capabilities and resources are available

**MODULE 2   PEACE   AND   STRATEGIC   STUDIES
                LINKAGE**

Unit1   Rules of Understanding: the key features of Strategic
             Studies Theory
Unit 2   The Application of Peace Studies in Conflict Resolution
             Processes
Unit 3   Conflict and Process of Mediation
Unit 4   Methods in Conflict Resolution amongst States in West
             Africa since 1960s

**Unit 1   Rules of Understanding: the key features of strategic
              Studies Theory**

Unit Structure

1.1   Introduction
1.2   Learning Outcomes
       1.3.1   Understanding Strategic Theory
       1.3.2   Process and Rules of understanding the key features of
               strategic Studies.
       1.3.3   The Application of Occam's Razor
       1.3.4   What Strategic Theory Is Not…?
       1.3.5   Self-Assessment Exercise
1.4   Summary
1.5   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises
1.6   References/Further Readings.

1.1   Introduction

The term 'strategy' must be one of the most commonly used terms in
public discourse. It is employed to refer to anything from state policy,
business plans, to personal choices. Yet few appreciate what this term
really means, and what it implies as an approach to the study of social
phenomena. The notion of Strategic Theory as a method of analysis has
permeated into the wider domain of International Relations and Political
Studies via the work of scholars like Bernard Brodie and Thomas
Schelling, and has been increasingly employed as a tool to assist in the
comprehension of decision-making, particularly with respect to the use
of military power. One of the best statements of the utility of Strategic
Theory is provided by Harry Yarger: 'Strategic theory opens the mind to
all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs
and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those of our
adversaries, allies, and others'

1.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
- Understanding the application of strategic theories
- Identifying the structures and key features involves in strategic studies.
- Applying various approaches to strategic studies.

1.3.1   Understanding Theory of Strategic Studies

M.L.R. Smith is Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, University of London.John Stone is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, University of London. Has raised an argument that the term ''strategy must be one of the most commonly used terms in public discourse. It is employed to refer to anything from state policy, business plans, to personal choices. Yet few appreciate what this term really means, and what it implies as an approach to the study of social phenomena. (Harry, 2006)''

''The notion of Strategic Theory as a method of analysis has permeated into the wider domain of International Relations and Political Studies via the work of scholars like Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling, and has been increasingly employed as a tool to assist in the comprehension of decision-making, particularly with respect to the use of military power. One of the best statements of the utility of Strategic Theory is provided by Harry Yarger: 'Strategic theory opens the mind to all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those of our adversaries, allies, and others'. (Harry,2006)''

''What, then, is Strategic Theory, and how does it help open the mind? Working from first principles, we aim to provide a concise understanding of what Strategic Theory encompasses in its essentials. As will be shown, to achieve this understanding it is important to appreciate what Strategic Theory is not, as much as what it is. In the process, we hope to show that Strategic Theory is a simple, parsimonious, yet elegant, way of clarifying complexity. (Harry,2006)''

However, it important for us to further explain more the nature of strategic theory. Plainly, in any study of the infinitely varied scale of human conduct, Strategic Theory cannot aspire to achieve any hard scientific understanding that survives experimental testing under exactly

replicable conditions. However, it does constitute a theory, in the broader sense, which advances a set of propositions that, if true, can be held to explain certain facts or phenomena.

In this regard, ''Strategic Theory reveals itself less as a set of hard and fast rules, and more as a series of purposive assumptions, or rules of understanding, that guide analysis; though as we shall endeavour to suggest in the conclusion, these rules do ultimately enable us to posit a plausible, all encompassing, definition of Strategic Theory (Harry, 2006).

1.3.2. Process and Rules of understanding the key features of strategic Studies.

- **The study of ends, ways and means**

''Strategy is concerned with the ways in which available means are employed in order to achieve desired ends. Analysis using Strategic Theory therefore involves the study, in Michael Howard's words, of the 'use of available resources to gain any objective'. (Arthur,1989)''
Here, the term 'resources' (the 'means') refers ''not simply to the tangible elements of power, but also to the many intangible factors that might impose themselves on a decision-maker – most notably the degree of will that an actor can mobilize in the pursuit of its goals (Arthur,1989)''

- **Interdependent decision-making**

''A second key feature of Strategy Theory is that decision-making is influenced by the existence of a wilful adversary (or adversaries) set on achieving its (or their) own ends. This in turn means that the quality of strategic decision-making must be measured not against any fixed standard of efficacy, but in light of the response it can be expected to elicit from an adversary. It is this feature – along with the uncertainty it engenders – that distinguishes strategy from administrative behaviour, and it is the consideration of how interdependent decisions are reached in a fluid environment that provides Strategic Theory with a great deal of its richness. Many of the key insights provided by thinkers like Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling, for example, are predicated on the proposition that strategic decision-making is dependent on the choices and actions of others in the political system. (Clausewitz,1976)''

- **The study of the political actor as the central unit of analysis**

''Principally, strategic theorists concern themselves with the calculations of what are termed 'unitary' political actors, be they states, sub-state entities, or any other social grouping. Strategic Theory analysis is interested in describing the choices available to such actors and evaluating the quality of their decision-making. Thus, strategic theorists

will invariably attempt to trace the line of thinking of a particular political entity to comprehend how it seeks to achieve its objectives (Clausewitz,1976) .

- **Understanding value systems and preferences**

''Evaluating decisions in light of the responses they elicit from an adversary implies a requirement to understand the relevant actors' value systems and preferences – in the interests of minimizing uncertainty. Strategic theorists are, in other words, concerned with understanding what motivates the actors under consideration. They are concerned with asking how actors construct their interests in light of their ideological motivations, how these interests translate into specific objectives and how they shape the choice of means employed to achieve them(Clausewitz,1976).

- **The assumption of rationality**

Strategic Theory assumes the existence of rational actors. To be considered rational, actors must exhibit behaviour that is consistent with the attainment of their desired end. The assumption of rationality does not suppose that the actor is functioning with perfect efficiency or that all decisions always produce the 'correct' or maximum outcome for the actor. It is merely a presupposition that an actor's decisions are made after some kind of cost–benefit calculation that results in a decision to employ means so as to optimize a desired end in accordance with an actor's values It is in some degree a problematic assumption (how do we know if a cost-benefit calculation has been undertaken for instance?), but Strategic Theory would lack analytical purchase without it (Clausewitz,1976).

- **The observance of moral neutrality**

''Strategic Theory is intellectually disinterested in the moral validity of the means, ways and ends of any actor. Commentary is confined to evaluating how well the chosen means are used to achieve stated ends. This understanding includes and applies to all instrumental acts of violence. This may seem clinical, even cold blooded, but it is a logical concomitant of any dispassionate attempt to understand strategic decisions. As Schelling elucidates, this is for two reasons. First, strategic 'analysis is usually about the situation not the individuals – about the structure of incentives, of information and communication, the choices available, and the tactics that can be employed'. Second, Strategic Theory 'cannot proceed from the point of view of a single favoured participant. It deals with situations in which one party has to think about how the others are going to reach their decisions (Arthur,1989) ''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This

should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1.What is assumption of rationality?

1.3.3   The Application of Occam's Razor

These six features comprise the core of Strategic Theory. We contend that it is a precise and economical tool because it applies the principle of Occam's Razor. That is to say, it incorporates as few postulates as possible in its operation.

''Of course, what has been presented so far is only a basic framework. What these key assumptions also provide is a point of entry into many other interesting questions, such as: how is it possible to gain an appreciation of another's value system (through serious historical or anthropological research); and how might we be able to discern when an actor has attained its objectives, or has reached a point where it has maximized its potential with its chosen means (a matter of judgment based on knowledge of the actor's value system)? (Harry, 2006)''

''With its focus on understanding value systems and their interaction with other actors in the wider environment, Strategic Theory might be considered a form of constructivism avant la lèttre. Strategic Theory, however, avoids the problematic nature of constructivist approaches as they have evolved within the field of contemporary International Relations. This latter brand of constructivism tends to come with normative 'bolt-ons' to the effect that, because identities and interests are not permanently fixed, they must be manipulated towards some set of universal humanitarian values. This, we contend, is an unduly ethnocentric enterprise that (for reasons provided earlier) Strategic Theory avoids. Additionally, Strategic Theory does not fall into the hole that American political scientists often manage to dig for themselves by perceiving a contradiction between the fact that identities and interests may be constructed from contingent historical and social experiences (rather than given by immutable structures in the international system), and the fact that once interests are formed they are often pursued with great realist vigour – particularly on the part of major state actors on the international stage. Strategic Theory perceives no such contradiction (Harry,2006)''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. What value system?

1.3.4   What Strategic Theory Is Not…

Strategic Theory avoids many of the pitfalls that have afflicted International Relations because, in disciplinary terms, the two are unrelated. Its modern origins derive from public choice economics. It is an analytical tool that is sometimes brought in to investigate issues and problems in the realm of International Relations, but it is not intrinsically of International Relations. Unfortunately, some scholars do consider it a branch of International Relations, and this leads to misunderstanding and confusion. Thus it is worth mentioning briefly what Strategic Theory is not. This, in itself, also helps to clarify the nature and value of our approach.

1) **Strategic Theory is not just the study of military power**
''It is true that the term 'strategy' derives from the Greek word strategos, meaning the 'art of the general', but the way strategy is defined (the application of means to ends) implies no inherent link with military power and war. The majority of self-described strategic theorists probably do study the use, or threat of use, of armed force in politics. Fundamentally, though, Strategic Theory has universal application across the sphere of human activity as Thomas Schelling, himself a political economist, demonstrated in much of his work. (Harry, 2006)''.

2) **Strategic Theory is not Strategic Studies**
''It is important to make a distinction between Strategic Theory and Strategic Studies. Strategic Studies emerged as a field of academic enquiry after World War II. It was concerned with the study of military power in international politics. As such it is unsurprising that Strategic Theory played an important role in shaping the methodological basis of Strategic Studies. On the other hand, the substantive concerns of Strategic Studies were more historically contingent. The realist focus on states and material power needs to be understood as consequent to the abandonment of interwar idealism, whilst the focus on deterrence arose due to the advent of nuclear weapons. Thus, although the end of the Cold War brought with it new conditions that challenged the relevance of Strategic Studies, the same cannot be said in relation to Strategic Theory with its commitment to more fundamental issues (Harry, 2006)''.

3) **Strategic Theory is not the same thing as Security Studies**
''For reasons outlined above, Strategic Studies has become subsumed into a much broader field of academic endeavour since the end of the Cold War. States and nuclear weapons are no longer the only things on the agenda when academics talk of 'security'. Such things remain important, but they now jostle up against a much greater range of concerns embraced by the new Security Studies. Indeed, security – defined in terms of the absence of threats to welfare – is becoming so

broad a term that neither of us is really quite sure what its study now amounts to. But this does not worry us over much: just as Strategic Theory is not Strategic Studies, nor is it Security Studies. (Harry, 2006)''

4) Strategic Theory is not the study of 'strategic culture'

''Strategic culture is a problematic concept, and is not necessary to sustain coherent strategic analysis. Strategic Theory, as has been emphasized, routinely involves the study of how value systems shape the character of choices in relation to ends and means. If this is what people mean by the study of 'culture' then Strategic Theory is, ipso facto, concerned with the study of cultural variables. Academic notions of strategic culture go back a long way. More recently it has attracted interest amongst constructivist-minded International Relations scholars who are concerned to challenge the dominant Realist paradigm in their field by demonstrating the importance of ideas for explaining the behaviour of political actors. Realists have succeeded in mounting a spirited counter-offensive. Nevertheless, the whole debate would hardly have been necessary had greater attention been paid to the insights available from the literature on strategic theory(Harry,2006)''

5) Strategic Theory is not Game Theory

''Just as Strategic Theory has no need to engage with problematic notions of culture, neither does it connote the opposite fallacy of a value-free understanding of rational-actor behaviour as embodied in Game Theory. By no means have all strategic theorists found value in Game Theory. Brodie, for example, did not believe it as directly valuable. Schelling did employ it, but the most influential and enduring aspects of his work derive not from his mathematical formulations, but from his profound qualitative understanding of the interdependent character of human relationships. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 3

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss your understanding of strategic theory relation to security studies

1.5   Summary

In sum, therefore, there is enough evidence to show that Strategic Theory offers a concise and coherent basis for investigating the social behaviour associated with conflict, that is, in situations where actors are endeavouring to secure their interests and values against the interests of

other political actors. It routinely reaches out to other areas of academic endeavour, but it is not intrinsically of any other area. Its fundamental concerns are not indissolubly linked to a particular historical, ethical or other context. On the contrary, it is defined in such a manner as to help the theorist to extricate him or herself from situational bias.

1.7   References/Further Readings

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1.8   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.

Q1. Strategic Theory assumes the existence of rational actors. To be considered rational, actors must exhibit behaviour that is consistent with the attainment of their desired end. The assumption of rationality does not suppose that the actor is functioning with perfect efficiency or that all decisions always produce the 'correct' or maximum outcome for the actor. It is merely a presupposition that an actor's decisions are made after some kind of cost–benefit calculation that results in a decision to employ means so as to optimize a desired end in accordance with an actor's values It is in some degree a problematic assumption (how do we know if a cost-benefit calculation has been undertaken for instance?), but Strategic Theory would lack analytical purchase without it

Answer to SAEs 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.

Q1. 'With its focus on understanding value systems and their interaction with other actors in the wider environment, Strategic Theory might be considered a form of constructivism avant la lèttre. Strategic Theory, however, avoids the problematic nature of constructivist approaches as they have evolved within the field of contemporary International Relations. This latter brand of constructivism tends to come with normative 'bolt-ons' to the effect that, because identities and interests are not permanently fixed, they must be manipulated towards some set of universal humanitarian values. This, we contend, is an unduly ethnocentric enterprise that (for reasons provided earlier) Strategic Theory avoids.

Answer to SAEs 3

1.   Strategic Studies has become subsumed into a much broader field of academic endeavour since the end of the Cold War. States and nuclear weapons are no longer the only things on the agenda when academics talk of 'security'. Such things remain important, but they now jostle up against a much greater range of concerns embraced by the new Security Studies. Indeed, security – defined in terms of the absence of threats to welfare – is becoming so broad a term that neither of us is really quite sure what its study now amounts to. But this does not worry us over much: just as Strategic Theory is not Strategic Studies, nor is it Security Studies.

Unit 2   The Application of Peace Studies in Conflict Resolution
                  Processes

Unit Structure

2.1   Introduction

The essence of this unit is to expose you to the general conflict handling styles available so that at the end you can see for yourself handling styles that are most suitable to conflict situations. Also, as future conflict managers, the point is to get you acquainted with methods of conflict handling that are most appropriate and expose you to those you should discard as negative in certain circumstances.

2.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
• Discuss the various conflict handling styles
• Identify the factors influencing conflict handling styles
• Differentiate between "cooperation" and "assertiveness" as issues to consider in conflict handling styles.
• Explain the extra-territorial level of conflict handling.

2.3   Conflict Handling Styles

''By conflict handling styles we refer to the responses that people make to address the situation that is considered detrimental to the attainment of a desired goal (Ojiji, 2006:120). Two typical forms of responses are usually noticed as they are related to our social and natural environment. These are cooperation and assertiveness. In the context of conflicts, cooperation manifests in a number of other methods of dealing with

conflicts, such as accommodation, avoidance, collaboration and compromise (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''.

On the other hand, assertiveness is the attempt to satisfy one's own needs and desires at the expense of the other person we relate with. In relation to conflict, assertiveness manifests in defending one's right in a given situation and pushing a position favourable to oneself or one's group. The specific conflict resolution methods that imply assertiveness are arbitration and threats to the other party.

2.3.1   Factors Influencing Conflict Handling Styles.

The interaction of these two major orientations affects conflict handling styles. These include:

1.   Domination:
''This is a style of dealing with conflict that is derived from the disposition of people to assert themselves in situations. Here, little or no interest in the wellbeing or interest of the other party is exhibited. The primary motivation in domination is the desire to win, and therefore make the other party lose. Thus, the assertive party behaves in a manner to suppress the views of the other party by using strong arguments or emphasizing its rank or economic position. This approach to handling conflict can hardly lead to a lasting resolution of the conflict. Even if the assertive person "succeeds" in "winning" the case, there is a tendency that the "resolution" will leave behind "grudges" in the other party which could be expressed at some other time through some other methods. This style of handling conflict is rooted in power relationship where one party perceives that it has more power over the conflict issue than the other party or parties (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

2.   Avoidance:
''Conflict avoidance occurs when one party in a potential conflict ignores the conflicting issues or denies the significance of the issue in their relationship. It is a way of not addressing the conflict, or a tactical way of postponing the conflict for a better time, if at all such a time will come. In this situation; the person is unassertive and uncooperative. There is no intention to pursue one's own needs or those of the other party(Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''.

However, conflict is not resolved by having the issues ignored or not getting attended to. In other words, conflict avoidance is a dangerous way of responding to a conflict, even if it guarantees some immediate sanity. In the long run, if the issues in the conflict are not addressed, a worsening relationship between the parties could ensue.

3.   Accommodation:
''This style of dealing with conflicts comes from a cooperative disposition. Thus, the person using this style is not assertive and not involved in competition with the other party. Rather, in accommodation there is a conscious attempt to neglect one's needs and focus on satisfying those of the other party. The underlying value here is that of self-sacrifice which may be a manifestation of self-esteem disorder. In such a situation, the person is meek so that he or she readily gives in to the demands of other people. Like the case of avoidance, it has a short-term benefit in the form of social stability. For instance, in the long run, the other party (that is assertive) may assume greater power that can be detrimental to other persons. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

4.   Collaboration:
''Here, the parties do not avoid the conflict. They work with each other to find a solution that is satisfactory to both of them. It is about dialogue in which the parties listen actively and gain understanding of the other party as well as their own. That understanding enables them to develop a solution that satisfies the concerns of both parties. It is a situation where both parties win. This style is more socially adaptive as it leads to a situation that is acceptable to the parties involved. Most negotiations are of this nature such that getting to the final solution can be quite tedious. When a solution is eventually found through negotiation, it tends to be binding on the parties as they both were part of the process. In other words, this style of handling conflict makes sure that the parties exercise control over the process as well as the outcome. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

5.   Compromising:
''Compromising involves findings, an expedient mutually acceptable solution, which partly satisfies both parties. In other words, parties split their differences and make concessions in order to resolve the conflict.In this situation, a party is partially assertive and partly cooperative. Compromise becomes necessary in situations where the positions of the parties are so incompatible that the two cannot be reconciled without one of them losing something in the process. This is different from collaboration, where the parties can be reconciled without any of them making losses. This is a "win some, lose some" situation. Compromise may succeed in reducing the intensity of the conflict but not in totally resolving the conflict. It can be a way of buying time necessary to work out a more acceptable solution to the conflict. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''.

6.   Confrontation/Fighting:
''Confrontation occurs when the parties in a conflict physically or emotionally "attack" each other. They could do this by threatening each other, insulting each other or generally engaging in violent acts such as

one party physically hitting the other. There is considerable degree of lack of understanding of each other's position as each one tries to hold on to its point of view and therefore disagrees with the other party's point of view. Expectedly, this style, is characterized by violence and creates a zero outcome; that is, a situation where both parties lose. In violent conflict situations every party involved certainly loses. It is only in a few cases that confrontation leads to win/lose situation, in which case the stronger party wins. This style cannot offer a lasting resolution to a conflict. One of the parties will bear grudges after confrontation. Indeed, it would likely increase the intensity of the conflict. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

7.   Problem-Solving:
''Parties to problem solving approach listen to each other constructively with the intention to understand and deal with the underlying issues in the conflict. This approach is predicated on parties showing mutual respect to each other, irrespective of their differences and searching for ways to resolve the problem. In this way, there is little concern about who is wrong or right; but parties consider conflict as an opportunity to improve on their relationship. It is an approach, which usually leads to mutual collaboration and a win/win solution. As the parties to the conflict listen attentively to understand each other's view point, their solution will ultimately lead to addressing the needs of both parties and contribute to rebuilding other relationship. Successful problem solving style will lead to a lasting resolution of conflict. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

2.3.2   The Extra-Territorial Level of Conflict Handling

At the extra-territorial level, especially when the conflict has gone out of the control of the parties leading to full-scale hostilities, supranational organizations, such as ECOWAS at the sub-regional level, African Union at the regional level and the United Nations at the global level, employ the following mechanisms to bring the conflict under control and usher in peaceful mechanism for stemming the tide of the conflicts. These could also be referred to as forms of peace process. They include:

1.   Peace-keeping:
Peacekeeping entails the use of peacekeepers (especially military contingents) to keep conflicting parties apart and keep conflict at current low levels. This also involves interposition where the peacekeepers are designed to place barriers between the forces of the parties that are already employing violence and to supervise the withdrawal of hostile forces, from contested areas. The peacekeepers are armed with light arms weapons and are only made to defend themselves when attacked.

2.   Good Offices:
This refers to the procedures whereby third parties act as channels of communication between the opponents, passing messages between them. In addition, the third parties may propose sites for formal diplomatic sessions and urge the antagonists to begin formal discussions (Holsti, 1972).

3.   Peace Enforcement:
Here, peace contingents involve offensive heavily-armed troops to impose peace on recalcitrant parties. These forces are primarily sent to conflict situation to effect ceasefires, separate combatants, supervise withdrawal of forces, and patrol frontiers. They are not fighting forces in the sense that their function is to halt aggression. This force is needed to create the space for increasing development and reducing conflict.

4.   Supervision:
This service comes after the parties to a conflict have already negotiated a preliminary 'armistice or ceasefire' agreement. The third party then delimits truce lines, polices them, handles violations according to established procedures, and occasionally administers contested territory or conflict flash points.

5.   Peace-making:
This arises in situations where conflict is high even though there are viable conditions for pursuing human social development.

6.   Peace Building:
This applies to a situation of low conflict, that is when conflict has been brought to low ebb and prospects for pursuing further development initiatives are high. According to Vande (2021:36) "peacebuilding activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and economically."

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
1.   The primary motivation in domination is the desire to ___
A.   Fight
B.   Win
C.   Suppress opposition
D.   Be aggregative
2.   A tactical way of postponing the conflict for a better time is called ____
A.   Collaboration
B.   Compromise

> C.   *Avoidance*
> D.   *Accommodation*
> 3.   *A conflict handling style that involves people working with each other to find a solution that is satisfactory to both of them is called ____*
> A.   *Collaboration*
> B.   *Confrontation*
> C.   *Assertiveness*
> D.   *Consideration*
> 4.   *___ occurs when the parties in a conflict physically or emotionally "attack" each other*

2.4   Summary

From this unit, you have learnt that conflicts in human society can easily be handled, especially when they are still on a small-scale, or when they have not completely gone out of hand. When, however, a conflict gets out of hand or goes full-scale, then extra-territorial levels of conflict handling styles become necessary and are called for.

2.5   References/Further Readings

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2.6 Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

1.   B
2.   C
3.   A
4.   Confrontation/fighting

Unit 3   THE CONCEPT, AND PROCESS OF MEDIATION

Unit Structure

3.1   Introduction

This unit sets out to introduce you, as the title suggests, to the concept of mediation and the process of mediation known in diplomatic relations. It does this by dwelling on the meaning of mediation, and identifying the guiding principles of the mediation process. Later on, it takes you through some of the stages involved in the mediation process.

2.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
• Define the term "mediation"
• Identify the guiding principles of the mediation process
• Enumerate the stages involved in the mediation process
• Differentiate between "problem statement" and "problem clarification" as vital stages of the mediation process.

3.3   Mediation

3.3.1 Meaning of Mediation

Godongs (citing Moore, 1996:15) defines mediation ''as the intervention in a negotiation or conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power, but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute...". Vande (2021:38) sees mediation as "a process in which a

neutral third party, the mediator assists two or more parties in order to help them negotiate an agreement on a matter of common interest."

''There are other definitions of mediation, but all points at the direction of the involvement of a third party being called upon to help the disputing parties negotiate a settlement.
However, there are many other situations in conflict where mediation is unsuitable. These include:

a)   When a serious incident has just occurred and no useful conversation is obtainable from the parties because of panic, confusion and grief.

b)   When it is evident that the sincerity of one or more of the parties is in doubt or simply in contradiction of the aims of negotiations and settlement.

c)   Where the incapability of a party to either listen or participate in any form of useful discussion and negotiation is beyond remedy.

d)   Where the issue is non-negotiable in nature.

e)   Where two unequal parties involved such that the balance of power between parties does not favour a fair agreement.

Where the issues in conflict deserve public knowledge rather than confidential negotiation under mediation. (Ndu Life Njoku, 2022)''

3.3.2 Guiding Principles of the Mediation Process

i.   ''Mediators should examine the suitability of their level of competence, experience and interest in handling a particular conflict before accepting to become intermediaries. Such self-examination should begin with SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis of the mediator in the conflict.

ii.   Availability of Mediation Plan: Plans should specify the relevant people, the best location, procedures and frameworks. The plan should also foresee areas of agreements and disagreement, psychological and behavioural standards and the type or quality of infrastructural needs required for successful negotiations should be indicated in the plan.

iii.   Impartiality: Mediators should seek to provide the ideals of justice and fairness in consideration of all issues brought to the negotiation table.

iv.   Confidentiality: Confidence of the parties to discuss freely and truthfully amongst themselves without any fear that their positions, claims, defences or remedies being sought would become known to other people not directly involved in the conflict or at negotiations should receive a boost.

v.   Self-determination: This principle permits disputants to either include or exclude any important issues in the course of negotiation.

vi.   Voluntariness: This gives disputants protection against compulsion by anyone in any stage of the process, they could even withdraw at whatever stage based on their judgments.

Empowerment and Education: This principle ensures that the mediation process should target the empowerment and education of disputants in such a way that they are given as enhanced capacity to deal with their problems and can handle conflicts. (Ndu Life Njoku,2022)''

3.3.3 The Mediation Process

There are several mediation stages and steps in the mediation functions which denote the reason why it is often regarded as a process. These stages are forms of intervention to assist parties in conflicts reach a voluntary settlement of their differences through an agreement that defines their future behaviour towards each other.

''A typical outline of the stages involved in mediation include initiation, preparation, introduction, problem statement and problem clarification, generation and evaluation of alternatives, selection of alternatives and reaching an agreement.

1.   Initiation:
There are several ways that the mediation process can commence. The matter could be submitted to a "neutral" or dispute resolution organization by one or all of the parties involved in a conflict.

On other occasions, a dispute could be referred by a court of law for possible settlement through the intervention of a mediator. This practice is popularly known as 'out-of-court' settlement in Nigeria. Here, disputants both agree to settle outside the formal judicial system, with or without the help of a third party.

2.   Preparation:
At this crucial stage it is necessary for parties to be well informed about the background to their conflict and the claims, defences and remedies being sought. Also, legal advice could be sought on technical issues; however, legal representation on such matters is excluded even where lawyers are present during negotiations. To be fully informed about the parties in conflict and the major features of their dispute, the mediator should know about the following:
i.   The balance of power between the parties;
ii.   Sources of pressure and the pressures for, and against, agreement;

iii.   The economic resources of the parties;
iv.   Political and personal differences between parties
v.   The authority of delegates in negotiations;
vi.   Cultural, religious and ideological differences and fixing of convenient appointment dates, time and venues.

3.   Introduction:

The stage of introduction is very important to the mediator as this determines the mediator's acceptability, integrity, credibility and neutrality. When he has been able to establish the above germane qualities, the mediator could use this opportunity to determine the following issues.
i.   Control of the entire process
ii.   Identification of the issues and positions of parties.
iii.   Search for consensus grounds
iv.   Provision of motivation for continued participation in the process.
This stage sets the foundation of confidence and hope in the mediation process.

4.   Problem Statement:

Parties could state a problem in two basic ways. The first approach allows issues to be raised one by one and discussion is made on each, before proceeding to the next issue. The second approach allows for an exhaustive listing of all relevant issues to be made before detailed discussions commence on each.

Whether the former or the latter approach is adopted, the problem statement allows the parties to tell their stories beginning with the complaining party. While this is going on, the mediator is expected to listen effectively and attentively to confirm, clarify or elaborate issues that require emphasis or attention. It is very common that the mediator asks both open-ended and close- ended questions, taking note of significant signals from the behaviour and body movements of each party, calm tension if necessary, clarify narrations by asking penetrating and focused questions. The mediator effectively later summarizes the stories and positions of the parties, assesses the appreciation of the listening party and thanks the party who has concluded the narration of his/her side of the story.

5.   Problem Clarification:

At this stage, the mediator brings out the concrete underlying issues of the conflict. The tools used in effecting this include questions, assessment of behaviour to bring out the real issues. Also important at this stage is the ability of the mediator to summarize areas of agreement and differences between the parties. This is followed by matching and ranking of the issues in order of priorities of the parties concerned.

6.   Generation and Evaluation of Alternatives:
In doing this, two important tools could be employed by the mediator. The first tool is the attempt that mediators make to create doubts on the extreme positions of each of the parties. In way, unviable alternatives are dropped from the negotiation. The second tool is the creation of new alternative courses of action for all parties, with the hope of achieving the desired compromise and subsequent agreement for parties in conflicts.

7.   Selection of Alternatives:
At this stage, the mediator is expected to assist the parties both jointly and individually to reduce the number of alternatives to a minimum of those with high prospects for desirable results needed by all parties.

8.   Agreement:
A mediator does not get involved in drafting an agreement for parties in conflict. It is usually a joint assignment for disputants who have been involved in negotiations. However, the mediator ensures that a clear summary of the terms of discussions, negotiated compromises, are readily available to parties drafting an agreement. Also, the mediator compliments or appreciates all parties for the cooperation enjoyed throughout the period of negotiations, before terminating the mediation process. The mediator should also set up a follow-up mechanism, indicating the relevant dates of implementation of the agreements reached by the parties in the conflict. (Ndu Life Njoku,2022)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
1.   What is the quality of a mediator who is to assist two or more parties in order to help them negotiate an agreement on a matter of common interest?
A.   Learned in international law
B.   Neutrality
C.   A former Secretary General of United Nations
D.   Well advanced in age
2.   Which of the following allows the parties to tell their stories beginning with the complaining party?
A.   The problem statement
B.   The background statement
C.   Description of the problem
D.   Interpretation of the problem
3.   A mediator usually gets involved in drafting an agreement for parties in conflict. (True/False)

3.5   Summary

On the whole, the fundamental goal of mediation is the achievement of an acceptable settlement through non-violent means between disputants, as well as the attainment of peace and justice.

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3.7   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

1.	B
2.	A
3.	False

Unit 4   METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AMONGST STATES IN WEST AFRICA SINCE 1960

Unit Structure

4.1   Introduction
4.2   Learning Outcomes
4.3   Conflicts in West Africa
       4.3.1   Nature and Scope of Conflict in West Africa
       4.3.2   Methods of Conflict Resolution in West Africa in the Pre-ECOWAS Period
       4.3.3   Methods of Conflict Resolution in West Africa in the ECOWAS Period
       4.3.4   Challenges of Peace-making Efforts in West Africa.
       4.3.5   Contributions of Civil Societies to West African Peace-building Process
4.4   Summary
4.5   References/Further Readings

4.1   Introduction

This unit dwells on the various practical steps and methods states in the West African sub-region have been adopting in resolving conflicts since independence. The unit begins by examining the nature and scope of conflict in the region, the methods of resolving the conflicts in the period before the regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States came into existence, and after, as well as the challenges West African states have faced in the process of resolving conflicts. Finally, the unit also exposes you to the contributions of civil societies in the region to the peace-building process.

4.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Explain the nature and scope of conflict in the West African sub-region
•   Identify the methods of conflict resolution in West Africa in the pre- ECOWAS period and in the ECOWAS period.
•   Mention and discuss the challenges which peace-keeping efforts in West Africa
•   Give examples of the contributions civil societies have made to peace-building process in West Africa.

4.3   Conflicts in West Africa

4.3.1. Nature and Scope of Conflicts in West Africa

It Conflicts in West Africa can be broadly grouped along the divides of intra-state and interstate conflicts.

''The intra-state conflicts come in the form of civil wars, guerrilla warfare, militant insurrections, and inter-ethnic warfare. Notable ones in this category include the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the Liberian crisis (1989-2003), the Sierra-Leone Civil War (1992-2002). This category of conflicts was more frequent, long drawn and more difficult to resolve. In most cases, they were motivated by the desire of individuals or groups of people to seize power, which were considered unrealizable through the constitutional process (Akinbi and Akinola, 2007).''

The inter-state category involves state of conflict between two or more states. Mention could be made of the Guinea-Bissau border crisis with Senegal (1989); the Nigeria-Chad Lake Chad crisis (1983), and Nigeria-

Cameroon feud over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. In most of these conflicts, territorial claims were the paramount issue. One other issue was the allegation of harbouring of dissident elements of which attempts made to flush out such dissidents provoked inter-state conflicts.

''It is, however, to be noted that most of the conflicts witnessed on the West African soil had third party involvement, which was either African or non-African in nature. The Liberian crisis, for instance, was strongly believed to have been supported by Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso; so also is the case with the Chad crisis which has been strongly alleged to have had the involvement of Libya on the side of the Transitional Government of National Unity (G.U.N.T.), while the Central Africa Republic (C.A.R.) and France were believed to be on the side of Hissene Habre's government (Akinbi and Akinola, 2007).'' Also, in the case of the Nigeria Civil War, some West African and other African countries supported the secessionist Biafra, while others supported the O.A.U.-backed peace mission.

''The consequences of the above scenario of external involvements were to manifest in the protracted nature of such conflicts. This made the resolution of such crises intractable, if not impossible. Besides, a situation where some members of ECOWAS are deeply involved in either supporting insurgents or the incumbent regimes cast doubts on the potency and efficacy of collective action (such as the ECOMOG) in

resolving the conflicts in West Africa. This is so because collective action involves the collective will of the entire member states without which activities of these independent actors may hamper the collective action and mar peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building in the sub-region by making it something of a wild goose chase. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

4.3.2 Methods of Conflict Resolution in West Africa in the Pre-ECOWAS Period

''It should be recalled that, West African countries were still grappling with issues relating to their independence as at 1960. While most attained the independence by 1960, some others were battling for their independence. Besides, after independence in 1960, most of these countries were pre-occupied with the problem of post-independence nation building. Emphasis then was on membership of the Organization of Africa Unity (O.A.U.), a continental body whose emphasis was primarily focused on the decolonization process and the liberation of oppressed African countries. The OAU's conflict resolution mechanism was centred on mediation in inter-state conflicts or cross-border conflicts and not on intra-state conflicts. The principle of non--interference was a key guiding feature of the OAU. Besides, there were limited intra-state conflicts as at that time since most African countries were still basking in the euphoria of hard won independence. Ethnic hostilities were still masked by independence attainment even as there was high aspiration and enthusiasm among the African states that the indigenous governments would address their common plights, needs and aspirations; hence, there was less need for intra-tribal or intra-ethnic hegemonic conflicts. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''Given that there was no mechanism among West African states for intervention in intra-state conflicts, it then follows that decisions to intervene in intra-state conflicts would be political, depending on where member state has concrete interest. Such interventions may be covert or overt support of friendly governments or support of dissidents against unfriendly governments. Some are in form of bilateral agreements and alliances. Because such interventions which may also result from giving support to ethnic militias across borders were informal, they were somewhat ad-hoc in nature and may rather than resolve the conflicts, further complicate the conflicts. The conflicts in the Casamance region in Senegal, the Nigerian Civil War are good examples of such interventions and participation. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''Also, where there was no formal mechanism for conflict resolution, the only mechanism left is non-binding mediation, negotiations, and use of good offices approaches. A good example of bi-lateral allies sending

troops for mutual assistance was exhibited when Sekou Toure sent Guinean troops into Siaka Steven's Sierra Leone in 1973 and into William Tolbert's Liberia in 1979 to help restore internal stability following civil disturbances in these countries (Adebayo, 2002). Hence, during the Nigerian Civil War, some friendly countries in West Africa backed the Biafra side, and some took sides with the Nigerian side, as we shall see later in this module. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

4.3.3 Methods of Conflict Resolution in West Africa in the ECOWAS Period

''When ECOWAS was finally formed in 1975, the organization merely provided for the protocol on non-aggression in 1978, patterned alongside the OAU's principle of non-interference. Also, the protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence which was signed in 1981 were not able to prevent internal dissension, conflict and large scale violence in the sub-region. As a result of these, the Chadian conflict of 1982 was handled at the continental level, even though the mediation was not very successful in ending hostilities. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''A wide-scale sub-regional intervention in internal conflict contrary to the principles of non-aggression and mutual assistance on defence began with peacekeeping mechanism tinkered out during the Liberian Civil War which broke out in December 1989. Initially, the Liberian war was treated as an internal problem of a sovereign nation. But it soon became a regional problem as other countries began to witness massive inflow of refugees considered of great threat to peace and economic well-being of the region and also as variants of the crisis emerged in Sierra-Leone, Guinea Bissau and later Cote d'Ivoire. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''It needs to be pointed out that, as at the time ECOWAS was taking up this responsibility it had no institutional instrument to engage in peacekeeping or mediation processes. Thus, seeing the inevitability of intervening in the Liberian crisis, the ECOWAS set up a mediation committee comprising representatives of five countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Mali and Togo. It was this committee who, among other things, recommended the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to act as an intervention force. This did not go down well with some ECOWAS members who felt it would be a breach of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state as enshrined in the charter of the OAU of which all members of ECOWAS were signatories (Iheme, 2004).''

''Eventually, the ECOMOG landed on the Liberian soil with 3,000 soldiers contributed by Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Guinea on August 24, 1990. The efforts of this force led to the

resolution of the crisis, followed by the conduct of an internationally supervised election in the year 1997. The challenge of the Liberian crisis was followed by another civil war in Sierra Leone just two years after the beginning of the Liberian crisis. The civil war was mainly motivated by the Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.). The ECOMOG with the later support of OAU and United Nations (U.N.) succeeded in bringing about a peace agreement that was signed in Lome in 2001 between the RUF and the government. This was followed by the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2002. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''The third main challenge that came the way of ECOMOG was that of Guinea - Bissau. The conflict was sparked off on the 6th of June, 1998, when the president of Guinea Bissau, Jogo Bernado, sacked the Chief of Army staff, Brigadier Ausumane Mane, over allegation of illegal trafficking in arms with a secessionist force, the Forces Democratique de Casamance (M.F.D.C.). The ECOMOG successfully got interest groups in the conflict to negotiate a transitional government and hold parliamentary elections in March, 2004. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''The role of ECOMOG in resolving the above crises to the point that relative peace was restored and without compromising national sovereignty proved to a very large extent that the ECOMOG mechanism was a welcome development. To a very large extent, it justified the viability of regional response to crisis for a more effective handling of regional issues. In addition, the resilience of ECOMOG was well established being able to handle supposedly overlapping crises as a role (Akinbi and Akinola, 2007).''

4.3.4   Challenges of Peace-Making Efforts in West Africa

''Despite some success stories, collective peace building efforts in Africa is still at a rudimentary level, generally lacking in established institutional frameworks and structures (Adetula, 2006)''.
''Because of the absence of institutionalized structures for conflict management, conflict resolution initiatives have mostly taken ad-hoc forms. In the Liberian conflict, for example, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government established a Community Standing Mediation Committee, which in turn created the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) at its inaugural session. In Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments did not formally approve of the ECOMOG force unit some three months after its intervention. In Guinea Bissau, the ministerial-level ECOWAS Defence Council voted to extend ECOMOG's mandate to Guinea Bissau even before the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government had time to address the issue. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''A key lesson from the ECOWAS security mechanism is that all the three ECOMOG interventions were highly improvised. There was no clear mandate on exactly what the troops would be doing. Peacekeepers were sent into fragile environments without adequate logistical support and funding, and without a political settlement. Unsurprisingly, when things became difficult, ECOMOG struggled to respond decisively in all three cases and was criticized for using too little or too much force and for compromising its stated neutrality. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''The Sierra Leone intervention in February 1998 clearly revealed that Nigeria, the principal hegemonic factor in the intervention failed to secure a clear mandate for its intervention from both ECOWAS and the UN immediately before the intervention. Second, it failed to act in concert with other important sub-regional states to garner key francophone support for the intervention. Third, their disastrous intelligence failure before the invasion of Monrovia in 1992 was repeated in Freetown in 1999. Fourth, Nigeria's leaders failed to secure military and logistical equipment and the necessary financial support before undertaking the intervention. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''However, Sierra Leone intervention showed some improvements from the Liberia's case. In Sierra Leone, Francophone countries were actively involved in ECOWAS peacemaking efforts from the start, resulting in less hostility and criticism of Nigeria's intervention therein with Cote d' Ivoire having negotiated the Abidjan peace agreement in 1996. Likewise, in Lome in1999, Francophone Togo took the lead, along with the UN, in peacemaking, while Burkina Faso was actively involved in efforts to reach agreement with the RUF. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''The ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau repeated some of the mistakes of the Liberia and Sierra Leone interventions. The peacekeepers were logistically ill-equipped for their mission; the number of troops was grossly insufficient to maintain security in the country, and the funding for the mission depended entirely on France, an external power which had its own interest in the outcome of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. Here, Senegal, a middle-size West African power, led an intervention with Guinea in defence of what it saw as its national security interest without an ECOWAS mandate and without Nigeria. What, one may want to know, was the result? The absence of Nigerian contingents from the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was critical to the premature end of the Senegal-led peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau in 1999. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces had been able to overcome their logistics short comings to protect Monrovia and Freetown from being over-run by rebels in 1992 and 1999 respectively. The Nigerians had also been able to repel the NPFL from

Monrovia in 1990 and restore the Kabbah government to power in Freetown in 1998. This suggests the indispensability of Nigeria's military and financial muscle to largely sub-regional peacekeeping efforts. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

4.3.5 Contributions of Civil Societies to Peace-Building Processes in West Africa

''Civil society actors in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau have enormous contribution in managing civil conflicts. In Liberia for example, the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (I.F.M.C.) crafted the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 1990, while ECOMOG supported an interim government in Monrovia between 1990 and 1994 with active civil society participation. In Sierra Leone, a cross-section of women's organizations pressured the military government to hold democratic elections in February 1996, while the inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (I.R.C.S.L.) played a crucial role during the negotiation of the Lome peace agreement of 1999 in Guinea-Bissau. Also, the Bishop of Bissau played an important role in mediating between both sides during the war, while civil society groups have played an important role in post-electoral peace building activities. (Ndu Life Njoku. 2022)''

''However, despite the often courageous role of civil society, this role got frustrated in large-scale conflicts in which armed factions controlled large parts of the country. In the end, ECOWAS, frustrated by military stalemate and the financial burden of protracted peacekeeping, pursued a policy of appeasing warlords and rebels in all three cases often in the face of vociferous opposition from civil society groups. In Liberia, the warlords were brought into an interim government in 1995 and their allies were given government posts; in Sierra Leone, Sankoh was given the Vice-Presidency in 1999, and the RUF got cabinet posts; in Guinea-Bissau, a deal was brokered in 1998 that established an interim government between representatives of Mane and Vieira. These deals proved to be unstable; Mane launched a coup against Vieira; Sankoh attacked UN peacekeepers; and, Taylor used his war chest to win elections before continuing his destabilization policies in the sub-region. In the words of Adebayo (2002:16):

This suggests that neither an exaggerated faith in the ability of civil society to manage uncivil conflicts, nor the blatant appeasement of warlords, can bring stability to West Africa. ECOWAS leaders will have to work closely with civil society actors in developing their security mechanism, since these actors are often closest to conflicts and can contribute to preventive efforts. (Adebayo, 2002)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
1.   Which of the following is not a form of intra-state conflict?
A.   Civil wars
B.   Guerrilla warfare
C.   Militant insurrections
D.   Trans-border crisis
2.   The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was finally formed in ___
A.   1975
B.   1978
C.   1974
D.   1963
3.   A wide-scale sub-regional intervention of ECOWAS in internal conflict contrary to the principles of non-aggression and mutual assistance on defence began with the ____
A.   Sierra Leone civil war
B.   Nigerian civil war
C.   Liberian civil war
D.   Senegalese civil war
4.   .A key lesson from the __ security mechanism is that all the three ECOMOG interventions were highly improvised.
A.   ECOWAS
B.   West African
C.   African
D.   African Union's

4.4   Summary

To summarize, both intra-state and inter-state conflicts have plagued the West African sub-region. The method of resolving these conflicts have been transformed from piecemeal approaches to more comprehensive approaches, with the establishment of the ECOWAS. Even though challenges still abound as far as conflict resolution in the region is concerned, one can say that civil societies have enormously contributed to the peace-building process in the region.

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4.6   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answers to SAEs 1

1.	*D*
2.	*A*
3.	*C*
4.	*A*

Module 3   STRATEGIC STUDIES AND ITS IMPACT TO WORLD POLITICS

Unit 1   The State Centered Focus
Unit 2   Strategic Studies as an academic Area of Study
Unit 3   The Concentration of Strategic Scholarship in Military Institution
Unit 4   Strategic Studies as Either Practical or Purely Theoretical Concept.

Unit 1   The State Centered Focus

Unit Structure

3.1   Introduction
3.2   Learning Outcomes
3.3   The State Centred Focus
      3.3.1   The Rational Actor Model
      3.3.2   The Western World
      3.3.3   The Realist Paradigm
      3.3.4   The Present and Short Term
3.4   Self-Assessment Exercise
3.5   Summary
3.6   References/Further Readings/Web Sources
3.7   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises

1.1   Introduction

This unit gives you a brief background of the Strategic Studies as an inter-disciplinary field of study, which at its core examines the ways in which military power and other coercive instruments may be used to achieve political ends in the course of a dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing wills. Since the subject matter is so broad, numerous insights from a variety of academic disciplines have been incorporated in order to enrich the study of strategy, including major insights from the sciences, arts, humanities, and the social sciences (especially International Relations, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology, among others). This history, and the composite nature of the discipline, is often overlooked by its critics, who in recent years have displayed a tendency to black box this field of inquiry. Strategic thought, succinctly understood as the leading ideas of military and civilian strategists about the threat and uses of force and the application of power to fulfil the ends of policy, provides the conceptual foundations that underpin Strategic Studies more broadly.

1.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
- Identify some core background of Strategic Studies
- Examine Realist perspective on Strategic Studies.
- Make a critical analysis on security contemporary issues

1.3   State Centered Focus

''Presently Strategic Studies is confronted with several challenges. On the one hand, the scholarship is charged with a seeming lack of relevance and its perceived intellectual flaws highlighted by the wider community of security studies scholarship. (Avey, etel 2014)''
Bannet, (2010) has argued that ''One contribution has, for example, even called Strategic Studies merely 'the specialist military-technical wing of the Realist approach to IR'.''

On the other hand, there is a challenge from those who more narrowly critique the absence of fresh thinking and new perspectives to be applied to the challenges facing contemporary political practice. (Bett,1997)''
''Strategic Studies scholars need to take these voices and challenges more seriously; it is increasingly clear that in the civilian academy the field appears to have been increasingly outmanoeuvred and cut off by the new and normatively-driven mainstream, which is instinctively more appealing in the context of Western liberal democracies(Bierman, 2009)''
 ''while in the policy field the absence of good strategic thinking is becoming increasingly evident. These two dynamics become especially clear, for example, in the way in which policy-makers have reached for counterinsurgency as a silver bullet, divorcing it from wider strategic imperatives, and indeed in the way in which this kind of warfare has been discussed as a form of 'armed social work'[7] which frames conflict and intervention in a manner more appealing and acceptable to Western publics and policy-makers. (Holsti,1996)

In the light of these multiple practical, environmental and intellectual challenges, we signal here a need to rethink and rejuvenate the field in both its theoretical foundations and practical applicability. Strategic Studies today is ripe for revitalisation but in order to begin this process the field needs to consider moving beyond its traditional constraints:
It is true that states have played and continue to play an important role in international affairs. We cannot understand the many outbreaks of

conflict and violence in the international system without recognising the role of the state. (Edward, 2015)''
However, actors other than states have gained in importance and the field compromises its relevance by not incorporating them in a more structured and significant manner. Individuals, non-state actors, transnational groups and international organisations all have strategies and increased power and agency, the field needs to urgently deal with them. States are important but they are far from the only significant strategic actors out there. This is equally of course the case for the study of the changing environments which enable and constrain actors, especially in terms of globalised structures and mechanisms of global governance. (Jentleson, 2002) ''

1.3.1   The rational actor model

The scholarship to date has relied heavily on these models to understand strategic behaviour and they have proven fruitful in many investigations. Still, they do not capture the full scope of strategic reason. Developments in cognitive psychology and related fields have the promise to renew the study of strategy and need to be further explored. Going beyond rationality as understood in rational choice theory would entail the study of emotions, intuitions and strategic imagination. Even Clausewitz, in whose footsteps many of scholars have trodden, asked that attention be paid to the idea of military genius and the role of passion in war. None of which are purely rational phenomena to which we can apply these dominant actor perspectives. (Newman,2015)''

1.3.2   The Western world

''Western states have indeed been responsible for significant armed conflict in modern history. In public perception, war is often associated with a dominant image of states at loggerheads, such as in the two world wars. This image overrides the many smaller and even deadlier engagements in other parts of the world. As has been pointed out time and again, civil wars in the non-Western world form, since the end of the Napoleonic wars, the dominant pattern. (Holsti,1996)''

''The field of Strategic Studies needs to recognise more fully the global roots of strategic thinking and action and incorporate these non-Western perspectives. The rise of new actors, notably India and China, pose both intellectual and policy challenges which require more informed thinking. In a changing world, the field must adopt a truly global outlook, if it is to remain relevant. Relatedly, there is a need to move beyond the dominance of American and British perspectives and scholarship. Recognizing and respecting the huge debt we owe this scholarship, we see a clear need to give greater attention to continental European and

more importantly non-Western perspectives on strategy. Examples which could easily be built from are Sun Tzu and Kautilya, and especially the way in which their thinking has influenced scholars and policy-makers in China and India. (Stephen,2005)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
1.　　*How do you described state centered strategic focus?*
　　2. *Discuss you view on western model of strategic process?*

3.3.4　The Realist paradigm

This paradigm has formed a cornerstone of the field and has contributed to many insights furthering our understanding of strategic behaviour. However, closely linked to problems with the state-based framework, we see a pressing need to incorporate alternative approaches. There are many other ways of looking at international affairs, which have not made sufficient inroads within the study of strategy so far. We need to more fully conduct investigations from the perspectives of other research traditions and points of view. (Celeste, 2015)

In the study of International Relations, strategic ideas are part of all the main research traditions, such as Constructivism, Liberalism or Marxism, and in turn these perspectives have shaped, and continue to shape, strategic thinking and action. The Realist research tradition will obviously remain significant for Strategic Studies, as indeed it will in wider IR given, for example, the foreign policy actions of Russia in Syria and Ukraine, and China in the South China Sea but Realism is not and should not be the only analytical tool in the toolbox of Strategic Studies. We recognise that this could be difficult given path dependencies and normative issues on both sides but it is essential to explore possibilities further in order to reinvigorate the field. (Jeremy, 2012)''

3.3.5　The present and the short term

Strategic Studies has, as a distinct field of study, always held a particular relevance to gauge pressing and contemporary security challenges at the expense of deeper and longer term reflection. The risks of short-termism have, however, been very real. For example, in the debate about new terrorism, historic roots were denied and *hodie*-centric reasoning dominated. The field would benefit from looking further back into history and we suggest that a perspective from the *longue duree* is essential. This long-term perspective should notably include pre-

nineteenth-century global history, enabling longer-term patterns to come to light in assisting with the study of today's challenges. (James,2015)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Described realism paradigm of strategic studies?

1.7 Summary

In this Unit, we have looked at Strategic Studies is an inter-disciplinary field of study, which at its core examines the ways in which military power and other coercive instruments may be used to achieve political ends in the course of a dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing wills. Since the subject matter is so broad, numerous insights from a variety of academic disciplines have been incorporated in order to enrich the study of strategy, including major insights from the sciences, arts, humanities, and the social sciences (especially International Relations, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology, among others).

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1.9   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answers to SAE 1

1.   'while in the policy field the absence of good strategic thinking is becoming increasingly evident. These two dynamics become especially clear, for example, in the way in which policy-makers have reached for counterinsurgency as a silver bullet, divorcing it from wider strategic imperatives, and indeed in the way in which this kind of warfare has been discussed as a form of 'armed social work'[7] which frames conflict and intervention in a manner more appealing and acceptable to Western publics and policy-makers.

2.   Q2. 'Western states have indeed been responsible for significant armed conflict in modern history. In public perception, war is often associated with a dominant image of states at loggerheads, such as in the two world wars. This image overrides the many smaller and even deadlier engagements in other parts of the world. As has been pointed out time and again, civil wars in the non-Western world form, since the end of the Napoleonic wars, the dominant pattern

Answer to SAE 2

Q1. 'This paradigm has formed a cornerstone of the field and has contributed to many insights furthering our understanding of strategic behaviour. However, closely linked to problems with the state-based framework, we see a pressing need to incorporate alternative approaches. There are many other ways of looking at international affairs, which have not made sufficient inroads within the study of strategy so far. We need to more fully conduct investigations from the perspectives of other research traditions and points of view.

Unit 2   Strategic Studies as an academic Area of Study

Unit Structure

2.1   Introduction

This unit introduces you to Strategic Studies is confronted with several challenges. On the one hand, the scholarship is charged with a seeming lack of relevance and its perceived intellectual flaws highlighted by the wider community of security studies scholarship. One contribution has, for example, even called Strategic Studies merely 'the specialist military-technical wing of the realist approach to IR' On the other hand, there is a challenge from those who more narrowly critique the absence of fresh thinking and new perspectives to be applied to the challenges facing contemporary political practice.

2.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Analyse the strategic as an academic area of studies.
•   Discuss the theoretical and practical aspect of strategic studies

2.3.1 The Concentration of Strategic Scholarship in Military Institution

''Traditionally the study of strategy was conducted within the walls of military academies and institutions. In the nineteenth century, the civilian strategist was almost non-existent. This changed with the advent of nuclear weapons and scholarship moved to think tanks like RAND

and also to civilian universities, since nuclear war remained a theoretical exercise. While we would encourage the continued engagement in military colleges and academies of higher learning with strategy, it should not be its only locus. The study of strategy needs a firmer base in civilian institutions as well. From the perspective of cross fertilization and the different intellectual and policy foci present in those locations, renewal and new ideas can be born. This exchange of perspectives between the military and civilians was, of course, where the Golden Age of Strategic Studies in the 1950s also originated. (David,2010)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. How do you see the traditional perspective of strategic studies?

2.3.2 Either the purely practical or the purely theoretical

Not only in Strategic Studies but in the wider field of international relations there has been a debate to what extent the scholarship has divorced itself from practical relevance and gone off into the purely theoretical for the sake of theory alone. This also applies to the study of strategy. Scholars should consider recalibrating the needs and necessities of the study of strategy for both practice and academia. In the more distant past, the purely theoretical approach has been found to be problematic, with examples of Cold War abstract reasoning that were very far removed from reality. In recent years, the field has been accused of being too close to policy, so as to lose its independence and risk being co-opted by policy-makers, this trend is the more worrying given the seeming lack of strategy in many recent foreign policy adventures. For Strategic Studies to be relevant, a careful balance needs to be found between theoretical rigour, solidity and relevance for policy. (Edward,2015)''

2.3.3 A positive vision

There are pressing world events that demand input and answers from scholars who have studied and theorized on the phenomenon of strategy. This is a field which still has much to contribute both intellectually and practically. What we are suggesting here is the plotting of a course between the hidebound Cold War perception of strategy and the wilder utopian shores in the broader field of security studies. As a plan of action to strengthen a global Strategic Studies enterprise, we formulate the following:

- The need to encourage research and publications exploring and developing the points suggested above in more visible and developed ways.
- The need for a scholarly outlet. This could come by rejuvenating existing journals such as the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, which would be the preferred option to build the necessary bridges. Alternatively, a new journal devoted to the topic of Global Strategic Studies could be established but it would remain important to reinvigorate rather than splitting the field, any new journal should be focused on offering opportunities for dialogue and fostering a sense of common purpose.
- The need for a greater concentration and framing of research efforts and the establishment of a network of scholars devoted to the study of strategy from a truly global perspective.
- The organisation of panels at major conferences both within and beyond the field of Strategic Studies itself.
- The acquisition of research funding to pursue these goals with greater purpose. (Jeremy,2012)''

Where should such a recalibration and redirection of the field towards global Strategic Studies lead us? First and foremost, it would create an area of research and investigation that is fit for the future. It would operate on the basis of the recognition that strategic challenges in the international system today are far more diverse and require a refreshed input than hitherto acknowledged. The challenges we see as most pressing are linked to a variety of non-state actors in the form of terrorists, insurgents, warlords, militia leaders, pirates and, most recently, the difficult to identify and easily deniable 'green men' that NATO is worried will be used to infiltrate the eastern frontiers of alliance territory. These diverse actors engage in a variety of different violent activities ranging from the purely criminal to the completely indiscriminate, and anything and everything in between. If we want the field to remain relevant, and make further development of strategic thought a serious and useful addition, we need to focus more on these actors and *their* ideas of strategy. A large-scale effort since the end of the Cold War has indeed tried to grapple with these agents in both local and global contexts. Most attempts have, however, been informed by tried and tested approaches, such as the extrapolation of balance of power theories and the security dilemma to non-state actors. This exercise has run into trouble with shortcomings in this theorization rapidly becoming apparent. (Hew, 2013)''

We currently witness a concerning trend that with the increased assertiveness of Russia, some Strategic Studies scholars have been harking back to the Cold War literature on escalation dominance and deterrence. Even though the scholarly efforts are laudable, we should be

wary of simply dusting off old concepts that seemed logical but were beyond utility already at the time of their conception. (Barry, 2009)''
Not only is it necessary to recognise the panoply of strategic actors, we also need to broaden the understanding of their behaviour from viewpoints other than that of the rational actor perspective. This could be highly beneficial for any grasp of the real driving forces of violent activity. It is not very helpful, as is common today, to assess the strategies of perceived opponents as something which we are familiar with but which they are not, i.e. ISIS is not a terrorist organisation.[17] Furthermore, developments in the study of psychology and emotions in relation to war could lead us to new and productive insights. This is just one example of where the field could head (David,2010).

Most of the violent actors, listed above, operate in the non-Western world but with links between battle theatres becoming increasingly and pressingly relevant for policy and strategy. As others have pointed out, the *banlieues* in many a Western metropolis are now directly linked to battle theatres further afield in Asia and Africa. (James,2013)''

Working from a perspective where we link the local, the regional and the global and also the particular with the general would be highly beneficial for deeper investigation. Transgressing the boundaries between security perspectives that focus on the domestic and the international would also be highly productive to push the existing boundaries of the field. Conversely, most military operations today are carried out in coalitions or based on alliances in which non-Western partners participate, e.g. the most prominent participants in United Nations operations have for a number of years been non-Western states and the coalition of states fighting Daesh/ISIS consists of a mix of both regional and Western states. These facts deserve a more thorough treatment, if only to add to a better understanding of converging and diverging strategic cultures and 'ways of war'. (Isabelle, 2010)''

With a widening of the theoretical approach to the study of strategy, we could attain a richer understanding of what strategy is all about. When we move beyond the purely power- and interest-driven ideas and further relate to norms, expectations, appropriateness, consequence and culture, we can increase our grasp of not only what we are doing ourselves, and of how our partners perceive common problems but also what is driving our opponents. (James, 2013)''

Around 20 years ago in an overview article Richard Betts asked 'should Strategic Studies survive?'. His answer then was a clear yes. Today, we argue that Strategic Studies indeed has a bright future, if we take these challenges seriously and see them as an impetus and inspiration to bring

the community of scholars together with new focus. We look forward to the constructive debate that this manifesto is intended to provoke and welcome ideas about how the field can be reinvigorated and how Strategic Studies can become truly global. (Richard, 1997)

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss strategic studies as either theoretical or practical field of study?

2.6   Summary

In this unit, we can under standard finally, a proper balance between the theoretical and the practical application would boost the field, not only scientifically, as it would increase its academic standing as a mature field of inquiry. It would also provide an impetus for practical application that is sufficiently divorced from day-to-day demands and the flavours of the month but still meets the requirements and challenges of praxis

2.7   References/Further Readings

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Richard K. Betts, (1997) 'Should Strategic Studies Survive?', *World Politics* 50/1 (1997), 7–33.

 2.9   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. Traditionally the study of strategy was conducted within the walls of military academies and institutions. In the nineteenth century, the civilian strategist was almost non-existent. This changed with the advent of nuclear weapons and scholarship moved to think tanks like RAND and also to civilian universities, since nuclear war remained a theoretical exercise. While we would encourage the continued engagement in military colleges and academies of higher learning with strategy, it should not be its only locus.

Answer to SAE 2

Q1. 'Not only in Strategic Studies but in the wider field of international relations there has been a debate to what extent the scholarship has divorced itself from practical relevance and gone off into the purely theoretical for the sake of theory alone. This also applies to the study of strategy. Scholars should consider recalibrating the needs and necessities of the study of strategy for both practice and academia. In the more distant past, the purely theoretical approach has been found to be problematic, with examples of Cold War abstract reasoning that were very far removed from reality. In recent years, the field has been accused of being too close to policy, so as to lose its independence and risk being co-opted by policy-makers, this trend is the more worrying given the seeming lack of strategy in many recent foreign policy adventures. For Strategic Studies to be relevant, a careful balance needs to be found between theoretical rigour, solidity and relevance for policy.

Unit 3   Understanding the Strategic Theory.

Unit Structure

3.1   Introduction
3.2   Learning Outcomes
         3.3.1   Theory of the Strategic Environment
         3.3.2   Chaos Theory
         3.3.2   Complex Theory
         3.3.3   Relationship Between Chaos and Complex Strategic
               Theory
3.4   Self-Assessment Exercise
3.5   Summary
3.6   References/Further Reading
3.7   Possible Answers to SAE

3.1   Introduction

Strategic theory seeks to cause specific effects in the environment—to advance favorable outcomes and preclude unfavorable ones. For the state, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadership interacts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of the state. This environment consists of the internal and external context, conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities, interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and the possible futures.

3.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- Give a detailed account of the role Strategic environment in resolving security Issues
- Discuss the nature of strategic environment
- Analyse critically the impact of Strategic Theory.

3.3.1   Theory of Strategic Environment

''The strategic environment functions as a self-organizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relative equilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment, some things are known

(predictable), some are probable, some are plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily in a direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particular interest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment results in both intended and unintended effects. The strategist ultimately seeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within the strategic environment through creation of multiordered effects. Conceptually, a model of strategy is simple—ends, ways, and means—but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent with it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors or to chance. (Harry,2006)''

The nature of the strategic environment has been described numerous times by different authorities. This environment, encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College in the acronym VUCA, is marked by:

a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) (Alvin,1997)''

Characterized by the four earmarks—volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)—the strategic environment is always in a greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or "chaos." The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and in compliance with policy guidance. (Harry,2006)

VUCA thinking argues that the strategic environment is volatile. It is subject to rapid and explosive reaction and change, often characterized by violence. Uncertainty also characterizes this environment, which is inherently problematic and unstable. New issues appear, and old problems repeat or reveal themselves in new ways so that past solutions are dubious, and the perceived greater truth often vacillates with time. Everything is subject to question and change. This environment is extremely complex. It is composed of many parts that are intricately related in such a manner that understanding them collectively or separating them distinctly is extremely difficult and often impossible. Sometimes the environment is so complicated or entangled that complete understanding and permanent solutions are improbable. The strategic environment is also characterized by ambiguity. The

environment can be interpreted from multiple perspectives with various conclusions that may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good and others bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may be surmised, but never entirely known. VUCA thinking describes the appearance of the environment without providing a theoretical understanding of it. Since the role of the strategist is ultimately to advocate actions that will lead to desirable outcomes while avoiding undesirable ones, the strategist must understand the nature of the environment in order to exert influence within it. (Roderick,1998)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. What do you understand by strategic environment

3.3.2 Chaos Theory

Manus, (1997) has argued that ''Chaos theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligent meteorologist who, while searching for a way to produce more accurate weather predictions, discovered the "butterfly effect." He noticed that miniscule changes in his initial input to mathematical calculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary and unpredictable effects on the outcomes. He concluded that the future behavior of complex and dynamic systems is incredibly sensitive to tiny variations in initial conditions.''

Over 150 years earlier, Clausewitz understood and described this phenomenon in war and wrapped it into his definition of friction: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Major Susan,2004)"

Likewise, folklore captured this same reality: "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; for want of a horse . ..the kingdom was lost!" Computers allow scientists to do the calculations to study this effect in mathematically simple systems, thereby illuminating the "chaotic" behavior of the strategic environment and other complex systems. (Harry,2006)''

Vicente, V (2000) was of view that ''Chaos theory is a different way of viewing reality. Prior to the development of chaos theory, two world views dominated thinking. Systems were defined as deterministic and predictable, or random and disordered—thus unpredictable. Deterministic systems are predictable because the same inputs will yield the same outputs every time the experiment is conducted. In math's

chaos theory, chaos is not a state of utter confusion—random, unpredictable, and uncontrollable—but an observable reality that adheres to certain rules even as it appears chaotic in the evident sense. It explains observed physical behavior that possesses characteristics in common with both order *and* randomness as opposed to the more traditional either orderliness *or* randomness. Put more scientifically, chaos theory describes unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems. A dynamical system is one that interacts and changes over time. Behavior in chaotic systems is aperiodic, meaning that no variable describing the state of the system undergoes a regular repetition of values—each changes in some part over time. The behavior in a chaotic system continues to manifest the effects of any small difference, and consequently a *precise* prediction of a future state in a given system that is aperiodic is impossible. On the other hand, chaotic behavior as a mathematical process does possess structure or patterns and, as a consequence, can be predicted and influenced to some extent, with the most influence occurring in the initial conditions.''

''Chaos theory is important because it helps explain why deterministic or linear systems sometimes produce unpredictable behavior. Chaos theory also demonstrates that much that appears as random, in reality is not—there are indirect cause-and-effect relationships at work, sometimes not detectable. The deterministic nature of a chaotic system ensures there is some manifestation of continuity from one state to the next, while the nonlinearity means that the consequences of any changes may appear as spontaneous and extreme. In a chaotic system, early changes can have an extraordinary effect on the long term, but the results are bounded from the extremity of total randomness. Thus chaotic systems are a mixture of continuities and change. The strategic environment can be viewed as a chaotic system in which human history represents aperiodic behavior—broad patterns in the rise and fall of civilizations are evident, but no event is ever repeated exactly. (James,2004)''

3.3.3 Complexity Theory

Complexity theory also offers insights into the nature of the strategic environment, often shared by or augmenting chaos theory. The strategic environment is by definition a complex system. A system exists when a set of elements are interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the system taken as a whole exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the sum of the parts. Systems are generally dynamic, and social systems are especially so. Systems may be very large or very small, and in some complex systems, large and small components live cooperatively. Complexity occurs in both natural and

man-made systems. The level of complexity depends on the character of the systems, the environment, and the nature of the interactions among them. The different parts of complex systems are linked and affect one another in a synergistic manner through both positive and negative feedback. In a complex system, the numerous independent elements continuously interact and spontaneously self-organize and adapt for survival in increasingly more elaborate and sophisticated structures over time. Cause and effect are not proportional to each other and often cannot be related. Such a system is neither completely deterministic nor completely random, but rather exhibits both characteristics—adhering to the chaos theory model. Complex systems, therefore, are not precisely predictable, and the sum of their interactions is greater than the parts. (Harry,2006)''

Complex systems appear to evolve naturally to a state of self-organized criticality, at which time they lie on the border of order and disorder, teetering on the "edge of chaos." At the point where a complex, dynamical, chaotic system becomes sufficiently unstable, an attractor (such as a minor event similar to Lorenz's tiny mathematical changes) instigates the stress, and the system splits. This is called bifurcation— the point at which significant change occurs, and the newly resulting systems are distinct from the original while still having continuities. The edge of chaos is important; it is the stage when the system can carry out the most complex operations and the point when both opportunities (positive feedbacks) and threats (negative feedbacks) are greatest. If the system cannot maintain its balance, it seeks a new equilibrium. At the point of bifurcation, little changes produce great outcomes. (John,2004)''

From the above citations of scholars, we can simply understand the action, importance and the impact of the strategic theory in the society by looking at various responses or feedback from either negative or positive perspectives.

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss your understanding on the two theories of Chaos and Complex Theories

3.3.4   Relationship Between Chaos and Complex Strategic Theory

Chaos and complexity theories offer a perspective that describes the strategic environment as it is, as opposed to a direct and simplistic cause-and-effect linear model. These theories recognize that the world is composed of both linear and nonlinear dynamics. Grasping this distinction is critical to the kind of analysis the strategist undertakes!

Complexity theory does not seek prediction but understanding of the various elements of the environment and the actors involved. It offers a complex worldview that accepts contradictions, anomalies, and dialectic processes. It alerts the strategist to the existence of multicausal situations, unintended consequences, circumstances ripe for change, the roles of feedback and self-fulfilling expectations, and other abnormalities discounted, or even disparaged, by the rational planning model. (Robert, 2004)''

Chaos and complexity theories serve as useful metaphors for the strategic environment because they provide insights to VUCA phenomena and the relationship between the strategic environment and strategy. The strategic environment is composed of elements representing both continuity and change. Relationships and interaction are the keys to understanding the nature and dynamism of the strategic environment. Characterized by instability and aperiodic behavior, it does not repeat itself precisely, although situations may closely approximate those of the past. Thus it possesses the attributes of both linearity and nonlinearity. The strategic environment is deterministic in that change is bounded by a variety of factors, including, to some degree, by what has occurred before. It will have continuities, but the exact nature and extremity of change are not necessarily predictable because of the nonlinear attributes. The strategic environment is often particularly sensitive to early changes at critical times, and the outcomes are often not proportional to the inputs, thus creating unpredictable, and at times unintended, outcomes. (Harry,2006)''

At this point we can simply understand the relationship between the two theories of chaos and complex their relationships and interaction are the keys to the understanding of the nature and dynamism of the strategic environment where complex issues can be allocated and put practical skills to address the emerging problem.

Self-Assessment Exercises 3

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. With illustration of simple examples describe the difference between Choas and Complex theory.

3.5   Summary

The strategic environment functions as a self-organizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relative equilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment, some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some are plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily in a direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particular interest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment results in both intended and unintended effects. The strategist ultimately seeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within the strategic environment through creation of multiordered effects. Conceptually, a model of strategy is simple—ends, ways, and means—but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent with it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors or to chance.

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3.7   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1

Q1. 'The strategic environment functions as a self-organizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relative equilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment, some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some are plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily in a direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particular interest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment results in both intended and unintended effects.31 The strategist ultimately seeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within the strategic environment through creation of multiordered effects. Conceptually, a model of strategy is simple—ends, ways, and means—but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent with it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors or to chance.

Answers to SAEs 2

Q1a.Vicente, V (2000) was of view that ''Chaos theory is a different way of viewing reality. Prior to the development of chaos theory, two world views dominated thinking. Systems were defined as deterministic and predictable, or random and disordered—thus unpredictable. Deterministic systems are predictable because the same inputs will yield

the same outputs every time the experiment is conducted. In math's chaos theory, chaos is not a state of utter confusion—random, unpredictable, and uncontrollable—but an observable reality that adheres to certain rules even as it appears chaotic in the evident sense

Q1b. ''Complexity theory also offers insights into the nature of the strategic environment, often shared by or augmenting chaos theory. The strategic environment is by definition a complex system. A system exists when a set of elements are interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the system taken as a whole exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the sum of the parts. Systems are generally dynamic, and social systems are especially so. Systems may be very large or very small, and in some complex systems, large and small components live cooperatively. Complexity occurs in both natural and man-made systems. The level of complexity depends on the character of the systems, the environment, and the nature of the interactions among them.

Answer to SAEs 3

Q1. ''Chaos and complexity theories serve as useful metaphors for the strategic environment because they provide insights to VUCA phenomena and the relationship between the strategic environment and strategy. The strategic environment is composed of elements representing both continuity and change. Relationships and interaction are the keys to understanding the nature and dynamism of the strategic environment. Characterized by instability and aperiodic behavior, it does not repeat itself precisely, although situations may closely approximate those of the past. Thus it possesses the attributes of both linearity and nonlinearity. The strategic environment is deterministic in that change is bounded by a variety of factors, including, to some degree, by what has occurred before. It will have continuities, but the exact nature and extremity of change are not necessarily predictable because of the nonlinear attributes.

**Unit 4   Understanding   the   Nature   of   Strategic
            Environment**

Unit Structure

4.1   Introduction
4.2   Learning Outcomes
4.3   Understanding the Nature of Strategic Environment
            4.3.1. Implication of the Strategic Environment
            4.3.2. Factors Constitute towards Understanding the Strategic
                   Environment
            4.3.3. Effect of Studying the Strategic Environment
4.4   Summary
4.5   References/Further Readings
4.6   Possible Answers to SAE

4.1   Introduction

Strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in which the
strategy they are developing is to be applied—understand the kind of
world they live in or that will emerge. As advanced in our previous unit
discussed the analogies of chaos and complexity theories, the strategic
environment is not totally random, unpredictable, or uncontrollable.
Rather, the environment exhibits some characteristics of both
randomness and order. Change may be induced in it by design or
chance, but, because of its complexity, any change may produce results
totally out of proportion to the initiating change— either greater or
lesser than anticipated—and thus a degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability is inherent to its nature. Changes come from actors,
interactive circumstances, or chance. Actors may introduce rational and
irrational changes through action or selective inaction, or through simple
indifference or ignorance. Yet many strategists reduce strategy to overly
linear and detailed directives that do not allow for the flexibility and
adaptability to accommodate such unpredictability.

4.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Give a detailed account of the implication of the Strategic
        Environment.
•   Assess the factors necessary for understanding the Strategic
        Environment.

- Analyse critically the impact of studying the strategic environment.

4.3   Understanding the Nature of Strategic Environment

Understanding the strategic environment as a system of systems is a daunting intellectual challenge. Each system within it has external and internal components—and all interrelate to varying degrees. The multilayered interaction results in complexity and nonlinearity. The chaotic nature of this interaction is difficult to fathom, and it is even more difficult to manipulate effectively. Nothing is ever quite what it seems and all is subject to greater or lesser changes. It is a world of unlimited possibilities and seemingly great promise, tempered by competing interests and often unclear or less than desirable alternatives. Much appears insidious and Machiavellian or subject to nature and chance. Policy is often stated in lofty and ideal terms with too little regard for political reality and available resources—leaving the strategist without practical goals and adequate resources. All are interrelated, often confusing and convoluted, and very complex. A strategist must be comfortable in the VUCA environment. Too few professional military officers are prepared for this actuality, (Harry, 2006)''.

The strategist is immersed in the complexity of the system of systems represented by the strategic environment. For example, a U.S. strategist assigned to NATO sees it from a national perspective as an external component even as he works within NATO to shape the rest of the international environment. Within NATO, he is an internal part of an organizational actor in the international environment. The complexity of relationships and interactions grows exponentially. The domestic environment is an internal component of the strategic environment relative to any national defense strategy. It consists of domestic actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles, as well as the physical realities of resources and capabilities. The strategist is confronted with the domestic interaction of individuals, news media, special interest groups, civilian think tanks, branches of government, other departments of the executive branch, and offices and sub-organizations within DOD itself. Thus, any strategy is subject to interaction and reaction with domestic interests and actors, the nuances of interests within the strategist's own organization, and the interests and actors of the international arena. Some domestic interests may actually be working at odds with the strategist, trying to frustrate his efforts for political or other reasons. Too few national security professionals are willingly capable of accepting and working with this complexity and

nonlinearity. Strategy remains in the too-hard box, and insufficient time and resources are devoted to its consideration. As a result, strategic thinking is often reduced to simple assumptions that are often ill-founded, but misleadingly seem to allow "strategy" to unfold like good planning. Strategists must study and analyze the whole environment and then shape it by the design and articulation of strategy. (Harry,2006)''

Strategy is too critical to be ignored or placed at risk by virtue of erroneous assumptions or by relegating it to a planning model. Strategic environments may be difficult to analyze, but good strategy—which must be based on sound strategic-level analysis— can shape the environment more positively than chance or lack of strategic direction. For as surely as uncertainty characterizes the future, the future will nonetheless come: "Strategy abhors a vacuum: if the strategic function is lacking, strategic effect will be generated by the casual accumulation of tactical and operational outcomes. (Michael, 2004)"

Carefully crafted strategic initiatives bound future results in outcomes more acceptable to policymakers than those offered by chance, expediency, or adversaries. As chaos theory suggests, early actions can have a disproportionate effect on the overall pattern of change in the strategic environment. Strategists, particularly when over-focused on immediate demands of decision makers, often fail to look to the future with sufficient depth of analysis and act too late to create positive strategic effects at relatively low costs. Relying on expediency and planning methodologies in lieu of proper strategic thinking ignores the advantages that accrue from intended cumulative effects and increases the costs for and risks to the state's security. (Harry,2006)''

The strategic environment can be analyzed from different perspectives. In this monograph, the reader is asked to consider it from the perspective of systems within systems *interacting* in both linear and nonlinear ways. The strategist must understand the systems, but the proper focus of strategy is on the dimensions of interaction. Strategy has many dimensions, and all are in play to a greater or lesser extent at all times. A weakness in considering any one dimension can prove fatal to the whole enterprise. Colin Gray suggests that there are 17 or more of these dimensions: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, economics and logistics, organization, administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology, operations, command, geography, friction/chance/uncertainty, adversary, and time. These must be considered holistically—that is, individually—but at the same time in context with the others. (John, 2002)''

Some have argued that the transformation of strategy has occurred over the last 2,400 years on a more extended and integrated scale. They

would list the major dimensions as bureaucracy, mass politics, ideology, technology and economic power. Here, too, it is recognized that the interaction of these affect outcomes exponentially. (John, 2002)''

History makes clear that particular dimensions play a greater role or are more critical at particular times, and that none can be ignored over time. Hence, as the Cold War wound down and the new world order began to emerge, ideology (communism versus liberal capitalism) appeared to wane in importance only to reemerge in the Global War On Terror (radical Islam versus secularism). It matters significantly what the topic of confrontation or the dimension of competition or collaboration is in developing a strategy. An economic issue may demand a conceptualization or model of interaction different from an ideological one and a different weighting of effort among the instruments of power. Just so, any other dimension may be affected, and all must be considered in the development of a strategy. As a complex system of systems, the strategic environment may evolve into new dimensions that must also be considered. Many strategists think too little about interaction, the dimensions in which it occurs, and the relationships among the dimensions. (Harry,2006)

4.3.1 Implications of the Strategic Environment.

Strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in which the strategy they are developing is to be applied—understand the kind of world they live in or that will emerge.48 As advanced in Part III with the analogies of chaos and complexity theories, the strategic environment is not totally random, unpredictable, or uncontrollable. Rather, the environment exhibits some characteristics of both randomness and order. Change may be induced in it by design or chance, but, because of its complexity, any change may produce results totally out of proportion to the initiating change— either greater or lesser than anticipated—and thus a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability is inherent to its nature. Changes come from actors, interactive circumstances, or chance. Actors may introduce rational and irrational changes through action or selective inaction, or through simple indifference or ignorance. Yet many strategists reduce strategy to overly linear and detailed directives that do not allow for the flexibility and adaptability to accommodate such unpredictability. (Harry,2006)''

On the other hand, much of the strategic environment is deterministic and adheres to certain rules; continuities guide its general behavior over time and extend—to varying degrees—into periods of major upheaval and new equilibriums. These rules are both physical, as is the case with gravity, geography, and weather, and incorporeal. Rules of international behavior are an example of an incorporeal continuity. When in effect,

these rules bound what is workable and acceptable within the international environment. Continuities may be codified and thus formally acknowledged, or may just be accepted practices. In some cases, they exist below the awareness level of the actors in the environment. Continuities always seek to reassert themselves, but their validity cannot be taken for granted. Continuities can be leveraged so that a strategy is assisted by the environment's natural inclinations, thus moving with the flow of history. Collective security is arguably a continuity that emerged in the 20th century and may be leveraged into the 21st century. On the other hand, a particular continuity's role may not be the same even though it still exists. Gravity continued to exist after the invention of the airplane, but its effect on warfare changed. Too few strategists critically consider the role of continuities in strategy development, missing opportunities or making invalid assumptions. For example, with the collapse the Soviet Union, many strategists focused on the promises of liberal capitalism and globalization and missed the implications of the resurgence of the continuities of nationalism and religion. Critical examination of continuities and change focuses the strategist on what needs to change, what continuities can be leveraged for the necessary changes, and what should not or cannot be changed. All are important! (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. What do you understand by NATO Strategy?

4.3.2 Factors constitute towards Understanding Strategic Environment

All strategy is about "the future." The future is where strategy has its effect. In dealing with unknowns and uncertainties, strategy forecasts from a knowledge and understanding of the systems of the strategic environment—what they are (facts and assumptions) and how they interact (observation, reason, and assumptions) within the dimensions of strategy. From this understanding, the strategist derives the key factors which contribute causally to the achievement of policy aims—assisting or precluding success. These factors may be tangible or intangible, representing any aspect of the environment. The existence of other states and actors, internal and external, is one of many factors that must be considered in any strategy development effort. Factors constitute the key facts, continuities, and emerging trends—they are at the point of interaction within the system and among systems. In strategic analysis these factors are keys to developing an effective strategy, because using or influencing them is how policy goals are achieved. The strategist seeks to change, leverage, or overcome these, in effect modifying the

equilibrium within the strategic environment to support policy aims. Balancing continuities and emerging trends is the most intellectually challenging task in developing strategy—seeking to address one aspect of a complex system without inducing unfavorable ripple effects elsewhere in the system. The strategist's analysis of how best to do this is reflected in his selection of ends, ways, and means—the rational output of strategic thought. Too often in strategy development, insufficient analysis is applied to the identification and use of key factors, and as a consequence key factors are often overlooked, misidentified, or ill addressed. (Harry,2006)''

Strategy is about thinking big and over time. Strategic thinking is not about reductionism, although the strategy eventually will be simplified and stated clearly as ends, ways, and means. Strategic thinking is about thoroughness and holistic thinking. It seeks to understand how the parts interact to form the whole by looking at parts and relationships among them—the effects they have on one another in the past, present, and anticipated future. It shares this perspective with chaos and complexity theories. Articulating strategic thinking as ends, ways, and means is only one step in a sophisticated intellectual process seeking to create a synthesis of consensus, efforts, and circumstances to influence the overall environment favorably while managing the risks involved in pursuing opportunities or reacting to threats. While ends, ways, and means get at the essence of the strategy and must flow from a strategic perspective, thus collectively creating a strategic effect, they do not obviate an explanation of" why," one of the paramount purposes of strategy. A strategy must work on different planes and speak to different audiences. In this sense, another purpose of strategy development is to explain and forecast in order to generate a domestic and foreign consensus in favor of the policy pursued. To do this, strategy must have a sense of where the state has been and where it is headed. Anything less in regard to the past "is to neglect the direction in which the historical winds have been blowing. And the best grand strategies, like the most efficient navigators, keep the winds behind them.'' Anything less in regard to the future is to strike blindly into the dark at nothing, even while asking others to follow you into the darkness. Balancing continuities of the past and emerging possibilities is essential; a strategy must articulate the transition from the past state to the future in a manner that resonates with multiple audiences. (Harry,2006)''

As a result of the complexity of the environment, strategy inherently creates a "security dilemma" for other states and actors that must be considered. Actions taken or not taken by one state or actor always have the potential to affect other states and actors, particularly their role in the strategic environment and their perception of that role. Any action risks changing the status quo for friends and adversaries alike, creating an

element of instability in the equilibrium and introducing an element of risk for all. Because of its chaotic nature, the environment is subject to unintended multiordered effects and chance. Strategy is never to be undertaken lightly and must be approached comprehensively. At the state level, according to MacGregor Knox, "Violence, chance, and politics; danger and friction; escalatory interaction between adversaries, remain the terrain of those who make strategy (Shona,1998)''.

The stakes are always potentially high! Many strategists too often focus on one-dimensional first-order effects, foregoing consideration of second- and third-order effects, how a strategy will be perceived by others, or the role of chance. In failing to properly consider the multidimensional and multiordered effects, strategists increase the potential risks. (Harry,2006)''

4.3.3 The Effects of Studying the Strategic Environment

The effects in the strategic environment are cumulative, but can be accommodated or nullified by interactions within the system, counterstrategies, or chance. As a complex system of systems, the environment seeks an equilibrium that allows its subsystems to coexist. As subsystems, states and actors seek to survive or advance in the environment according to what they deem acceptable and the system will tolerate. Changes can cancel one another in whole or part— although states and actors tend to have long memories, and important interests persevere. Once a change becomes part of the fabric of the environment, it lingers, influencing the nature of future change. It then becomes one level of consideration among many for future strategies but often reemerges in a different context. Much of this activity may appear below the noise level of the strategist, but the role of the strategist is to be aware of what and who influence the well-being of the state and how. Too few strategists give consideration to the role of continuities—what they are, the roles they play, and when they are important to strategy. (Harry,2006)''

As a chaotic, complex system, the strategic environment is also time sensitive—timing and rate of change matter. Somewhat paradoxically, periods of stability are the best time to contemplate bold shifts in strategy and the most difficult time to get a decision to do it. The environment is always rebalancing itself at the margins, and states apply the nuances of diplomacy and force in a peaceful world very carefully. At such times of relative stability, strategy rightfully focuses on what the state wants to achieve and then considers how the state will accomplish its goals over the long term. Yet few decisionmakers are willing to risk disturbances in the equilibrium or expend political capital for future gains without a clear threat or clarion opportunity, particularly in a

democratic state. This makes it difficult to advocate strategies to preclude major upheavals in the environment. Thus, the governments of France and Great Britain appeased Germany during the 1930s instead of confronting it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to move the United States only incrementally, and relatively insufficiently, toward preparedness for World War II. Yet strategy serves the state best when it anticipates and leads change. Preemptive or proactive strategies—or well-articulated grand strategies—too often are ignored by the strategic community as a result of the preference for near-term stability and the avoidance of political risk. (Harry, 2006)''

When the strategic equilibrium is disrupted in a major way, in chaos theory termed a potential bifurcation, the more numerous, rapid, and complex changes require a much more responsive strategy. Again, paradoxically, periods of major instability are the best time to advocate bold, broad strategies but provide the least time for consideration, thus magnifying the risk. Here decision makers perceive the risks of not changing to be greater than the risks of adopting a bold strategy. Thus, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor opened the way for Roosevelt to go to war to defeat Japan and the Axis Powers. But the Roosevelt administration, in concert with its allies, used success in the war to establish a "new world order" defined by the establishment of the United Nations and the institutions for international finance. In periods of great instability, strategy-making is accelerated but can be enhanced by the strategist's preparation prior to the upheaval. The strategist who fully comprehends the nature of the environment and its continuities and manifestations during periods of stability can leverage this mastery during such periods. This leverage could be particularly useful if the instability cannot be preempted favorably through proactive strategies. Such mastery also allows the clarification of what constitutes well-being and anticipates objectives, while fostering familiarity with potential courses of action and resource requirements. In the unstable environment, the strategist gives great consideration to the multiordered effects of the rate and significance of change, and the fact that predictability decreases as change increases in rate and scope. This means that change itself is magnified in the process and must be managed carefully. In these circumstances, the strategist must compete on the edge, creating a relentless flow of competitive advantages that collectively move the state forward in the preferred strategic direction. The demands upon the strategist and strategy differ from those of a stable environment in that they are now confronting less clear boundaries, less predictable adversaries and allies, a more VUCA-like future, less time in which to develop strategy, or various combinations of these factors. In such an environment, the strategist anticipates whenever possible, reacts when necessary, and leads when circumstances are right. (Jack,2004)''

Strategists must prepare themselves in times of stability for periods of instability by mastering knowledge and understanding of the many subsystems and their interactions, as well as the whole of the strategic environment.

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss the effect of strategic environment?

4.4   Summary

The strategic environment readily compares to a chaotic, complex system. To be successful, the strategist and senior military professionals must understand its nature and implications for the development of good strategies that advance and protect the interests of the state. It requires that the professional maintain a level of interest and knowledge in the past, the present, and the future, and immerse himself in the continued study of the strategic environment.

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4.7   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1 and 2

Q1. ''The strategist is immersed in the complexity of the system of systems represented by the strategic environment. For example, a U.S. strategist assigned to NATO sees it from a national perspective as an external component even as he works within NATO to shape the rest of the international environment. Within NATO, he is an internal part of an organizational actor in the international environment. The complexity of relationships and interactions grows exponentially. The domestic environment is an internal component of the strategic environment relative to any national defense strategy. It consists of domestic actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles, as well as the physical realities of resources and capabilities. The strategist is confronted with the domestic interaction of individuals, news media, special interest groups, civilian think tanks, branches of government, other departments of the executive branch, and offices and sub-organizations within DOD itself. Thus, any strategy is subject to interaction and reaction with domestic interests and actors, the nuances of interests within the strategist's own organization, and the interests and actors of the international arena. Some domestic interests may actually be working at odds with the strategist, trying to frustrate his efforts for political or other reasons. Too few national security professionals are willingly capable of accepting and working with this complexity and nonlinearity. Strategy remains in the too-hard box, and insufficient time and resources are devoted to its consideration. As a result, strategic thinking is often reduced to simple assumptions that are often ill-founded, but misleadingly seem to allow "strategy" to unfold like good planning. Strategists must study and analyze the whole environment and then shape it by the design and articulation of strategy. (Harry,2006)''

Q2. 'Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative, but can be accommodated or nullified by interactions within the system, counterstrategies, or chance. As a complex system of systems, the environment seeks an equilibrium that allows its subsystems to coexist. As subsystems, states and actors seek to survive or advance in the environment according to what they deem acceptable and the system

will tolerate. Changes can cancel one another in whole or part—although states and actors tend to have long memories, and important interests persevere. Once a change becomes part of the fabric of the environment, it lingers, influencing the nature of future change. It then becomes one level of consideration among many for future strategies but often reemerges in a different context. Much of this activity may appear below the noise level of the strategist, but the role of the strategist is to be aware of what and who influence the well-being of the state and how. Too few strategists give consideration to the role of continuities—what they are, the roles they play, and when they are important to strategy.

Module 4   STRATEGIST'S MIND SET

Unit 1   Professionalism in Strategic Studies
Unit 2   Strategic Studies and National Interest
Unit 3   Strategic Studies Functional Areas
Unit 4   Resources in Strategic Studies

Unit 1   Professionalism in Strategic Studies

Unit Structure

1.1.   Introduction
1.2.   Learning Outcomes
1.3.   Professionalism in Strategic Studies
       1.3.1   Strategic Skills
       1.3.2   Culture and Ideology in Strategic Studies
       1.3.3   Using of logic in the application of strategic studies
       1.3.4   National Interest and the application of Strategic Studies
1.4.   Summary
1.5.   References/Further Readings/Web Sources
1.6.   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises

1.1   Introduction

This unit sets out to get you acquainted with Strategic thinking as both an art and science and as an essential element of military professionalism. True strategic genius is able to comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, especially its complexity and multiordered interactions, and derive rational ends, ways, and means that solicit consensus and create strategic effects leading to the desired end state. Not all senior military officers can aspire to reach the apex of strategic skill, but all senior leaders should be able to evaluate and execute a coherent and relevant strategy. In this regard, a proper understanding of the strategist's mindset further helps the professional, genius or not, to assess his role and responsibilities in regard to strategy. Leadership can delegate the strategy formulation function to strategic genius if it is present and can be recognized, but the leader retains responsibility for the quality of both the strategy and its execution.

1.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

- Explain the necessity skills needed for the professionalism in Strategic Studies
- Identify the key issues on the culture and ideology in Strategic Studies
- State the goals of using logic in the application of strategic Studies

1.3 Professionalism in Strategic Studies

1.3.1 Strategic Skills

James, K (1998) has argued that ''strategy is essentially a human enterprise, with all of humanity's genius, frailties, and shortcomings. It is both an individual and collective undertaking that bears fruit from its successful anticipation of requirements and effects and the successful execution of its methodology. The strategist and the implementers of strategy are actors pitted against other actors—including other strategists, circumstance, and chance in the chaotic and complex strategic environment. History is replete with examples of people making irrational, as opposed to rational, decisions, and wrong rational decisions based on inaccurate information and assumptions. Study can help gain insight into human behavior, but simplicity, stability, and universality do not apply to human behavior, even as assumptions about human behavior help us deal with it.''

As a human enterprise, every aspect of strategy is subject to exception, and the strategist must be open to this reality. This reality applies to all participant allies and their enemies, and even to onlookers, whether they be strategist, leader, or executor. (Harry,2006)''

Strategy must be consistent with national values and acceptable to international norms. For the United States, this can be particularly problematic. U.S. liberal culture (free markets, equal opportunity, free elections, liberal democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, and individualism) fundamentally clashes with that of many other societies. Cultural conflicts about faith and identity are reflected at the individual and societal levels. As the universal nation, the modern United States has a distinct culture that does not include to the same degree the elements of hierarchy, community, tradition, and custom so evident in older, more stratified societies. Consequently, U.S. strategy is prone to clash with the elites and populations of non-Western cultures and to differ on specific issues even with traditional Europe. (Bart, 1993)''

Historical experience and outlook differ by nationality and culture, with these differences often posing issues for strategy formulation and execution. It does not follow, however, that the United States must change these elements in other societies; they need only to be recognized and accommodated by strategy. Legitimacy, morality, and cultural appreciation are keys to long-term effective strategy because they address the human dimension of interaction within the strategic environment. Expediency in regard to them may produce short-term gains but risks alienating too many other actors. In the end, we must learn to see ourselves, our allies, our adversaries, and others as an integral part of strategy. (Carl,1976)''

We must understand that based on the assumption of Stephen, J (2001) "strategy is as much about psychology as it is facts on the ground. Above all, strategy is about seeing the complexity and long-term possibilities inherent in the strategic circumstances.

As a minimum they [strategists] must see clearly both themselves and potential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits—through humility, relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely address issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly discern and prepare to strike the enemy jugular—whether by surprise attack or attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties of decision and the dangers of action. ''

Strategists must swim in complexity to understand the strategic environment and be open to all its possibilities, while planners seek to simplify and clarify so that they can act directly. These distinct roles call for two different thought processes, but Westerners, with their unitary outlooks, are culturally at a disadvantage in perceiving possibilities from the strategic realm, marked by complexity and ambiguity. Western thinking is primarily scientific or Newtonian. (Harry, 2006)''

From the above discussion we can simply, understand the skills and tactics required by strategists as an implementer of strategy and actors of strategic action plan that involves various issues in the chaotic and complex environment which motivate peoples to have rational thinking before taking decision on various complex and simple issues.

1.3.2. Culture and Ideology in Strategic Studies

Ideology and culture are powerful influences on the shaping of strategy and strategic success. Both influence the making and execution of

strategy in multiple ways. Human participants in strategy all wear a set of analytical blinders composed of their ideological and cultural assumptions and preferences regarding the strategic environment and how to shape it. These blinders are a potential weakness for exploitation by our adversaries and other actors when we wear them, but opportunities for exploitation by us when they are worn by others. The strategist's frame of reference affects how he sees the world and how he advocates interacting within it. These human preferences influence how strategy is constructed and executed. For example, strategists looking at the world from the perspective of realism, liberalism, or constructivism will have divergent worldviews and will likely arrive at different strategic approaches. (Robert,1997)''

Strategists are both aided and limited by these constructs. Such constructs discipline thinking but also potentially limit consideration of alternatives. (Harry, 2006)''

Ideology and culture not only shape the expectations and goals of those who formulate and approve strategy but the ferocity and stamina of those who execute it. In addition, ideology and culture influence national popular support and global acceptance of the legitimacy of a national strategy. (Murry, 1986)''

Consequently, the strategist must consider the cultural and ideological perspectives of strategy internally and externally, as well as personally. Internally, there are preferences that garner and sustain acceptability and support, and externally there are differences based on nationality, ideology, religion, and culture that must be considered in the development and execution of strategy. One needs to look no further than the American experience in Vietnam to illustrate this. Once the war was publicly reframed into a nationalist struggle for Vietnamese unity, both domestic and foreign support waned. For Americans, sustainment of a nonrepresentative South Vietnamese government no longer justified the costs in lives on both sides. The strategist must know what motivates him and others, and what meets the criteria of both internal and external acceptability. Strategy founded on false constructs or beliefs, or on inconsistency with acceptability criteria at home or abroad, is at greater risk. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Described your understanding of strategic skill.

3.3.3   Using of Logic in the application of strategic Studies

To get the rationality of western logic, the reality of the world is expressed in either *or* terms—it is assumed to be either black or white. The strategic environment is much less objective than Western logic portrays it, often containing more gray than black and white. Good strategists have always recognized this ambiguity and how to think about it. It is only recently that a discipline of so-called "fuzzy logic" has emerged to describe the greater complexity and corresponding openness in thinking required of the strategic environment. Fuzzy logic or "fuzzy thinking," however poorly named, helps illuminate the realities of the strategic environment because it provides allowance for degree, probability, and ambiguity in the formulation of objectives and concepts. (Harry,2006)

The science of fuzzy logic is an attempt to contrast reality with the binary logic inherent to Western scientific thought. Binary logic is rooted in Aristotle's philosophical law that something is either A *or* "not A." It cannot be A *and* "not A." It is either true or false. Thus in Western science, math, logic, and much of culture, we assume a world of blacks and whites that does not change—this is bivalent logic—two-valuedness. This assumption permeates Western thinking. For example, you are either with us or against us. Every statement is either true or false; it has a truth value of 1 or 0. Thus if you are asked if a number is a 1 or a 0, it is clearly one or the other. In reality, the world is very much gray. If you are asked if 0.4 is a 1 or a 0, in Western bivalent thinking you must decide which it is and act accordingly. In reality it is more than a 0 and less than a 1, something in between, or gray. Hence, fuzzy logic argues that everything is a matter of degree or multivalence—with three or more options or an infinite spectrum of options instead of the two extremes of true or false. Fuzzy logic advocates argue that, for the sake of simplicity, our culture traded off accuracy—the way the world is in reality— for a black or white answer. Western scientific thought is limited or hindered by this bivalent logic. As shown by recent developments, "fuzzy thinking" better reflects reality in both math and science. New "smarter" appliances, computers, and other products are already in the marketplace as a result of the application of this science. (Alvin,2004)''

Fuzzy logic also has application in strategy, but scientific or Newtonian thought dominates most Western thought. As a result, military planners tend to seek certainty in their planning processes—direct cause and effect—even at the expense of accuracy or reality. In the sense that executors of strategy need to work from facts and concrete assumptions about cause and effect to coordinate and implement their activities, this practice serves organizational planning needs well. But such Newtonian

thinking at the strategic levels distorts reality and obscures the actual complexity, leading to faulty assumptions and hiding potential issues and options. Strategic thinking is better served by openness to possibilities rather than a constrained perspective. (Harry,2006)''

Again, Clausewitz recognized the difference in reality and planning with his concept of friction. He cautions that: "The good general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible. Friction results from what cannot be known, what changes from what you knew, and all those glitches that can be set an operation—the reality of war. Friction at the operational and tactical levels is mitigated by proper planning and appropriate anticipation and reaction—branches and sequels to the plan. In essence, the good general creates a black and white reality by attempting to account for everything possible in the planning process. Since friction affects the enemy army as well as one's own, the commander who creates reality best is at an advantage in overcoming friction and winning the engagement. (Clausewitz',1976) ''

At the strategic level, the degree of uncertainty and complexity is much greater because of the scope of time and nature of the environment. The future cannot be predicted with sufficient precision because the "frictions" are too great to plan for successfully. Good strategy is designed to accommodate, deter, and seek advantages in the realities of degree, probability, and ambiguity—all incident to a complex chaotic system. It accommodates and uses friction. Fuzzy logic helps to explain the ambiguity and uncertainty observed at this level—revealing more of the possibilities to the strategist, while at the same time qualifying expectations. The future is shaped from the structuring of these "possibilities" and expectations into a coherent strategy, expressed as ends, ways, and means, leading to a better end state. (Harry,2006)''

Since strategy can be formulated at different levels, the strategist should be clear in regard to the level at which he is working even as he remains holistic in his outlook. At the national level, strategy is concerned with maintaining internal systems in balance with one another, while creating effects in the external environment that favor the state over time. When it focuses on lower levels or specific issues, strategy is really a case of particular generalization—what strategic effect is required to what purpose and how does it affect the whole of the environment. On the other hand, strategy at any level is not problem-solving in a classic sense. It does not seek to solve a specific problem as much as to anticipate a future and shape an environment in which fewer problems arise and those that do can be resolved in favorable terms. Causation in strategy is contingent, not categorical. Context always matters.

Ultimately the success of strategic effects depends on what the adversary and others choose to do and on what reality turns out to be. Hence strategists must cultivate a web-like sense of reality, seeing everything as connected in some way to everything else and being open to all possibilities. The strategist provides direction that is consistent with the past as it bridges to the future. (Bart,1993)''

In this process, strategy must be inherently flexible as it anticipates the future. Thus, strategy is always seeking a balance between specificity and flexibility in establishing boundaries planning. Strategy does not dictate the future, but it does anticipate it and seeks to shape it in favorable terms at whatever level it functions, maintaining an appropriate degree of adaptability and flexibility. (Harry,2006)''

3.3.4 National Interest and the application of Strategic Studies

The true purpose of strategy is to create favorable effects in support of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national interests. Strategic effects are the impact that *the accomplishment* of strategic objectives has on the environment. Effect flows from strategic performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s) employed, and the resources used. Thus, strategic performance is the measure of the quality of actions actually executed to achieve the policy aims. (James,1998)''

Effects occur on different levels and from different causes within the environment. Effects must be comprehended in at least three dimensions. First, good strategy deliberately seeks to create multiple-order effects—a chain of effects that culminates in strategic-level success. Such intended first-, second-, and third-order effects, etc. are a rational product of the strategist's analysis, with the purpose of stimulating and influencing interaction or conditions within the environment in favor of the policy aims. (Harry,2006)''

t   t
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tt   t
Chance   sc   s
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National Policy

c   c
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Strategys

Ends
Ways Means

Figure 4.

''Ultimately the role of the strategist is to evaluate the complex and evolving environment and translate policy goals into terms from which planning can proceed. Strategic thinking must see the environment as it actually is, identify the factors that favor or hinder the policy aims, and anticipate the possibilities for achievement of policy goals. The strategist is concerned with facts, factors, and assumptions in this process. Each must be right. Facts are reality as it is—the grayness of fuzzy thinking as opposed to invariable black and white. Factors are facts that affect policy aims. Assumptions bridge the unknown. Through the formulation of appropriate ends, ways, and means to manipulate the factors and take advantage of the possibilities, the strategist creates favorable effects on behalf of policy goals. Openness and recognition of

personal biases and preferences move the strategist closer to a proper assessment of reality. This assessment tempered by an appreciation of chance and others' ideological and cultural biases and preferences—in light of interests and policy goals—defines the effects desired. A proper mindset on the part of the strategist is critical to the development of good strategy. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Critically analyse the impact of strategic studies on National Development

1.4 Summary

When a strategic concept is implemented to achieve an objective that produces an intended reaction from the adversary or a direct change within the environment—a first-order effect is created. But if the strategist has foreseen and sought multiordered effects as a result of the concept in action, he has deliberately created cascading effects—intended second- and third-order effects. On the other hand, a different dimension of effects occurs when the strategist fails to fully comprehend the consequences of his choices, with the strategy creating unanticipated consequences in the environment. A third dimension of effects that must be considered is the intervention of chance or adversaries and others in reacting to the effects of the original strategy. The good strategist seeks to understand all these dimensions of effects and to capitalize on or compensate for them in his strategy. Thus, he prepares for those effects he foresees and maintains a degree of adaptability and flexibility for those he cannot foresee. Fuzzy "thinking" helps the strategist to understand the possible manifestations of effects by revealing the shades of reality.

1.5 References/Further Readings

Alvin M. Saperstein, (2004) "Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools," *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, *http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/ books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat'l %20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/ch05.html*, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.

Bart Kosko,(1993) *Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic*, New York: Hyperion, 1993, pp. 4-22. The humanities are a noteworthy exception to this pervasiveness, but even here quantification has been applied by some to seek the "right" explanation

Carl von Clausewitz, (1976) *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 141.

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James Kurth, (1998) "Inside the Cave: The Banality of I. R. Studies," *The National Interest*, Fall 1998, pp. 38-40.

Stephen J. Cimbala, (2001) *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, pp. 7-14. While somewhat controversial, this book contributes important insights to the nature of the strategic environment.

Robert Jervis, (1979) *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 60.

Murray and Grimsley, (1986) pp. 6-7. See also Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers*, New York: The Free Press, 1986, for practices and examples of how to do this.

1.6   Possible Answers to Self Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1 and 2

Q1. We must understand that based on the assumption of Stephen, J (2001) "strategy is as much about psychology as it is facts on the ground. Above all, strategy is about seeing the complexity and long-term possibilities inherent in the strategic circumstances.

As a minimum they [strategists] must see clearly both themselves and potential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits—through humility, relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely address issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly discern and prepare to strike the enemy jugular—whether by surprise attack or attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties of decision and the dangers of action. ''

Q2. ''The true purpose of strategy is to create favorable effects in support of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national interests. Strategic effects are the impact that *the accomplishment* of strategic objectives has on the environment. Effect flows from strategic performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s) employed, and the resources used. Thus, strategic performance is the measure of the quality of actions actually executed to achieve the policy aims. (James,1998)''

Unit 2   Strategic Studies and National Interest

Unit Structure

2.1   Introduction
2.2   Learning Outcomes
2.3   National Interest and Application of Strategic Studies
          2.3.1. Development of Strategic Objectives
          2.3.2. Relationship between Strategic Studies and Planning
2.4   Summary
2.5   References/Further Readings/Web Sources
2.6   Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises

2.1   Introduction

This unit will further give you the background to the true purpose of strategy which was to create favorable effects in support of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national interests. Strategic effects are the impact that *the accomplishment* of strategic objectives has on the environment. Effect flows from strategic performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s) employed, and the resources used. Thus, strategic performance is the measure of the quality of actions actually executed to achieve the policy aims. Effects occur on different levels and from different causes within the environment. Effects must be comprehended in at least three dimensions. First, good strategy deliberately seeks to create multiple-order effects—a chain of effects that culminates in strategic-level success. Such intended first-, second-, and third-order effects, etc. are a rational product of the strategist's analysis, with the purpose of stimulating and influencing interaction or conditions within the environment in favor of the policy aims.

2.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Establish the links between the Strategic Studies and Planning
•   Analyse the impact of strategic studies towards attaining National Interest.
•   Discussed the Development of strategic objectives.

2.3   National Interest and the Application of Strategic Studies

The strategic concept is implemented to achieve an objective that produces an intended reaction from the adversary or a direct change within the environment—a first-order effect is created. But if the strategist has foreseen and sought multiordered effects as a result of the concept in action, he has deliberately created cascading effects—intended second- and third-order effects. On the other hand, a different dimension of effects occurs when the strategist fails to fully comprehend the consequences of his choices, with the strategy creating unanticipated consequences in the environment. A third dimension of effects that must be considered is the intervention of chance or adversaries and others in reacting to the effects of the original strategy. The good strategist seeks to understand all these dimensions of effects and to capitalize on or compensate for them in his strategy. Thus, he prepares for those effects he foresees and maintains a degree of adaptability and flexibility for those he cannot foresee. Fuzzy "thinking" helps the strategist to understand the possible manifestations of effects by revealing the shades of reality. (Harry,2006)''

Ultimately the role of the strategist is to evaluate the complex and evolving environment and translate policy goals into terms from which planning can proceed. Strategic thinking must see the environment as it actually is, identify the factors that favor or hinder the policy aims, and anticipate the possibilities for achievement of policy goals. The strategist is concerned with facts, factors, and assumptions in this process. Each must be right. Facts are reality as it is—the grayness of fuzzy thinking as opposed to invariable black and white. Factors are facts that affect policy aims. Assumptions bridge the unknown. Through the formulation of appropriate ends, ways, and means to manipulate the factors and take advantage of the possibilities, the strategist creates favorable effects on behalf of policy goals. Openness and recognition of personal biases and preferences move the strategist closer to a proper assessment of reality. This assessment tempered by an appreciation of chance and others' ideological and cultural biases and preferences—in light of interests and policy goals—defines the effects desired. A proper mindset on the part of the strategist is critical to the development of good strategy. (Harry,2006)''

2.3.1 Relationship Strategy and Planning.

''Military professionals come from a world of very adept planners; they learn planning methodologies from the day they enter service. *Strategy is not planning*. As described above, it partakes of a different mindset.

Planning makes strategy actionable. It relies on a high degree of certainty—a world that is concrete and can be addressed in explicit terms. In essence, it takes a gray world and makes it black and white through its analysis of the facts and assumptions about the unknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusing heavily on first-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future results can be precisely known if enough is known about the facts and the conditions affecting the undertaking. The planning process is essential to reduce uncertainty at the tactical level—it allows detailed actions to be prescribed. In reality, uncertainty can never quite be achieved even at that level, and it increases exponentially as we ascend from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level. (Harry,2006)''

''The planning process works because the lower the level, the morelimited the scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline; hence, the number of unknowns is limited and can be compensated for in branches and sequels to create "certainty." *Planning is not strategy*. It is essential for the successful execution of a strategy—making strategy actionable, but requires a different mindset. The military professional is trained for the certainty of planning throughout his career, but must be educated for uncertainty as he enters the strategic realm. (Harry, 2006)''

''The strategist must understand the difference between strategy and planning in order to produce good strategy. The planner must understand the difference between planning and strategy in order to execute strategy successfully. Planning bridges the gap between strategy and execution. The purpose of planning is to create certainty so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of strategy formulation is to clarify, influence, manage, or resolve the VUCA of the strategic environment through the identification and creation of strategic effects in support of policy goals. Strategy lays down what is important and to be achieved, sets the parameters for the necessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to allocate in terms of resources. (Harry,2006)''

Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature, identifies the objectives to be achieved and defines the box in which detailed planning can be accomplished—it bounds planning. Within that box, planning adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts, figures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve the strategy's objectives. The planner is Newtonian or scientific in his approach; the strategist is more "fuzzy." Both share the paradigm of ends, ways, and means. Too many military professionals confuse strategy and planning. As a consequence, planning-level thinking is often applied in the strategy development process or when planning objectives and concepts are elevated to the strategic level. When this occurs, even though the plan may be successful, the resulting strategic effects fail to adequately support, or

are actually counterproductive to, the stated policy goals or other interests. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Discuss the Relationship between planning and Strategic studies

2.3.2 Development of Strategic Objectives

''In strategy formulation, getting the objectives (ends) right matters most! Too often in strategy development, too little time is spent on consideration of the appropriate objectives in the context of the desired policy, national interests, and the environment. Yet it is the identification and achievement of the right objectives that creates the desired strategic effect. Objectives are the true focus of strategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, a proposed strategy is fundamentally flawed and cannot be effective. If the wrong objectives are identified, the concepts and resources serve no strategic purpose. Thus, the logic of strategy argues that objectives are primary even though concepts and resources are also crucial to success—action and costs are subordinate to purpose in strategy. Yet in strategy formulation, efficiency is often confused with effectiveness by both strategists and leadership. Strategy must reflect a preference for effectiveness. In this regard, objectives are concerned with doing the right things. Concepts are concerned with doing things right. Resources are concerned with costs. Objectives determine effectiveness; concepts and resources are measures of efficiency. A lack of efficiency increases the cost of success, but a lack of effectiveness precludes success. Ultimately, strategy's success can be measured only in terms of the degree to which its objectives are accomplished. Thus, again, efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness. (Alan,1997)''

 At the point where constraints on concepts or resources risk achievement of the objectives, the strategy is in question. For the nation-state, strategy and strategic objectives are derived from the policy consideration of protecting or advancing national interests within the context of the strategic environment as it is, and as it may become. In the past, security policy largely has focused on the international strategic environment in regard to national security needs—the external strategic environment. The domestic strategic environment, the internal component, was less identified with national security concerns. "Globalization" and its derivatives, such as an integrated world economy and the Global War On Terror, have forced a general acceptance that the concept of internal and external strategic environments is less distinct than in the past. Within the United States,

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such realization has subordinated national security strategy to a larger grand strategy concerned with both domestic and international issues in many current theorists' thinking. In either case, strategy is driven by national interests at the state level, and the strategist must consider both the external and internal components of the strategic environment in the development of strategy. (Harry,2006)''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. Identify key issues of development strategic objective?

2.4   Summary

As we have observed in this unit, we simply put it in this form, if the strategic objective is to win the war, then losing a battle is regrettable but does not necessarily preclude achievement of the strategic objective. The state can seek additional battles or apply other instruments of power. On the other hand, if the objective is to win every battle, then the state has been denied its strategic objective as soon as a single battle is lost. The strategy has failed, producing different repercussions in the internal and external components of the strategic environment, even if the war is ultimately won. The "win-every-battle" strategy also has confined its use of power to the military instrument. In modern war, winning battles is a planning objective; winning wars is a strategic objective. Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. To do otherwise is to divert focus and power, lessening probabilities for success and increasing the probability of unintended second- and third-order effects

2.5.   References/Further Readings

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Harry, R (2006) Strategic Theory For The 21st Century:the Little Book on Big Strategy: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244

2.6   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer to SAEs 1 and 2

Q1. ''Military professionals come from a world of very adept planners; they learn planning methodologies from the day they enter service. *Strategy is not planning.* As described above, it partakes of a different mindset. Planning makes strategy actionable. It relies on a high degree of certainty—a world that is concrete and can be addressed in explicit terms. In essence, it takes a gray world and makes it black and white through its analysis of the facts and assumptions about the unknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusing heavily on first-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future results can be precisely known if enough is known about the facts and the conditions affecting the undertaking. The planning process is essential to reduce uncertainty at the tactical level—it allows detailed actions to be prescribed. In reality, uncertainty can never quite be achieved even at that level, and it increases exponentially as we ascend from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level. (Harry,2006)''

Q2. ''In strategy formulation, getting the objectives (ends) right matters most! Too often in strategy development, too little time is spent on consideration of the appropriate objectives in the context of the desired policy, national interests, and the environment. Yet it is the identification and achievement of the right objectives that creates the desired strategic effect. Objectives are the true focus of strategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, a proposed strategy is fundamentally flawed and cannot be effective. If the wrong objectives are identified, the concepts and resources serve no strategic purpose. Thus, the logic of strategy argues that objectives are primary even though concepts and resources are also crucial to success—action and costs are subordinate to purpose in strategy. Yet in strategy formulation, efficiency is often confused with effectiveness by both strategists and leadership. Strategy must reflect a preference for effectiveness. In this regard, objectives are concerned with doing the right things. Concepts are concerned with doing things right. Resources are concerned with costs. Objectives determine effectiveness; concepts and resources are measures of efficiency. A lack of efficiency increases the cost of success, but a lack of effectiveness precludes success. Ultimately, strategy's success can be measured only in terms of the degree to which its objectives are accomplished. Thus, again, efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness. (Alan,1997)''

Unit 3   Strategic Studies Functional Areas

Unit Structure

3.1   Introduction
3.2   Learning Outcomes
3.3   Strategic Studies Functional Areas
         3.3.1   USA Strategic Operational Roles
         3.3.2   USA Strategic operational role in Iraq War
3.4   Summary
3.5   References/Further Reading

3.1   Introduction

This unit dwells on Strategy which seeks to protect or advance a particular interest, or the general interest, of the state within the strategic environment relative to other actors, circumstances, and chance in accordance with guidance provided by policy. In doing this, strategy uses analysis to determine the relevant factors—facts, issues, threats, and opportunities—that act or interact to affect the interest. Strategy seeks to act on or use these factors to influence the strategic environment favorably without inadvertently creating other unfavorable circumstances within the environment. These factors are the primary focus of strategy; their relationship to the interest and policy guidance leads to appropriate objectives and concepts—what is to be accomplished and how to use the state's instruments of power to accomplish the objectives. Instruments of power may be used singularly or in combination, and directly or indirectly. Given the complex and chaotic nature of the environment, defining the right objectives for desired strategic effect, developing a proper concept, and providing resources are all formidable tasks.

3.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Identify the functional areas of Strategy.
•   Explain the position of USA using strategy to intervene in some wars in different parts of the wold.

3.3   Strategic Studies Functional Areas

Since strategy is hierarchical, the strategist must understand the level of strategy at which he is working, the nature of the strategic environment at his level in regard to internal and external factors, and the comprehensiveness of strategy—the consequences of his choices in regard to other levels of strategy. With this in mind, the strategist can develop objectives. Strategic objectives may be derived from policy, higher levels of strategy, or independent analysis of the strategic environment. The primary question in determining objectives is this: What end(s), if accomplished, will create the desired strategic effect in support of policy or interests without detrimental collateral effects? *Objectives (ends)* explain "what" is to be accomplished. They flow from a consideration of the interest, which is expressed as a desired end state, and the factors in the strategic environment affecting the realization of this desired end state. Objectives are bounded by policy guidance, higher strategy, the nature of the strategic environment, and the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power available. Objectives are selected to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects that lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the corresponding level of strategy, ultimately serving national interests. In strategy, objectives are expressed with explicit verbs (e.g., deter war, promote regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces). Explicit verbs force the strategist to consider and qualify what is to be accomplished and help establish the parameters for the use of power. (Harry,2006)''

A number of problems plague the strategic community in regard to the development of objectives. Objectives too seldom receive the depth of thought and reflection they merit. The objectives establish the parameters of all that follows. Objectives must reflect a thorough understanding of the end state desired, the nature of the environment, policy guidance, and the multiordered effects required to create the conditions for the end state. The diversity of outcomes possible in the environment means that the totality of specific results rarely can be predicted at the outset. (Mackubin Thomas,2005)''

Strategy, as a matter of principle, must be flexible and adaptable. Thus, strategy cannot be made static by objectives that are too confining. In its formulation, it must focus on "comprehensive" objectives that reflect an understanding of the dynamic nature of the strategic environment and are sufficiently encompassing to allow for change in execution without losing focus on policy or interests. On the other hand, objectives so broad or vague that they can be misinterpreted or fail to provide appropriate direction risk the success of policy. Strategic objectives logically bound but do not unnecessarily confine subordinate levels. (Harry,2006)''

Strategic objectives maintain their validity, while providing for adaptability and flexibility, by focusing on root purposes and causes. If objectives are set at the strategic level with a focus on root purposes and causes and an appreciation of the nature of the strategic environment (chaos, complexity, human nature, chance, friction, etc.), they are logically of sufficient breadth to provide the necessary adaptability and flexibility to confront the unforeseen. In turn, they also logically broaden the scope of consideration for ways and means—further enhancing the preconsideration of adaptability. Most strategists make the objectives too narrow and precise, pushing their thinking down to the planning level. At the planning level, exactness of detail is more valued because it can be quantified and made actionable. Such detail works in the planningrealm because of the reduced scope and greater certainty. Planning-level objectives elevated to the strategic level are more susceptible to failure as a result of the scope and chaotic nature of the strategic environment, which exponentially multiplies possibilities for friction and asymmetric reactions by others. In strategy, the focus is on clarity of objectives appropriate for the level, not prescribing detailed instructions for lower levels. Strategic objectives directly serve the strategic purpose—the desired end state. (Harry,2006)''

Simply put, if the strategic objective is to win the war, then losing a battle is regrettable but does not necessarily preclude achievement of the strategic objective. The state can seek additional battles or apply other instruments of power. On the other hand, if the objective is to win every battle, then the state has been denied its strategic objective as soon as a single battle is lost. The strategy has failed, producing different repercussions in the internal and external components of the strategic environment, even if the war is ultimately won. The "win-every-battle" strategy also has confined its use of power to the military instrument. In modern war, winning battles is a planning objective; winning wars is a strategic objective. Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. To do otherwise is to divert focus and power, lessening probabilities for success and increasing the probability of unintended second- and third-order effects. This eventuality appears evident in the U.S. national-level strategic approach in the second Iraq War. (Harry,2006)''.

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. What do you understand by strategic Principles?

3.3.2. USA Strategic Functional Roles in Strategy

Donald E. Nuechterlein, in *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980's*, describes *national interests* as the

perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment. (Donald,1984)''

The *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms* defines national security interests as "the foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving U.S. political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. (*Joint Publication 1-02*, p. 360.)''

The nature of the strategic environment, as developed in this monograph, suggests a more generalized definition, such as "the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states and actors in the emerging strategic environment expressed as desired end states." This broader definition encapsulates the dynamism of a strategic environment in which multiple actors, chance, and interaction play a role, and both external and internal components are recognized. Interests are expressed as general or particular desired end states or conditions. "U.S. economic well-being" would be a generalized interest; "international access to Middle Eastern oil" illustrates a more particular economic interest. Interests may change over time, although general interests such as free trade and defense of the homeland are immutable. (Harry,2006)''

At the highest level, political leadership uses policy to articulate state interests and guidance in achieving them. Policy provides guidance for strategy. Such guidance may be quite general, as in a vision statement that relates interests to the strategic environment, or a more specific statement of guidance containing elements of ends, ways, and means. It is found in various documents, speeches, policy statements, and other pronouncements made on behalf of the government by various officials or provided by leadership as direct guidance for the development of strategy. Policy may be implied as well as stated. It may be the result of a detailed strategic appraisal or arrived at intuitively. The strategist must understand national interests and policy in order to formulate appropriate strategy. Given the complexity of the strategic environment, the strategist must be holistic in his deliberations and apprise the policymaker of the interaction and any conflict between a particular policy and larger interests or policies. Lower-level leaders may state more definitive guidance as policy, but such policy is subordinate to higher-level policy and strategy. Strategists at lower organizational levels must have a comprehensive grasp of interests, higher policy and strategy, and their own guidance in order to formulate subordinate strategies. In all cases, strategy is subordinate to policy and hierarchical

in application. Nonetheless, the strategy development process by its nature evaluates the appropriateness, practicality, and consequences of policy, and thus informs policy of the art of the possible and the costs and benefits of achievement or failure. (Harry,2006)''

Military subordination to civilian policymakers is a recurring and sensitive issue in civil-military relations within the United States. The political leadership and the American people expect their military to execute the guidance provided by elected officials faithfully. Yet, the American people also demand that their military perform professionally and win the nation's wars. Civil-military relations are not an exclusively American issue. Clausewitz provided a proper perspective on the relationship of the military and policy in *On War*: "The assertion that a major military development or the plan for one, should be a matter of *purely military* opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning for a war, and ask them for *purely military* advice. (Gaddis ,1978)"

Policy provides guidance for objectives and use of the instruments of power, but the strategy formulation process logically informs policy. In a democratic society, the military professional must build a relationship with civilian leadership that facilitates the essential two-way communication between policy and strategy. If policy misguides, asks the improbable, or unnecessarily confines strategy, the level of risk associated with the strategy rises. (Harry,2006)''

In the world of the military strategist, strategy can be demanded even when inadequate or no policy guidance has been provided. In such a case, the strategist's responsibility is to seek policy clarification from leadership. Often this is best done by recommending alternative policy choices based on an analysis of interests in relation to strategic circumstances—a necessary analysis for strategy formulation also. The distinction is that the policy alternatives are derived directly from the interests. Both policy and strategy should be consistent with the protection or advancement of overall state interests in the strategic environment. It is the responsibility of the strategist to identify all the viable alternatives. (Harry,2006)''.

3.3.3 USA Strategic Operational Role in Iraq War

The Bush administration has been somewhat ambiguous on root purposes in the second Iraq War, one expressed root purpose in going to war with Iraq was to affect a regime change in Baghdad so that international terrorists would be denied state sponsorship and potential weapons of mass destruction. A number of "strategic" objectives

emerged from this purpose: (1) defeat Iraqi military forces in war, (2) remove Saddam Hussein from power, and (3) establish a new democratic Iraqi regime. One could postulate that the first objective, defeat Iraqi military forces, was inappropriate as a national security-level objective and should have been subordinated by locating it at the theater-military level. In practice, these objectives were sought sequentially. Through its elevation and sequential expression, the defeat of Iraq military forces became the focal point of the strategy when, in fact, the key objective and point of focus should have been the establishment of a new democratic regime, with the military defeat of Iraqi forces and the removal of Saddam Hussein expressed as acceptable strategic outcomes in guiding subordinate levels. (Harry,2006)

As a consequence of this misdirected focus, the military objective occupied the time and talent of the policymakers and national-level military leadership with consequent neglect of the third objective. While this proposition is debatable, it is clear that the presumption of the strategy was that the defeat of the Iraqi military would lead directly to accomplishment of the other objectives. In actual fact, more thought and a more intense focus and effort on how to achieve the democratic regime objective was needed. The inappropriate elevation of the objective and the sequencing also illustrate the mindset that inflicting military defeat is essential to the achievement of the other two objectives. Again, this may or may not have been true, but the point is that defeat of the Iraq military forces was an appropriate focus for a lower level of strategy or planning. The closer you approach planning, the easier the conceptualization becomes— it quantifies and can be made more precise. People prefer certainty and migrate toward it—it is more comfortable. Strategy deals with ambiguity and uncertainty. Most people are uncomfortable with these and seek to move toward the known at the expense of improperly analyzing and thus jeopardizing the recognition and achievement of the proper objectives. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q2. What are rational behind President Bush war intervention in Iraq?

3.4   Summary

The Bush administration has been somewhat ambiguous on root purposes in the second Iraq War, one expressed root purpose in going to war with Iraq was to affect a regime change in Baghdad so that

international terrorists would be denied state sponsorship and potential weapons of mass destruction. A number of "strategic" objectives emerged from this purpose: (1) defeat Iraqi military forces in war, (2) remove Saddam Hussein from power, and (3) establish a new democratic Iraqi regime. One could postulate that the first objective, defeat Iraqi military forces, was inappropriate as a national security-level objective and should have been subordinated by locating it at the theater-military level.

3.5 References/Further Readings

Donald, E. (1984) *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 4

Harry, R (2006) Strategic Theory For The 21st Century:the Little Book on Big Strategy: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244

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Gaddis, (1978) The *Landscape of History*, p. 66.

Mackubin , O (2005) *National Review Online*, January 5, 2005; available   from *http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens200501050715.asp*, Internet, accessed January 5, 2005.

3.6 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Self-Assessment Exercises 1 and 2

Q1. 'Strategy, as a matter of principle, must be flexible and adaptable. Thus, strategy cannot be made static by objectives that are too confining. In its formulation, it must focus on "comprehensive" objectives that reflect an understanding of the dynamic nature of the strategic environment and are sufficiently encompassing to allow for change in execution without losing focus on policy or interests. On the other hand, objectives so broad or vague that they can be misinterpreted or fail to provide appropriate direction risk the success of policy. Strategic objectives logically bound but do not unnecessarily confine subordinate levels.

Q2. The Bush administration has been somewhat ambiguous on root purposes in the second Iraq War, one expressed root purpose in going to war with Iraq was to effect a regime change in Baghdad so that international terrorists would be denied state sponsorship and potential weapons of mass destruction. A number of "strategic" objectives emerged from this purpose: (1) defeat Iraqi military forces in war, (2) remove Saddam Hussein from power, and (3) establish a new democratic Iraqi regime. One could postulate that the first objective, defeat Iraqi military forces, was inappropriate as a national security-level objective and should have been subordinated by locating it at the theater-military level.

Unit 4   Resources in Strategic Studies

Unit Structure

4.1   Introduction
4.2   Learning Outcomes
4.3   Use of Strategic Resources
          4.3.1   Military Resources
          4.3.2   Testing of Strategic Logic and Risk
          4.3.3   Assumptions and Premises of Strategy
4.4   Summary
4.5   References/Further Readings

4.1   Introduction

Resources (means) in strategy formulation determine the types and levels of resources that are necessary to support the concepts of the strategy. In strategy, resources can be tangible or intangible. Examples of tangible resources include forces, people, equipment, money, and facilities. The primary issue with tangible resources is that they are seldom sufficient to support the best concept optimally. This shortage can be an actual inability to resource, or the result of the desire on the part of leadership to be prudent and efficient with government funding, or competing demands. Intangible resources include things like national will, international goodwill, courage, intellect, or even fanaticism. Intangible resources are problematic for the strategist in that they often are not measurable or are volatile.

4.2   Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
•   Discuss various types of resources in Strategic Studies
•   Explain the nature of military Resources in Strategic Studies

4.3   Use of Resources in Strategic Studies

National will in a democracy is certainly an essential resource, particularly in a long-term strategy, but the issue for the strategist is that it is more apt to need engendering and sustainment than be a given and reliable. Hence, intangible resources should always be suspect. They require close examination to determine whether they are actually

improperly expressed concepts or objectives. The responsibility of the strategist is to ensure that the resources necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives as envisioned by the concepts are articulated and available. (Harry,2006)''

''The hierarchy and logic of strategy also function in consideration of resources. Resources increasingly are defined in detail as the planning level is approached. A national security or grand strategy could list "military forces" as a resource for its concepts, even if the appropriate type of forces did not exist, and still be consistent as long as the development of the forces was funded and the concept allowed the time for building the force. It would then be the responsibility of the subordinate level of strategy to develop an objective and concept for creating the force—moving from the general to the particular. Assignment of resources requires no verb. It merely expresses what is to be made available for use in applying the concepts to accomplish the objectives. Thus "to develop, build, or establish a larger force" is a way; the "force" itself, or the dollars to build it, is the resource. In articulating strategy, using the discussion of means to describe concepts should be avoided, as should articulating concepts as resources. In a very simplified manner, "diplomacy" is a strategic concept, but diplomats are among the resources required for the use of diplomacy. Imprecision in the vocabulary and logic of strategy leads to confusion and encourages friction at lower levels. The student of *On War* knows Clausewitz preferred "overthrow of the enemy's government" as the end, to fight a decisive battle as the way, and a large army as the means. He saw the large army as an appropriate resource to support his way—the decisive battle. But saying "*to use* a large army" implies a range of different concepts for success. The employment of verbs to describe resources frequently suggests a problem within the logic of the strategy. (Harry,2006)''

4.3.1 Military Resources

The rule of thumb to apply is that resources can usually be quantified, if only in general terms: The Army, the Air Force, the Navy; units and armed forces of the United States; DoD personnel; dollars; facilities; equipment—trucks, planes, ships, etc.; and resources of organizations— Red Cross, NATO, etc. The strategist should state these as resources in terms that make clear to subordinate levels what is to be made available to support the concepts. How the resources are to be used is articulated in the concept. The specific development of resources is refined in the subordinate strategy and planning processes. (Harry,2006)''

Resource selection, like concepts, has implications in regard to multi-level effects. Military resources can do a lot of things—fight wars,

conduct humanitarian operations, and perform nation-building are examples. While military forces may be the only available resources, the choice may have consequences. Military forces providing tsunami relief may not be as effective as experienced civilian nongovernment agencies or may be perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of the supported nations. Military forces involved in nation-building may be perceived by some as an occupying force, thus becoming the problem as opposed to part of the solution. If policy or circumstances dictate the use of the resources in such circumstances, the strategist's responsibility is to be aware of the potential second- and third-order effects and to consider such effects in the development of the strategy. (Harry,2006)

Resources are an integral part of good strategy. And while efficiency can be gained in the aggregate by doing things better, resources are usually the focus of efficiency advocates who promote doing the same things with less. Allocating inadequate resources for a strategic concept is a recipe for disaster, and will cause even greater costs in recovering. Another commonly heard refrain among the military profession at large is that resources drive strategy. There is an element of truth in this statement. Resources are almost always limited at the strategic level because of competing demands from diverse needs. The strategist's responsibility is to ensure that the strategic concept will accomplish the objective, and that it is resourced to do so. A better concept may require less or different resources. A **strategy** that is not adequately resourced is not a viable strategy at all. (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 1

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q1. How do you rate the impact of military resource in strategic studies?

4.3.3 Testing Strategy's Logic and Risk

All strategy has its own inherent logic which can be assessed to determine validity and risk. The identification of resources in the development process is a good starting point for testing a strategy's internal logic. The strategist should think backward through the process to ensure the resources provided are adequate to implement the concepts, that the concepts envisioned can achieve the stated objectives in an acceptable manner, that the accomplishment of the objectives will create the strategic effects to satisfy the policy aims and promote and protect the national interests, and so forth. Thus, the strategist questions suitability—will the strategy's attainment accomplish the effect desired; he questions feasibility—can the action be accomplished by the means available; and he questions acceptability—are the effects as well as the

methods and resources used to achieve those efforts justified and acceptable to the body politic? In this process, the strategist considers tangibles, such as resource availability, weapons capability, and geography, and intangibles, such as national will, public opinion, world opinion, and actions/reactions of U.S. allies, adversaries, and other nations and actors. A strategy that clearly can be labeled as unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable is not valid. However, if an appropriate strategy formulation process has been adhered to, this will rarely be the case. The strategy is likely to be assessed as valid with qualifications— the qualifications being the measure of risk. (Harry,2006)''

Risk Assessment

Risk is an assessment of the balance among what is known, assumed, and unknown, as well as the correspondence between what is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available. Risk assessment is not just a measure of the probability of success *or* failure. It is also an assessment of the probable consequences of success *and* failure. The strategic environment responds as a complex system— acting successfully, acting unsuccessfully, and failing to act must be anticipated and weighed. Since there are seldom enough resources or a clever enough concept to guarantee absolute success, there is always some risk in a dynamic strategic environment. Complexity, friction, and freedom of choice of other actors also guarantee some element of risk. Risk weighs the potential advantages and disadvantages of adopting the strategy. (Harry,2006)''

Risk assessment examines the strategy in its entire logic—ends, ways, and means—in the context of the environment and seeks to determine what effects are created by the implementation of the strategy. It seeks to determine how the equilibrium is affected, and whether the environment is more or less favorable for the state as a result of the strategy. It asks how other actors will react to what has been attempted or achieved; how they will react to the way in which the strategy was pursued; what the balance is between intended and unintended consequences; how chance or friction will play in this strategy. The strategist must assess how the assumptions made or factors that might change could impact on success or effects. He must ask how much flexibility is inherent to the strategy, how it can be changed or recovered, and at what cost; what are the elements of the strategic environment the strategy is relying on for success; and what are the consequences if these change, and is the strategy flexible or adaptable enough to accommodate these changes. Risk assessment is an integral part of the strategy formulation process and should lead to acceptance, modification, or rejection of the strategy. (Harry,2006)''

The strategist seeks to minimize risk through his development of the strategy—the relationship or balance of ends, ways, and means. But ultimately the strategist informs the decision makers of the risks in the strategy so the leaders can decide if the risks are acceptable or not. The strategist continuously contemplates the possibilities as the future unfolds. (Harry,2006)''

3.3.4   Assumption and Premises of Strategy

Harry, R (2006) has further cited the premises of strategy in 15 folds in trying to explain the scope, action and inaction of strategic practice.

1.   Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive. Strategy seeks to promote or protect national interests as the future unfolds. In doing this, it must consider change and make assumptions. Both change and assumptions are bounded by existing facts and realistic possibilities. Strategy is clear on what are facts, assumptions, and possibilities.

2.   Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates all levels of strategy. Policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims in an acceptable manner. However, the development of strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims, and strategy informs policy of the art of the possible.

3.   Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment.

4.   Strategy maintains a holistic perspective. It demands comprehensive consideration. Strategy is developed from a thorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the nature of the strategic environment. Strategic analysis highlights the internal and external factors in the strategic environment that help define strategic effect and the specific objectives, concepts, and resources of the strategy. Strategy reflects a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of its own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on the strategist's own level.

5.   Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors. Any strategy, once known or implemented, threatens the status quo and creates risk for the equilibrium of the strategic environment.81 The strategist must determine if the end justifies the risks of initiating action, and other actors must decide whether to act and in what manner.

6.   Strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished. Strategy focuses on a preferred end state among possible end states in a dynamic environment. It provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of the instruments of power to achieve specified objectives, thereby creating strategic effects leading to the desired end state. The strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, the policy, and the nation's aggregate interests to determine what strategic effect is necessary before proper objectives can be determined.

7.   Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. It is more than an intellectual consideration of objective factors. The role of belief systems and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the development and execution of strategy.

8.   Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood and accounted for to a greater or lesser extent.

9.   Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. This focus makes strategy inherently adaptable and flexible. Strategy learns from experience and must be sufficiently broad and flexible in its construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary's countermoves. Strategy's focus on root causes and purposes ensures that direction of subordinate levels is sufficiently broad to be adaptable and flexible.

10.   Strategy is hierarchical. Just as strategy is subordinate to policy, lower levels of strategy and planning are subordinate to higher levels of strategy. The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control.

11.   Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time. Strategy must be integrated into the stream of history; it must be congruous with what has already happened and with the realistic possibilities ofthe future. Small changes at the right time can have large and unexpected consequences. Consequently, an intervention at an early date has greater effect at less cost than a

later intervention. Strategy is about thinking and acting in time in a way that is fundamentally different from planning.

12. Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative; once given birth, they become a part of the play of continuity and change. Strategies at different levels interact and influence the success of higher and lower strategy and planning over time.

13. Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects that lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed. In that way, they ultimately serve national interests. Good strategy is both effective and efficient, but effectiveness takes precedence over efficiency. Concepts and resources serve objectives without undue risk of failure or unintended effects.

14. Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that level of strategy, as well as contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally and externally. From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves suitability, acceptability, and feasibility.

15. Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to the uncertain nature of the strategic environment. Success is contingent on implementation of an *effective* strategy—ends, ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic environment. Failure is the inability to achieve one's objectives, the thwarting of achievement of one's objectives by other actors or chance, or the creation of unintended adverse effects of such magnitude as to negate what would otherwise be regarded as strategic   success.   (Harry,2006)''

Self-Assessment Exercises 2

Attempt these exercises to measure what you have learnt so far. This should not take you more than 5 minutes.
Q2. Discuss the impact of risk assessment in strategic studies?

4.4   Summary

ECOMOG restored constitutional legality and reinstated the government of the democratically elected regimes when called upon. At the request of the lawful authorities, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government acted to restore peace, and if possible, reinstate estranged leaders to power in conflict-ridden countries. At necessary intervals, the mechanism for supervision and control of the cease-fire is often set up by ECOWAS with the contingents of soldiers sent by neighbouring sister countries

4.5   References/Further Readings

Harry, R (2006) Strategic Theory For The 21st Century:the Little Book on Big Strategy: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244

4.7   Possible Answers to Self – Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

Answer SAEs 1and 2

Q1. Resource selection, like concepts, has implications in regard to multi-level effects. Military resources can do a lot of things—fight wars, conduct humanitarian operations, and perform nation-building are examples. While military forces may be the only available resources, the choice may have consequences. Military forces providing tsunami relief may not be as effective as experienced civilian nongovernment agencies or may be perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of the supported nations. Military forces involved in nation-building may be perceived by some as an occupying force, thus becoming the problem as opposed to part of the solution. If policy or circumstances dictate the use of the resources in such circumstances, the strategist's responsibility is to be aware of the potential second- and third-order effects and to consider such effects in the development of the strategy.

Q2. 'Risk assessment examines the strategy in its entire logic—ends, ways, and means—in the context of the environment and seeks to determine what effects are created by the implementation of the strategy. It seeks to determine how the equilibrium is affected, and whether the environment is more or less favorable for the state as a result of the strategy. It asks how other actors will react to what has been attempted or achieved; how they will react to the way in which the strategy was pursued; what the balance is between intended and unintended consequences; how chance or friction will play in this strategy. The strategist must assess how the assumptions made or factors that might change could impact on success or effects. He must ask how much flexibility is inherent to the strategy, how it can be changed or recovered, and at what cost; what are the elements of the strategic environment the strategy is relying on for success; and what are the consequences if these change, and is the strategy flexible or adaptable enough to accommodate these changes. Risk assessment is an integral part of the strategy formulation process and should lead to acceptance, modification, or rejection of the strategy.