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COURSE TITLE: DEMOBILIZATION DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION
PCR 373
DEMobilization Disarmament and Reintegration

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PCR 373: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

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Module 1
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Unit 1: Definition and Features of Armed Conflicts

1.0: Introduction

For a proper understanding of the peculiar features of an armed conflict, it is necessary to differentiate between violence and conflicts. This helps us in clarifying what actually constitutes an armed conflict.

It is clear that the end of the Cold-War has brought about an increase in the proliferation of the tools of war, reasons which are not our immediate concern in this unit. The reality in Africa however is that warlordism, i.e. the illegal exploitation of resources to fight wars by rebels and militias has been on the increase on the continent. This continues apace with the transition and democratization process in many African states since the 1990s. this phenomenon has been one of the major causes of internal disquiet and tension in many African
states. Consequently, there has been the emergence of many post-conflict states on the continent.

This development has underscored the desirability of DDR processes in many of the post-conflict states. This is why this unit discusses the phenomenon of the upsurge in armed conflicts in post-Cold War Africa. This is in order to provide the basis of understanding of the issues that remotely create the need for DDR processes.

2.0 Objectives:
At the end of this unit you should be able:

1. To define an armed conflict;
2. To identify the main features of an armed conflict;
3. To distinguish between a non-international armed conflict and one that is international.

3.0 Main Contents:
As you must have learnt in previous courses, conflicts can not be wished away in the affairs of men but it must not be allowed to degenerate into violence and chaos. This is why this unit presents a detailed clarification and distinction of conflicts. This is done by differentiating between armed conflicts and conflicts. This is particularly essential for this course because the concept of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration deals basically with the aftermath of armed conflicts. In this unit, we shall start by exposing you to different notions of the concept of conflict, crises violence and armed conflicts. This will be followed by a presentation of the various features of armed conflicts and concluded with the provision of some tools that can be used to illustrate the progression of armed conflicts.
Conflict has been defined severally and differently over the years from different perspectives and by different scholars. This has made available a plethora of diversely rich resources to aid research and teaching on the subject. According to Dan Smith an armed conflict can be defined as open, armed clashes between two or more centrally organized parties, with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and territory. However, our knowledge of conflicts tells us that the motives for embarking on destructive conflicts are more then the stated ones by Dan Smith. Other incentives for destructive conflicts include but not limited to ethnic domination or liberation and religious expansion or liberation amongst others. It is also necessary to state that there is a difference between what constitutes a war and an armed conflict. According to Gleditch (2001) the number of deaths must exceed 999 in a war while that of an armed conflict must be below the fore quoted figure. It must be clarified that armed conflicts are characterized by the use of both conventional and unconventional arms.

Also, in contemporary times the emergence of warlords who seize and use the natural resources of their countries against the civil populace have made domestic armed conflicts to be very deadly and beyond the ability of many state armed forces to cope with. Dan Smith expatiates on the reasons for the widespread of armed conflicts since the 1990s. According to him, at the start of 1990 to the end of 1999 there were 118 armed conflicts globally in which 80 states and two para-state regions were involved and resulting in the death of approximately six million people. This unit posits that if we seek to prevent conflict from escalating into armed warfare, or, failing that, to at least achieve an end to fighting as soon as possible, and if we want to maximise the opportunity for avoiding the return of the war after apparent settlement, we must first be sure that we properly understand armed conflicts and their causes.
Of the 118 armed conflicts which ensued from 1990 to 1999, ten can be strictly defined as inter-state conflicts. Although it is often these conflicts that dominate the headlines and shape the popular view of how contemporary wars are fought, today they account for only a relatively small proportion of overall war. Five can be strictly defined as wars of independence, although the insurgents in many more wars would themselves define their conflicts in those terms. One hundred wars were largely, primarily or even exclusively internal conflicts. The fact that such loose terminology must be used is an indication of the extent to which many wars defy water-tight categorization (Hyden, 2006).

For instance, two wars that are not included in 1999 and 2000 in that total of 100, were entirely internal Ethiopian affairs in every respect except that the site of most of the fighting was in neighbouring Somalia. The war that went on in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) from 1998 into 2000 is in a category by itself that is perhaps best regarded as trans-national. It was, in part, a civil war, fought to determine whether President Laurent Kabila should remain in power, and in part an international war for regional power and influence. Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe were allied with President Kabila’s forces, while Rwanda and Uganda fought against them and, in 2000, against each other as well from 56 in 1990 (and 47 in 1989) to 68 in 1992. In those years the initial optimism about the end of the Cold War was quickly supplanted by a new pessimism, in reaction to the apparent wave of new conflicts in the post-Cold War era. As it turns out, however, the number of armed conflicts each year has since stabilised and then even declined (the total of 118 wars 1990-1999, therefore, is made up of 100 primarily civil wars, 2 essentially civil wars, 5 wars of independence, 10 inter-state wars and 1 trans-national war, (Gleditsh 2001, Hyden, 2006 and Patomaki, 2001).

New violent conflicts in Europe (including Russia, Turkey and the Caucasus) account for two-thirds of the increase in the annual incidence of wars in
the early 1990s. At that time, the region quickly became one of the most violent in the world. The decline in the annual number of armed conflicts after 1992 is likewise largely due to changes in Europe, until the particularly sharp fall between 1997 and 1998. The upsurge in violent conflict in Europe was itself highly concentrated in the Balkans and the Caucasus, in the context of the processes of disintegration in Yugoslavia and the USSR. The fact that that upsurge has now abated suggests that the proliferation of war in Europe in the early 1990s did not herald a new era of violent conflict on the continent, as many commentators feared at the time. Those conflicts were, rather, the violent and tragic symptoms of social, economic and political readjustment following the collapse of the systems of power in Yugoslavia and the USSR. As the effects of those complex readjustments are assimilated at both the national and international levels, their consequences have fortunately become less dramatic and less violent.

Nevertheless, any optimism generated by this conclusion should be tempered by two further considerations. First, on the global level, the old conflicts are very much present. Of the armed conflicts active in 1999, 66 per cent were more than five years old, and 30 per cent had lasted for longer than 20 years. These protracted armed conflicts have proven to be extremely difficult to bring to an end. The world, therefore, is not necessarily entering a new and more peaceful era.

Second, in Europe, most of the armed conflicts that began in the late 1980s or early 1990s, and that are now inactive, have not really been brought to an end. Rather, they have been suspended. This difference between ended and suspended is crucial to understanding the problem of armed conflict today. The international political landscape is disfigured by wars that resume after not only the signing of cease-fires, but even after the conclusion of peace agreements. In the past decade alone, among the wars that have resumed after the conclusion of cease-fires or apparent peace agreements, it is possible to count those in Angola, Burundi,
Cambodia, Chechnya, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Kosovo, Liberia, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Often the wars return with even greater ferocity and destructiveness, and almost always at particularly high cost for the civilian population.

There are many different reasons for the resumption of war: these can be grouped under four headings. The first is simple insincerity by one or both parties (the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone is a case in point; it cannot be trusted to keep any agreement). The second reason is disappointment on the part of one or both of the parties. This may often seem, from the outside, to be the same thing as insincerity. There are many cases in which one side’s acceptance of a peace agreement is only conditional, although the condition is neither publicly stated nor part of the peace agreement. In some cases, one side strongly expects to win the post-war election and only for that reason agrees to sign the peace agreement. If that expectation is not realised, they go back to war. UNITA in Angola is an example.

The third reason is internal disagreement and even fragmentation on one or both sides. This, too, may seem to be insincerity. Peace agreements often bring the tensions and conflicts within each party to the surface; the unity that was maintained for the sake of the war can quickly disintegrate if and when peace comes. Indeed, the imminence of peace can often appear to be a threat to one part of the coalition on one side of the conflict, frustrating their capacity to fulfill long-term aims. Consider the splinter groups from the IRA in Northern Ireland in this context, or the rejection of the peace process in Israel and the West Bank by militants both in Israel and among the Palestinians.

The fourth reason for the resumption of war is that the underlying causes of armed conflict remain. Failure to address the long-term causes of the conflict will mean that all efforts at reconstruction are doomed to be, at best, cosmetic. Five
years after the Dayton Agreement to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most observers continue to see a high risk that the war will resume if the international armed peacekeeping force were to withdraw.

The fundamental instability of peace agreements is one primary explanation for the fact protracted conflict is common – a major feature of contemporary war, as noted briefly above. Taber (1970) explains a second reason for contemporary wars lasting for many years in terms of the relative weakness of the insurgent forces. The guerrillas can control the pace and intensity of combat by deciding where and how to strike; unless government forces are able and willing to locate major targets and strike pre-emptively the result will be a long, limited war, a rumbling conflict that erupts intermittently.

This is why combat zones are very often confined to one part of the country. It is perfectly possible for reporters, politicians, researchers, businessmen, diplomats, World Bank experts and other outsiders to visit the capital of a war-torn country and yet not to know that a war is going on. Because many armed conflicts are localised and remain relatively low-level for several years on end, they do not make good stories for the international news media. These conflicts rarely produce clear cut events such as victories, triumphs and disasters; they simply linger on as a slow torture for the participants. However, this should not create the illusion of their capacity to escalate suddenly and viciously. When that escalation occurs, it often seems to international observers to have come out of a clear blue sky. Such was the initial reaction to the massacres in Rwanda in 1994. Regardless of this, not only did those massacres take place against a historical background of repetitive cycles of mass killings, but also it is now known that there were many signs of imminent tragedy that were ignored until after it was too late (Adelman and Suhrke 1996).
3.1 Features of Armed Conflicts

This section of the unit will dwell largely on the phenomenon of armed conflicts from the perspective of intra-national conflicts that have become widespread since the end of the Cold-War. The features of armed conflicts will be seen from two perspectives. These are from the local and international perspectives of armed conflicts. According to Karen Costello, they are:

The Adversary

There is a common saying that it takes two to tango, so also, it takes at least two parties for an armed conflict to ensue. Therefore, there must be an adversary first and foremost for armed conflict to break out. There must also have been a broken relationship with irreconcilable differences before they would ideally resort to armed conflicts. In many ethnically plural countries, it is not uncommon for neighbours to be each other’s worst adversities. This is usually due to conflicts that may touch on resources, values and mismanagement of information or wrong perception. In the context of communal conflicts, the contiguity communities have made rivalry more intense. This is similar to its definition by (Barash & Webel, 2003). Rivals were those use a common stream going by the meaning of the Latin word *rivus*. Therefore, it should be expected that rivals would confront themselves if there is scarcity of water. This to large extent offers insight into many of the domestic conflicts in Africa.

Dangers

At the beginning of this course you must have learnt that inherent in any conflict are dangers and opportunities depending the way they are handled. Danger and conflict are inseparable and related to these is fear is an ever-present element in damaged relations. This often makes parties to take preemptive actions against each other. In the context of armed conflicts whether guerrillas, civil insurgencies
or militias the fear of being defeated or losing often worsens the conflict and
hardens the stance of party in the conflict. Properly trained and prepared personnel
can manage their fear and exploit its stimulant effects. Uncontrolled, it rapidly
degrades individual and group cohesiveness and effectiveness in battle. The effect
of fear on operations is thus a measure of the standards of training, leadership and
readiness of combat forces. As students of peace studies and conflict resolution, we
should bear in mind that fear is a major factor predisposing disputing parties to
take arms.

Friction

Friction is a concept that is very difficult to understand without the personal
experience of conflict. It is defined as the features of war that resist all action,
make the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Carl von
Clausewitz (1780-1831) in his book On War explained friction by pointing out that
what was important in war was very simple and that in war the very simple became
progressively more difficult to achieve. This process was not only due to the
multitude of problems which arise in attempting any complex activity in an
uncertain and changing environment, but because of the presence and actions of an
unpredictable adversary and, most important of all, because of the effects, both
conscious and subconscious, of fear.

Uncertainty

The concept of uncertainty is related to friction and recognises that a lack of
accurate and timely information, errors, confusion and contradictions combine to
create what is known as the fog of war. Highly complex situations must be faced
and dealt with when there is insufficient time for complete planning and
investigation of the issues. In particular, peace advisers or practitioners need to be
risk aware rather than risk averse in order to offer accurate analysis and persuade
the appropriate individuals to be pro-active. The best preparation for this problem
is not only to understand its practical inevitability in time of conflict, but to ensure that unity of command and understanding of the aim are supported by coherent and comprehensive doctrine and practised by realistic and demanding exercises.

**The Use of Children**

There have been many studies on this and despite so, this has not stopped in many places where armed conflicts are taking place. It has been observed lately that this is o more limited to boys alone as it now includes girls and in this context, the sad experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone readily come to mind. We must not assume that this is a new phenomenon because Oluwaniyi (2003) reveals that the earliest form of children’s involvement in war was in 1212 when two armies of children from France and Germany joined to with adult soldiers to recapture the Holyland. Furthermore, the “war to end all wars” of 1915 has become significant in Britain till date because of the death of Jack Cornwell, who enrolled and was trained as one of six hundred boys by the Royal Navy but died while defending his country. Therefore it is not limited to guerrillas or militias alone though more pronounced and peculiar to them. He is today an hero because his statue is in over 120, 000 schools in Britain. It was a common practice by the Germans to use children as their last line of defence during the first and second world wars.

**The use of Arms**

Small arms in this context refer to weapons designed for personal use, (Okpeyi Jnr, 2008). These are self-loading guns and revolvers, pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifle and light machine guns. He describes light weapons as ; heavy machine-guns, hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-air craft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-air craft missile systems and mortars of calibers of less than 100mm.
3.2 International and Internal Dimensions of Armed Conflicts.

The reality of armed conflicts transcending borders other than their place of primary occurrences and the involvement of neighbouring states have largely informed the notion of internationalized and internal armed conflicts. The sub-section will be guided by the position of the humanitarian law which posits that irrespective of the nature of armed conflicts, there must be the application of certain rules of conduct in order to minimize casualties.

The views of Stewart (2003) are very instructive in understanding this. According to him, the term “internationalized armed conflict” describes internal hostilities that are rendered international. The factual circumstances which can achieve that internationalization are numerous and often complex: the term internationalized armed conflict includes war between two internal factions both of which are backed by different States; direct hostilities between two foreign States that militarily intervene in an internal armed conflict in support of opposing sides; and war involving a foreign intervention in support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government. The most transparent internationalized internal armed conflicts in recent history include NATO’s intervention in the armed conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999 and the intervention undertaken by Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and others, in support of opposing sides of the internal armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998.

4.0 Conclusion

From the preceding presentation it is apparent that the scourge of armed conflict stares us in the face. In Africa it has become a feature of the democratization processes in many of these countries. In some settings, it has brought about a truncation of the democratic processes. These conflicts have assumed more
horrendous dimensions as a result of the use of arms. It has also called to question the sovereignty of some states because of its trans-border dimension which has made it internationalized.

5.0 Summary

The unit dwelled on the meaning and features of armed conflicts. It supported with empirical instances the reality of the upsurge in violent conflicts all over the world since the end of the Cold-War. The international dimensions of these violent conflicts were also presented. All these have direct and indirect effects on the creation of post-conflict communities where the processes of DDR are required.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Distinguish with illustrations the difference between war and conflicts.
2. Enumerate and discuss the features of armed conflicts that you studied in this unit.
3. What are the dimensions of armed conflicts since the 1990s?
4. In your opinion, how can what you have studied in this unit make the processes of DDR imperative?

7.0 References and Further Reading


Spencer, D. "Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America." , February
1997 Accessed on 29-5-2009 at

Unit 2: Weapons in Post-Conflict States

1.0: Introduction

A study or discussion on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration would be incomplete without a proper understanding of the features that characterize armed conflicts. One of these is the use of arms. Ordinarily, the thought that arms would play any damaging or instrumental role in intra-national conflicts years back would have been ignored with a sleight of hand. However, recent events now reveal an urgent need to focus on ways of addressing the challenges of surplus arms that constitute sources of danger in many post-conflict communities. This is against the background of intense inter and intra-ethnic conflicts that have become characterized with deadly weapons. This is why this unit introduces you to the basics of arms. The essence of this is to broaden your view of the issues that make the processes of DDR imperative with the hope that this would enhance your understanding and handling of the processes when you come across them.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Know the characteristics of weapons and arms.
2. Know the implications of surplus arms in post-conflict communities.
3.0 Main Contents

Beyond its literary meaning the word arm or arms has a deeper meaning especially in security and military parlances. The legitimate possession and use of weapons is also one of the defining features of a sovereign state. However, recent events in many third world countries have seen the manifestation of direct challenge to this fundamental attribute of the state by many militia groups and separatist movements. As stated in earlier unit, the upsurge in warlordism has also led to the privatization of violence in Africa. Reasons for this are not unconnected to the failure or mismanagement of electoral processes, violent attempts to upstage hegemonies and crass greed on the part of many recycled and sit-tight leaders.

Over time, advancements in technology have brought both joy and sadness to humanity. Much as the possession and use of weapons is considered permissive and legitimate by sovereign states, it has become practically impossible to stop the illegitimate possession and use of weapons by rebels, militias and dissident groups in concerned societies. Indeed, the challenge of mopping up arms in the aftermath of violent domestic conflicts is one of the focal points of DDR.

At the international level, the possession of certain classes of weapons is considered inimical to global peace. These weapons are the ones commonly described as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This is because of their potentials that can ruin humanity in seconds. Nuclear weapons are no less deadly in bringing about destruction in pre and post-conflict communities.

3.1. Weapons in Post-Conflict States

The dawn of globalization has made the world borderless to a large extent. This is largely due to the shift from nationalism to regional integration which has seen the birth of organisations like the European Union, (EU) and other regional bodies. However, securing the borders and curtailing black market activities remain a daunting challenge to many third world nations such as Nigeria. As a
result of this, the availability, accessibility and affordability of weapons have become relatively eased for purchase. Subsequently, differences and disputes that should ordinarily not lead to violence degenerate into spontaneous violence due to the availability, accessibility and affordability of weapons. This has also produced positive and negative effects on global peace and security because of the increase in human mobility, the proliferation and the emergence of a global black market that deals in the sales of weapons. Consequently, communal conflicts that were hitherto characterized by unsophisticated weapons have now become deadlier and lethal because of the availability of arms.

Therefore, a lot of countries have so many illegally possessed arms in circulation within their borders most especially in the possession of militants and rebel groups. So, in the pre and post-conflict communities, the challenge of weapons and arms is a stark reality that cannot be wished away. However, it must be noted that these weapons are of various types. This unit acquaints you with some of the common types.

According to Albert Einstein the splitting of the atom has changed everything but our way of thinking, and hence we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. From this saying, we are faced with the reality of the catastrophe that weapons constitute to the human race. Albert Einstein once noted that as a child, he had been taught that modern times began with the fall of the Roman Empire. But everything changed with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Now, Einstein observed, we must say that modern times began in 1945. The use of weapons and its effects during the 2nd World War have made imperative the need to address the possession, proliferation and use of arms in order to save humanity from self-extinction.

This unit posits that there is indeed something special about nuclear weapons. This is because they represent a dramatic discontinuity in human
history especially in the conduct of warfares and they offer the option of an even more dramatic break: an erasing of the past, an end to the present, and a negating of the future. There is no gainsaying that no matter how destructive and bestial conventional forms of warfare can be; they can never be as destructive as nuclear war.

According to Barash and Webel (2003), some of these weapons and necessary things to know about them are listed below:

1. The weapons (bombs and warheads) themselves, and their effects;
2. “Delivery systems” (the means by which nuclear weapons are to be fired at their targets);
3. “Strategic doctrine,” which is concerned with the plans and strategies for the use of nuclear weapons;
4. The problem of nuclear proliferation.

3.2 The Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons

Barash and Webel (2003) proceed to explain that nuclear weapons derive their explosive power from the conversion of matter into energy. This conversion takes place based on the well-known equation, \( E = mc^2 \), in which \( E \) is the amount of energy released, \( m \) = mass to be converted into energy, and \( c = \) the speed of light is itself a very large number, and is squared in the equation; the resulting energy release is enormous. Nuclear fusion drives the sun and the stars; prior to 1945, the explosive power of nuclear energy had never been realized and released by humans.

In reality, the power of nuclear weapons exceeds that of most conventional explosives by approximately a factor of one million. The striking significance of nuclear weapons lies in its underlying significance because
something radically new and qualitatively different from previous human experience has been introduced into the world of war and into strategic thinking about conflicts.

Atomic bombs are products of nuclear fission, the splitting of large, unstable atoms, most commonly uranium – 235 (a radioactive isotope of the element uranium) or plutonium-239 (another radioactive element, one that is essentially man-made). When sufficient fissionable material is gathered together in a place and exposed to a barrage of neutrons some of the unstable nuclei are separated releasing energy as well as additional neutrons. These neutrons, in turn, split the nuclei of other atoms, releasing yet more energy and also more neutrons, which continue to split additional nuclei in a chain reaction that accelerates geometrically, and thus, at extraordinary speed. The material has reached critical mass when each nucleus, after being split (or “fissioned”), releases enough neutrons to split approximately two nearly nuclei. As a result, an immense amount of energy can be released in a very short time. For example, 0.00000058 seconds, $2^{57}$ nuclei (approximately 2 followed by 24 zeros) will have been split, releasing the energy equivalent to 100,000 tons of TNT, (Barash and Webel, 2002 and Akinwunmi, 2008).

Atomic, or fission, explosions are typically measured in kilotons (KT), that is, the equivalent energy that would be released by the detonation of thousands of tons of TNS. Thus, a 12-KT atomic explosion – the size that destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima – releases the same amount of energy as would be released if 12,000 tons of TNT were to detonate.

The first nuclear weapons were based on fission. Most nuclear weapons today, however, are fusion, or thermonuclear devices. They derive much of their energy from the squeezing together of very small atoms, notably deuterium and tritium, two isotopes of hydrogen. In the process, the element
helium is produced, and through the conversion of mass into energy, vast amount of energy are released. When plutonium, for example, is split, the total mass of the fission products that are formed – such as iron, cobalt, and manganese – is slightly less than that of the parent nucleus which the process started. Similarly, the total mass of the helium nuclei produced by fusion is slightly less than the mass of the hydrogen isotopes with which a fusion reaction begins. This mass has not been “lost” rather, it has been converted into energy.

Fusion is more effective than fission in that more energy per starting mass is released. But fusion is also more difficult to initiate than fission, since great heat and pressure are required literally to squeeze the hydrogen nuclei together. Therefore, fusion explosions – or “hydrogen bombs,” as they are often known – start with a relatively small “atomic” explosion, which serves as a trigger to initiate the much more powerful fusion reaction. This requirement of great heat and pressure is why fusion reactions are also known as thermonuclear explosions. Fusion explosions are also typically boosted with an additional fission component, as the energy released by the fusion is captured by a lower-grade form of uranium, usually U-238, which is induced to split as well. So the typical thermonuclear (H-bomb or hydrogen bomb) explosion is fission-fusion-fission, all occurring in a minuscule fraction of a second.

The energy released in such detonations can extend into the range of megatons (Mt), equivalent to millions of tons of TNT. Although nuclear explosives are often referred to as bombs, they are in fact more likely to be carried by a missile, in which case they are known as warheads. In addition, nuclear weapons are often designated as either tactical or strategic. The former usually refers to weapons that are intended for use on a battlefield; the latter
are normally intended for use against an adversary’s (usually distant) homeland.

Also, common in post-conflict communities are small arms light weapons which will be given detailed attention in subsequent units of the study.

**Weapons of Defence or (In)security**

The extant reality in many countries especially in the third world call for an appraisal of the role of weapons in many of such states. This is informed by the continued contestation for supremacy by groups operating outside the state and the state. The possession of weapons by groups that are violently engaging the state brings to fore the assessment of the use of weapons. As the legally responsible institution for the protection and safety of citizens the possession and use of weapons by the state cannot be disputed as a legal right. This underscores the role of weapons as instruments of defence against external aggression while enhancing the legitimacy and functional responsibility of the state to the citizens.

However, the legitimacy of the state in Africa has come under intense challenge and assault as a result of ills such as injustice, poor leadership, corruption, mismanagement of religious and ethnic plurality and the mismanagement of elections. Also, organized crimes have contributed immensely to the proliferation of weapons.

As a result of the preceding, grievances and criminal tendencies have worsened the security situation of many states in Africa. The illegal possession and use of weapons have worsened the security situation.

Therefore, weapons now have positive and negative impacts in many states of the continent with a worsening of the security situation.
4.0 Conclusion
The use of weapons in domestic conflicts and hitherto conventional wars can be described as a consequence of the increment in domestic conflicts that have made blacks markets of weapons to thrive. These weapons have become instruments of handling and settling conflicts in many instances. it has also encouraged the proliferation of both stationary and roaming guerrilla movements on the continent.

5.0 Summary
The unit discussed the unprecedented use of weapons in domestic or communal conflicts as a perverse phenomenon that threatens overall human existence. The components of some of these weapons were also presented.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
1) What are the characteristics of nuclear weapons?
2) What is the impact of nuclear weapons on international conflict?

7.0 References and Further readings


Transition: The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program. Africa Regional Series.

1.0 Introduction

A discussion or study on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will be inadequate without a proper understanding of the reasons for the proliferation of small arms; their use by war parties and the effects on the communal conflicts in Africa. In the post-Cold War era, in which the profit motive has replaced East-West concerns as the main stimulus behind weapons sales, ex-Warsaw Pact and NATO nations are dumping their arsenals on the open market. Prices for some weapons, such as Soviet-designed Kalashnikov AKM automatic rifles (commonly known as AK-47s), have fallen below cost. Many Third World countries, such as China, Egypt, and South Africa, have also stepped up sales of light weapons and small arms. More than a dozen nations that were importers of small arms 15 years ago now manufacture and export them.

As a result of this proliferation of small arms and fallen prices, local war lords across Africa who ordinarily should not have access to these deadly weapons are getting them at their finger tips. This has been one of the major reasons for upsurge
in violent crimes and communal conflicts in many African countries. Consequently, it has become imperative for peace and conflict experts to look for more technical ways to stop this ugly trend. This is why this unit will expose you to the dangers that the use small arms are posing to peace and stability of the affected African countries.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1) To define Small arms
2) To differentiate Small arms from other kind of weapons
3) To mention the effects of small arms on communal conflict

3.0 Main Contents

Before going into the details of our discussion, it is important to define Small arms. While there is no universally accepted definition of small arms, the term is commonly viewed as encompassing man-portable firearms and their ammunition primarily designed for individual use by military forces as lethal weapons. A typical list of small arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, and light machine-guns. Compared to complex major weapon systems, small arms are more widely produced and available, relatively easy to conceal, and require little maintenance, logistic support, and training to operate. This explains why they are the commonest weapons for war parties especially during communal violent conflicts across Africa.

3.1 Supply and Demand

According to Herbert L. Calhoun (1998) estimates of the number of small arms in circulation range from 100 to 500 million, with 50-80 million being AK-47
assault rifles. An increasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammunition either through indigenous or licensed production. It has been reported that an AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased on the streets of some developing countries for as little as 10 U.S. dollars, or in exchange for a chicken or a goat. International transfers are also a major source of small arms and light weapons supply, through channels, both legal and illegal. Legal and illegal transfers are often so closely intertwined that it is difficult to establish a clear basis for distinguishing them. Many weapons originating as legal production or exports eventually fall into illegal circulation. It is impossible to know with certainty what percentage of small arms and light weapons transfers are illegal, or when and how weapons that were originally transferred legally become illegal at some point in their history.

The recent crisis in Somalia is a good case in point. The arms that helped worsen that crisis can be traced directly to the flood of AK-47 assault rifles brought back to Somalia by some 200,000 fleeing teen-age soldiers from the Ogaden War on the Somalia-Ethiopian border. These weapons were acquired legally by the Somalian government for legitimate security purposes. Many weapons purchased legally for security needs in one conflict turn up being used for illicit purposes in another. They are often re-circulated by sympathetic governments or ethnic sub-groups to the army or rebel forces of another.

3.2 The Response of the International Community

The United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to restrain the spread of small arms and light weapons. Building on its earlier initiatives which called for action to combat illicit trade and the criminal misuse of small arms, the UN General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions over recent years calling
for a range of actions at all levels. Resolution 46/36 H of December 1991 called on states to curb illicit trafficking in arms by insuring better control over stocks and transfers, and by encouraging work at all levels to harmonize relevant laws and procedures. This resolution contained a list of indicative measures to be implemented at the state, regional and international level.

Resolution 50/70 B of December, 1995, requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to prepare a report on the problems of small arms. A panel of 16 nations was established in 1996, and in July of 1997, issued a report which analyzed the nature and causes of small arms problems and provided a number of recommendations for action to address them.

Resolution 52/38 J established a second panel of 23 members, convened in 1998, to review the implementation of the recommendations of the first, to suggest further measures, and to examine the feasibility of holding an international conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms, in all its aspects. Resolution 51/45 N of December 1996 and 52/38 G of December 1997 were the first resolutions designed to address the post-conflict aspects of disarmament. They stressed the importance and benefits of instituting certain practical disarmament measures during and after conflicts -- measures such as collecting, controlling, and disposing of small arms and light weapons, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and ways to restrain production and illicit transfers.

Resolution 54/54V of December 1999 decided to convene an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, during the summer of 2001. The resolution specified that the conference should produce a global action program as its primary outcome. Expectations are already high about the prospects for this conference. The first Preparatory Committee
(Prepcom) met February 28-March 3 of this year to decide procedural matters related to the conference. A second Prepcom is scheduled for January 2001.

The UN Secretary-General in January 1995 sounded a clarion call to action in the small arms and light weapons area. In the supplement to "An Agenda for Peace," he noted the considerable progress made in dealing with weapons of mass destruction, and encouraged the international community to turn its focus to the weapons that are "actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands and that are being used in the conflicts the UN is actually engaged in, small arms and light weapons." In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, a groundswell of initiatives have been developed and continue to be pursued.

In November 1997, for instance, the United States, Mexico and 26 other governments from the hemisphere of the Americas signed a convention negotiated through the Organization of American States against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosive materials. The treaty requires states to strengthen border controls, mark firearms, and share information on weapons manufacturers, dealers, importers, and exporters.

In May 1998, the 15 members of the European Union (EU) entered into a political commitment on a code of conduct governing arms transfers. The code establishes eight criteria for EU arms exports. They place restrictions on transfers to human rights violators, repressive governments, and on exports to areas of prolonged conflict. In December 1998, in an effort to combat destabilizing accumulations of small arms, EU countries also adopted a legally binding Joint Action on Small Arms. The Joint Action is designed to help stem the spread of small arms by supporting inventory reductions, regional registers, exchanges of
information, enhancing national controls, improving education and awareness, and providing incentives to warring factions to surrender and destroy their arms.

In July 1998, twenty-one nations met in Oslo, Norway at the behest of that government for the first international government-level conference on small arms. The attendees agreed that the complexity of small arms problems requires multifaceted actions and pursuit along a variety of parallel tracks. The Oslo consensus was embodied in a final document entitled "Elements of a Common Understanding" which called for global support of eleven existing parallel international initiatives. In December 1999, a second Norway-hosted conference was held in Oslo. A geographically varied mix of 18 countries attended. The objective of the conference was to take stock of ongoing developments and to engage in in-depth discussions on arms brokering. The outcome of this second conference was another "Elements of a Common Understanding," which identified areas for further study and outlined a number of possible measures for addressing problems of arms brokering.

At the August-September 1998 Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in Durban, South Africa, the heads of state expressed concern over the illicit transfer and circulation of small arms and their proliferation as constituting a serious threat to national and regional security of many non-aligned nations. They urged Summit attendees to take steps to effectively deal with problems of small arms through administrative and legislative means, and called upon producers and nations with the largest arsenals to reduce significantly the production and trade in conventional weapons. The Summit welcomed adoption of the guidelines of UNGA resolution 46/36 H of September 1991 and the imminent establishment of the Mali-led moratorium in West Africa.
Following-up on the momentum created at the first Oslo conference, the Government of Belgium hosted an October 1998 first-of-a-kind conference on "Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development." Approximately ninety countries plus a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were represented in Brussels. The conference eschewed the idea that disarmament and development could be treated successfully in isolation from each other and called for nations to adopt an integrated approach. The Brussels conference issued a "Call for Action" out-lining in comprehensive detail activities that the international community should consider in addressing the problems of small arms and development.

In October 1998, the sixteen member states of the Economic Community of West African States, led by the President of the Republic of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, declared a three-year renewable moratorium on the production, import, and export of light weapons in West Africa. This was the culmination of almost five years of intensive efforts on the part of the government of Mali, the UN, and other governments, both in the region and beyond, to establish the first ever moratorium on conventional arms anywhere. An organizational mechanism has been established to implement and administer the moratorium, as a number of nations consider how best to contribute to its success.

Besides inter-governmental actions, NGOs have also played an important role in raising the consciousness of the international community, in carrying the burden of academic research, and in building effective data collections. They have also helped galvanize the action of governments in support of small arms and light weapon efforts. NGOs have also sponsored key conferences and seminars and participated in most government-sponsored conferences. Their constant encouragement of better cooperation between governments, civil society, and the
NGOs themselves ensures that progress in the small arms field will be steady and cumulative.

3.3 Effects of Small Arms on Communal Conflicts

Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned to small arms primarily as a result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration and destructiveness of intrastate and communal conflicts, many of which called for costly United Nations peacekeeping missions. The change in the international security landscape from a few large-scale interstate wars to frequent small-scale intrastate conflicts, has occurred at a time when international norms, export controls regimes, and treaties to control or eliminate weapons of mass destruction are making substantial progress. At the same time, the proliferation and criminal misuse of small arms and light weapons are posing increasing threats to national and regional security.

These weapons have fueled dozens of intrastate and communal conflicts around the globe, killing, injuring, and displacing millions of people, primarily women and children, from Albania to the former Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); From Niger to Nigeria. They are today's real weapons of mass destruction. Between 20 and 30 million deaths have occurred in the 85 wars since 1945 (as reported in Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts, The Scarecrow Press, 1998). Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000 fatalities in the last 50 years due mostly to small arms and light weapons, according to the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. The U.S. Committee for Refugees calculates that in 1997 there were more than 14 million refugees in foreign lands, and more than 19 million "internal refugees," a number rivaling the mass movement of peoples after World War II. In short, the regulation of small arms and light weapons, compared to weapons of mass destruction, remains a relatively underdeveloped area.
The negative effects of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons have been far-reaching and diverse. Although most important are the increased threats to international and regional security, direct effects are also felt through dramatic increases in peacekeeping costs resulting from the increased number and intensity of intrastate conflicts. Other negative effects of these weapons include their increased use by terrorists, the heightened threats to UN peacekeepers and humanitarian relief workers, and the undermining of the implementation of peace agreements. The urgent need to stem the proliferation and misuse of these weapons, which has been urged by two UN Secretaries-General, has raised a number of humanitarian, law enforcement, developmental, and security challenges for the international community.

4.0 Conclusion

While small arms play a significant role in escalating communal conflicts that exact enormous human and socioeconomic costs, the roots of such conflicts lie in political, economic, ethnic and religious differences and disparities. These are often aggravated by governance-related deficiencies, such as exclusionary and repressive policies, and lack of, or weaknesses in, democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, and human rights observance. Conditions of endemic insecurity and weak national and interstate regulatory and law enforcement structures, together with the fact that these weapons are cheap, widely available, easily concealed and transportable across porous borders, and require little maintenance and training, further compound the problems of widespread proliferation, illicit trafficking and possession, and criminal misuse.
5.0 Summary

The unit discussed extensively the most disturbing problem of spread of the use of small arms in violent communal and interstate conflicts across the globe with a primary focus on Africa. The gruesome effects of the usage of Small arms on communal conflicts were also analyzed.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1) Give a concise definition of Small Arms
2) What are reasons for the proliferation of Small arms in Africa
3) Discuss the effects of Small arms on communal conflicts in Africa

7.0 References

Herbert L. C, (1998) Small Arms and Light Weapons: Can They Be Controlled?
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.

In: Identity, Culture and Politics, Volume 3, Number 2, December 2002.
Unit 4: Arms Control and Disarmament

1.0: Introduction

Most arms control efforts since World War II have been devoted to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or to heavy conventional weapons. But since the United Nations issued a supplement to the 1995 Agenda for Peace, increasing attention has been given to the weapons that are actually producing the horrors witnessed in Africa, the Balkans and other parts of the world. These weapons are small arms and light weapons, such as landmines, assault rifles (like the AK-47), and machine guns. This unit examines the efforts at developing and establishing appropriate and effective international control over small arms and light weapons. The unit also critically considers the mechanisms and instruments that have been established to control these arms transfers. In addition, it examines the link between arms control and disarmament in Africa.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To explain the term Arms control

2) To give reasons for the initiation of arms control

3) Establish the link between arms control and disarmament.
3.0 Main Contents

For a lucid understanding, any discussion on arms control must start with the explanation of the term. Arms control can be describe as an umbrella term for restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. Arms control is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy which seeks to impose such limitations upon consenting participants through international treaties and agreements, although it may also comprise efforts by a nation or group of nations to enforce limitations upon a non-consenting country. On a national or community level, arms control can amount to programs to control the access of private citizens to weapons. At the level of DDR, Arms control treaties and agreements are often seen as a way to avoid costly arms races which would prove counter-productive to national aims and future peace. Some are used as ways to stop the spread of certain military technologies (such as nuclear weaponry or missile technology) in return for assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of those technologies. Additionally, some arms control agreements are entered to limit the damage done by warfare, especially to civilians and the environment, which is seen as bad for all participants regardless of who wins a war.

While arms control treaties are seen by many peace proponents as a key tool against war, by the participants, they are often seen as simply ways to limit the high costs of the development and building of weapons, and even reduce the costs associated with war itself. Arms control can even be a way of maintaining the viability of military action by limiting those weapons that would make war as costly and destructive as to make it no longer a viable tool for national policy.
3.1 Sources of Arms in Africa

In Africa, as in other regions, flow of arms can be divided into legal and illegal components. No international instrument currently regulates the international arms trade. Therefore, the legality of arms transfers is determined by relevant national legislation of the export, transit and recipient states, as well as international arms embargoes. The legal trade typically entails government-to-government transfers where the required import and export documentation is provided and neither the importer nor the exporter is subject to an arms embargo. The illicit trade generally involves arms transactions where one or more of the parties has an arms embargo imposed against it or operates in violation of arms control legislation. These parties can include non-state actors such as rebel groups, militias and criminal gangs. The illegal arms trade is also characterized by members of the security forces and licensed civilian firearm holders selling their personal arms and ammunition in violation of national law. The unauthorized informal production of firearms by gunsmiths is a significant source of illicit firearms in some areas in Africa, particularly in West Africa.

Both aspects of the arms trade can include transport agents, middlemen or brokers, transporting the arms by land, water or air. Those who facilitate illegal transactions often attempt to disguise them as legitimate trade by means of forged documentation or to conceal arms in consignments of innocuous goods. On some occasions, arms are disassembled, and the different components are transported separately to the final destination.

3.2 ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES

The development of an Africa-wide small arms and light weapons (SALW) control agreement predates the premier international SALW control framework, titled the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was negotiated
by UN members in 2001. The year before the UN Programme was adopted, member states of the Organization of African Unity met in Bamako, Mali and compiled a common African position on the illicit trafficking and proliferation of SALW: the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. A key aspect of this document is the recommendation that signatory states establish National Focal Points that synchronize the government bodies responsible for devising a national arms control action plan, facilitating small arms control research, monitoring arms control activities and formulating policy and legislation. Many African states have created such positions, though some of these entities are more effective than others.

Subsequently, regional arms control agreements have been negotiated within the structures of regional economic communities. These agreements have sought to achieve multiple objectives: make the illicit production and possession of small arms and light weapons a criminal offense, promote the destruction of stocks of surplus weapons and introduce tighter control measures over weapon stockpiles and arms transfers. Three prominent regional agreements have been negotiated on the continent covering the majority of sub-Saharan Africa:

* Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006)
* Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001)
* Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004).

3.3 WEST AFRICA

The ECOWAS Convention evolved from the politically binding 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light
Weapons. In terms of this Convention, member states must ban the transfer of small arms and light weapons into and out of their national territory. A member state can request exemptions to meet legitimate national defense and security needs or to participate in operations to support peace. In this regard, member states are compelled to establish and maintain arms transfer control systems. The Convention also requires member states to discourage civilian possession of small arms and light weapons, carefully regulate where such possession exists, safely store and maintain their national small arms and light weapons stocks, collect and destroy surplus and illicit arms, mark all state and civilian held small arms and light weapons with a unique number and closely regulate arms brokering activities.

To facilitate the implementation of the Convention, a small arms unit was established within the ECOWAS Department of Political Affairs and Defence to coordinate activities in relation to the implementation of the Convention. In addition, the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) was set up in Bamako on 8 June 2006 to assist member states to build small arms control capacity at the national level. In particular, ECOSAP was tasked with collaborating with national SALW commissions to enhance their ability to counter the proliferation and misuse of these weapons. Member states have engaged in considerable consultation and research with regards to the strictures of the Convention, but measurable implementation of this agreement has yet to be realized. In addition, as of the end of 2008, the Convention has not yet entered into force. Only six ECOWAS member states have ratified the resolution: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. In order for the Convention to become legally binding, nine member states are required to ratify it.

3.4 SOUTHERN AFRICA

The SADC Firearms Protocol was the first African regional small arms agreement to become legally binding. The protocol aims to promote cooperation
among states in order to curb and prevent the excessive manufacturing, accumulation, trafficking, possession and use of illicit firearms, ammunition and other related materials. States in the region have successfully collaborated to coordinate several arms control initiatives, particularly in the area of arms collection and destruction. For example, between 2001 and 2006, joint policing operations between the South African and Mozambican police, commonly referred to as Operations Rachel, resulted in the collection and destruction of 46,902 small arms and light weapons and 24,493,565 rounds of ammunition on Mozambican soil.

3.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION

The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons throughout Africa undermines sustainable peace and continental integration in Africa as these arms can contribute to the exacerbation and increased lethality of violent conflict. However, African states, with the support of donor governments and agencies, have not been complacent in initiating efforts to counteract this proliferation. As indicated above, inter-state initiatives have been launched to proactively respond to the small arms and light weapons problem. In some cases, neighboring states that do not maintain cordial relations with each other have willingly joined common arms control forums. This is particularly the case in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa where a number of governments (or factions within said governments) stand accused of supplying arms to non-state actors in other states and violating arms embargoes. For example, these types of accusations have proliferated between the DRC and Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Yet joint participation in arms control fora have helped states move past recrimination to solutions that can contribute to sustainable peace in these impacted regions.
4.0 CONCLUSION

Despite the noticeable reduction in major armed conflicts in Africa, long-term peace remains elusive in many areas across the most marginalized continent. A key component of this dynamic is the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Non-state actors, such as rebel groups and militias, as well as repressive governments, are still able to source small arms and light weapons domestically or through regional and international smuggling networks. Securing such weapons is nonetheless more complicated than it was in the 1990s, as international and regional arms control and disarmament initiatives have constrained access to the more conventional sources of small arms and light weapons. Further constructive action aimed at deepening the effectiveness of these arms control and disarmament process, both internationally and in Africa, is crucial. This process requires the targeting of donor assistance to allow for measurable and sustainable capacity building of the national and inter-state arms control and disarmament agencies and strategic operational projects. In turn, as early evidence suggests, such measures will further promote continental integration and peace-building.

5.0 Summary

This unit attempts to give an overall assessment of the implications of arms control and disarmament for peace and stability of the African continent. It starts with a concise explanation on the term “arms control”; reasons for it and the methods of arms distribution in Africa. The discussion also entails some case studies and the implications of arms control for continental integration and stability.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
1) In your own words explain the term “Arms Control”
2) Mention two sources of arms and three prominent regional agreements
on arms control in Africa

7.0 References


Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Bamako Declaration on an African
Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Bamako: OAU, 2000).


Unit 5: THE ROLE OF SMALL AND LIGHT ARMS IN MIGRATION AND CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN NIGERIA SINCE THE 1980S.

1.0: Introduction

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) systems is a social problem that affects the entire globe. This is despite the fact that a consensus largely exists that these arms do not on their own cause violence. Based on what could be described as information based on experience, one time Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in person of Lt. General T.Y Danjuma quoted in Falola and Okpeh Jnr (2008) confirmed this view when he argued that the ready availability of small and light weapons has escalated conflicts and aided the activities of criminal elements across the globe.

Similarly former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan informed that the death toll from small and light arms dwarf other weapon systems and now exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (Akinwunmi,2008). It is not the sole objective of this unit to focus on the death toll resulting from the uses and abuses of these weapons, but to show how these weapons have escalated conflicts in Nigeria and how this trend constitute a part of the challenges of the DDR process and security sector reform. You will
also be exposed to how this brings about internal displacement of many people from their various settlements into emergency camps in various parts of Nigeria.

2.0 Objectives
At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Know how small and light weapons affect conflict pattern and migration;
- Understand how small and light weapons worsen the problem of internal displacement in different parts of Nigeria since the 1980s.

3.0 Main Contents

Supply of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria

As the saying goes that if there is no demand for a product, the supply dwindles with time, the proliferation of small and light weapons in Nigeria follows this trend. According to various researches carried out on SALW in Nigeria two major sources have been identified. These sources are internal and external.

Internal Sources

1 The Civil War
Shortly after the Civil War in Nigeria (1967-1970), small arms and light weapons became common in circulation. This could be traced to failure of the DDR process initiated by the Federal Government after the civil war. This was as a result of the inability of the Federal Government to come out with a policy that would re-claim all the weapons produced for the purpose of the war. The General Yakubu Gowon's administration paid more attention to the surrender of the rebel forces. And since the Biafran soldiers were not properly rehabilitated, some of the arms were sold to migrants and criminals who began to use the weapons for robbery in the country. The seventies produced robbers like Oyenusi, (Akinwunmi 2008).

II Black Market
A correlation can be established between proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the incidence of poverty in the country. The eighties witnessed
serious economic crisis in the country. It was the period in which the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was introduced by General Ibrahim Babangida’s military administration. This was a policy that led to loss of jobs for many and a drastic fall in the value of Naira.

SAP is a World Bank solution to Third World countries’ economic crises. The SAP, according to the Babangida's military administration, was meant to run for two years, but was later extended when the government saw that it required more time to implement the reforms. The program included the liberalization of trade, devaluation of over-valued currency, privatization of public enterprises, and the reduction in the over-bloated public services.

However, the Program did not resolve the economic crisis in the country as anticipated by the military administration. Instead, it added to the misery of the masses that were retrenched from their places of work as a result of the collapse of many industries. Most of these industries collapsed because of the shortage in the supply of foreign exchange, leading to high costs of production and shortages of imported raw materials. Those industries that did not collapse had to retrench some of their staff in order to survive.

The cumulative effect of the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Program is the pauperization of the great majority of Nigerians. As mentioned above, the SAP created unemployment, because of this unemployment, many became involved in criminal activities which included illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons. The trade became very lucrative and those involved sourced for these weapons internally from local blacksmiths. Among those arrested for illegal possession of fire-arms in the country were many blacksmiths. Also, many of the arrested armed robbers or criminals have confessed to getting the arms from this source, (Tamuno, 1991 and Akinwunmi, 2008)
External Sources

III Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

Following the involvement of the Nigerian military in peace-keeping operations in the sub-region, many of the SALW came in wide circulation in the country. It is claimed that some discharged soldiers from war zones in Liberia and Sierra Leo had returned to the country with various types of munitions used in wartime, and sold the weapons in the country for money. Some weapons captured by the Police from criminals and militia members have been identified to these various peace mission exercises in the sub-region.

Also, Nigeria's borders are very porous which makes the flow of small and light weapons into the country relatively easy. Through these borders, many of the SALW have been smuggled into the country. Nigeria's customs and immigration officers have succeed in arresting and intercepting some of these smuggled arms. Besides these types, there are arms smuggled by big men and women in the society, (Akinwunmi 2008). Guns are hidden inside inflated spare tires of vehicles in some instances.

One may not have accurate statistics on the SALW in circulation in Nigeria but one fact that is incontrovertible is that the percentage is high. This is buttressed by the fact that in some cities in Nigeria, any of the weapons in the category above is referred to as “pure water”. “Pure water” is sachet water sold in virtually all the nooks and crannies of the country. The fact that any of the SALW could be described as “pure water” testifies to their proliferation in the country.

Use of SALW in Conflicts

Nigeria has been divided into six geo-political zones. Although many ascribe the this division to the Constitutional Conference of late Head of State General Sanni Abacha, Onwudiwe (2004) however, reveals that the idea of 3 North and 3 South as a zoning medel was first mooted by Aper Aku one time Governor of Borno
State. Since then, none of these zones has been spared of violent conflicts over the past decade ranging from ethnic to religious, resource control or communal conflicts. One feature of these violent conflicts of these has been the use of SALW. The use of these SALW made these conflicts to be prolonged and lethal resulting in the deaths of thousands of people, especially the vulnerable ones in society, the destruction of properties; besides widespread internal displacement of many in the country. Cognizant of the fact that the objective of this unit is not a discourse of all the conflicts that have taken place in the country since the eighties; it will however focus on some major violent conflicts as case studies, which resulted in massive internal displacement, the emergence of refugee camps all over the country and intractable proliferation and spread of SALW.

**Northern Nigeria**

There are three geo-political zones in this region. These are the Northwest, Northeast, and North Central. As a result of the proximity to North Africa and the Fulani Jihad in the pre-colonial times, Islam became entrenched in the region, especially in the Northwest and the Northeast. Principally, the region has witnessed more religious conflicts than any of the regions in the Country. In the eighties, the Maitatsine crisis resulted in the death of thousands, which the government conservatively estimated to be over four thousand. The crisis also led to internal displacements in the region. Many southerners, mostly Christians, fled the area to other peaceful Northern cities or to Southern towns or cities, (Akinwunmi 2008).

The late nineties witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and instrumentalisation of Shari'ah as a political weapon. This resulted in violent conflicts in most of the cities in the North, especially in Kaduna. During this period, there was free use of SALW by both Muslim and Christian groups. The involvement of SALW led to the death of many Nigerians and another massive
internal displacement in the country. There were influxes of people to the Central zone and to the Southern region.

While religious conflicts are prevalent in the core North, the crises in the North Central zone are of another dimension. These crises took the form of ethno-religious tensions and indene – settler upheavals. The Azara crisis in Nasarawa State, the Jos crisis in Plateau State and the Jukun/Tiv crisis in Taraba State are examples of conflicts with ethnic coloration, (Akinwunmi, 2008). These crises witnessed the use of SALW in high proportion, to the extent that some settlements were virtually destroyed as witnessed in Jukun/Tiv crisis in 2001. It was in the same crisis that Tiv ethnic militias allegedly killed 16 soldiers. This led to the reprisal operations by the military leading to the destruction of several villages bordering Taraba state.

**Southwestern Zone**

The conflicts here are mostly communal in nature. The most protracted of the crises in this region was the Ife/Modakeke crisis. The use of SALW in this conflict led to the destruction of many Ife and Modakeke settlements. The Federal Government had to intervene by imposing dusk to dawn curfews on the affected communities. The prevalence of SALW in the region could also be traced to surfacing of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). The OPC, as was popularly known and called, emerged in the nineties with the sole objective of protecting the interest of the Yoruba. The OPC has been identified by the security forces as being responsible for the ethnic conflicts and tensions in the region. According to police accounts, the OPC has been responsible for about 60 per cent of the violence in Lagos alone. The group has engaged the Hausa as witnessed in 1999 at Ketu, Mile 12 market and in 2000 as witnessed in Shagamu.

The group has also engaged other ethnic groups in the region. These groups include the Igbo and the Ijaw. The crisis with Ijaw had dire consequences in terms
of the numbers of death and the people rendered homeless by the activities of the ethnic militias involved. In all of these conflicts, there was the free use of SALW which further worsened the violent conflicts.

Southeastern Zone

Here, the crises can be described as ideological and resource based conflicts. This is because they are caused by ethnic sentiments, reprisals and border disputes. For example, Hausa residents in this zone were attacked in response to the attacks and killings of the Igbo in the Northern crises. The Bakassi militias armed with SALW championed the attacks. The consequences were the massive migration of Hausa residents residing in the zone to their own zones. This zone has also witnessed a high incidence of criminal activities. Armed robbery attacks are almost becoming the order of the day. Sophisticated SALW were used and there are instances when the police had to watch helplessly, as the bandits operated without any challenge, because of the crude weapons at their disposal.

South-South Zone

The conflicts in this zone are of different dimensions. These include resource control conflicts between the restless youth of the zone (directly or indirectly supported by the elders) and the Federal Government. Youths in this zone are armed with SALW to the extent that the authority of the Federal Government is constantly challenged as oil pipelines are destroyed and oil workers, most especially foreigners, are randomly kidnapped and ransoms demanded from the government and multi-national companies operating there.

Apart from the conflicts arising from the agitations for resource control, the zone has been a hotbed of communal conflicts between the various ethnic groups in the area. Some of these include the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict, Ijaw and Yoruba conflict, and Urhobo/Ijaw conflicts, etc. These incessant ethnic conflicts in the zone make the illegal trafficking in SALW to be lucrative. The availability of these weapons
makes conflicts here to be especially deadly in nature. This poses a serious challenge to the process of DDR.

**Displacement Arising From the Use of SALW**

The proliferation of SALW besides constituting a threat to DDR processes in Nigeria has also caused internal displacement in all the zones discussed above. Most people have moved out voluntarily or involuntarily from the affected areas. In the North where religious conflicts are prevalent, many southerners, who are mostly Christians, have moved in and settled in the Middle Belt or to their zones in the South. The northerners also affected in the crisis in the Northern zones have also migrated to the North as was the case in Lagos and some of the Eastern cities. The various crises mentioned in this chapter have led to displacement of many Nigerians. This aptly falls within the definition of internal displacement as defined by the UN as revealed by Ibeanu (1999). The UN Guiding Principles define internally displaced persons as:

…persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations or generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

Approximately, about 200,000 to 500,000 are displaced in Nigeria in 2004, (Akinwunmi 2008). The figures include about 60,000 who fled their homes as a result of the unrest in Plateau State that led the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State. The following violent conflicts have produced many more displaced persons. These conflicts include:
a. Tiv - Jukun crisis
b. Hausa - Kataf

c. Igbirra - Bassa

d. Ife - Modakeke

e. Tiv - Ajar

f. Ijaw - Itsekiri

g. Jos - crisis

h. Jos-crisis

See the Table below for estimates

**Table 1: Estimated Numbers of IDPS in the Nigeria**

**North**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>ESTIMA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Plateau State crisis</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adamawa and Gombe crises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>(people were displaced from)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Violence in Kaduna</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>State arising from the introduction of sharia law and</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nasarawa/Taraba crises</td>
<td>100,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2  | Religious clashes in Kano                        | 8,000    |

| 2  | Eastern Bauchi State (June-                       | 22,000   |

**South**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>ESTIMA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reprisal attacks against</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clashes in Ebonyi State</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lagos crises (February)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.0 Conclusion
The rate of conflict reprisals in Nigeria is increasing the demand for these light and small arms as many communities who have suffered defeats from other communities prepare themselves by simply acquiring their arms in the name of self-protection. The role of these arms in fuelling conflicts cannot be overstated. In recent years, internal conflicts and wars of liberation through the use of these deadly weapons have been a major factor in causing internal displacement around Africa. From the preceding presentations, this unit has empirically and graphically presented how SALW affects conflicts intensity and internal displacement in Nigeria since the 1980s. Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world are equally faced with series of conflicts displacing about 20-22 million people out of which about 470,000 are from Nigeria, (Akinwunmi 2008).

5.0 Summary
The unit presented graphic illustrations to justify the poignant effect of SALW on the pattern of conflicts and internal displacements in Nigeria since the 1980s. The unit argues that the evidences of internal displacement and conflict intensity constitute a core of the challenges of DDR in Nigeria. This suggests that if DDR is to have any far reaching effects, it must take into cognizance the effects of SALW on conflict pattern and intensity.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
- Does SALW affect DDR? Discuss with illustrations.
- Compare and contrast the pattern of internal displacement in Northwestern and Southwestern Nigeria.

7.0 References and Further Reading
Akinwunmi, O. (2008). ‘The Role of Small and Light Arms in Migration and


Module 2

Unit 1: Definition of Demobilization
Unit 2: Definition of Disarmament
Unit 3: Definition of Reintegration
Unit 4: DDR and Democratic Transitions
Unit 5: Financial Empowerment and DDR in Post-Conflict Communities

Unit 1: Definition of Demobilization

1.0: Introduction
2.0: Objectives
3.0 Main Contents
4.0: Conclusion
5.0: Summary
6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction

As we have mentioned in our earlier discussion, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a first and most step in the transition from war to peace. But according to Massimo Fusato (2003) DDR which aims at demilitarization can also be used in times of peace, to reduce the size of armed forces and redirect public spending towards other meaningful ventures. However, you must know that DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by much hatred and face a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons and go back to the civil
society where structures have crumbled, and the economy has become stagnant. The strength of DDR lies in the fact that it usually supports the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe environment, transferring ex-combatants back to civilian life, and enabling people to earn livelihoods through peaceful means instead of war. But before proceeding further in our discussion, it is essentially to understand fully the meaning of each of the combined terms (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration). This is why this unit will start with the attempt to define and explain the term-demobilization.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To define Demobilization

2) To explain the importance of Demobilization in the DDR processes

3.0 Main Contents

As you may be aware, demobilization just like any of such terms do not a singular or universally accepted definition. In other words, there are numerous definitions for the term depending on the views of the scholars involved. For examples: the Princeton University in the United States defines it as an “act of changing from a war basis to a peace basis including disbanding or discharging troops…”; the Wikipedia sees demobilization “as the process of standing down a nation's armed forces from combat-ready status”. It explains further that, this may be as a result of victory in war, or because a crisis has been peacefully resolved and military force will not be necessary. The opposite of demobilization is mobilization. Demobilization also include the dismantling of military units and the transition of ex-combatants from military to civilian life. In times of peace, demobilization programs can be gradual and tuned to the needs of the groups being demobilized. At the end of a conflict, demobilization presents the same logistical
challenges as do programs of emergency relief and resettlement of displaced people.

Anderlini and Conaway (N.D:1) present demobilization as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, is the process of releasing combatants from a mobilized state. The discharge of ex-combatants spans over a period of time, during which they are usually conveyed to their homes or new districts and granted small initial reinsertion packages to enhance their resettlement process. They inform further that ex-combatants or guerrillas are in some cases eager to return to their homes while in some cases they may deliberately stall the process out of fear of being rejected when they get back to their communities. In Uganda, in the early 1990s, in order to forestall any hitch or resistance from the ex-combatants, they and their families were briefed prior to the distribution of settling down kit that included shelter, food, transport, clothing and medical care for a transition period of six-months.

Demobilization in the views expressed by encyclopedia.com is the dismissal of troops to go into the civilian life and closing of a war industry at the cessation of a national emergency. In America where the prosecution of war relied on volunteers, militia and drafted civilians, the abrupt return of these men to civil life had its own peculiar challenges like places with similar peculiarities. In the first two American wars, the Revolution and the War of 1812, short-term enlistments and limitations of transportation and communication made demobilization a continuous process. Mustered-out or run-away troops were not recorded, sometimes unpaid, and always had to find their way home.

In the American-Mexican War, Gen. Winfield Scott experienced a premature demobilization of 40% of his troops after the battle of Cerro Gordo on
April 18, 1847 when their one-year enlistments expired (www.encyclopaedia.com). Since then, volunteers enlisted for the period of conflicts only. At the end of the war, 41,000 men dispersed over the American South-West and Mexico before the military finally transported them to New Orleans by boat.

World War I terminated with an abruptness that again caught American military planners unprepared. They had over 3 million service who were eligible for discharge. Officials viewed the discharge by military unit the most equitable and least economically disruptive of alternative and at the same time provided an effective force for occupation and other contingencies. Thirty demobilization centers in the United States processed troops out of service as close to their homes as possible.

As a result of lessons learnt from previous experiences, a special division started the demobilization plan in the last two of the second World War. Even so, the unexpected surrender by the Japanese and public clamour for the return of soldiers to civilian life released a deluge of veterans and caused concern among military strategists conscious of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to security of America. Eight million soldiers out of five million were deployed abroad had to be demobilized and a four-year logistical plan had to be initiated. A point-based system of assessing individuals was used for the release of troops instead of a unit system of releasing them collectively. The military released half of its 8 million service men by the end of 1945, but a slowdown early in 1946 ignited a public outcry and demonstrations by troops. By June 1946, the army reduced its strength by half. This sharp reduction left the U.S Army fully demobilized and weaker than it was prior to the war. After World War II, many other factors changed the traditional problems of demobilization. The limited wars of this period used reserve call-ups and rotated drafted troops on an individual twelve-month basis,
making demobilization continuous. This meant that demobilization could be planned.

However, the reverse can be seen in the case of Nigeria after the end of the civil war. Going by the experiences of men involved in the war especially on the part of the Biafran Army, the demobilization cannot be said to have been properly done. This is because of many them; forty years after the civil war are still uncatered for. This is a damning verdict on the three Rs of Reconstruction Rehabilitation and Reintegration purportedly done by the government of Retired General Yakubu Gowon.

But before demobilization can take place, there are some conditions necessary for its proper direction. Demobilization especially the one involving large numbers of soldiers are complex processes that require great coordination among the different actors involved. The following conditions are required before beginning a DDR program, and help to guarantee its success:

3.1: Security

A safe environment is required in order for parties to give up their weapons, and for DDR institutions to operate. Only trust can break the cycle of violence, allowing warring individuals and parties to disarm and resume civilian life. Third parties play an important role in guaranteeing compliance with a ceasefire, respect for public order, the safety of individuals, and equitable implementation of disarmament programs. Peacekeeping forces cannot be expected to end hostilities, but a credible deterring force is necessary to prevent unilateral violations of agreements, which could jeopardize an entire DDR program.
This brings to fore the necessity of order or security for peace. For the DDR process to take place as part of the peace process, order or security of the environment must be put in place. Security of the setting for DDR will create the needed enabling environment for its success.

3.2: Inclusion of All Warring Parties

In order to establish a safe environment and break the security dilemma, it is necessary that all parties be included in the DDR program and demobilize at the same time. Otherwise, it is easy for one party to resume fighting, taking advantage of its opponents' disarmament. It is important that all parties develop ownership of the process and do not feel discriminated against, that different parties feel that they are being treated equitably, and that they are given the same opportunities to reintegrate into society. Institutions implementing DDR should communicate regularly and frequently with each party at the political and military commander level. External observers and peacekeepers should be perceived by all sides to be impartial, neutral, and credible.

3.3: Political Agreement

The conditions of security and inclusion must be integrated into a political agreement defining the end of hostilities and the implementation of DDR. Experience has shown that DDR programs cannot drive a peace process. DDR can only be implemented in the context of a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, or a peace agreement. It can reinforce the agreement, as a form of security guarantee and a confidence-building measure, but it cannot precede the agreement. Shared political will, and a policy of amnesty and reconciliation, create the best conditions for successful implementation of a DDR program. Specific issues must be directly
addressed by the peace process and integrated into the political agreement, including:

- clear eligibility criteria for participation in the program;
- creation of credible responsible institutions;
- definition of realistic goals and a timetable for implementation.

Political agreements should take into account the practical realities of disarmament and demobilization, in order to set realistic goals that will support the sustainability of the peace accord. Closely related to the above preconditions to demobilization are the processes which must also be taken seriously by those in charge of the programme. These processes of demobilization include: assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programs, and transportation to the communities of destination. We shall now try to explain them one after the other:

3.4: Assembly

There are a number of advantages in having an assembly of ex-combatants helps ensure their participation in the demobilization and the entire DDR program. When ex-combatants are assembled, they are first registered and then receive civilian identification cards, which allow the holders to participate in the DDR program and receive benefits. Encampments are not intended to host ex-combatants for a long time, but adequate facilities, food supplies, and medical assistance are important to maintain discipline, concentration and security. In addition, encampments' infrastructure should be built to meet not only the needs of ex-combatants, but also of the many dependants who may follow them.

3.5 Orientation
This is essential in establishing and reinforcing ex-combatants' beliefs that the DDR program offers viable alternatives to conflict as a livelihood: Pre-discharge orientation has important practical and psychological functions. Practically, it provides ex-combatants and their dependents with basic information about the DDR program. Psychologically, it empowers DDR beneficiaries as free citizens, by addressing their needs and doubts and asking for their interactive participation. The pre-discharge orientation typically focuses on the DDR program, the implementing agencies, the rights and obligations of participants, and how they can access the program's benefits. General information is also offered about reintegration into civilian life, such as health issues, education and employment opportunities, and access to land and credit.

Post-discharge orientation caters to more specific needs, in the context of the community of resettlement. Post-discharge orientation is the first step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides information about the place of relocation, economic opportunities, and relevant local institutions and social networks, including religious groups, NGOs, veterans' associations, farmers' associations, women's groups, and others.

3.6 Transportation

This is a primary logistical challenge. Ex-combatants, their families, and their belongings are transported to the district of destination. If organized convoys cannot reach the communities of origin or destinations of choice, ex-combatants are provided with travel allowances, which ensure that they can finance their way home independently.

4.0 Conclusion
As you see clearly, demobilization includes the dismantling of military units and the transition of ex-combatants from military to civilian life. In times of peace, demobilization programs can be gradual and tuned to the needs of the groups being demobilized. At the end of a conflict, demobilization presents the same logistical challenges as do programs of emergency relief and resettlement of displaced people.

5.0 Summary

In this unit, we have demonstrated clearly that demobilization has no clear cut definition that is generally accepted but have several definitions from different personalities, scholars and practitioners in the arena of peace and conflict studies. But for our purposes, some definitions were given to guide our proper understanding of the term. The preconditions and processes involved in demobilization were also analyzed.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1) Give 5 different definitions of the term demobilization

2) Mention and explain the major preconditions for demobilization

3) What are the processes involved in demobilization

7.0 References

Burgess, G and Burgess, H. (2007). Beyond the Intractability Knowledge Base

Pro Conflict Information Consortium (Formerly Conflict Research Consortium), University of Colorado, United States of America


Unit 2: Definition of Disarmament

1.0: Introduction

Disarmament is the first phase of DDR, and logically precedes demobilization and reintegartion. However, it is often a long-term process. A major problem is the collection of small weapons and light arms, which are easy to conceal and difficult to account for. The existence of large paramilitary groups and irregular forces also complicates disarmament which, under these conditions, becomes a long-term process to be carried out over a wide region, by peacekeepers, regular military forces, and civilian police. The creation of effective police forces becomes a high priority, both for their ability to control the territory more effectively than peacekeepers, and for the indirect effects of improved security. A safe environment greatly enhances the effectiveness of voluntary disarmament programs, by decreasing the need for civilians to retain their weapons. But what is disarmament? This unit will attempt to define and explain the term. It will also mention the processes involved.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To define disarmament
2) To explain the processes involved in disarmament programme
3) To discuss the barrier to disarmament

3.0 Main Contents

Just like all the related terms, disarmament lacks universally accepted definition. Consequently; we have as many as possible definitions. For examples, The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language (2007) sees it as “the act of laying down arms, especially the reduction or abolition of a nation's military forces and armaments” or “the condition of being disarmed”. US Department of Defense (2005) viewed disarmament as “the reduction of a military establishment to some level set by international agreement”. Collins English Dictionary (2009) on its part sees it as “the reduction of offensive or defensive fighting capability, as by a nation” or “the act of disarming or state of being disarmed”. But simply put; Disarmament is the act of reducing, limiting, or abolishing weapons.

The United Nations defines disarmament as: “the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons in a conflict zone” (Anderlini and Cornaway N.D:2). Often physical disarmament takes place in assembly areas where the ex-combatants are assembled in camp-like settings, weapons are confiscitated safely stored and eventually destroyed.

Disarmament generally refers to a country's military or specific type of weaponry. Operationally, the most common form of disarmament is abolishment of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear arms. General and Complete Disarmament refers to the removal of all weaponry, including conventional arms. Disarmament can be contrasted with arms control, which essentially refers to the act of controlling arms rather than eliminating them. A distinction can also be made between disarmament as a process (the process of eliminating weapons), and disarmament as an end state (the absence of weapons). Disarmament has also come to be associated with three things. These include:
A) The aforementioned arms control, which is not associated with a schedule of gradually reducing and then eliminating major weapons systems;

B) Nuclear disarmament, which does not address civilian weapons and military systems whose firepower and extent of damage can be considerable. For examples: the war in Iraq has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians; during the Korean War, hundreds of thousands have died; and in so-called "New Wars" in Africa, millions have died. In none of these cases were nuclear weapons used. Yet, the extents of civilian and military deaths have been considerable, surpassing the damage caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War Two;

C) Unilateral disarmament, which seeks to reduce weapons systems in either an ad hoc fashion or based on initiatives within one nation. This approach fails to leverage reductions in one country for reductions in another, or series of countries. Furthermore, unilateral disarmament, as was advocated in the United Kingdom, fails to assuage the concerns of "realists" about the dangers of weapons systems and power projection by other countries;

Philosophically, disarmament should be viewed as a form of demilitarization, part of an economic, political, technical, and military process to reduce and eliminate weapons systems. Thus, disarmament is part of a set of other strategies, like economic conversion, which aim to reduce the power of war making institutions and associated constituencies. Disarmament need not be a "utopian" project in the sense of being misguided or naive. Rather, various strategies can be used to promote the political, economic, and media power necessary for demilitarization.

3.1 Approaches to Disarmament
Arms collection centers need security guarantees, both for center personnel and for ex-combatants. Collection and destruction of weapons should be completed quickly, to avoid having arms stolen from storage centers and used to restart fighting. Disarmament criteria may focus on specific weapons, individuals, or groups, but the specific approaches are as follow:

- An exclusive focus on weapons may attract individuals who seek the benefits connected to the disarmament program, but who are not ex-combatants willing to demobilize;
- A focus on individual disarmament which is considered an aggressive attitude by military leaders, who may decide not to cooperate if they believe that they have lost control over the process;
- A combined approach requires both surrender of weapons and individual verification of combatant status. This approach reduces abuse, and shifts the program entry criterion toward eligibility as a combatant.

Identifying a specific group for disarmament has proven to be the most effective strategy in ensuring the cooperation of commanders, although it has some undesirable consequences: strengthening the commanders' control over the combatants, and enabling abuses by commanders who "sell" access to the DDR program. Disarmament is important not only for the material improvement of security conditions, but also for its psychological impact. There are added psychological benefits when ex-combatants physically disable their own weapons, and are led in doing so by their commanders, immediately upon entering the disarmament site. The process symbolically underscores the transition from military to civilian life. Additionally, public destruction of weapons is an important tool in sensitizing the population and promoting the DDR program.
3.2 Barriers to disarmament

The political and economic barriers to disarmament are considerable. They mostly based on the concentrated power of those supporting militaristic approaches to foreign policy. Another key barrier is ideological. Many foundations and universities have failed to support research in disarmament, instead favoring more ad hoc and limited approaches like arms control, conflict resolution, and limits on weapons systems in specific countries. Part of this may be pragmatism, but often it is the result of a limited understanding of the history of disarmament. Attempts to restrict nuclear proliferation are of course a necessity. Bolstering these efforts would be assisted by checking the link between military intervention and nuclear proliferation. Many countries fearful of being invaded, particularly by the U.S., have tried to secure or develop nuclear weapons. As a result, policies to limit military interventions may be part of a larger demilitarization program.

Case Studies of Disarmament

Somalia:

4.0: Conclusion

Disarmament is important not only for the material improvement of security conditions, but also for its psychological impact. There are added psychological benefits when ex-combatants physically disable their own weapons, and are led in doing so by their commanders, immediately upon entering the disarmament site. The process symbolically underscores the transition from military to civilian life.
Additionally, public destruction of weapons is an important tool in sensitizing the population and promoting the DDR program.

5.0: Summary
In this unit, we have given sufficient definitions of disarmament as a key component of the DDR programme. The importance of disarmament in the DDR programme; the approaches involved and the possible barriers against the success of the programme were also explained.

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
1) What is disarmament and how is it important to the DDR programme?
2) Explain the approaches to Disarmament
3) Discuss the possible barriers to the success of disarmament programme.

7.0: References and Further Reading

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins


run the arms race New York: Pantheon.


Unit 3: Definition of Reintegration

1.0: Introduction
2.0: Objectives
3.0 Main Contents
4.0: Conclusion
5.0: Summary
6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0: Introduction
After ex-combatants have been demobilized and disarmed, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarizing the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. In order for all this not to happen, an effective reintegration exercise must be undertaken. This is why this unit will focus on the meaning and processes involved in reintegration of excombatants in DDR programme.

2.0: Objectives
At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To define reintegration
2) To explain various reintegration processes
3) To discuss the Challenges facing Reintegration in Africa

3.0 Main Contents

According to Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko (2009) ending conflicts must be done in a way that encourages sustainable security and this “requires a sophisticated political strategy that aims to move political and communal entities toward accommodation”. Armed groups must be disarmed, demobilised and ultimately reintegrated into social, political and economic orders in the post conflicts societies.

Reintegration, meanwhile, "is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance." Alexandra Guaqueta, in her essay on Colombia, defines political reintegration as ‘letting … irregular armies share power through electoral competition or transforming them into law-abiding citizens with social recognition and influence in public opinion and policy-making at the local or national levels’ (p. 34). She notes that groups must be accepted by the relevant communities and have the capacity to perform as social and political interlocutors.
3.1: Reintegration Processes

Reintegration includes the following: Reinsertion, which addresses the most immediate needs of ex-combatants. Reinsertion assistance consists of short-term relief interventions, which provide a safety net for demobilized ex-combatants. Assistance may include housing, medical care, food, and elementary education for children. The distribution of cash allowances has proven to be the most effective and efficient way to provide reinsertion assistance. Cash payments are preferred over in-kind assistance because of reduced transaction costs, easier and more transparent accounting, and because cash payments can adapt more closely to the specific needs of beneficiaries. Additionally, cash allowances have the positive psychological effect of empowering ex-combatants to take charge of their lives.

- However, cash payments present two dilemmas: they can give the negative impression of being "cash for weapons," and they can be easily lost or misused for consumption and pleasure. A common solution to this problem is to distribute allowances neither in advance, nor at the time of disarmament, but instead after arrival at the community of destination, in separate installments, and accompanied by post-discharge counseling. Initiatives aimed at full and self-sustained social and economic reintegration, which must follow temporary reinsertion assistance programs. Ex-combatants are a special group who present additional challenges, since:
  - they constitute a potential security threat;
  - they may be viewed with fear, suspicion, and resentment by the rest of the population;
  - they are often uprooted from their communities of origin and their social networks;
  - they may not know or may no longer accept basic social rules.
• For these reasons, the first step in reintegration of ex-combatants is their inclusion in society. DDR programs provide cooperation with formal and informal local social networks, psychological support and counseling, and initiatives for the reunification of families.

3.2 Economic Reintegration

This is the final requirement for a DDR program to be successful and sustainable in the long term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts is to provide ex-combatants with financial independence through employment. Different initiatives should cater to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into the labor force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers. Common economic integration programs include education and professional training, public employment, encouragement of private initiative through skills development and microcredit support, and access to land.

3.3 The Challenges of Reintegrating into Civil Society

Despite the logistical challenges of disarmament and demobilization, reintegration which is the acquisition of civilian status and sustainable employment and income—is considered the most difficult phase of any DDR process. An Institute for Security Studies (ISS) paper calls it “the Achilles heel of DDR”. One author says donors have the mistaken idea that “As soon as you get guns out of their hands, they are suddenly innocuous human beings again, but that is not the case at all.” Others argue that reintegration’s difficulties push it beyond the scope of any DDR process, and thus this phase should be confined to reinsertion. Because DDR originally focused on short-term disarmament, reintegration is the least developed phase, in some cases confined to vocational training in one or two fields. According to Massimo (2003)“You have to provide an economic alternative to living by the gun,”. But in post-conflict countries, job opportunities are scarce,
and sometimes communities are hesitant to employ ex-combatants. In Liberia for example after the civil war the ex combatants were said not to face stigmatization but the unemployment rate was put at around 80 percent. Even now it is still hard to find jobs.

Other challenges of reintegration programmes in Africa include the following:

- The inflation of the number of combatants to DDR. For instance in Côte d’Ivoire, this number increased from about 30,000 to more than 45,000 within a few months. More than 100,000 combatants have been recently disarmed and demobilized in Liberia, which is almost triple the number of assessed at the beginning of the process. More than 70,000 ex-combatants went through the DDR process in Sierra Leone. Participants stressed that economic incentives offered to ex-combatants are certainly one of the reasons for this inflation in numbers of ex-combatants.

- Increasing numbers of child combatants to DDR: almost 3,000 today in Côte d’Ivoire, about 7,000 went through DDR process in Sierra Leone and more than 10,000 in Liberia.

- Gap between the aspiration of ex-combatants to join post-conflict (re)formed national armed and security forces on the one hand and, on the other hand, the absorption capacity of these forces. A recent investigation from the National Commission on DDR of Côte d’Ivoire shows that a large majority of young combatants there would like, as a “first choice”, to be integrated into 2 It is important to stress that the lack of funding experienced in West Africa is not necessarily the case for reintegration programmes in other regions. In the Great Lakes for instance, there are sufficient funds for DDR (MDRP), but these programmes face difficulties that are mainly of a political nature.

4.0: Conclusion
For any reintegration programme to be successful, this is need for adequate long term planning especially in the area of finance. Planning of the long term financing of the reintegration of ex-combatants. Such long term planning should be effective well before the commencement of the implementation of DDR programmes. Preferably, long term financing of reintegration should take place in parallel with negotiations on peace agreements. For swift and credible implementation, the planning and financing of DDR must be included in the agenda of the peace negotiations. Optimization of the financing architecture of reintegration. It is also important to avoid the fragmentation of the financing of reintegration programmes. To this effect, one could envisage the establishment of a global fund for the long term financing of post-conflict reintegration of ex-combatants. Such a fund would coherently merge the reintegration programmes into the planning and implementation of policies related to post-conflict economic reconstruction, poverty alleviation, youth employment and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. For instance, a network of donors and development partners could be established, using the scheme devised in Guinea Bissau. For effective reintegration of ex-combatants, it is extremely important that funds pledged by international partners be made available within appropriate timeframes.

5.0: Summary
In this unit we have demonstrated that there is no universally definition for reintegration. But several definitions were given for our proper understanding of the term within the DDR framework. Several challenges facing the implementation of reintegration programmes as well suggestions on how tackle them were also discussed

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
1) What is reintegration?
2) Discuss some the challenges facing the reintegration programme in post-conflicts countries in Africa
3) How do you think some of these challenges can be resolved?

7.0: References and Further Reading


1.0: Introduction

As you already know, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a first step in the transition from war to peace. But DDR can be used in time of peace as well, to reduce the size of armed forces and redistribute public spending. However DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by animosities. They are also face with a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons, when civil society structures have crumbled, and when the economy is stagnant. This why establishment of real democratic practice became a must in such transitional societies. In this unit we attempt to bring out the relationship between democracy and DDR in societies that are transiting or moving from war to peace.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To explain the relationship between democracy and DDR
2) To discuss the importance of democracy in transitional or post conflict societies
3) To analyse some of the challenges and how best to resolve them

3.0 Main Contents
Democracy, unlike other forms of governance, has inherent checks and balances. This normally promotes dialogue/diplomacy and discourages people from resorting to violence to resolve their political differences. With the combination of democracy and DDR, it therefore becomes easier to support the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe environment. This will definitely and adequately pave way for the transfer of ex-combatants back to civilian life, and empower them to earn livelihood through peaceful means instead of war. Some basic features of democracy in post-conflict or transitional societies are discussed below.

3.1 Development of Political Parties
The development of political parties usually plays a very significant role in the stabilization and democratization of post-conflict societies. As important as these political parties to the sustenance of peace and democracy in such societies; they are mostly expose to several difficulties. For example, international aid programmes for these political parties is often limited. But before they can effective certain conditions must be met. These include:

A) Long-term engagements are needed. Long-term strategic planning needs to be reconciled with flexibility and adaptability in the execution and implementation of programmes on the ground.

B) Donor coordination. A long-term political party programme should be integrated in the broader democratization, reconstruction and peace building agendas.
C) **Goals should be moderate** and determined by the circumstances on the ground. We should always be aware that societal, economic, institutional and historical factors have a stronger impact on the development of post-conflict parties and party systems than international support.

D) **Recognition of Major political actors** Organizations that provide political party assistance always have to focus on all relevant political actors and parties. However, in a highly fragmented political party landscape it is extremely difficult to identify the relevant players. If the most powerful political actors do not respect the rule of law and if they continue to resort to violence, organizations put at stake their own integrity when providing these groups with direct assistance.

E) **An inclusive inter-party dialogue** can help parties to overcome mistrust, to moderate positions, and to build consensus on issues that have not been dealt with in the peace agreement.

F) **Broad Political debate**—Special efforts should be made to help broaden the political debate. Too often this remains one-dimensional with an exclusive focus on ethnicity for example. It is important to assist parties to get organized around tangible policy issues that can have a direct positive impact on people’s lives, and to build coalitions on the basis of political goals and ideas.

G) **Continuous Analyses** A post-conflict programme should be based on a good understanding of the conflict, the nature and background of the political parties and the power balance. Continuous analysis is needed.

H) **Rule of law must prevail**—There is popular saying that where law ends, tyranny begins. And justice is the first condition for peace and security.

**3.2 Organising Elections**
The value and significance of open, free and fair elections in countries transitioning from conflict to peace or consolidation of peace can not be overemphasised. Successful political and governance transition is central to any post-conflict nation-building project. Although, the constitution-making process after violent conflict offers a great opportunity to create a sense of common vision of the future of the state, but it is the success of the elections that will show ‘roadmap’ on how to get there and entrench democracy in such communities. Elections lend sought-after credibility to the leadership and institutions that emerge to replace structures imposed on the country and its population during the conflict. In the case of Africa, many of these wars span across decades and run deep. For examples, Angola’s war, was fought for over 27 years and ended in 2002, Mozambique’s 17-year-old war come to an end in 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords. Liberia and Sierra Leone’s horrible wars ended in 2001 and 2002 respectively.

All were followed by multi-party elections. Elections serve more than one purpose especially in the post-conflict context. Apart from providing legitimacy and international credibility to post-conflict administrations, they also encourage democratic values such as tolerance and inclusiveness. Elections also help mark formal end of conflicts and promote state-building after bitter conflicts with some exceptions. For instances: in Liberia, as in Congo DR and Sierra Leone, an earlier general election in 1997 failed to end the conflict. The chief architect of the Liberian war, Charles Taylor, emerged president of the war-battered country after the 1997 elections. However, the ex-rebel leader’s presidency was short-lived as a new rebel faction, the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), militarily challenged President Taylor’s democratic dictatorship. Amos Sawyer, the former President of Liberia’s Interim
Government opinion that the Liberian State / government produced by 1997 election “turned out to be a criminal state, legitimized by elections”.

But Sierra-Leone presents a positive story. In 2007, Sierra Leone held its second post-conflict elections in which the opposition party candidate, Ernest Bai Koroma won in a tight run-off. The immediate past president, Ahmed Tijan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) handed over the reins of power to the All Peoples Congress (APC) led by President Bai Koroma. Koroma beat Kabbah’s vice president and flagbearer of the SLPP, Solomon Berewa. The smooth transition marked the first time ever of a peaceful and democratic handover of power from one political party to another in the country’s history.

3.3 Challenges to Democratisation in Post conflicts States in Africa

The greatest threat to democratisation and state-building in most post conflict States in Africa as in elsewhere( Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and Congo DR etc), has been their battered economies. Mismanagement of public resources is widespread, while majority of the people live in slum. With the exception of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the rest of these post-war countries are well-endowed with natural resources including oil, diamond, iron ore, platinum and cobalt. Prices of these commodities were at phenomenal levels until they started slipping from the middle of 2008. The UNDP Human Development Index (2007/2008) ranks Sierra Leone 176 out of 177 countries. At 40.5 years, life expectancy in Sierra Leone is even below the African average, seven years after the war ended there.

Angola, Africa’s fastest growing economy ranks 162, yet the country’s economy has been expanding at a phenomenal pace – an annual average of about 19 per cent since 2000. As Africa’s leading oil exporter, Angola raked in billions
of dollars during the spike in oil prices but the dos Santos MPLA-government is corrupt, incompetent and wasteful. Transparency International, the anti-corruption watchdog, rates Angola as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. There is next to no investment in the larger rural population and basic infrastructure beyond Luanda, the national capital any wonder Angolans feel terribly disillusioned.

Other development indicators for Sierra Leone are equally stark. Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector provides about three-fourths of jobs however, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme trained ex-combatants as plumbers, carpenters and mechanics. In spite of its centrality to Sierra Leone’s recovery, only a handful opted for life in agriculture as the incentives for resettlement were comparatively far worse than for those settled as plumbers, carpenters or mechanics. At its peak, the reconstruction was costing the United Nations some US$16.4 billion and the British government US$150 million a year.

The democracy dividend promised at the end of the war in 2002 remains a mirage for the bulk of the population. Bretton Woods institutions and other donors’ insistence on liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of public goods with next to no social safety net for even the most vulnerable, has also complicated the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure which were all damaged or destroyed during the conflict.

It was thought that spearheading reconstruction agenda with democratisation alongside liberalised markets would address the fundamental causes of the war, which includes institutional weakness, endemic corruption, youth alienation and abysmal human rights records as well as promote productivity and innovation. This has yet to happen in many of these post-conflict states. Cote d’Ivoire, the Central
African Republic and Congo-Brazaville and Niger remain extremely volatile. Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia are sitting on knife-edge as a surging trade in narcotics from Latin America takes hold along the West African coast. Congo DR has fractured with dissident rebels fighting the Kinshasa government of President Joseph Kabila. In spite of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and elections in the south of the country, Sudan is at war as the genocide continues in the Darfur region of the country. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is set to indict the Sudanese president on war crime charges. Economic policies foisted on these same fragile nations by the international community undermine marginal progress made on the political front in these countries. The implementation of unmitigated neo-liberal threesome policy dictum of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation have further perpetuated the injustices of the past including pricing basic services such as healthcare, education and sanitation above the reach of the most disadvantaged.

Africa states generally lack the necessary capacity or the will to effectively perform core functions of statehood. For post-war recovery African states the crisis is dire and urgent: many are unwilling or simply unable to provide basic public services such as governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, fostering sustainable and equitable economic growth as well as other essential public goods such as clean water, affordable health care, schools, roads and decent jobs. The high level of youth unemployment is a major challenge to the security and development of these fragile countries.

In the last 12 months alone there have been democratic reversals in African countries including Guinea and Mauritania. High food prices triggered violent street protests across the continent, from Liberia to Cameroon. Dozens died in these riots and attempts to quell the protests narrowed rather than expanded the
frontiers of freedom and democracy. The creeping narcotic shipment in transit to Europe through some of these post-conflict states poses perhaps the severest danger to the expansion of the frontiers of democracy and development in Africa.

4.0: Conclusion

In spite of the challenges above, the situation is not completely hopeless. Even it is still fair to conclude that democracy is steadily taking root in many of these traumatised countries. It is however very important, that in the pursuit of the ideal governance system, these countries do not overlook the socio-economic component of the post-war recovery agenda and they must prepare to learn from positive experience of others. For example, they can learn from the Rwanda experience. Although the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) leader, Paul Kagame, remains in charge as president of the country after he was returned through an election, the country has remarkably remade itself after the 1994 genocide. Indeed, in some specific aspects of liberal democracy, economic freedom and popular participation in politics, the tiny East African country is a world leader.

5.0 Summary

There is no doubt that, democracy is the most essential ingredient for enthronement of enduring peace in societies transiting from war to peace. This is why this unit is specifically created to discuss the democracy in societies in transition. To do justice to the topic, the relationship between democracy and DDR in societies that are transiting or moving from war to peace was analysed. Basic features of
democracy in such societies; challenges and how to tackle such problems were also discussed in the unit.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
1) Why is Democracy important in Post conflict Communities?
2) Explain Challenges of democracy in Societies in transition from war to peace

7.0 References and further readings
The Search for Democratic Governance, Cape Town: IDASA/CPS/NIMD.
Unit 5: Financial Empowerment and DDR in Post-Conflict Communities

1.0 Introduction

As a major component of the DDR processes in post-conflict communities, giving money or financial empowerment to ex-combatants in post-conflict communities has been contentious. This topic has been brought into this study because of the fact that Nigeria itself is in the process of a similitude of DDR based on the amnesty granted to ex-militants in the Niger-Delta part of the country. Therefore, cognizant of the potentials of experience sharing in situations like this, this unit presents and examines the possible consequences or benefits of cash in the DDR process. It is instructive to inform that this unit will be largely based on a comparative study of DDR processes in Sierra Leone.

It is also instructive to state that DDR is an integral part of the post-conflict peace-building process. Therefore, its management would substantially affect the failure or success of any post-conflict peace-building process.
2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

• Understand how cash can positively or negatively affect the DDR processes;
• Put into practice what you have learnt in real life situations;
• Define and distinguish different interpretations of the terms Re-integration and Reinsertion.

3.0 Main Contents

The term DDR unknown to many, could mean different things depending on the context. According to Wilibald (N.D:3):

• ‘Disarmament’ is defined as the ‘collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunitions, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants’ (DPKO, 2000, p. 15). It constitutes the formal change in status from ‘combatant’ to ‘ex-combatant’, defined here as ‘soldiers no longer serving in formal military or paramilitary structures, or . . . [participating] in militia or guerrilla activities’ (Muggah, 2004, p. 32).
• ‘Demobilisation’ denotes the ‘process by which armed forces . . . either downsize or completely disband’ (DPKO, 2000, p. 15), and are transported to their location of choice.
• ‘Reinsertion’ is the ‘immediate post-demobilisation package [of interim assistance] offered to ex-combatants . . . before the longer-term process of reintegration’ (Isima, 2004, p. 4). Does money work?
• ‘Reintegration’ refers to the enduring ‘process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities’ (Knight and Özerdem, 2004, p. 500). Two issues define the tenure of DDR processes. These two issues are security and development. There have arisen two schools of thought on along these lines of issues. These are the maximalists and minimalists. In this context, the UN leans towards the minimalists because most of their activities in post-conflict communities are geared towards improving security. On the other hand, World Bank cues behind the maximalists because they opined that DDR is an opportunity for development and reconstruction, (Muggah, 2004, p. 27). However, it is cheering that these two can be mutually reinforcing. This is so because; one meets the immediate need of security while the other addresses challenges of development.

**DDR as A Social Contract**

Furthermore, Wilibald argues for the conceptualization of DDR as a type of social contract. This is informed by the fact that a weapon in the hands of ex-militants has both security and economic utilities. In terms of security most ex-militants are reluctant to give up all arms because of the possibility of having to go back to the bush incase the post-conflict process does not adequately compensate them. Often times this depends on the management of the post-conflict peace-building processes and their confidence in the process. Therefore, it become clear that weapon is useful to militants in both conflict and post-conflict period. Economically, weapons and arms provide sustenance for militants most especially during the conflict period. It is for this reason that without absolute faith in the DDR process disarmament; which entails the surrendering of weapons and arms may not have the full cooperation of ex-militants or combatants.
However, an application of the social contract as a concept driving overall framework of the DDR can immensely aid the DDR process. The application of the social contract in this context entails those ex-combatants to trade off the physical, psychological and economic security which their arms and weapons provided them in times of war and violent conflict in exchange for opportunities and assistance provided for them by the State. This underscore the need for the DDR process to holistic and sincerely pursued by both the concerned States and the international community where affected.

**Money and DDR: How Complementary?**

The level of poverty in many third world countries worse-still by government officials have heightened the consideration of giving money directly to those in need; especially during emergencies. Although, widespread corruption and failure of the banking sector in these countries have also curtailed the rate of embracing this approach, nevertheless, there are still very strong arguments for giving money directly to those in need including ex-militants.

Wilibald captures the arguments for and against this approach by comparing the contexts of DDR and development.

**Advantages and Disadvantages Cash For DDR**

According to Wlibald, there are identifiable benefits of providing cash in emergencies and other developmental contexts are identified in the literature. Most importantly, cash is considered as being adaptable to the specific needs of individual beneficiaries, hence doing away with the need to pinpoint requirements and allowing freedom of choice. Not only are beneficiaries seen as being in the best position to determine their own needs, but also the very ability to do so is deemed as representing a fundamental step towards empowerment. Cash transfers are also seen as maintaining beneficiaries’ dignity, given that no stigma is attached and channelling cash through a banking system avoids the problem of long queues.
It is further argued that the use of cash presents a cost-efficient way for beneficiaries to receive, donors to give and agencies to deliver aid. This is because cash transfers forego the need for beneficiaries to carry bulky commodities from distribution sites to their homes, and because they entail lower transaction and logistical costs for the programme in terms of transportation and storage. In addition, cash transfers are perceived as having beneficial knock-on effects on local markets and trade. By encouraging local production, it is asserted that disincentive effects often triggered by commodity aid are avoided. Lastly, cash is deemed to sidestep the problem of commodity aid being sold at a great loss in value, since it can be used directly to meet diverse livelihood needs.

On the other hand, the literature also identifies a series of potential drawbacks of using cash. One common perception is that beneficiaries might abuse the freedom of choice by spending the money on ‘demerit’ goods and services, such as alcohol and gambling. This assessment partly explains the fact that cash transfers are often viewed with reluctance by donors and recipient governments, which may be more concerned about disposing of commodity surpluses and garnering political support than with shifting their traditional focus from in-kind to other forms of assistance. Cash transfers are also seen as foregoing the possibility of self-selection and thus as being more difficult to target, since cash is of inherent value to everyone.
The Table below according to Walibald deepens our understanding of the pros and cons of cash in DDR processes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential benefits of cash in DDR programmes</th>
<th>Potential drawbacks of cash in DDR programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influences compliance with voluntary disarmament:</strong> cash may lever ex-combatants’ compliance with voluntary disarmament commitments.</td>
<td><strong>Creates illegal arms market and regional arms trade:</strong> cash may fuel the creation of an illegal arms market and trigger the smuggling of weapons across national borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is attractive to ex-combatants:</strong> cash payments may be attractive to ex-combatants who seek immediate compensation.</td>
<td><strong>Allows purchase of newer and better weapons (antisocial use):</strong> the money received may be used to buy newer and more dangerous weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accelerates disarmament and demobilisation:</strong> cash may encourage ex-combatants to rapidly disarm, demobilise and move back to their communities.</td>
<td><strong>Fuels expectations and demands (security risk):</strong> cash may create expectations among ex-combatants, which can entail security risks and lead to rearmament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diffuses political unrest:</strong> cash transfers may help disperse ex-combatants across the country, thus diffusing political tensions and reducing the likelihood of rearmament.</td>
<td><strong>Serves as a disincentive to economic reintegration:</strong> cash payments may discourage ex-combatants from finding employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Softens the impact on communities:</strong> cash transfers may ameliorate the extra resource burden placed on host communities and families upon the return of ex-combatants.</td>
<td><strong>Causes community resentment:</strong> cash payments may place ex-combatants in a privileged position vis-à-vis civilians and may be seen as rewarding perpetrators of a conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Is easier to implement:** cash-based assistance schemes may be easier to implement in post-conflict contexts where infrastructure is poor and institutions weak.

**Stimulates institutional capacity building:** cash transfers can strengthen local institutional capacity, such as by encouraging banks to manage large amounts of money.

**Source:** Wilibald: 322

**Fails to address limited financial management and investment skills:** ex-combatants may have little experience in managing money and operating within a cash economy.

**Faces physical and institutional barriers to delivery:** the lack of institutional capacity and/or infrastructure inherent to post-war settings may hamper the delivery of cash.

It is important to put some notions and hypothesis on the effects of cash on DDR processes to test. In this regard, Wilibald still serves as our guide based on findings of surveys done amongst ex-combatants in some African countries. This will further expose us to empirical instances of how cash affects DDR processes.

4.0 Conclusion

This unit introduced the debate on the desirability of money or otherwise in the DDR process especially at the disarmament stage. It makes it clear that there can be advantages and disadvantages of using cash in DDR processes. Therefore, the way the peculiar challenges in each situation are managed substantially affects the outcome.

5.0 Summary

The unit provided deeper insight into the operational meaning of some terms in the DDR processes. The unit expanded the scope of understanding of the DDR by introducing the social contract concept. It also gave comparative implications of the use of cash in the DDR process.
6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

• Compare and contrast the Reinsertion and Reintegration processes?
• In your opinion but based theoretical analysis given in this unit, explain how cash can affect the processes of Reinsertion and Reintegration
• Examine the applicability of social contract concept of in the Niger Delta Amnesty programme

7.0 References and Further Reading


DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) (2000) Disarmament,


1.0 Introduction

Having been introduced to the theoretical underpinnings of the argument for and against the use of cash in DDR processes, this unit takes the discourse to the practical level by presenting you case studies and real life scenarios of the impact of the use of cash in DDR in post-conflict communities and how this affected post-conflict relations between the ex-combatants and their neighbours.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- Comprehend empirical implications of the application of cash during the DDR processes;
- Know to what extent cash should be applied in the DDR process;
3.0 Assessing the facts: an empirical analysis

It has been shown that the theoretical case for and against the use of cash payments in emergencies and other developmental contexts, as well as in DDR processes that bring together short-term emergency and long-term development concerns, is fairly balanced. It is important to bear in mind, though, that this finding is based on the hypothetical benefits and drawbacks of using cash, and that these theoretical assumptions do not necessarily hold up in practice.

Testing Theoretical Assumptions: Empirical Evidence

Some of the most widespread notions associated with the use of cash in DDR are informed by perceptions that ex-combatants misuse money, and that cash causes community resentment, fuels corruption, entails security risks, faces barriers to delivery, disadvantages women and creates regional arms markets. This unit gets to the heart of the question of ‘does money work?’ This based on the work of Wilibald.

‘Ex-combatants misuse money’—do they?
Despite common perceptions, the DDR experiences reviewed here suggest that ex-combatants tend to use the cash received wisely to satisfy immediate needs, even if this involves purchasing items that are generally considered as ‘unwise’. The study further reveals that targeting decisions can have a critical impact on the way in which the money is utilised, and that conditionality can positively affect spending patterns. However, it cautions that any systematic attempt to assess the (mis)use of cash almost certainly has a large margin of error, as people are unlikely to admit that ‘money has been spent on alcohol . . . or guns even if it had been for fear that this would jeopardise further assistance’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 30). Two independent surveys carried out among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone produced similar results: the money received was spent on meeting living expenses and family needs (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004, p. 31), respectively on food and clothing, followed by investments in trading businesses, medical care, housing construction, education, marriage and family (SSL, 2002, pp. 23–24).66 Even though focus group discussions with ex-combatants in Sierra Leone point towards incidents of misuse (SSL, 2002, p. 37) and unverified reports in Liberia imply that money has been spent on illicit drugs, it is important to recognise that apparent misuses of cash cannot be seen in black-and-white terms. In Mozambique, for example, ex-combatants reportedly spent some of their money on alcohol, yet ‘far from being anti-social, this was part of a village celebration that helped to reintegrate them into local society’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 29).

The potential impact of targeting cash at specific groups is illustrated by the case of Liberia, where money provided to former child soldiers has proven unlikely to be used for productive purposes. Indeed, child ex-combatants have reportedly used the cash to purchase ‘marijuana and other drugs that are plentiful in Liberia’ (RI, 2004, para. 5) or former commanders have taken it away. Although there is some evidence to suggest that children gave the money to their families (Martin
and Lumeya, 2005, para. 6), the lesson to be drawn, reinforced by the experience of Sierra Leone, is that ‘cash should not be paid to children’ (Molloy, 2004, p. 3). Instead, giving cash to women dependants of ex-combatants and to communities to manage can prevent potential misuse (DPKO, 2003, p. 27). Conditionality, if coupled with strict supervision, can further affect (and indeed direct) spending patterns, as was the case in the Republic of the Congo (RoC), where little misuse of cash was reported due to good supervision, which ensured that money was spent in accordance with prior agreements.

‘Cash causes community resentment’—does it?

DDR experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate that the provision of cash to ex-combatants can indeed elicit community resentment. Yet, such an immediate reaction is likely to fade given pragmatic consideration by community members, and appropriate decisions being taken at the managerial level of the programme.

In Liberia, the giving of cash to ex-combatants has caused strong resentment among civilians: ‘It makes me angry because we went through the hardship and suffering but we got no compensation’ (IrinNews, 2005, para. 11). Such a response is based on the common perception that civilians are excluded from benefits and perpetrators are rewarded for atrocities. The following comment is a case in a point respondents revealed that: ‘giving them [ex-combatants] money is like paying them for the havoc they created. Why should they be rewarded when we [civilians] have nothing?’ (Martin and Lumeya, 2005, para. 7). The potential knock-on effects of such bitterness are in evidence in Sierra Leone, where perceived favouritism was found to have ‘increased tensions between host communities and ex-combatants rather than cash transfers serving as an investment in peace and reconciliation’ (DPKO, 2003, p. 27).
However, experience in Sierra Leone and the RoC also suggests that initial com-

munity resentment is likely to abate once the rationale and, importantly, the

potential gains of cash transfers are recognised (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon,

2004, p. 35).
**Does money work?:** one ex-combatant remarked, ‘they [community members] did not like the fact that we got money but they did not mind taking our money’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 54). Communicating the objectives and outcomes of DDR in places of return is therefore of critical importance. In addition, targeting and other managerial decisions can counter negative community perceptions. While targeting individuals was seen as critical in Sierra Leone, given the aim of ‘buying something from the rebels that only they can provide . . . peace’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 34), latent resentment caused by this strategy was countered by additional community-focused programmes (DPKO, 2003, p. 27). Furthermore, projects such as the Stop-gaps, under which ‘ex-combatants worked side by side with community members’ (UNAMSIL, 2003a, p. 8), had the beneficial side-effect of offsetting community resentment.

‘Cash fuels corruption’—does it?

In line with common perceptions, giving cash as part of DDR assistance packages possibly encourages corruption and manipulation, particularly at the commander level. However, the occurrence of corruption is affected by decisions that go far beyond the choice of using cash, namely, the eligibility criteria adopted for entry to the programme and the commitment shown in relation to the enforcement of such regulations, as well as the choice of payment location.

The final evaluation report of the Sierra Leone DDR programme asserts that ‘the lure of the Le600,000 Reinsertion Benefit encouraged corruption at the commander level’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 15). This is attributable to the condition of handing in a weapon to gain admission to the programme (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 38), which encouraged commanders to take the guns off junior officers, women and children in anticipation of pecuniary gains, further encouraging ‘various nefarious practices, such as giving weapons to non-combatants like wives, brothers, close relatives and friends to disarm in order
to collect benefits that could be shared with the perpetrators’ (Kai-Kai, 2000, p. 121). In addition, an insufficient UN peace-keeping presence at disarmament centres reportedly allowed ‘non-combatants who did not fully meet the criteria . . . to enter the program’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 14) in Sierra Leone, and resulted in ex-combatants bypassing the identity card process and repeatedly collecting cash payments in Liberia (ICG, 2004, p. 5).

Rather than negating the utility of cash, however, these incidents point up a need to rethink the eligibility criteria for gaining entry to DDR programmes. Furthermore, the likelihood of non-entitled people being admitted to DDR processes and of combatants claiming multiple cash payments can be reduced by establishing a robust identification system and committing sufficient resources to ensure enforcement. Lastly, in Sierra Leone, shifting the handing out of cash from encampment to communities curbed corruption by making it ‘more difficult for commanders to demand partial payment of the Reinsertion Benefit’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 52).
‘Cash entails security risks’—does it? While cash transfers made at the disarmament stage and associated with a cash-for-weapons image possibly impact negatively on the security situation in and around disarmament or demobilisation camps, the reviewed experiences suggest that cash payments during reinsertion can have a favourable effect on local and national security. Therefore, managerial decisions on the choice of payment location affect the state of security more than the use of cash itself, as does the planning of information campaigns and ensuring timely delivery.

The potential security risks caused by a cash-for-weapons image are best illustrated by the December 2003 incidents in the Liberian capital of Monrovia, where ‘fighters grew restless outside Camp Scheiffelin when they discovered there was no “cash for weapons”’ (ICG, 2004, p. 5). The subsequent decision to make USD 75 of the reinsertion payment available at disarmament made the security situation worse by attracting an unmanageable number of fighters, which clearly exceeded the programme’s capacity and led to its subsequent suspension (IrinNews, 2005, paras. 10–11).

While the cash-for-weapons image does, to some extent, fuel itself, experience suggests that it can also be caused by the presentation of poor information to combatants (ICG, 2004, p. 5) and that it is often exacerbated by UN peacekeepers themselves when trying to lure fighters into the programme. This is much to the disadvantage of the programme, as illustrated in Sierra Leone, where false promises reportedly ‘caused problems later, as frustration arose over the fact that initial expectations were not met’ (Tefsamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 30).

In contrast, evidence indicates that cash transfers during reinsertion can have a positive impact on local and national security. This is reflected, for example, in the low levels of violence reported in parts of Liberia where the Danish Refugee
Council is running a dollar-a-day programme for ex-combatants. Similarly, Sierra Leone’s low crime rate is often attributed to the fact that transitional cash payments ensured that ‘ex-combatants had the means to support themselves and their families and therefore were less likely to engage in illegal activities’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 83). Yet common complaints about ‘significant and unpredictable delays in the delivery of allowances’ (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2004, p. 34) point towards the need to ensure a timely delivery of promised cash transfers. This is vital to prevent frustrations, and to build lasting trust in the programme. As one ex-combatant ominously stated, ‘DDR officials should keep to their promise if they don’t want more problems . . . The bad thing is, if there is a reoccurrence of war, you will find it very difficult to disarm the combatants because they will think that they are lying to them the second time’ (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004, p. 33).

‘Cash faces barriers to delivery’—does it?

The DDR experiences reviewed here suggest that logistical planning and management can overcome the physical and institutional barriers to delivering cash inherent to post-conflict situations. Also, it needs to be stressed that ‘the contextual difficulties raised by emergencies do not apply only to cash responses’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 8), and that interventions of any sort, whether in cash or in-kind, are likely to be difficult in post-conflict settings, which are usually bedevilled by poor infrastructure and weak institutions.
**Does money work:** There can be no denying that efforts to provide cash payments in Sierra Leone faced a number of challenges common to post-conflict environments, including ‘the absence of banks in a large part of the country, movement of a huge quantity of cash across the country, security for the process and co-ordination of various agencies involved within a tight timeframe’ (Kai-Kai, 2002, pp. 2–3). However, these challenges were managed successfully (despite occasional hiccups) by contracting payment officers to deliver the cash by means of helicopter and under UN security to district headquarters for subsequent collection by ex-combatants. The success is also reflected in the fact that the majority of surveyed ex-combatants ‘considered the process of paying their benefits to have been transparent and efficient’ (SSL, 2002, p. 36), with delays in delivery being the major cause of the process being considered as inefficient.

Yet the real question is not whether cash is harder to deliver in post-conflict situations than in more peaceful environments, but how it measures up against possible alternatives. In this respect, experience from Sierra Leone suggests that, from a logistical point of view and despite the post-conflict environment, cash was the superior form of assistance. This is ‘because the majority of the ex-combatants were demobilized during the 2001 rainy season . . . which meant that the logistics of distributing in-kind benefits would have been extremely complicated. Under these circumstances, the decision to provide monetized reinsertion benefits made good sense’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 54).

‘**Cash disadvantages women**’—does it?

While it is shown that cash transfers per se do not adversely affect women, the eligibility criteria adopted for gaining entry to the DDR process, in combination with the provision of cash, can perhaps disadvantage female fighters. Contrary to widespread assumptions, no negative impact of cash on the wives of
excombatants or on other female household members emerged in any of the cases studied.
A survey carried out among former combatants in Sierra Leone suggests that ‘there are very small differences in women’s experiences of DDR as compared to men’ (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004, p. 37) and that variations in satisfaction with the DDR programme are unrelated to gender (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004, p. 3). Yet it is clear that the condition adopted for gaining entry to the programme (and thus for having a voice in the survey question on satisfaction)—that is, the handing in of a weapon—can adversely affect female combatants. This is illustrated, for example, in the accounts of commanders, who, in anticipation of pecuniary gains, reportedly took ‘guns away from people who had actually participated in combat, especially women’ (Tesfamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 15), or, in the case of group disarmament, selected ‘non-combatant males over females associated with the fighting forces’ (Tesfa-michael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 43), thereby effectively making it impossible for female combatants to enter the DDR process and to receive cash benefits. Again, rather than questioning the utility of cash, this points up a need to rethink the eligibility criteria adopted for gaining entry to DDR programmes.
There is no evidence, in the cases studied, of cash transfers disadvantaging female members of the households of ex-combatants; in fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Cursory observations suggest that former fighters in Sierra Leone gave part of their money to spouses and other female household members. Furthermore, deliberate efforts to foster household control over cash payments met with success in Somalia, where ex-combatants’ wives had to sign the contract that would subsequently lead to cash payments. Such best practices are currently being applied in Sudan, where male ex-combatants are encouraged to bring along their wives when collecting the cash allowance—they receive an additional USD 100 if they show up as a pair.

‘Cash creates regional arms markets’—does it?

Experience from Liberia and Sierra Leone suggests that cash payments, particularly when associated with a cash-for-weapons image, can have regional implications in terms of triggering cross-border arms movements and fuelling inter-regional expectations. While decisions on setting the amount or choosing the payment location can perhaps affect the regional impact of cash transfers, the permeability of borders and the regional dimension of conflicts in West Africa intimate the need for a coordinated regional approach to DDR, and to cash transfers therein.

Even if cash transfers in DDR processes are rarely intended to be (or to be seen as) a cash-for-weapons deal, it is a matter of fact that such an image is often created. For example, Refugees International (RI) points out that, ‘in Côte d’Ivoire, ex-combatants were offered $970 for disarming . . . while in Liberia, they were offered $300’ (Bernath and Martin, 2004, p. iv). It is a mute point that cash was provided neither ‘for disarming’, nor at the point of disarmament only. The fact is that it came to be perceived as such, and that the disparities in the amount ‘offered’ resulted in ‘combatants from Liberia crossing into Côte d’Ivoire to get a better
deal’ (Bernath and Martin, 2004, p. iv). The regional interconnectedness of fighting groups in West Africa also means that combatants in Liberia, for example, are ‘fully aware of the disarmament programme in Sierra Leone and want something similar’ (ICG, 2003, p. 18), thus creating regional expectations and demands. In this context, RI voices concern about the precedent of paying child soldiers in Liberia: ‘Will DDRR [Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation] in the Ivory Coast . . . now inevitably involve cash payments to children [too]?’ (RI, 2004, para. 6).

The regional dimension of conflicts in West Africa, illustrated, for instance, by the fact that ‘[f]ighters from Liberia are in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea, and mercenary forces from the region are fighting in Liberia’ (RI, 2003, para. 10), raise thorny questions about the disarmament and demobilisation of foreign combatants engaged in national conflicts, and of national fighters embroiled in foreign conflicts, as well as their eligibility for cash payments in DDR programmes. Until now, these issues have been dealt with on a national basis; in Sierra Leone, for example, combatants returning from Liberia became eligible for a USD 200 one-time cash payment (Tesseamichael, Ball and Nenon, 2004, p. 15). Increasingly, however, and in light of the permeability of national borders, the need for a regional design and the regional application of DDR in West Africa is being recognised. Indeed, it is often argued that, ‘without such regionalized DDR programmes, the cross-border movement of younger fighters . . . threatens to reverse whatever gains are being made in [one country]’ (Olonisakin, 2004, p. 197). Does money work?

To that end, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program approach currently being undertaken in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where cash payments are not fully standardised but consistent enough to prevent the creation of regional arms markets, may serve as best practice.
4.0 Conclusion
From the empirical analysis provided in this unit and the theoretical background in Unit 5 of this Module, it can be posited that cash does negate the intention of DDR processes. However, the management of the process determines to a large extent the rate of success.

5.0 Summary
The unit captured some empirical instances of the application of cash and its attendant effects on DDR processes. It also presented the perception of neighbours of ex-militant to the giving of cash to ex-militants, the attitude of ex-militants to an average DDR process that involves cash and the demonstrative effects of financial inducement to aid the success of DDR.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
- What have you learnt in this unit?
- “Reality is nothing perception is everything”. In your own opinion can perception of the inclusion of cash in DDR processes affect the relations between communities and ex-combatants?

7.0 References and Further Reading


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Module 3

Unit 1: The Political Challenges of DDR,
Unit 2: The Socio-Cultural Challenges
Unit 3: The Economic Dimension,
Unit 4: The Psychological Challenges

Unit 1: The Political Challenges of DDR

1.0: Introduction

There is a growing awareness among policy-makers, analysts and practitioners of the strong interrelationships between different elements of post-conflict peace building. They have also realized that the DDR as the most important peace-building mechanism in transitional societies are bound to face a number of serious challenges which must be properly taken care of the success of the programme. This unit attempts to examine some of the key political challenges facing the DDR and how best to develop policy frameworks as well as approaches to tackle these challenges in any given post-conflict context.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To explain main political challenges facing the DDR
2) To discuss best ways to resolve these challenges

3.0: Main Contents

In recent years, a significant number of African countries have emerged from conflict and are now undertaking disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. The importance of successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to preventing the recurrence of violence and
creating the conditions for sustainable peace and development has been long recognized. However, there is ample evidence that current DDR practices often do not accomplish those objectives since there have been numerous instances of African countries relapsing into violence. In fact, about 50% of post-conflict countries in Africa revert back to conflict within five years due largely to ineffective ways of handling of some the challenges especially in the political arena. We shall now attempt to examine some of these political challenges:

3.1 The political transformation of ex-combatants

   Agreeing the timing and scope of post-conflict disarmament is politically sensitive and highly context specific, varying based on whether the program starts after the defeat of one of the warring parties, after the peace settlement or due to a government decision to reduce its armed forces. Questions such as who is holding the weapons and why? How should temporarily armed civilians during conflict be dealt with? What is the nature and structure of ex-combatants? And where there are local traditions in the possession and use of weapons? All these have to be answered carefully since they all have an impact on the scope and timing of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDR). Military, guerrilla, and paramilitary groups that pursue ideological and political goals need to be converted in the course of the peace-building process. Therefore politics needs to be put back at the center of the DDR processes and armed groups need to be evaluated with different temporal perspectives.

   Demobilization and reintegration are not only an individual, but also a collective process. The evaluation should take into account the future of the former collective political group that was the guerilla, and also the electoral success of the political party, not only in the first elections, but also in a medium to long-term
perspective meaning in a different temporal perspective than the one scheduled for the reintegration of former combatants in the peace agreement. The political transformation of former rebel groups into political parties seems to be a logical outcome of groups seeking a place within state institutions after demobilization. This process has taken place El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Kosovo.

Yet, in some instances, groups have become depoliticized such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Indeed, very little attention is usually paid to the actual change and implementation of laws, which may not favor former guerrillas and minority groups that resorted to violence to achieve political aims. The transformation of a former armed group into a new political party, or any other kind of political actor resorting to democratic mechanisms to achieve its aims, should be considered an element of evaluation in DDR programs. All of this also requires a better understanding of how external actors can support the political aspirations of former warring groups and a clear awareness from all stakeholders of that key dimension of the process.

3.2 Ideological Differences among the Political Parties

Post-conflict parties and party systems vary substantially. This is mainly because most of the emerging political parties are coming from different ideological background and uncommon world views which must be blended positively if peace must reign supreme in the societies that are transiting from war to peace. To achieve this, post-conflict societies should not be considered ‘tabula rasa’ situations where institutions can be developed from scratch. Rather, the existing structures must be properly studied and blended with any new orientation
and ideas which are being introduced. The main differences between today’s post-conflict democracies (as Afghanistan or Rwanda) and other young democracies include the existence of a peace settlement, the prevalence of a relatively high level of violence and insecurity, the international (military) presence, and the deep social cleavages, tensions and mistrust that resonate in the political system. All these expectedly, are posing serious political challenges to the DDR in these societies in Africa.

3.3 Constant Disagreement among the key Political Figures

As we have mentioned above, most political actors and parties in post conflict environments can not enjoy ideological unity due to their different orientations and backgrounds. It is therefore natural for them to often engage in constant political disagreement which often threatens the existing fragile peace in such societies. For example in Cote d’Ivoire, after negotiations at the October 2006 AU summit, the AU Peace and Security Council recommended that the then President, Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny remain in office for no longer than 12 months. These developments, as in the past, do not make any of Côte d’Ivoire’s current challenges any easier. A series of failed peace deals, an increase in human rights abuses, the postponement of elections that were to be held in October, 2006 and the Forces nouvelles continued refusal to give up arms until the existing nationality laws, which exclude individuals living in the north from gaining Ivorian citizenship, are reformed are just some of the major trials facing the country and, therefore, creating a series of political challenges for DDR related program work. There were three major Political challenges within the peace process that confronted Côte d’Ivoire: (1) a credible process towards elections; (2) decision making on the issue of identity/nationality laws and (3)
disarmament in an environment where the north and south interpret the process in the same manner.

3.4 Tackling the Challenges

In confronting the political challenges of DDR, below are some tips that can provide an effective guide:

- A single and fixed approach must be avoided.
- Programmes should promote local viewpoints, knowledge and perspectives so as to provide external actors with an inclusive view of the situation.
- Greater effort needs to be made in order to understand the specific nature of conflicts in different countries.
- Local stakeholders need to be included in all aspects of DDR and SSR processes as well as the initiatives undertaken to design and implement the programmes with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities among the different actors, taking into account their competencies and capacities.
- For a genuine DDR/SSR intervention, all actors – government agencies, civil society organizations, NGOs and international agencies – need to be involved. The role of traditional actors, authorities and structures needs to be reinforced in these processes.
- Although external intervention and support are essential to facilitate dialogue and to provide logistic and financial support, the final decision on these programmes should rest with the national governments, which should consult with all relevant actors through a mechanism of collective participation.
- In order to optimize existing capacities, local capacities need to be correctly assessed and developed, taking into account existing capabilities in the system and the traditional structures of governance.
For the external actors not to worse the situation, there must be a coherent and coordinated policy based on the following:

- External actors should facilitate dialogue and provide logistic support while local actors should guarantee leadership during the implementation process.
- In terms of political willingness, there should be significant involvement at all levels of government with an institutionalized periodic evaluation of the process.
- Continental and regional stakeholders such as the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Great Lakes countries should play a higher coordinating role.
- Links among political initiatives such as the AU development structure and peace reconstruction, the APRM, national strategies for development and poverty reduction should be strengthened.
- Improved sensitization strategies should be put in place in order to reach target populations to inform them about the process and its developments. These strategies should especially take into account women and children, thereby ensuring a higher degree of success.
- Clear and effective channels of communications among all relevant actors should be put in place to better ensure coordination and the sharing of good practices.
- Capacity building of local stakeholders – government, NGO, and local communities – is critical to ensure the success of the programme.
• Clear norms, a defined agenda and an institutionalized mechanism should be agreed and established to conduct a successful evaluation of the programme.

4.0: Conclusion

Beyond the above problems, most of these post conflict societies have weak legal instrument. The weak legal institutions have allowed injustice, abuse of human rights, organised crime and corruption to grow. Poor record-keeping hamper attempts to tackle impunity, top police officials are beholden to politicians and slow to adopt modern methods, and the courts have such a heavy backlog that many are denied justice. Improved staffing, training, and a willingness to break with the abuses of the past are needed to protect citizens, establish accountability and attract good people to politics.

5.0: Summary

In this unit, we have enumerated and analysed political challenges facing DDR in post conflict societies across Africa. Drawing examples from parts of the continent; some suggestions are also given on the best ways to salvage the situation. It is our overall position that the development of all embracing political system will play a significant role in the stabilization and democratization of post-conflict societies.

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

1) What are some of the political challenges to DDR in Africa?
2) Discuss how best to resolve the challenges.

7.0: References and Further Reading

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Final Report


Batrice P. The Politics and Anti-Politics of Disarmament, Demobilization


Unit 2: The Socio-Cultural Challenges

1.0: Introduction

The causes for conflicts in modern day Africa cannot be understood without an appreciation of the struggle between traditional African culture and its clashes with Muslim and European cultures. Understanding Africa’s triple heritage is fundamental to understanding the geography of Sub-Saharan Africa – its political situation, its ethnic conflicts, its population dilemma, and current development crises. Consequently, any programme that is geared towards establishing lasting peace in post conflict societies in Africa as in other places such as DDR usually encounter socio-cultural challenges. This unit is therefore design to bring out some of the key socio-cultural challenges DDR is usually exposed to in such communities and suggest ways to solve them.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To analyse the link between conflict and culture
2) To explain some of the socio-cultural challenges of DDR in Africa
3) To mention some the ways out of the problems

3.0 Main Contents

The triple heritage of African socio-cultural life is a great source of crisis in the beleaguered continent. For examples there are: conflicts among muslims and christians, tradition and modern culture such as in Northern Nigeria; the incompatibility between traditional, Islamic (Sharia laws) and Western political systems, such as Sudan conflict between Islamic north and Negro south; split loyalties to several leaders (Buganda and conflicts in Uganda). This problem is further compounded by ethnic differences and tensions caused by colonial past, division of groups among states during the partition of Africa, imbalance and unequal development which began with colonization. Many of these problems were caused by the balkanization of the continent by European colonizers without regard to any ethnic affiliations in the new independent states. This is political ineptness, incompetence, and corrupt practices of some leaders. Idi Amin of Uganda, Mombutu Seseseko of Zaire-Congo, Siad Barre’s naivety in playing off the Soviets against the West set the stage for political instability in Somalia, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa Republic, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha of Nigeria and many others.

Discriminatory policies in some states many of such treatments began with European colonization during which Educational and welfare programs favored some ethnic groups and placed them above other groups within the country (Hutus and Tutsis, Yoruba an Ibos in the South and Hausas in the North in Nigeria, Groups in Southern and Northern Ghana.) In the post colonial African politics, there has been undue international interference in purely local affairs of African states. The support of Francophone states by the French, Anglophone nations by
the US and UK and South Africa’s Apartheid government and the support for Socialist nations by Cuba and former Soviet Union. This coming together of three distinctive socio-cultural affiliations has serious implications for the continent most especially in the conflict arena. Some of the impacts are discussed below:

3.1 The Impacts of the Triple Socio-Cultural heritage

A. The diffusion of Islamic and European beliefs caused the demise of traditional folk customs by which indigenous Africans had lived and governed themselves for ages.

B. Foreign cultures may at times be less responsive to the diversity of local conditions and could consequently generate conflicts and adverse impacts on the environment.

C. The disappearance of folk customs was symbolic of the loss of traditional African values. The result is a generation of neither Africans that are neither European nor African.

D. The diffusion of European culture has led to the dominance of Western perspectives on issues that are purely African. European solutions to indigenous African problems may not always work leading often to crisis in development.

E. The domination of foreign cultures has caused many conflicts several spheres of African life: e.g., new names, new role for women, marriage, new concepts about the family that do not match African values, new concepts about the state, etc.

F. The most disturbing outcome of the unholy alliance is the resultant violent ethnic conflicts and civil wars across Africa. For examples; Civil war in Chad
(1975-83); Katanga Province’s attempt to secede from Congo after independence in 1960; Biafran war in Nigeria (1967-70); Somalian civil war (1990); Wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia; Hutus and Tutsis in both Rwanda and Burundi, and many others.

3.2 The Socio-cultural Challenges to DDR

As we have mentioned above, sharp socio-cultural differences that existed in most African countries has contributed greatly to constant crisis in the region. It therefore becomes natural that before DDR as a peace building mechanism can succeed in post conflict areas; it must be ready to surmount some of the expected socio-cultural challenges. Some of these are analysed as follows:

As many of us know, DDR is a highly socio-culturally multi-dimensional process where former political/military belligerents (with clear social and cultural cleavages) have to work side by side, build trust in one another, and agree to disarm and return to civilian life. As our discussions have shown, DDR is not, and should never be understood simply as a technical exercise of disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants and associated groups. The challenge for the local and international peace builders, is how to make sure that all excombatants, abandon the socio-cultural differences and support DDR processes.

A related issue is how the international actors will support and enhance genuine and broad national ownership of DDR processes. Their efforts often depend on increasing the capacity of relevant national institutions well beyond central government without given consideration to the existing cultural divisions. This is extremely challenging when supporting transitional governments that may lack legitimacy, highly contested political transitions, or fragmented societies and
collapsed economies. Striking the right balance between supporting national ownership and strengthened national capacities to accommodate all the social and cultural groups and the pressure to ensure the rapid delivery of a DDR programme remains a challenge. Nonetheless, it is key to achieve sustainable peace.

Ensuring proper social reintegration is another challenge.

Following are the key elements of the challenge of social reintegration

- Ensuring post conflict socio-cultural harmony
- Restoration of family ties with the societies at large
- Connecting with social norms for peace
- Enhancing, social and cultural status of the societies as whole.
- Ensuring the ability of each cultural group to make decision about their own life and on day to day matter without fear or intimidation.

### 3.3 WAYS OUT

The sustainability of reintegration efforts depends upon the capacity of DDR programmes to link more creatively with maintenance of socio-cultural unity, particularly those programmes that are focused on employment, income and livelihoods, and the delivery of basic services. If our reintegration programmes cannot do a better job of providing alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants and actually offering them employment and income generation opportunities then our DDR efforts will ultimately fail. The UN, together with the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development bank has recently approved a new policy on
employment generation, income creation and reintegration in post-conflict environments. As is the case with the IDDRS, the policy is good, and comprehensive, but the challenge remains to translate this policy into concrete programmes on the ground.

To enhance the prospects for sustainable reintegration the UN is increasingly linking its efforts to support the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups into broader national planning tools and development frameworks (e.g. joint assessments, PRSPs etc). However, more efforts are needed in this regard.

Those involved must also ensure proper funding for DDR, and particularly the resources available for reintegration. As you all know in peacekeeping contexts, the UN assessed budget can be used to fund disarmament, and demobilization activities, including reinsertion. However, reintegration activities are entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. In non-peacekeeping contexts where most DDR programmes actually take place, the entire DDR process relies on voluntary contributions from donors. This was the case in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Central African Republic. And this is the key challenge for us all. As a result of the lack of predictable funding, the shape, scope and sustainability of reintegration is too often determined by the availability of resources, rather than the reintegration requirements coming from thorough assessments.

While those who have witnessed the horrors of war may never forget, they must be given the opportunity to heal and empowered to face the future with confidence. Psycho-social counseling is not only cost-effective; it reaps tremendous benefits as communities learn to trust each other again while adapting to the post-conflict environment. When we seize the opportunity to reintegrate ex-combatants, we must ensure that we simultaneously empower them to contribute to
their society’s peaceful development. Doing so requires an investment in psycho-social counseling and the creation of a sense of responsibility among DDR beneficiaries.

4.0: Conclusion

While those who have witnessed the horrors of war may never forget, they must be given the opportunity to heal and empowered to face the future with confidence. Psycho-social counseling is not only cost-effective; it reaps tremendous benefits as communities learn to trust each other again while adapting to the post-conflict environment. When we seize the opportunity to reintegrate ex-combatants, we must ensure that we simultaneously empower them to contribute to their society’s peaceful development. Doing so requires an investment in psycho-social counseling and the creation of a sense of responsibility among DDR beneficiaries.

5.0: Summary

As we have mentioned in our previous discussions, DDR as peace building mechanism is prone to a number of confidence breaking challenges which must be handled creatively and cleverly by the principal actors for it to succeed. This unit has attempted to discuss, some of the socio-challenges of DDR especially in Africa. Some of the ways to tackle the crisis were also discussed.

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

1) Explain some of the socio-cultural challenges of DDR in Africa
2) Suggest some the ways you think these problems can be tackled successfully

7.0: References and Further Reading

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Unit 3 The Economic Dimension

1.0: Introduction
To date, successful addressing of the economic dimensions of DDR in post conflict still present a great challenge to the actors. The programme usually focus on curtailing resource flows to combatants through global control regimes. Yet, the creation of robust regulatory frameworks addressing the global traffic of resources that make armed conflict feasible is a long-term objective. While important for structural conflict prevention, this approach offers comparatively few practical insights for confronting the immediate challenges of transforming war-ravaged countries, in particular those where lengthy conflict has distorted political and economic relationships in favor of the entrepreneurs of violence. Recent years have seen the end of conflict or major hostilities in Sierra Leone, Angola, Afghanistan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan, all conflicts in which violent struggles over natural resource wealth have figured prominently. Yet, there is still a lack of understanding as to whether and how the violent and illicit exploitation of natural resources and the pervasive criminalization of economic life during conflict create distinctive obstacles for designing and mediating peace processes and developing and implementing programs for post-
conflict peace building and economic recovery. This unit will focus on the economic dimension of DDR, to bring the challenges and how best to tackle them.

2.0: Objectives
At the end of this unit, you should be able:

1) To explain the economic dimension of DDR
2) To discuss how to best to tackle some of the economic challenges of DDR

4.0 Main Contents
Though economic consideration, could not be said to the sole or even primary cause of conflict, but it has become more important to so many combatants than political factors. Therefore, any peace building mechanism such as the DDR must be well prepared to tackle the economic challenges in order to be successful. Apart from the petty criminality that typically accompanies warfare; contemporary conflicts have become systemically criminalized, as insurgent groups and rogue regimes engage in illegal economic activities either directly or through links with transnational criminal networks. The war economies fuelling conflict also thrive on linkages with neighboring states, informal trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the prolongation of conflict and instability.

3.1 Some of the Economic Challenges
Access to lucrative resources and smuggling networks may prolong conflict, as weaker parties can avoid ‘hurting stalemates’ by generating finances necessary to continue hostilities. Particularly where armed groups depend on lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, drugs, or coltan, there is a greater risk that conflict will be lengthened by the consequent fragmentation and fractionalization of combatant groups, as internal discipline and cohesion is undermined. In particular, continued
combatant access to lucrative resources and the proliferation of combatant parties have been identified as key factors in failed peace implementation, multiplying the number of potential ‘spoilers’ who resort to violence to thwart peace mediation or implementation. Peace spoilers may also be situated beyond the borders of the state, particularly where a civil war is embedded in a wider ‘regional conflict formation,’ such as Sierra Leone in West Africa and Afghanistan in Central Asia. Neighboring states, for instance, may benefit economically from conflict, as exemplified by the business networks set up by government and military officials from Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in the DRC and by the Liberian government in Sierra Leone.

Economic activity during wartime serves a variety of functions, which can be usefully distinguished as combat economies, shadow economies, and civilian coping economies. Often controlled by combatants, criminal entrepreneurs, and corrupt governments, these economic relationships tend to persist after the formal resolution of active hostilities. In these settings, a main challenge for peace building efforts is to address the dysfunctional elements of the shadow economy, while retaining its socially beneficial aspects. Where the illegal exploitation or inequitable, unaccountable management of natural resources has been central to conflict dynamics, improved resource governance needs to be a central element of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction strategies.

The high risk of violent conflict that has been attributed to natural resource dependence in a given country is not a direct relationship, but one that is mediated by critical governance failures. Systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, patrimonial rule, and the exclusionary ‘shadow state’ often associated with resource abundance may fuel political and economic grievances by undermining the state’s legitimacy and by weakening its capacity to perform core functions, such as the provision of security, the management of public resources,
and the equitable and efficient provision of basic goods and services. The state’s failure to manage natural resource exploitation effectively and equitably strongly influences the opportunity for and feasibility of rebellion – and thus also the re-emergence of violence in post-conflict situations - as it affects the relative strength of the state being challenged. The improved governance of natural resources, thus, needs to be made a central element of state building efforts within a comprehensive peace building strategy.

3.2 The Way Forward
Many ways have been suggested on how to tackle the above mentioned economic challenges some of them are as follows:

Transforming Shadow Economies and Addressing Economic Criminalization
Where shadow economies are based on illegal natural resource exploitation, and where smuggling and contraband trade have become implicated in the political economy of conflict, economic criminality tends to be systemic and well-integrated into regional and global criminal networks. Once entrenched, criminality can seriously undermine peace building and post-conflict recovery. Those who have generated economic benefit during conflict, not least from sanctions regimes, such as the mafia structures in Kosovo and Bosnia, seek to consolidate their power infragile post-conflict situation by expanding control over the local economy and political processes. Quite clearly, the more widespread is the informal economy, the fewer are the tax revenues that accrue to the state. This undermines the ability of states emerging from war to finance the provision of basic goods and services, most importantly security, to undertake needed reconstruction projects, and to establish viable institutions of governance. While post-conflict foreign aid may bridge this finance gap, it does not provide a sustainable basis for state finance.
Importantly, the failure of the state to provide basic services, with their de facto provision by criminal or shadow networks, undermines the creation of the ‘social contract’ necessary for stable and accountable governance. For peacebuilding efforts to address these twin challenges, policy action requires both ‘carrots and sticks.’

A primary task is to take the violence out of the economy by strengthening law enforcement and the judicial sector in post-conflict countries to address the systemic criminality of shadow economies. Where these capacities are weak, outside cooperation on law enforcement and mutual legal assistance, as well as direct policing operations by UN peace missions, may provide necessary support. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, established an organized crime unit in Kosovo to deal with the criminal economic activities that sustained the militants and to curtail their ability to divert guns and money to support hostilities in Southern Serbia and Northern Macedonia. Where politically feasible, the most egregious crimes, including those of economic nature, should be prosecuted domestically or, where applicable, by international courts. Recently, both the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Sierra Leone Special Court issued indictments for, inter alia, participation in ‘joint criminal enterprises,’ while the Porter Commission in Uganda, despite its flaws, led to the purge of high-ranking Ugandan military officials engaged in illegal resource exploitation in Eastern DRC.

Economic criminality is difficult to root out, not only because criminal networks are highly adaptive, but also because of the vital economic and social functions that they have often come to serve. For this reason, increased policy attention needs to be paid to creating incentives and alternative income-generating activities for entrepreneurs and other beneficiaries of the shadow economy to ‘turn legal’ and join the formal economy. This requires attention to the full range of
reasons that individuals continue to participate in shadow activities. In Afghanistan, for example, farmers continue to grow poppy not only because it is a lucrative crop, but also because the poppy trade has generated a complex system of patron-client relations and an elaborate, if highly extortive, system of credit. For many poor farmers and sharecroppers, poppy cultivation is often the only way to access credits needed to secure their livelihoods and to pay accumulated debts to local warlords. Policy efforts to reduce poppy cultivation thus need to address the socio-economic structures that characterize the ‘poppy cultivation environment.’

Regional Approach

Transforming shadow economies also requires a regional approach, as they are often integrated in traditional trade routes, cross-border smuggling, and are reinforced by cross-border social and kinship ties. This makes borderlands, often endowed with natural resources, the center of illegal activities. Yet, state-centric regulatory efforts risk generating cross-border displacement effects, simply moving the undesired activities - and their conflict-potential - to neighboring countries. Drug eradication efforts in Colombia and Afghanistan, for example, have encouraged increased cultivation in Bolivia and Pakistan. Similarly, the sanctions imposed against Liberia in 2001 perversely encouraged a reverse smuggling flow of illegally exploited diamonds back into Sierra Leone, in order to then export them ‘legally’ under the government-established diamond certification scheme. Strengthening border security as part of peace building efforts is necessary, yet largely insufficient to effectively address shadow trade, especially in countries with long and inaccessible borders and weak capacities for border policing and customs control. A more promising strategy would be to complement border control with policies that address the structural factors that encourage cross-border shadow trade.
In the case of drug cultivation, this may include addressing the cross-border environment through bilateral cooperation on poverty eradication, alternative livelihood development, and socio-economic integration of neighboring communities in border areas. Similarly, efforts to address regional shadow trade and smuggling should support cooperation within regional and sub-regional organizations to eliminate differentials in prices, tariffs, and quota systems that raise the profitability of, and thus create the incentives for, cross-border conflict trade.

Regional economic integration could also help to create regional markets for legitimate and mutually beneficial economic relations between neighboring countries, thus strengthening the ‘buy-in’ of influential neighbor states to regional stability and peace. Where they exist, regional or sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), can play an important role in addressing shadow trade and criminality. Despite its shortcomings and unclear mandate vis-à-vis the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is a promising initiative that could develop mechanisms to collectively address the problem of shadow trade and promote the responsible management of natural resources. This would require coordination with the AU’s CSSDCA, which has explicitly linked the need for improved natural resource management with conflict prevention and sustainable development.

Securing Natural Resource Wealth

The high risk of violent conflict that has been attributed to natural resource dependence in a given country is not a direct relationship, but one that is mediated by critical governance failures. Systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, patrimonial rule, and the exclusionary ‘shadow state’ often associated with resource abundance may fuel political and economic grievances by
undermining the state’s legitimacy and by weakening its capacity to perform core functions, such as the provision of security, the management of public resources, and the equitable and efficient provision of basic goods and services. The state’s failure to manage natural resource exploitation effectively and equitably strongly influences the opportunity for and feasibility of rebellion – and thus also the re-emergence of violence in post-conflict situations - as it affects the relative strength of the state being challenged.

The improved governance of natural resources, thus, needs to be made a central element of state building efforts within a comprehensive peace building strategy. Rebuilding the capacity of domestic institution and promoting good governance of natural resource wealth after years, if not decades, of war, mismanagement and systemic corruption is a long-term task, but it is a critical one. Importantly, peace building needs to address the predatory culture of state institutions, a product of colonial rule and post-independence leadership that promotes rent-seeking rather than socially beneficial economic activity. In countries such as Sierra Leone and the DRC, this requires the outright transformation of governance structures, rather than their mere reconstruction. Importantly, where the military and police were part of the ‘industrial organization’ of the predatory state structure, donor-supported security sector reform (SSR) can play a crucial role in transforming the security apparatus’ role from economic predation to civilian protection. Where the illicit exploitation of natural resources has been central to conflict dynamics, the early restoration of responsible resource management should be a priority. Here, international donors can assist post-conflict countries to design transparent accounting practices and to develop schemes for equitable and socially beneficial sharing of resource revenues. International agencies may also play an important role in acting as independent monitors to ensure compliance through externally-monitored natural resource
funds or escrow accounts for income generated from the exploitation of non-lootable resources, such as oil, gas, or mining.

If properly administered, these could protect the large inflows of revenues from rent-seekers and provide a degree of financial transparency. To date, natural resource management initiatives of this sort have been conceived and implemented as a means of preventing conflict rather than assisting countries recover from war. This is the case with the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project’s fiscal management and social revenue-sharing components, and the UK-sponsored Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which seeks to promote fiscal transparency among corporations and host governments engaged in extractive industry operations. There is no reason these mechanisms cannot be adapted to the needs of post-conflict recovery. Indeed, as donor leverage is often greater in these settings, the potential for securing effective resource governance is strong. In Sierra Leone, for instance, support by the UN and multiple donors has made a priority of restoring order to the diamond industry. Programs such as the Diamond Area Community Development Fund and the Kono Peace Diamonds Alliance not only provide benefits to the government by expanding the scope of licensed mining and raising official diamond exports, but also ensures regular incomes to artisanal miners and their communities. Effective national resource management also requires an adequate regulatory framework for private sector operations in the extractive industries and commodity trade to ensure that private investment in post-conflict settings serves the public interest.

**Encouraging the participation of the Civil Societies**

The creation of transparent economic and equitable economic governance highlights the important role of civil society in post-conflict peace building and recovery. In the long-term, the success of resource management systems will depend on the emergence of a strong civil society that is able to hold governments
to account. In the short and medium term, civil society organizations will need external support in developing relevant capacities, particularly in collecting information on illegal resource exploitation and government corruption and mobilizing public awareness. Support for civil society can also be indirect. The UN Expert Panel report on the illicit exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, for example, helped Congolese civil society and church groups raise these issues during the peace negotiations. A potential forum for assisting the new government to fulfill its commitment to improved economic governance is the International Support Committee (CIAT), created to advice on the transition program established in the December 17, 2002 power-sharing agreement. From War Economies to Peace Economies: Challenges for Peace building and Post-Conflict Recovery.

4.0: Conclusion

Rebuilding the capacity of domestic institution and promoting good governance of natural resource wealth after years, if not decades, of war, mismanagement and systemic corruption is a long-term task, but it is a critical one. Importantly, peace building needs to address the predatory culture of state institutions, a product of colonial rule and post-independence leadership that promotes rent-seeking rather than socially beneficial economic activity. In countries such as Sierra Leone and the DRC, this requires the outright transformation of governance structures, rather than their mere reconstruction. Importantly, where the military and police were part of the ‘industrial organization’ of the predatory state structure, donor-supported security sector reform (SSR) can play a crucial role in transforming the security apparatus’ role from economic predation to civilian protection. Where the illicit exploitation of natural resources has been central to conflict dynamics, the early restoration of responsible resource management should be a priority. Here, international donors
can assist post-conflict countries to design transparent accounting practices and to develop schemes for equitable and socially beneficial sharing of resource revenues. International agencies may also play an important role in acting as independent monitors to ensure compliance.

5.0: Summary

Economic factors play a different role in different conflicts. Yet, the legacies of economic predation, militarized production, and criminalized trade in many of today’s conflicts highlight the different challenges that conflict management faces in these settings. While more research is needed on these issues, a range of policy levers can, when applied in a robust and coordinated effort, raise the odds for successful peacemaking and peace building.

6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments

1) Mention and discuss 3 economic challenges of DDR
2) How do you think these challenges can be successfully resolve

7.0: References and Further Reading


Ballentine, K and Sherman, J (Eds.) (2003). The Political Economy of
Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers


Unit 4: The Psychological Challenges

1.0: Introduction
This unit is based on empirical instances of DDR processes. It focuses on the impacts of war on victims and perpetrators at the DDR phase. Due to the destructive effects of being child soldiers on victims, it is important to draw on empirical examples in order to bring to the fore the destructive of war on child soldiers.

2.0 Objectives
At the end of this unit, the expected objectives are that:

- Students should be able to appreciate the impact of war on child soldiers;
- Students should be able to understand how to combat the destructive effects of war on child soldiers and other victims.

3.0 Main Contents
3.1 Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers
The forceful enlistment of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, has long been a challenging issue, despite limited political efforts to tackle it. Africa has experienced the largest number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, and it has also seen the highest military conscription of children in war. The trauma of
being a child soldier results in a number of psychological problems. Research shows that the experience of war may have a profound impact on the personality development of an individual and their view of the world. Instances show that children who have participated in war often show regressive or aggressive behavior with a tendency towards violence. However, this should not be confused with the manifestation in children who were socialized to violence as a show of manliness.

Moreover, child soldiers often develop skills that allow them to survive in a war environment, but not in a more peaceful society. The severity and duration of a wartime environment may also result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD refers to the psychological and physical problems which can sometimes follow particularly threatening or distressing events including: repeated and intrusive memories of the distressing event, the experience of flashbacks or nightmares, physical reactions such as sweating or shaking, avoidance of reminders of the distressing event, sleeping and or concentration problems, (Narayan 2001).

The rehabilitation of child soldiers in a post-conflict environment is varied. One method is based on the model for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of child soldiers. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers describes DDR in the following manner:

**Disarmament**: The collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails weapons collection, assembly of combatants and development of arms management programs, including their safe storage and sometimes their destruction. Because many child soldiers do not carry their own weapons, disarmament should not be a prerequisite for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.
**Demobilization:** The formal and controlled discharge of soldiers from the army or from an armed group. In demobilizing children the objectives should be to verify the child's participation in armed conflict, to collect basic information to establish the child's identity for family tracing, to assess priority needs, and to provide the child with information about what is likely to happen next.

**Reintegration:** A long-term process which aims to give children a viable alternative to their involvement in armed conflict and help them resume life in the community. Elements of reintegration include family reunification (or finding alternative care if reunification is impossible), providing education and training, devising appropriate strategies for economic and livelihood support and in some cases providing psycho-social support. The DDR model has been used throughout the world and, in particular, West Africa.

Another rehabilitation model has been used by a Mozambican non-governmental organization, Reconstruindo a Esperança (Rebuilding Hope). Rebuilding Hope uses a process that involves the collaboration of community leaders, Western-trained psychologists, and local *curandeiros* (healers).

The process is based on the principle that all societies and cultures have developed, created, and learned mechanisms to deal with their specific problems in different spheres of life and that in order for a community to rebuild itself from trauma, one must first ask "how is this society or community already using its own resources to overcome or deal with the problem?" The organization focuses on providing psychological assistance and promoting community reintegration following 16 years of war in Mozambique.
Rebuilding Hope specifically encourages and depends on the involvement and participation of community religious authorities, local teachers, and parents. With the help of traditional local and religious leaders, the organization connects with local *curandeiros* when individuals with PTSD feel they need traditional purification rituals to wash away the bad spirits. In addition, the traditional healers purify their patients and send them to the psychologists for additional support. The result is an integrated support system involving a traditional healing process where children are reintegrated into their families and communities as rehabilitated people, while the psychologists develop sustainability methods for mental and emotional well-being. The result is a symbiotic model of psychotherapeutic interventions that includes the local knowledge and culture.

**Findings from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**

According to Pauleto and Patel (2010), there are currently an estimated 300,000 child soldiers worldwide, of which approximately 8,000 are in the eastern part of the DRC, which now constitutes a significant area of child soldier recruitment in the country. The duo argue that despite the alarming and evident scale of the problem, international and local efforts to address the problems associated with child recruitment into armed conflict have been sparsely successful. Pauleto and Patel reveal further that since the brake-out of violent conflicts in 1997 in DRC, an estimated 30,000 children have undergone the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme. However, in a protracted and volatile conflict such as that in eastern DRC, re-recruitment of child soldiers is rampant, and it is difficult to ascertain how many children have been demobilized more than once, or for how long.
The DDR programme for children is seen as fundamentally different from that of adults. Children’s rights expect that child soldier DDR programmes are operationalized both during and after conflict, as it is a fundamental human rights issue and not a security one. On the other hand, adult DDR is not seen as feasible during hostilities, this is why it is carried out basically in post-conflict scenarios in order to maintain peace and security and to promote long-term development. Pauleto and Patel (2010) argue that the aim of child soldier DDR is thus to restore the fundamental rights of children to enjoy a happy childhood free from exploitation. The core features of this procedure entail removing children from hostilities, psychosocial support, and family reintegration. However, there are some limitations to the DDR process in the Kivus. Despite increasing international attention devoted to the issue of child soldiering, little research has been conducted on child soldier DDR in the context of on-going conflicts, particularly with regards to what implications a conflict has on the re-recruitment of demobilised children. Pauleto and Patel (2010) based on a survey of available literature suggests that DDR programmes are largely modelled on experience of long established post-conflict societies, where the risk of re-recruitment of children, as well as further war-related trauma is low.

For instance, it has been noted that in post-conflict Sierra Leone DDR was far more effective than during the war. The Liberian experience also illustrates that children who lived outside the safe zone in Monrovia were easy targets for re-recruitment once hostilities resumed in 2000. There is a similar pattern of child soldier recruitment in the current conflict in the Kivus (in eastern DRC). Here, DDR programmes may be ineffective, as the likelihood of further violence once a child has been demobilized is high. Children who have already served in an armed group may be even more at risk than others, as an experienced soldier is a valuable asset in war. This is because of a combination of trauma and bitterness suffered as
a result of involvement in violent conflicts. Therefore, the psychological needs of children and adults in the DDR processes must be given serious attention.

3.0 Conclusion
This unit advocates that continued diagnoses of children affected by war and thorough analysis of the socio-political and cultural contexts in which they exist must be well understood. The fore mentioned are often neglected sometimes inadvertently by interveners. Dire consequences have attended wholesale imposition of imported or alien programmes contrary to the socio-cultural sensibilities of targeted communities. This must be avoided in designing and implementing DDR programmes.

5.0 Summary
The unit discusses the psychological angle of DDR with emphasis on children and scant references to adults. It presented examples from DRC based on the protracted and volatile conflicts that have bedevilled the country for decades. It concludes by cautioning against the wholesale adoption of DDR programmes without taking their implications for the socio-cultural context of the targeted recipients into consideration.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
With case-studies, show how the wholesale adoption of externally designed DDR programmes can cause psychological challenge for the targeted recipients.

7.0 References and Further Reading

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Module 4

Unit 1: Organizations Involved in Disarmament
Unit 2: Ex-Combatants and Prospects of Peace in the Post-Conflict Phase
Unit 3: The Gender Perspectives of DDR
Unit 4: The Imperative of Human Security
Unit 5: Feminists' Perspectives of Human Security

1.0: Introduction

Due to the crises of confidence that characterize relationships in post-conflict communities, there is often the need to have bodies other than the State to initiate or cooperate with the state for the process. Equally important for consideration in handling the disarmament process is the status of the body undertaking the project because of the security implications of poor handling and lack of legitimacy. This is why this unit addresses this subject.

2.0: Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:
• Know the history of the involvement of bodies involved in disarmament;
• Know how they collaborate with the affected states;
• Know some of the security implications of their actions, inactions and mistakes.

3.0 Main Contents

This unit will present the activities of some International Non-Governmental-Organisations because they have been the most active in collaborating with the affected states to undertake the disarmament processes. The roles of INGOs in security related activities have become prominent since the end of the Second World War. According to RCSS (2007) INGOs have a long history of exclusion from security issues is a recent phenomenon, for historically partly due to insufficient competent professional information and analyses, and also because security had been considered an area reserved exclusively under state sovereignty. Since their involvement after the Second World War, they have broadened their agenda to include arms control and disarmament issues. RCSS (2007) gives the examples of the role INGOs played in the permanent extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the campaign of the World Court Project for and advisory opinion in the legality of nuclear weapons by the International Court of Justice in 1996, and the role of the Nuclear Threat Initiative in reducing the proliferation of WMD.

RCSS (2007) reveals that it was only with the involvement of INGOs in the movement against landmines and the subsequent Ottawa Process and Convention that these non-state actors were drawn into the thick of disarmament negotiations. In fact, the credit of initiating the anti-landmine movement goes to INGOs. During 1991, several INGOs, several INGOs, National NGOs (NNGOs) and individuals
simultaneously began to discuss the necessity of coordinating initiatives and calls for a ban on landmines. The movement to ban landmines gained impetus after the formation in 1992 of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a coalition of six INGOs comprising Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). With the support of UN agencies, governments, and the ICRC, ICBL spearheaded and succeeded in its effort to mobilize international public support for a global ban on landmines and was instrumental in bringing about the Ottawa Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines. This treaty, which presently has 151 signatories, prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, (RCSS, 2007).

**Definition of INGOs**

Interestingly, while there is consensus that INGOs play a dominant role in transnational relations, there is no universally agreed definition of INGOs. This is primarily because INGOs as a category of organization are very diverse in nature, form, and structure; hence generalizations on INGOs are very difficult. A grouping of NGOs and INGOs as done by RCSS (2007:13) is presented below:

**Table 1.1 Acronyms for NGO Types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINGO</td>
<td>Big International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNGO</td>
<td>Community-Based Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONGO</td>
<td>Donor Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRO</td>
<td>Grass-Roots Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGDO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Development Organization</td>
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</table>
Besides the listed ones presented above the corruption of the concept of NGO has brought about the emergence of NGOs with no clear-cut agenda or objective. Animasawun (2010) describes these ones as Freelance Non-Governmental-Organisations, (FRINGOs) and there other perverted forms known as Brief Case Non-Governmental-Organization (BRINGOs). However, the UN has its definition of what qualifies to be addressed as an INGO. The definition states that an INGO is a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its citizens; in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities, with which the organisation co-operates.’ It is on the basis of this definition, along with the principle listed in Art. 71 of the UN Charter, that NGOs are identified and permitted to maintain a working relationship with the UN.

DISARMAMENT AND INGOs
Disarmament, in its simplest form refers to the reduction or elimination by a nation of its weapons systems. It envisions the drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons, looking towards the eradication of war itself, and is based on the notion that if there were no more weapons there would be no more war, (RCSS,2007). The concept of disarmament is an ideal based on the view that weapons cause wars, and that the eradication of weapons will in itself remove the main causes of conflict. Thus, the act of disarmament is seen as creating a new situation in which the potential for international conflict is eliminated.
The proponents of disarmament see the goal as simply reducing the size of military forces, budgets, explosive power, and other aggregate measures. Their rationale is that armaments have been the major cause of international instability and conflict, and only through reductions in the weaponry of all nations can the world achieve peace.

Based on this broad definition four distinct conceptions have emerged. These are; the penal destruction or reduction of the armament of a country defeated in war; bilateral disarmament agreements applying to specific geographic areas; the complete abolition of all armaments; and the reduction and limitation of national armaments by general international agreement through international forums such as the UN. Further, there are three different ways of viewing disarmament: unilateral or voluntary; through bilateral or multilateral agreements; and forced disarmament, (RCSS 2007).

**INGOs in Arms and Disarmament**

This sub-section is based largely on the findings of RCSS (2007). The association of NGOs with disarmament movements is traceable to the early nineteenth century; the ‘peace societies’ of that period, concerned with issues such as the relation of armaments and militarism to the prospects of international peace were essentially NGOs. Despite this fact, the influence of NGOs in the field of arms control and disarmament remained minimal till the end of World War II.

But since the end of World War II, NGOs have been playing an important role in arms control and disarmament issues and have expanded their agenda to include several security-related issues. Their active participation in the field of arms control and disarmament has resulted in their making essential contributions to disarmament and security debates as well as policy development and implementation. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, individual scientists,
experts, research institutes, and various NGOs were very active in promoting measures to prevent radioactive fallout from nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation. By disseminating accurate information and warnings about the dangers resulting from nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons, they stimulated public interest and pressure that helped to generate the political will of governments necessary to ban testing in the atmosphere in 1963, and to agree on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Several NGOs were established in the post-War era to deal specifically with this issue. The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-proliferation (PPNN) and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) are examples of two INGOs set up to deal with the issue of nuclear weapons and war in the 1980s.

In addition to these new NGOs established during the Cold War era, several existing NGOs expanded their agenda in the post–World War II period to deal with the challenges posed by weapons proliferation. Amnesty International and Greenpeace, NGOs devoted to promoting human rights and protecting the environment respectively, included activities against both conventional and nuclear weapons in their programmes.

In more recent times, NGOs helped to initiate and promote the efforts to convene the Test Ban Amendment Conference in 1991, which revived the efforts for a comprehensive test ban and restored that item to a top place on the international agenda. They also played an active role in promoting the achievement of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its verification systems. Another important initiative undertaken by a group of NGOs is the World Court Project that led to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July 1996 on the legality of the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons. NGOs have also played a significant role in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, resulting in its permanent extension. It was also at this conference that several hundred NGOs came together
and organized the ‘Abolition 2000’ caucus to promote the early abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

As a result, NGOs concerned with disarmament- and security related issues now make up an important part of the transnational civil society. Taking advantage of the possibilities for communication and organization which are now possible and combining forces in a variety of ways to transform global political agendas, NGOs are now increasingly important actors alongside governments and international institutions in tackling transnational security problems, and, along with their activity and influence, raising important issues of democratic accountability.

While the actual potential and viability of INGOs in the field of arms control and disarmament would be examined at length later, it would suffice to mention a few facts about their involvement in arms control and disarmament. These, as enumerated by David Atwood, are that, while NGO involvement in disarmament affairs is longstanding, its current manifestations are part of a broader reality of transnational civil society engagement on issues of global concern.

Further, disarmament has many dimensions and NGO engagement with these dimensions is not uniform but sometimes contradictory.

Finally, NGOs play many important roles in advancing disarmament affairs, which go well beyond their very limited direct access to disarmament negotiations.

Given the characteristics features of INGOs along with the nature of the post–Cold War world, INGOs can and have performed several important roles in the field of arms control and disarmament. In an interesting study, David Atwood identified 11 roles that NGOs could play in the field of arms control and disarmament. These are:

• generating public awareness;
• constituency-building and campaigning at the national and transnational levels;
• reframing issues;
• policy agenda-building and policy development;
• developing and changing norms;
• lobbying and/or advocacy;
• exchanging and targeting of information;
• researching and expert policy advising;
• monitoring and evaluating actor behaviour;
• developing Track II initiatives; and
• implementing policy

4.0 Conclusion
From the accounts presented in this unit, it is clear that disarmament benefits immensely from the support offered by INGOs due to their expertise and the constraints that confront the affected states at the post-conflict phase when disarmament is direly needed. Therefore, the role of INGOs as defined by the UN cannot be overemphasized in the disarmament process.

5.0 Summary
The unit traces the initial involvement of INGOs as participants in the disarmament and arms control struggles. It identifies the end of the Second World War as their entry point and since they have blossomed in offering the needed support to affected states as the need arises. It also presented different definitions of INGOs, their characteristics and roles in the disarmament and arms control struggle.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
• Define the term INGO
• What is disarmament and can INGOs play any role in the process?

7.0 References and Further Reading


International Non-Governmental Organizations in Arms Control and Disarmament Potential and Viability. [www.rcss.org](http://www.rcss.org).


Unit 2: Ex-Combatants and Prospects for Peace in the Post-Conflict Phase

1.0: Introduction

As victims and active participants of violent conflict ex-combatants are key stake-holders in the DDR processes. This is why they must be given utmost consideration when designing the whole gamut of the DDR programmes. In the context of disarmament they occupy the front-burner because the failure or success of the process will make or mar the security situation and security sector reforms that characterise post-conflict communities. Also, disarmament being a very apparent action with palpable effects must pay equal attention to combatants in order to ensure sustainable peace in the post-conflict phase.

Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to

- Appreciate the centrality of ex-combatants to the prospects of peace in post-conflict phase;
• Know the relationship between the ex-combatants and the prospects of peace in the post-conflict phase in all its ramifications.

4.0 Main Contents

Despite the contending demands on the state and government in the post-conflict phase, considerable space must be accorded the demands of ex-combatants. Typical of most post-conflict communities, ex-combatants have challenges that are not all the time peculiar to them. Common amongst these challenges are issues that touch on security, welfare and representation, (Schwarz, 2005). Other issues that have been identified touch on peace, security and development, (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005). Arguing further, Krause and Jutersonke (2005) posit that the peace in post-conflict communities depends on the assumption that hitherto combatants will eventually be rewarded with incentives such as cash, access to training and micro-credit amongst others. In subsequent sections, empirical instances of how ex-combatants adjusted into the post-conflict peace-building processes are presented.

Dzinesa (2008) based on many instances argue that security and peace in the post-conflict community are dependent more than any else on a successful disarmament. The World Bank, itself a major provider of technical and financial assistance to governments planning and implementing demobilisation and reintegration processes, revealed that survey data for DDR cases indicate that many former combatants lack basic education, marketable job skills, and for some, the social skills needed for successful economic and social integration. This is why making provision for them goes a long way in safeguarding the peace in post-conflict communities. Dzinesa (2008) quotes Nicole Ball as stating that ‘The typical (war) veteran is semiliterate at best, is unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land, and frequently has many dependents.’ The ex-combatants’ need for support is undeniable. They require humanitarian
assistance, taking into consideration their immediate post war unemployed status and the fact that they have lost time and opportunities while fighting to liberate their countries and improve the prospects of their kith and kin. The livelihood, security and status of ex-combatants prior to the termination of the conflict would have depended on their military capabilities, military supplies and possession of weapons. The ease with which ex-combatants identify with their military past and the difficulties involved in confronting uncertain civilian livelihoods necessitates the need for reintegration assistance. If unsuccessfully disarmed and reintegrated, ex-combatants may fall back on their military training and weapons possession in order to engage in criminal activities and there are instances to support this assertion.

**Organizing Ex-Combatants for Peace in Mozambique**

Based on feelings and perceptions formed during the war period, ex-combatants are often treated as a risk to social peace and stability. Yet, as one organization in Mozambique demonstrates, ex-combatants can be key players in the peacebuilding process, promoting peace and reconciliation, and mediating peaceful solutions to conflicts.

In 1995, two organizations serving ex-combatants from FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and RENAMO (Rebel Mozambique National Resistance), the opposing forces in the Mozambican civil conflict, created the Promotion of Peace (PROPAZ) programme. It grew out of the dissatisfaction and frustration felt by ex-combatants with the reintegration process and the need to find peaceful, non-violent solutions to conflicts that arose over issues of pensions and disarmament.
Originally the goal of PROPAZ was to train ex-combatants in peaceful conflict resolution techniques so that they could assist their colleagues through the difficulties of the reintegration. However, the programme quickly expanded to address conflicts and promote peace in the broader community. The mission of PROPAZ is “to promote peace, human rights, gender equality, unity and reconciliation through training programs in conflict resolution at the community and national levels.” The primary activities of the PROPAZ peace promoters are:

- Training local mediators
- Facilitating the resolution of conflicts
- Public education on peaceful conflict resolution

PROPAZ programme personnel use community seminars to identify possible peace promoters. These individuals are chosen based on interest and demonstrated skills. Their training consists of courses on community development, gender issues, conflict resolution and transformation.

After about four months of training, the new team of peace promoters begin to implement the programme in their locality. PROPAZ attempts to build balanced teams with an equal number of individuals from FRELIMO and RENAMO. Dialogue is used to help the team members identify problem issues and develop solutions for moving forward. The teamwork by ex-combatants from each side of the civil war offers evidence to communities struggling with conflict that there is an alternative to violence.

PROPAZ peace promoters work with local leadership when attempting to establish a new peace project. Their first step is to approach local leaders to explain the programme, its goals, and methodology. These leaders are drawn from
governmental, traditional and religious sectors.

Once the leaders agree, the team holds a public meeting to explain the concepts of conflict resolution. These meetings use theatre, poetry, and question and answer sessions to present the message. The goal is to educate the community about the need for peaceful conflict resolution and identify individuals to be trained in mediation skills.

Since 1995, PROPAZ has trained 150 ex-combatants as peace promoters in six of Mozambique’s ten provinces. Each province is divided into four districts served by a peace promoter team of five individuals. These promoters are working in over 100 communities to organize conflict resolution teams made up of community members including those who were not combatants. Through this structure, PROPAZ now involves over 1000 individuals in peace-building activities throughout the country.

Whereas, a success story as described above was recorded in Mozambique, the case in a place like South Africa has not been very encouraging because of the continued involvement of improperly disarmed ex-combatants in different form of violence.

4.0 Conclusion
Ex-combatants are very crucial to peace and security in post-conflict communities. As victims and participants their involvement and cooperation go a long way in sustain the peace in post-conflict communities as described in this unit.

5.0 Summary
The unit described with illustrations the importance of the involvement and cooperation of ex-combatants to maintenance and sustenance of peace and security in post conflict communities. It also presented two instances where the ex-
combatants have played two different roles due to the management of the disarmament process amongst other variables as presented in this unit.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Do you ex-combatants important in the enthronement and sustenance of peace in the post-conflict phase?

7.0 References and Further Reading


Dzinesa, G. A. (2007). ‘Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and


Organizing Ex-Combatants for Peace in Mozambique. [www.rjonline.com](http://www.rjonline.com)
Unit 3: The Gender Perspectives of DDR

1.0: Introduction

The whole idea of DDR presupposes the end of war and the re-entering of ex-combatants into the larger society. However, this does not turn out as simple as it seems all the times due to many foreseen and unforeseen variables that affect the process remotely and immediately. The wider implications of the process which transcends the participants in the DDR processes necessitate the need to engender the process amongst other reasons.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- Know the importance of a gender perspective of DDR
- Appreciate the advantages of a gender perspective of DDR
Main Contents

Nothing underscores the need for engendering DDR more than the seeming neglect of female ex-combatants despite its obvious need. According to Bouta (2005), despite the fact that paragraph 13 of resolution 1325 emphasizes the need to pay attention to the needs of female ex-combatants not equal attention have been given to female ex-combatants by both the State and multilateral agencies. The reason for the neglect women’s need in the post-war period could be due to the age-long held opinion that women are naturally inclined to peace in all situations unlike men. However, recent happenings have questioned this assertion. This is because of the involvement of women and girls in active warfare, (Bouta, 2005). Women have been involved in wars in places like Eritrea, Srilanka, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Algeria and Liberia, (Bouta, 2005). All these underscore the need to give equal consideration to the needs of women and girl combatants in post-conflict communities when the DDR processes begin.

While the motives are different in some cases, it is similar in some others. However, both boys and girls have joined guerrillas against their wishes. Bouta (2005) reports that in many war-torn countries, girls joined militias or guerrillas to run away from domestic oppressions, to seek protection and adventure in rare cases. On the other hand warlords tended to recruit women in preference to men because they feel women are more obedient than men and give symbolic value to their claims and agitations.

Bouta (2005) points out that most women serve as cooks, nurses, doctors and logisticians for armies and as a result of this they do not always carry arms. This sometimes makes it difficult for them to claim to ex-combatants because they do not carry or possess arms. As a result, they are often not given proper attention or short-changed in the DDR processes. However, despite the fact that some of the
agencies and INGOs involved in DDR try to target women, they are still faced with some constraints that constitute challenges for them.

**Challenges of Engendering DDR**

Much as a number of agencies mouth their commitment to the engendering of DDR, there are still challenges confronting them in fulfilling this. Some of these challenges as discussed by Bouta (2005) are presented below.

1. **Paucity of Funds**: this remains the bane of engendering DDR in many instances. This is because the practicality of DDR implies buying the peace because the unstated intention and expectation of offering money to the ex-combatants is to stop them from constituting threats to security and not basically to help them. Therefore, the scale weighs more in the favour of men in this context because they constitute more threats in the post-conflict phase than women.

2. **Non Possession of Weapons**: due to the fact that more men carried weapons while wars lasted and paucity of funds constrains them from enlisting those who did not possess weapons because they constitute lesser insecurity when compared with those who carried weapons.

3. **Disappearance of Women**: owing to cultural beliefs that negatively stigmatise women when pre-war relations return, women are not able to cope with the negative stigmatisation that comes with carrying a baby born out of rape or forced relationships. So many of these women flee ad are not available to benefit from the DDR process.

Having identified some of the challenges confronting the engendering of DDR, it expected that the identified problems will be useful for initiators and managers of DDR processes in order to ensure that the engendering of DDR is improved.
Suggestions on how to Engender DDR

Flowing from the problems militating against the engendering of DDR highlighted above, the following suggestions are considered plausible

1. **Provision of more funds:** in order to cater for the needs of all, more funds should be set aside for the DDR projects. This will make room for the need of women whose needs are often relegated due to the higher premium placed on the needs of men who are given priority because they may retard the peace process. It therefore, suggested that if more money is made available, the needs of women can be simultaneously taken care off.

2. **Broadening of Scope:** the scope of those to be taken care of in the DDR budget should also include those who do not posses arms. This is because women constitute the core of the vulnerable in conflict and as a result hardly in possession of arms. This also counts against them during the DDR processes when efforts and incentives are for those who turn in their arms. In this event, women who were never in possession of arms have nothing to return. Therefore, broadening the scope of incentives to include those who do not possess weapons will go a long way in engendering the DDR process.

3. **Massive campaign against stigmatisation:** this is informed by the behaviour of women in post-conflict communities. They usually flee from their immediate communities because of the stigmatisation associated with carrying pregnancies and babies from rapes. The decision to flee denies them the opportunity of benefiting from the DDR processes. Therefore, efforts should be intensified to encourage women not to flee from post-conflict communities because of fear, rejection and shame that come with stigmatisation. Also, communities should be
encouraged not to reject women in such conditions because it contradicts the spirit of reconciliation required for sustainable peace in post-conflict communities.

**Conclusion**
From the presentation in this unit, it becomes clear that contrary to hitherto held view that women have no roles in either regular or irregular armies, they indeed play both active and auxiliary roles. This makes gendering of DDR processes a matter of necessity in order to take care of the needs of the affected women and girls in such situations. Although, there are challenges confronting agencies and INGOs embarking on DDR in this regard, these challenges are not tenable as excuses for non-performance in this regard.

**5.0 Summary**
The unit presented and discussed the plight of women and girls as fighters especially in irregular armies at the post-conflict phase during the disarmament stage of the DDR process. It highlighted the challenges facing the agencies and INGos involved in this task in the context of reaching and providing for women.

**6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments**
- Discuss the challenges confronting women in the DDR process
- Why do you think the engendering of DDR is necessary?

**7.0 References and Further Reading**

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (2001). *CIDA’s Action*


Unit 4: The Imperative of Human Security

1.0: Introduction

As a concept that takes care of the fears and wants of people even in communities other than post-conflict ones, the concept of human security and its appropriate application goes a long way in preventing conflicts and supporting post-conflict peace. This is why it comes into the context of DDR processes because it takes care of the security of man from the micro to the macro level.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Know the nexus between human security and sustainable peace in post-conflict communities;
- Know how human security as a concept can be supportive of DDR processes.
3.0 Main Contents

Bakut (2006), observes that the concept of security is widely accepted as contested, the summary of the whole notion can be described as provision of condition that enhances safety, or feeling protected from harm or danger. It also includes the provision of defence, protection and preservation of fundamental values and the absence of danger to acquired values. Therefore, security, must include the absence of all forms of violence and the presence of positive peace.

It is noteworthy to state that the concept of security has received wider intellectual and policy attention since the end of the cold war. Palme et al (1982) initiated the concept of common security, a positive-sum idea that concieves of the greater security one state as mutually reinforcing with that of the other. With the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 came another radical concept of security known as the concept of comprehensive security by, (Westing, 1989). This concept of security broadened the spectrum of traditional concerns of security. In contemporary times, human security has taken the center stage. This is popularly defined as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and oppression, and protection from the sudden and hurtful impact in the patterns of everyday life” quoted in (Gleditsch, 2001: 53).

A detailed list of the features of the concept of human security includes; political security implying freedom from dictatorship and other forms of arbitrary government; economic and social security entailing the freedom from poverty and want; cultural security defined as the freedom from ethnic and religious domination and enviromental security. It becomes auspicious to identify the defining featurezof the concept of human security with the ideals promoted by human rights activists especially the third generation of human rights issues that touch on the issues of the enviroment. The concept human security has to some extent mitigated the dominance of power-political thinking on international
relations, (Glegitsch, 2001). At the intra-state level, it constitutes one of the main planks of civil society agitations in the few military posts left in Africa, the democratizing states and post-conflict states. Further more, it can serve as conflict prevention mechanism if properly implemented.

Taken that the causes of conflicts include fears and wants, if human security aims at removing fears and wants, it therefore, follows that it can be very useful in the DDR processes because of its potentials to prevent violent conflicts. This is why it has been considered important and useful for the purpose of this course that dwells on the subject of DDR. According to Krause and Jutersonke (2005), the conception of the concept of human security as espoused by the United Nations Development Programme in its Development Report of 1994 covers a wide range of areas. These scopes include economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community and political security.

The main thrust of the concept is to expand the notion and conception of security beyond focus on territorial protection or defence against external aggression and safeguarding of the national interest. Human security aims to make human beings the referent object of protection through sustainable development. The intent is to attempt to divert huge spending on military activities that characterised the Cold War to more productive ends that will meet the needs of the people. The concept was promoted from the beginning as a practical concept with defined strategic goals.

Since the introduction of the concept it has gained wide usage and application by both state and non-state actors in politics, development, international relations and peace studies. At the grassroots and governmental levels it commonly defined by both state and non-state actors as putting the people first, (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005). In practical terms it means adopting a bottom-top
approach to security with focus on the relationship between the states and their citizens by ensuring that state security is not mistaken for the security of the regime. Instead it argues for equating of security with the economic, environmental, political and social wellbeing of the citizens. This has become more necessary because many regimes continue to perceive security as that of the regime at the expense of the wellbeing of the citizens.

There are broad and narrow conceptions of human security. The broad vision also referred to as the Japanese is based on the original UNDP conception that aims at achieving freedom from want, (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005). Freedom from want entails meeting basic needs in economic, health, food, social and environmental terms. All these form the fulcrum of the Japanese Trust Fund for Human Security. The second conception is known as Freedom from Fear. This entails removing the use or threat of force and violence from peoples’ daily lives. The two conceptions can be useful for the DDR processes at different stages. However, Freedom from Fear seems more apt for the DDR process because it addresses the threats constituted by the presence of ex-combatants who have not been properly disarmed, demobilised or reintegrated.

Indisputably, a proper application of the concept of human security can be very useful and supportive of the DDR process. This is not limited to security but also includes representation and welfare of citizens including ex-combatants. The potentials of human security in this regard cannot be overemphasized. This is because careful analyses of most conflicts indicate that human insecurity is one of the pathogens of conflict in many of the conflict ridden states. This can be found at both the individual and group levels.

Similarly, Schwarz (2005) argues that human security offers hope of preventing and even resolving conflicts. Based on the two conceptions of human security, that is, freedom from want and freedom from fear, the citizens can be
adequately protected from all forms of terror and oppression which often predispose people to forming and joining guerrilla formations. Common to the two conceptions is that threats to citizens in many cases arise from predatory rulers, widespread corruption, politics of exclusion, perverted judiciary, flawed electoral processes amongst others. A look at all of these oppressive practices shows that the state is culpable in many of these instances. Therefore, human security can also reshape the relationship between the state and the citizens based on a liberal philosophy that places high premium on human liberty, human dignity and human freedom, (Schwarz, 2005).

An advantage of hinging DDR on the notion of human security is that it serves a dual purpose. The first one is that it takes care of ex-combatants and the second one is that it strengthens the state by giving it legitimacy.

**Development or Security and DDR**

Schwarz (2005) generates a debate on whether it is development or security that reduces the occurrence and predisposition to violence. This question in the opinion of this unit can be answered by the human security because of its scope. Schwarz (2005) argues that despite the barrier between the development and security communities, the need to provide opportunities for citizens also known as opportunities for participation and economic well-being in post-conflict situations seems to be an emerging international consensus. He advocates that linkage between development and security must not be understood as creating individual opportunities, but rather as reducing inequalities between ethnic groups or between regions in a country. By ensuring human security throughout the country, the areas of discontent and rebellion will be reduced.

Recent events however, point to the fact that security especially human security is a precondition for political, social, and economic wellbeing. This is illustrated by the notion of *security first* and the idea of sustainable *disarmament*
for sustainable development both of which have been embraced by major international organizations including the World Bank through support for DDR programmes.

4.0 Conclusion
The unit argues that human security can go a long way in supporting DDR and that it should be hinged on it because it serves more than a purpose. The unit posits that human security while taking care of ex-combatants will also grant legitimacy to the state because it would simultaneously take care of the needs of the citizens.

Summary
This unit details the origin of the concept of human security, its dimensions, applicability and the huge potentials it has for DDR processes. It also presents the debate between development and security communities on which one should come first in the post-conflict community.

Tutor Marked Assignments
How do you think DDR can bring about sustainable peace and development?
Define human security and explain its relevance to the DDR processes.

References and Further Reading


Unit 5: Feminists’ Perspectives of Human Security

1.0: Introduction
2.0: Objectives
3.0: Main Contents
4.0: Conclusion
5.0: Summary
6.0: Tutor Marked Assignments
7.0: References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
The evolution of human security reflects a collective search among communities of policy-makers, the academia and state-actors on the need to make human beings the centre of policies and initiatives. The significance of the concept lies in its comprehensive approach to issues of peace, security and development that affect humanity collectively and individually. The United Nations Commission on Human Security co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata got a mandate in 2001 to come up with answers to ways off achieving the Millennium Declaration’s goals of attaining freedom from fear and freedom from want for humanity. Earlier in 2000, 180 countries endorsed the Decalaration. According to the Commisions’s publication entitled; Human Security Now published in 2003, human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment. According to Truang et al (2006) this definition integrates Human Rights, Human Development and Human Security as three facets of a common ethical base for the safety of human life and dignity as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and subsequent Human Rights treaties.
However, there are challenges militating against the realisation of the objectives of human security in many countries. Truaong et al (2006) observes that every facet of human security involves a direct or indirect mediating role of cultural and religious institutions, covering from the most local and historically specific experience of individuals and groups to the most global level of disputes over territorial and resource control, (Truaong, 2005). One of the inadvertent implications of post-9/11 is the fortification of the state-centric notion of security and a stronger control of the social body that impinges on the human rights concerns.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- Know the burden of war borne by women using two countries as case studies;
- Appreciate the need for feminists’ perspective of human security and its potentials for the DDR process.

3.0 Main Contents

The need to transcend the state-centric and masculinist conception of security lies at the heart of human security. This has made an intersectional perspective of that pays attention to gender imperative. In times of conflict, the historical and systematic discrimination faced by women as a result of patriarchal structures is accentuated during a conflict. Social, religious and cultural factors that make women dependent inhibit their mobility, restrict their participation in the public sphere and deny them decision-making power within the family. These practises obstruct their overall progress making vulnerable to abuses and injuries during and after conflicts. As a course that focuses on DDR, it must not be lost on us that the
plight of women has not received the desired attention. This is inclusive of the DDR periods. Although, the prevalent notion years back was that violence against women in conflict situations was largely framed within the rubric of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ (Abeysekera, 2006). Recent understandings of violence and abuse against women in conflicts have become sensitive to the complexities of the situation.


**Conflict as Catalyst for Change**

The conflicts in Sri Lanka and Timor Leste took place in a context in which the majority of women were underprivileged and discriminated against at all levels. In Timor Leste, the rural population suffered severe neglect and under-development; patriarchal norms that restricted women’s freedom combined with social and cultural practises to deny women their rights to education, health care and proper nutrition.

In Sri Lanka there were different kinds of restrictions against the independence of women based on patriarchal beliefs and attitudes. There were also regional differences in inequalities on development indices like health and education. The worst affected areas were the minority communities in the country.

At the level of decision-making, not more than 5% of the parliament were women with a low level of women presence in the local government (Abeysekera, 2006). In Timor Leste, free adult franchise was not available to the public until after the referendum of 1999. In Sri-Lanka, women dominated the labour-intensive and lower-paid sub-sectors of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Since the 1980s, many women began migrating to the urban centers to earn livings as
domestic workers and factory workers. In Timor Leste, the seriousness of the conflict confined most women indoors.

Abeysekera (2005) submits that in the two countries, patriarchal social structures constituted barriers on women’s autonomy, freedom of movement, choice of marriage partner and reproductive and sexual choices. Patriarchal laws prohibit women from owning and controlling resources such as land. The disadvantaged position of women was worsened by conflicts.

**The Period of Conflict: Timor Leste during Indonesian Occupation**

To further underscore the fact that women get involved in armed conflicts and are deserving of consideration in the DDR processes, this sub-unit presents the experiences of women as victims and participants during the conflict. According to Abeysekera (2006) many women were active members of FRETILIN and played strategic roles in the secret networks that sustained the resistance while the occupation lasted.

Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN Rapporteur on Violence against women noted in her report that the Indonesian military and the local militias in East Timor used rape as a method of torture and intimidation against the local population. Abeysekera (2006) reports also that female relatives of political opponents of the regime were raped as a form of revenge and in order to force the men out of hiding. This was confirmed by the testimonies of several girls who were below 18 and women that they were extensively tortured, raped and forced into sexual slavery in 1980. Women also spoke of being raped in front of their families and communities. Others lamented the problems they faced within their communities as a consequence of bearing children conceived after rapes. Olga da Silva Amaral and Beatriz Guiterrez of Timor Leste testified of being held as sex captives in military camps for extended periods. Amaral described the vulnerability of the
women in her village after the arrest of all the men of the village. Guiterrez had three children by three different Indonesian soldiers and became an object of social mockery when she was labelled as the ‘local wife’ of the enemy (Abeysekera, 2006).

Sri Lanka: The North and East During the Years of Conflict: 1977 to 2002

Just as it happened in Timor Leste, there were many reported cases of the violation of women and girls. Gory pictures of rape cases and other abuses were painted during the sessions of the Fact-Finding Commission organized in 1997 in the north-central and eastern parts of the country which comprised mixed populations of Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim people and where militarisation was intense as a response to large-scale massacres of civilians that had taken place during the 1990s.

Furthermore, Abeysekera (2006) reveals that most acts of sexual violence against the Tamil women in the north and east that were committed by the Sri Lankan security forces have been reported in the 1990s. Many heart-rending cases equally got media attention. One of these was the case of Krishanthi Kumarasamy, her mother, her brother and a neighbour in 1996 and the murder of Koneswary in 1997.

Involvement of Women in the Peace Process.

In Timor Leste, the most prominent role of women was at the advocacy and lobbying levels at the international level. However, the involvement of women in the negotiation process happened very slowly. In the early 1990s, only one out of a team of 30 negotiators was a woman over a period that spanned six years. The situation improved slightly in 1997 when four women became part of the team.
Several attempts have been made to resolve the raging ethnic conflict over the past twenty years. However, in all of these, no woman was involved at any level. Worse-still there was no discussion or expression of concern about their non-involvement. Their activities have been limited to bridge-building initiatives in the civil-society realm. Also, since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002, they have also been active in organising around issues of participation and inclusion, (Abeyeskera 2006). Since then there have been a level of progress indicative of brighter prospects for the inclusion of women in peace processes.

4.0 Conclusion

This unit argues that based on the plight of women during and after conflicts a feminist perspective on human security cannot be discountenanced. It posits that if DDR programmes are to have the desired effects, they must be based on the concept of human security with equal premium on the feminists’ perspective of the concept.

5.0 Summary

The unit presented instances of the violation and abuse of women and girls in particular in arguing for the inclusion of feminists’ perspective of human security in the DDR processes. This was done with many empirical instances drawn from Timor Leste and Sri Lanka.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

- Discuss the relevance of a feminist perspective on human security to the DDR process.

7.0 References and Further Reading

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