COURSE CODE: INR391

(2 CREDIT UNIT)

COURSE TITLE: NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY I
INR391

NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY I

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Course Description

INR391, Nigeria's Foreign Policy I is a one semester course in the third year of B.A. (Hons) degree in International studies. It is a two unit credit course designed to increase your knowledge on vital issues on the foreign policy relation of Nigeria. The course is structured into four modules as described below:

Module 1. Background to Nigeria's Foreign Policy
This module launch you into understanding first, meaning of policy; foreign policy; components of foreign policy including basic principles guiding the states, goals to achieve and available means for the pursuit. Secondly, the historical development, constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. Third, how the national interests, structure of economy, strategic location; political structure; socio-cultural influence; personal idiosyncrasies; military; demographic; domestic political situations serves as determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy as well as the impact of exogenous or external influences on Nigeria's foreign policy. Fourth, institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation; Ministry of External Affair as an institution responsible for conducting foreign policy; the significant role of think tanks in enhancing quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making and implementation as well as the instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy.

Module 2. Nigeria's Afro-Centric Policy
This module is interesting as it help you to have good understanding on the origin of Nigeria's Afro-centric bent including the factors that necessitated Nigeria's foreign policy of Afro-centeredness, Nigeria's Afro-centric policy objectives; Nigeria's role in the eradication of apartheid policy and decolonization, Nigeria's contribution towards the unity, economic integration and development as well as Nigeria's efforts in the promoting peace and security in African continent.

Module 3. Nigeria Relations With Great Powers
This module is significant as it help you gain knowledge on the Nigeria relations with Great powers. It familiarize you with the Nigeria relations with United Kingdom (Britain); United States (America); USSR (Russia) and France respectively. More importantly, it identifies and addresses issues in the changing relations between Nigeria and each of the Great powers.

Module 4. Nigeria's Role In International Organizations
This module is interesting as it help you increase knowledge and to appreciate Nigeria's contributions in international organizations. It familiarize you with: the contributions of Nigeria to the effective functioning of United Nations Organization (UNO), what Nigeria as a member has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the UNO. How Nigeria has contributed to the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations (CONs); what Nigeria has benefited from the activities of the CONs. The reasons why Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); what Nigeria has benefited as a member of OPEC. Nigeria in the formation and transformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU), the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS.
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INTRODUCTION

INR391, Nigeria's Foreign Policy I is a one semester course in the third year of B.A. (Hons) degree in International studies. It is a two unit credit course designed to give you knowledge on vital issues relating to the foreign policy of Nigeria. The course begins with module one, which present you the background to understanding Nigeria's foreign policy, particularly meanings and components of Nigeria's foreign policy; the historical development of Nigeria's foreign policy; factors that determines Nigeria's foreign policy; the formulation and mechanisms for the implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy. Interestingly, Module two of the course brings to your limelight the Nigeria Afro-centric policy, which include the origin and necessity for Nigeria Afro-centric bent, Nigeria's efforts in ending apartheid and in decolonization of Africa; Nigeria's efforts in promoting unity, development, peace and security in Africa. Module three, take you further to familiarize you Nigeria relations with the Great powers, especially with the United Kingdom (UK), United States, Russia and France. Module four, focuses on Nigeria's role in international organizations such as United Nations Organizations (UNO); Commonwealth of Nations (CONs); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as well as her role in Sub-regional Organizations [Organization of African Unity(OAU)/African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Therefore, the study are structured into four modules. Each module is structured into four units. A unit guide comprises of instructional material. It gives you a brief of the course content, course guidelines and suggestions and steps to take while studying. You can also find self-assessment exercises for your study.

COURSE AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The general aim of this course is to provide students of international relations with comprehensive knowledge on Nigeria's foreign policy and relations. However, the course specific objectives include to enable you:

- understand the meanings, components and historical development of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- gain in-depth knowledge on the factors that determines Nigeria's foreign policy;
- familiarize with the formulation and the mechanisms for implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- understanding the origin and necessity for Nigeria's Afro-centric bent;
- appreciate Nigeria's efforts in promoting unity, development, peace and security in Africa;
- gain knowledge on Nigeria bilateral relations with the Great powers;
- appreciate the role played by Nigeria in international and in sub-regional organizations.

The specific objectives of each study unit can be found at the beginning and you can make references to it while studying. It is necessary and helpful for you to check at the end of the unit, if your progress is consistent with the stated objectives and if you can conveniently answer the self-assessment exercises. The overall objectives of the course will be achieved, if you diligently study and complete all the units in this course.
WORKING THROUGH THE COURSE

To complete the course, you are required to read the study units and other related materials. You will also need to undertake practical exercises for which you need a pen, a note-book, and other materials that will be listed in this guide. The exercises are to aid you in understanding the concepts being presented. At the end of each unit, you will be required to submit written assignment for assessment purposes.

At the end of the course, you will be expected to write a final examination.

THE COURSE MATERIAL

In this course, as in all other courses, the major components you will find are as follows:

1. Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignments

STUDY UNITS

There are 16 study units in this course. They are:

Module 1: Background to Nigeria's Foreign Policy
Unit 1: Meanings and Components of Foreign Policy
Unit 2: Historical Development of Nigeria's Foreign Policy
Unit 3: Factors that Determine Nigeria's Foreign Policy
Unit 4: Formulation and Mechanisms for Implementation of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Module 2: Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy
Unit 1: Origin and Necessity for Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy
Unit 2: Nigeria's Effort in Ending Apartheid and Decolonization of Africa
Unit 3: Nigeria's Effort towards the Unity and Development of Africa
Unit 4: Nigeria's Effort in Promoting Peace and Security in Africa

Module 3: Nigeria Relations with Great Powers
Unit 1: Nigeria Relations with United Kingdom (UK)
Unit 2: Nigeria Relations with United States (US)
Unit 3: Nigeria Relations with Russia
Unit 4: Nigeria Relations with France

Module 4: Nigeria's Role in International Organizations
Unit 1: Nigeria in United Nations Organization (UNO)
Unit 2: Nigeria in Commonwealth of Nations (CONs)
Unit 3: Nigeria in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Unit 4: Nigeria in Sub-Regional Organizations (OAU/AU, ECOWAS)
As you can observe, the course begins with the basics and expands into a more elaborate, complex and detailed form. All you need to do is to follow the instructions as provided in each unit. In addition, some self-assessment exercises have been provided with which you can test your progress with the text and determine if your study is fulfilling the stated objectives. Tutor-marked assignments have also been provided to aid your study. All these will assist you to be able to fully grasp the spirit and letters of Europe’s role and place in international politics.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may yourself wish to consult as the need arises, even though I have made efforts to provide you with the most important information you need to pass this course. However, I would encourage you, as a third year student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, be sure to consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: the Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your own understanding of the course content. Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

At the end of each unit, you will find tutor-marked assignments. There is an average of two tutor-marked assignments per unit. This will allow you to engage the course as robustly as possible. You need to submit at least four assignments of which the three with the highest marks will be recorded as part of your total course grade. This will account for 10 percent each, making a total of 30 percent. When you complete your assignments, send them including your form to your tutor for formal assessment on or before the deadline.

Self-assessment exercises are also provided in each unit. The exercises should help you to evaluate your understanding of the material so far.

These are not to be submitted. You will find all answers to these within the units they are intended for.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

There will be a final examination at the end of the course. The examination carries a total of 70 percent of the total course grade. The examination will reflect the contents of what you have learnt and the self-assessments and tutor-marked assignments. You therefore need to revise your course materials beforehand.
COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table sets out how the actual course marking is broken down.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>MARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Four assignments (the best four of all the</td>
<td>Four assignments, each marked out of 10%, but highest scoring three</td>
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<tr>
<td>assignments submitted for marking)</td>
<td>selected, thus totalling 30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Examination</td>
<td>70% of overall course score</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% of course score</td>
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COURSE OVERVIEW PRESENTATION SCHEME

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<td>Unit 2</td>
<td>Nigeria's Effort in Ending Apartheid and Decolonization of Africa</td>
<td>Week 6</td>
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<td>Revision</td>
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<td>Week 17</td>
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WHAT YOU WILL NEED FOR THE COURSE
This course builds on what you have learnt in the 100 Levels. It will be helpful if you try to review what you studied earlier. Second, you may need to purchase one or two texts recommended as important for your mastery of the course content. You need quality time in a study friendly environment every week. If you are computer-literate (which ideally you should be), you should be prepared to visit recommended websites. You should also cultivate the habit of visiting reputable physical libraries accessible to you.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS
There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your tutor marked assignments promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your self-assessment exercise, tutor-marked assignment or the grading of an assignment. In any case, you are advised to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

ASSESSMENT EXERCISES
There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First is the Tutor-Marked Assignments; second is a written examination. In handling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The tutor-marked assignments are now being done online. Ensure that you register all your courses so that you can have easy access to the online assignments. Your score in the online assignments will account for 30 per cent of your total coursework. At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAs)
Usually, there are four online tutor-marked assignments in this course. Each assignment will be marked over ten percent. The best three (that is the highest three of the 10 marks) will be counted. This implies that the total mark for the best three assignments will constitute 30% of your total course work. You will be able to complete your online assignments successfully from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING
The final examination for INR 391: Nigeria's Foreign Policy I will be of two hours duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of multiple choice and fill-in-the-gaps questions which will reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed. It is important that you use adequate time to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.
HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

1. There are 16 units in this course. You are to spend one week in each unit. In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do. The study units tell you when to read and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you in a class exercise.

2. Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chance of passing the course.

3. The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your reference or from a reading section.

4. The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor’s job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

5. Read this course guide thoroughly. It is your first assignment.

6. Organise a study schedule – Design a ‘Course Overview’ to guide you through the course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units.

7. Important information; e.g. details of your tutorials and the date of the first day of the semester is available at the study centre.

8. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.

9. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it.

10. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind in their coursework. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please let your tutor or course coordinator know before it is too late for help.
11. Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.

12. Assemble the study materials. You will need your references for the unit you are studying at any point in time.

13. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.

14. Visit your study centre whenever you need up-to-date information.

15. Well before the relevant online TMA due dates, visit your study centre for relevant information and updates. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination.

16. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit’s objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.

17. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the course guide).

CONCLUSION

This is a theory course, but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to political issues in domestic and international arenas.

SUMMARY

‘Nigeria's Foreign Policy I’, introduces you to general understanding as regards the foreign policy and relations of Nigeria. All the basic course materials that you need to successfully complete the course are provided. At the end, you will be able to:

- review the meanings, components and historical development of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- identify and discuss the factors that determines Nigeria's foreign policy;
- explain the formulation and mechanism for implementation of foreign policy in Nigeria;
- discuss origin and necessity for Nigeria's Afro-centric bent;
- examine the efforts of Nigeria in promoting unity, development, peace and security in Africa;
- explain the Nigeria relations with the Great powers;
- discuss role of Nigeria in international and sub-regional organizations.
### List of Acronyms

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>Association for Better Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFFs</td>
<td>African Congress Freedom Fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONs</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Commander of the Order of the Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FESTAC</td>
<td>African Festival of Arts and Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCR</td>
<td>Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFLA</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACAP</td>
<td>National Committee Against Apartheid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>National Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of Africa Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SAFR</td>
<td>Southern Africa Relief Fund</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organization</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<td>United Nations Committee Against Apartheid</td>
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<td>United Nations Command to Congo</td>
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Bibliography and Suggested Reading
**MODULE 1: BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

**INTRODUCTION**

This module launch you into understanding first, meaning of policy; foreign policy; components of foreign policy including basic principles guiding the states, goals to achieve and available means for the pursuit. Secondly the historical development, constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. Third, how the national interests, structure of economy, strategic location; political structure; socio-cultural influence; personal idiosyncrasies; military; demographic; domestic political situations serves as determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy as well as the impact of exogenous or external influences on Nigeria's foreign policy. Fourth, institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation; Ministry of External Affairs as an institution responsible for conducting foreign policy; the significant role of think tanks in enhancing quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making and implementation as well as the instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy.

The module comprises five units upon which our discussion will subsequently anchored on for better understanding:

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UNIT 1 MEANINGS AND COMPONENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

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   3.4 Relationship between national interest and foreign policy
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is a global concept and there is virtually no nation-state or country without foreign policy. As a future foreign policy maker, this unit provide you with simple and clear meanings of the term policy, definitions of the concept of foreign policy, the fundamental components of foreign policy as well as the relationship between national interest and foreign policy. This unit is significant, as it serves as a good foundation for comprehending the subject of this course on foreign policy discussion.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- give the meaning of the term policy;
- define the concept of foreign policy according to various scholars;
- explain the fundamental components of foreign policy; and
- discuss the relationship between national interest and foreign policy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Meaning of Policy

The term policy can be described as "a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party" (Cambridge dictionary, 2016). It is a plan or a course of action, as of a government intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters. Or a course of action, guiding principle, or procedure considered expedient or advantageous (Free dictionary, 2016). A set of policies are principles, rules, and guidelines formulated or adopted by an organization or nation-state to reach its long-term goals. Policies and procedures are designed to influence and determine all major decisions and actions, and all activities take place within the
boundaries set by them. To Ofoegbu (1980:3) policy means "a course of action adopted by a Government, a group of persons." It connotes wisdom and prudent conduct. Its Greek roots relate to the polis, that is, to citizenship and statecraft. It is, therefore, a set of connected ideas and thoughts (products of mental activity, reflective processes and acts) which embody judgment, choices, decisions, evaluations, systematic insight, solutions and understanding of truth. In the development or formulation of policy we require the recognition of problems, the development of knowledge about these problems, and the clarification of the goals or values which we seek in our efforts at finding solutions. All this is followed by an analysis of the environment and its conditioning factors; a description of trends such as the operating realities elsewhere or frameworks of decision-making or prevailing formulae for decisions. These are followed by an outline of available alternatives, consideration and evaluation of these alternatives, and the choice or selection of alternative solutions. In the end we make decisions, pass judgment and pick our choices. Invariably, this is an integration of a number of selected alternatives into a system of interrelated elements covering knowledge of the problems, goals desired, means-cost assessments, likely other ways of attaining the desired goals, the different stages of actions to be followed, and the solutions proposed. Policy, therefore deals:

with the production of values and connected deals that can lead to the solution of problems. It contributes positively to the creation and accumulation of these values, and deals equally with the sharing of values in society. This role of 'sharing' may be performed authoritatively or voluntarily. Another attribute of policy is that every policy seeks to clarify goals, positions and actions after stating them. These functions constitute statements of policy, and the general public cherishes them (ibid, 1980:3).

However, the making of policy demands planning. Planning, as we know, is a demonstration of faith in rational thought and organization. It draws heavily from the success of science and engineering in thinking about the future and producing solution to human, social and environmental problems. Significantly, it is important to point out that:

Nation-states in the international system have many policies. These are usually domestic and foreign in nature. The category designated 'domestic' comprises many sub-categories which covers economics, social welfare, national politics, education, transport, and so on. Together these regulate, shape, direct and govern relations among citizens, groups of citizens and national institutions. They either provide contentment and happiness or discontent and domestic unease. if their overall effect is beneficial and satisfying, they generate that inner strength of character and will-power that promotes self-confidence and self-awareness (ibid, 1980:4).

From the above backdrop paraphrase, you will notice that only domestic category was briefly highlighted. It is because our interest is particularly on foreign policy and that will subsequently constitute our next line of consideration.
SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you define the term policy?

3.2 Definitions of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is the category, which deals with defence, security, international political relations, and international economic relations. It deals with the relations between one actor in international system and other actors in the international system. These other actors, as we said earlier, may be states, international organizations, some types of individuals, or the environment of the system irrespective of whether the elements involve are social, cultural or structural (Rosenau, 1969 in Ofoegbu, 1980:4).

Similarly, many of the goals, social, cultural, political, economic and so on, which states try to pursue in international system cannot be achieved within the territorial confines of the national state. At times, states need the active cooperation, even assistance, of other states in the system to achieve their national objectives. Because of this a state necessarily has to be in communication with the external environment. It is the totality of this communication that is commonly referred to as foreign policy (Ojo and Sesay, 2002:113). However, like many other concepts in international relations, universal acceptability still eludes the definition of foreign policy. And doubts are expressed on the possibility of any definition of the discipline ever winning universality in its acceptance.

Interestingly, renowned and leading scholars in the field of international relations have in their works, provided helpful and usable clarification of the concept. According to Adeniji (1968:15) it is a projection of the country’s national interest into the trans-national arena, and the consequent interaction of one with the other. Northedge (1968:9) sees foreign policy as “the use of political influence to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them”. To Frankel (1963) foreign policy consists of decisions and actions, which involve to an appreciable extent, relations between one state and others. Tyoden (1989:59) refers to foreign policy as measures consciously designed and put in place by a government for the attainment of specific goals and objectives in the international system. For Holsti cited in Asogwa, (2009:2) it is the actions of a state towards the external environment and the conditions usually domesticated under which these actions are formulated. According to Rizwan (2009) it refers to the ways in which the central governments of sovereign states relate to each other and to the global system in order to achieve various goals or objectives. Thus, it represents a set of principles or course of action that government of states adopts that help to define their relationship with other parts of the world. Chibundu (2001:5) posits that foreign policy is a country’s response to the world outside its own frontiers. Foreign policy is a state’s behavior external to her. It is what states do to each other. It is taken to be action of a state towards another, including also the reactions of these states to actions by states. These actions or response to actions depending on the circumstance may either be friendly or aggressive, simple or complex. Some countries can at different times be friends or enemies within a given short or long period of time. For example, Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Ivory Coast, Gabon,
Tanzania and Zambia during the Nigerian civil war 1967-70. This was because they recognized and traded with ‘Biafra’, the breakaway Eastern region of Nigeria. However, every state, nation or country has a foreign policy, which forms a basis for her interaction with other states, non-governmental organizations, private or public organizations in the international system. Nigeria's Foreign policy, therefore, refers to the country's:

*course or principle of action that determines her interaction with other states and even non-state actors in the international system. It encompasses the laws and principles, which guide the actions in her relations with other states and non-state actors in the international system. It indeed, constitutes different policies for different issues and problems, which confront a nation-state as it interacts with other nation-states in the international system. These issues and problems are viewed and treated within a larger nation's foreign policy strategy (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005:33-34).*

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you define in a scholarly manner the concept of foreign policy?

3.3 Fundamental Components of Foreign Policy

*The basic principles guiding the states:* This refers to the law or professed rule guiding the decisions and actions of the state or its government in relating with other states in the international system. The basic principles also include the philosophy underlying a country's foreign policy, which guides her decisions and actions in the pursuit of national interests in external relations.

*The goals to achieve:* This refers to goals, which the states pursue in international relations. Such goals are usually in line with her national philosophy and interest. The goals can be constructive or destructive, objective or subjective, moral or immoral, dignifying or belittling, aggressive or persuasive, progressive or retrogressive. The pursuit of any of these goals depends on the disposition of the nation's leadership and what it perceives to be the national interest at a particular time.

*The available means for the pursuit:* One of the major components of a country's foreign policy is the available resources for the implementation of that country's foreign policy. This includes establishment of foreign services and recruitment and posting of highly qualified personnel and provision of standard operational guidelines. The available means for which a state can devote for the implementation of her foreign policy constitute a vital component of her foreign policy. This largely influences the practice of diplomacy (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the three fundamental components of foreign policy?
3.4 Relationship between National Interest and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy and national interest are inseparable concepts in international relations, and indeed, the foundation of a state's foreign policy is her national interest which in turn directs the course of the foreign policy. Hence, the concept of national interest has continued to play a significant role in the foreign policies of sovereign states. A state's foreign policy is not operated in vacuum. The main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is invariably the promotion and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest refers to the totality or the aggregate of interest of individuals and group within a given nation state. Viewed from its classical perspective, national interest encompasses the various strategies employed in the international interactions of states in order to ensure the preservation of the stated goal of society. Hence, in political discourse, national interest serves two primary purposes - as an analytical tool and as an instrument of political action. As an analytical tool, it serves as a conceptual guide by providing the objectives often considered by a state while weighing an intended foreign policy option. As an instrument of political action, it serves to justify or repudiate a state's foreign policy option and action in the international system. This explains the interconnectedness of foreign policy and national interest. Indeed, the concept of national interest is so deeply interwoven with that of foreign policy that the renowned international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau once stated "no nation can have true guide as to what it must do and what it needs to do in foreign policy without accepting national interest as the guide (Akinboye in Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999:365-366). Therefore, national interest, broadly conceived, is a guide to the formulation of foreign policy. It is not an end in itself but a means to an end. In other words, it is a method of reaching a goal; and in formulation such goals, core values and national ethos must be considered. The central role that values play in defining national interest has been underscored by Joseph Frankel (1963). According to him, "value describes the inner element brought to bear by the decision-makers upon the process of making decision." Thus, in his address to the conference of Nigeria's foreign policy held in Kuru in 1986, President Babagida aggregated the conception of Nigeria's national interest in the following words:

Nigeria's national interest can be identified as predicated on the nation's military, economic, political and social security. Anything that will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security must be seen as being in their national interest. Anything that promotes Nigeria's economic growth and development is in the national interest. Anything that will make Nigeria politically stable is also in the national interest" (Akinboye in Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999:365-366).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you discuss the relationship between national interest and foreign policy?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to give the meanings of the term policy; define the concept of foreign policy according to various scholars; identify and explain the fundamental components of foreign policy; discuss the relationship or interconnectedness between national interest foreign policy of a nation-state.
5.0 SUMMARY

Policy is a plan of what to do in particular situations that have been agreed to officially by a
group of people or a government to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other
matters. Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions, which involve to an appreciable extent,
relations between one state and others. Therefore, any plan consciously put in place by a
government for the attainment of specific goals and objectives in the international system is
referred to as foreign policy. The foreign policy of a country or state is made up of three
identified essential components - the basic principles guiding the states; the goals to be achieved
as well as the available means for the pursuit of the goals. These goals constitute the national
interest and it serves two primary purposes - as an analytical tool and as an instrument
of political action. As an analytical tool, it serves as a conceptual guide by providing the objectives
often considered by a state while weighing an intended foreign policy option. As an instrument
of political action, it serves to justify or repudiate a state's foreign policy option and action in the
international system. This shows the interconnectedness of national interest and foreign policy.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Define and explain the term policy?
ii. Discuss the concept of foreign policy from the point of view of scholars?
iii. Identify and explain the three fundamental components of foreign policy?
iv. Discuss the relationship/interconnectedness between national interest and foreign policy?

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UNIT 2: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Origin and Development of Nigeria's Foreign Policy
   3.2 Constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The history of Nigeria’s foreign policy could be divided into two distinctive eras, namely, the era before independence and the era after independence. Though, the period of 1914 to the later part of 1960 under the colonial administration, the interest of the British colonial master was the solely interests of the entity called Nigeria. A writer puts it this way, “the interest of Her Majesty’s government in England was the interest of the then dependent state of Nigeria.” However, the post-independent period saw the formation of an indigenous Nigerian foreign policy that could truly be called “Nigerian’s foreign policy”. With the coming of successive governments in the following years after independence - the military and other subsequent civilian administrations - the foreign policy of Nigeria had, via various ideological constructions, evolved to what we now have today (Ogo and Emakpo, 2005). However, this unit provides you with the discussion on the origin and development of Nigeria's foreign policy as well as constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the origin and development of Nigeria's foreign policy; and
- explain the constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origin and Development of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

From 1960-1966, the foundation of what we know have as Nigeria's foreign policy is directly owned to the vision of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's first Prime Minister and Head of government, October 1960 to January 1966 (Fawole, 2003). Balewa's address in the House of Representative on 20th August, 1960; Independence Day address on 1st October, 1960 as well as his acceptance speech on the occasion of Nigeria's accession to membership of the United Nations in New York on 8th October, 1960 fundamentally point out the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy and which others are anchored is the promotion of the national interest.
of the federation and of its citizens. This in essence means that Nigeria's foreign policy, like that of any other country is out to be fundamentally guided by her national interest. Unfortunately, what constitutes the country's national interest was not clearly articulated. However, Fawole (2003) identifies that at independence, Balewa's enunciated four broad principles that would underpin Nigeria's foreign policy and external relations: The First, it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organization. Second, Nigeria, a large and populous country of over thirty five millions, has absolutely no territorial or expansionist intentions. Third, we shall not forget our old friends and we are proud to have been accepted as a member of the commonwealth, but nevertheless we do not intend to align ourselves as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. We are committed to the principles upon which the United Nations Organization is founded. Fourth, Nigeria hopes to work with other African states for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence.

Ekenedirichukwu (2010) states that despite the intention of Balewa not to align with power blocks as captured in the above declared foreign relation principles, Nigeria’s foreign policy immediately after independence till the first military coup was predominantly pro-British and guided by British interests. Thus, while claiming non-alignment as one of her policy objectives, Nigeria was clearly pro-British and pro-West generally. Thus, when Balewa courageously stated that while the government was responsible for its action, but that it would not allow the infiltration of communism into Nigeria, he was stating what later became obvious as the British government was consistently tele-guiding Nigeria’s new leadership and actions towards rejecting the Soviet Union’s communist ideology and even seeking or accepting any type of aid from them. For instance, when the Soviet Embassy was established in Lagos in 1961, the number of its diplomatic staff was limited to ten whereas no such restriction was placed on the diplomatic missions of West European countries or the United States of America. The Soviet embassy was allocated a paltry figure of five diplomatic car plates whereas Britain and the United States of America were entitled to one hundred each. It can therefore be asserted that even the opening of the Soviet embassy was grudgingly conceded: a camouflage to the outside world that Nigeria was non-aligned. Ekenedirichukwu observes that “Balewa would hardly take any major foreign policy decisions without first consulting the British government. Therefore, one notable feature of the period was that it was consistently pro-African and pro-Commonwealth in tune with Nigeria’s British slant. “all sectors of the economy were not only controlled by the West, but were entirely dependent on their capitalist orientation for the country’s consumptive patterns and developmental efforts.” This was the prevalent option as chosen by Balewa. However, there were lots of inconsistencies and contradictions in Balewa’s foreign policy as could be seen from the some actions he took within the period:

- refusal to attend the maiden conference of the non-aligned Movement in Belgrade;
- prevarication over the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc until December 1961;
- acceptance of the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact until he was forced to abrogate it by students and the opposition.

From 1966-1975, the military coup of January 15, 1966 brought an abrupt end to the First Republic. Aguiyi Ironsi who took over as the military head of state could not make any feasible impact in the international system as the regime was short-lived as a result of a counter-coup that
occurred on July 29, 1966, putting an end to Ironsi’s six-month old government. This period under General Yakubu Gowon, was turbulent as well as interesting in Nigerian history as very significant events took place between 1966 and 1969 the Nigerian civil war and the oil boom, which provided Nigeria a new impetus to practice her non-aligned stance and position of neutrality in international events. Thus, the government of the day was involved with the civil war and the attitudes of former and new entrants into the alignment scope of the Nigerian State. The civil war-ridden administration of Gowon nearly witnessed the dismemberment of the country. There was paradigm shift in Nigeria's foreign policy to the East; the administration became pro-East as against Western posture of the previous administration. Most of the weapons used in prosecuting the civil war were procured from the East. This was as a result of lukewarm attitude of Britain in the area of weapon supply to Nigeria. For instance, faced with the British initial hesitation at supplying arms to the Nigerian government to launch the war against Biafra, the government had to turn to the Soviet who supplied all the weapons needed for the onslaught. This seeming advantage of the USSR in the ideological warfare led Britain to get involved in the war, so as to stave off the Soviet increasingly communist influence in Nigeria. Thus, the period was devoted to winning the civil war and maintaining the integrity of the Nigerian nation. The period was a very vibrant decade of interesting foreign policy leaning as propaganda became a major aspect of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Coming out from a serious civil war, Nigeria learnt a lot of lessons: (i) there was need to come closer cooperation to other African states on matters that could promote both political and economic freedom to the continent; (ii) that Nigeria need not unnecessarily reject overtures of friendship from the Soviet Union; (iii) that Nigeria could disagree with Britain on issues it felt strongly about and still retain her status. However, the administration adopted the principle of non-interference in the sovereignty of African states, respect for the principles governing the OAU and UNO. Also, it played a crucial role in the establishment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and financial assistance made to the liberation committee of the OAU (Arowolo, 2008).

From 1975-1979, the period saw a true manifestation of the Africa policy of Nigeria as the regime under Murtala Mohammed gave a well-defined, articulate, coherent and explicit policy for Africa that was not tainted with fear or preference to any bloc or country. In his address to the OAU in Addis Ababa, he gave notice of the direction that Africa was going to take in the new era, and with Nigeria’s leadership. Part of his speech read thus: Africa has come of age, it is no longer in the orbit of any continental power. It should no longer take order from any country however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar. This boldness exhibited by the Nigerian leader has been given as perhaps one of the many reasons given for his untimely elimination from the political scene. There is an issue of conspiracy by the West that could not stomach a revolutionary leader, a staunch believer in Africa and a soldier who was ready to do all it took to wrest Africa from the wrenches of the capitalist West that had continued to control the continent’s destiny many years after the declaration of independence (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010). Damilola (2011) describes that the period between 1975 and 1979, is generally regarded as when Nigeria’s support for and defense for African states was vigorously displayed. It was actively involved in every African country struggling to break the yoke of colonialism. It was during this period that the independence process in Angola became crisis ridden; Nigeria however supported and donated a huge amount to the group with socialist principles which pitched against the western powers including Britain and America. However, Nigeria stood its ground and won for it great accolade as the champion of Africa’s interest. This
was also proven in Nigeria’s hard line position on the Rhodesian crisis. This enabled southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe to gain sovereign statehood in April 1980. In spite of the independence characterized pattern of Nigeria’s foreign policy this period, an important feature of it was the special relationship which it established with the United States of America as the Nigerian head of state Olusegun Obasanjo paid a visit to the United States in October 1977 and the president of the United States president carter reciprocated by paying a visit to Nigeria in April 1978. The implication of this is that Nigeria has been upgraded in the international system as the previous attempt to pay this visit to the United States by General Gowon between 1974 and 1975 was unsuccessful. This also asserts the fact that at this point, Nigeria’s foreign policy has become largely independent that is not anti west or in support of the west.

From 1979-1983, Nigeria's foreign policy suffered a great setback under the Shehu Shagari administration, making the country to lose credibility as a result of lack of direction, inaction and incompetence. The regime was not able to provide initiative or leadership. The four years of his regime were therefore, a period of recess for Nigeria's foreign policy. It was characterized by the slowing down of the tempo and potency experienced in the past and the substantial dismantling of the role-expectation which the previous regime had instituted. The performance level of foreign policy could be measured by the level of ineptitude, indifference and incompetence. These stagnancy and inaction were also a result of economic mismanagement and corruption at the domestic level. A vibrant foreign policy needs a vibrant economy and domestic policy (Arowolo, 2008). Similarly, Damilola (2011) confirms that this period experienced a radical departure from the prevailing pattern of the previous as Nigeria’s external policy came to assume a low profile like that obtained under Ballewa’s regime as the nature and character of the president Shagari was very conservative and the economic recession which hit the country were responsible for this. Relations with Britain became very cordial again but nevertheless, Shagari’s administration continued to attention to African affairs. Crude petroleum continued to be sold at consolatory prices to a number of poor African countries, financial aid was also given to others like newly independent Zimbabwe and some organizations like SWAPO in Namibia. The set back of this regime was its expulsion of illegal aliens majority of which were Ghanaian’s in 1983. This questioned our sprit of brother hood and the ECOWAS treaty

From 1983-1985, the Buhari/Idiagbon regime took over a country that was nearly empty. The regime met ineptitude in governance, mismanagement, high level of political violence and economic paralysis. Shagari regime lost total control of affairs and the domestic environment had become heated up by violence that erupted in some parts of the country. Challenges that confronted the regime of Buhari were how to rebuild the nation and put vigour into the foreign policy formulation, in order to regain the lost glory of Nigeria's foreign policy. In achieving this lofty objective, the regime was too overwhelmed by exuberance and overzealousness to succeed, as forces and confrontation rather than compromise and conciliation were employed in its external relations approach. As a result of its militant posture, the regime employed reactive approach to foreign policy issues. In most cases, it reacted to international issues rather than taking the initiative, vengeful considerations became the basis of Nigeria's diplomacy. There was diplomatic row between Nigeria and Britain. This was evident in the expulsion of two British diplomats in Lagos by Nigeria as a result of earlier expulsion of two Nigerian diplomats in London. Damilola (2011) identifies major development in Buhari regime, the attempt to kidnap and fly Umaru Dikko from London to Lagos in July 1984 for weighty allegation of corruption
against him, the attempt which was frustrated by the London metropolitan police and negatively affected Anglo-Nigerian relations during the regime. Arowolo (2008) summarizes that what was however clear during this period was that the action taken by the government was very unpopular to many countries. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime also expelled illegal West Africans resident in the country. The land borders: were closed to prevent smuggling, the inflow of illegal immigrants as well as movement of currency. Generally, the regime pursued a foreign policy that was vibrant, robust and pushing, but in a rather confrontational manner.

From 1985-1993, the regime of Babangida took the bull by the horn and worked towards actualizing the lofty objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy at the inception. In this connection, the regime unveiled modules operandi of its foreign policy approach. According to Babangida, Africa is the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, with the concentric circles approach, whereby her national interest overrides all other considerations. In a very lucid manner, Babangida enumerated vita areas of government priorities, where he suggested home-grown solutions to African problems. According to him; African problems and their solutions shall constitute the Premise of Nigeria's foreign policy. The realization of The OAU's Lagos Plan of Action for self-sufficiency and Constructive cooperation in Africa shall be Nigeria's Primary pursuit. The ECOWAS shall be strengthened with a view to achieving the organization’s objectives of sub-regional integration. The problem of the drought-stricken areas of Africa shall be given priority attention. Nigeria's membership in the UN shall be made more practical and meaningful. Lastly the call for a New International Economic Order (IEO) which has lost its momentum in the face of the debt crisis shall be reactivated. The Babangida administration tried to bring back Nigeria into the forefront of African international relations. Efforts were made to move away slightly, from political objectives, to economic reconstructing. A number of trade and economic missions were undertaken. Germany, China, Brazil, Japan, Argentina, etc, for example visited Nigeria to discuss possible ways of cooperation. To strengthen South-South cooperation, Nigeria courted Indonesia, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Zimbabwe, etc to find areas of possible economic and technical cooperation. The administration was noted to have established diplomatic ties with Israel. In the area of conflict resolution, the regime was unequalled, Liberian and Sierra-Leone crises and some other crises in other countries attracted the attention of Babangida regime. The interventionist role of Nigeria in conflict resolution and prevention was being pursued through ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Arowolo, 2008).

Whatever successes that Babangida regime might have recorded in its foreign policy approach were eroded by domestic anti-human rights posture and the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election considered to have been the fairest and freest in the history of Nigeria's political process. The annulment came at a time, when the international community had made democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights a determining basis for external relations. For instance, France had particularly chosen democracy as a condition for her relations with any country in developing world. This inhuman domestic posture demonstrated By Babangida regime, gave a lethal blow to Nigeria's image abroad and its foreign policy pursuit. The wave of globalization has blurred the hither dichotomy between nations' borders, as bad governance and abuse of human, rights have become international issues, since its repercussions are borne across borders (Arowolo, 2008).
From 1993-1998, given that General Sani Abacha took over by force unnecessarily and at a time the world was gradually tilting towards liberal democracy, and given the opposition to such obvious palace coup on the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan, Nigeria was generally hostile to most countries and became a pariah among the comity of nations. Thus, foreign policy during this period was “reactive and isolationist.” For him, there was a need to fashion out a new foreign policy thrust for the country as the traditional position had become more or less in his estimation. Thus, he constituted a 50-member committee of every other interest group apart from career diplomats, intellectuals and experts in the field of international relations and foreign policy. This deliberate action showed his hand early enough that he did not want anything except to direct what should happen without recourse to what had been the tradition. Moreover, the regime was so brazen in disregard of diplomatic norms and showed marked disdain for finesse in relations with the diplomatic corps of other countries that left them stunned. The situation was not helped by such ignoble actions of Abacha as the unwarranted and unjustified killing of the Ogoni activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others despite huge outcry and pleas from the international community. Such traditional allies as Britain, United States, France, Germany, Canada and South Africa and many others temporarily withdrew diplomatic representations and support for Nigeria; and “in response to the isolation from the West and its associates, Abacha turned to Asia”. This further alienated Nigeria from dominant powers of the world as Asia did not really do much for the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. This was the situation Nigeria found herself till Abacha died suddenly on 8th June 1998 (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010). According to Arowolo (2008) Abacha regime brought setback to Nigeria's foreign policy as the country became isolated in the international arena. Various sanctions imposed on the country as a result of the regime’s 'poor human rights policies, and crimes against humanity weakened Nigeria's economy as the standard of living fell greatly.

From 1998-1999, Abacha’s sudden death left Nigeria in the state of international isolationism, and thus the succeeding regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar promised not to stay longer than necessary, as it became more evident and clearer that the international community would not tolerate any form of tenacious military role in the country. Also, the overwhelming sanctions imposed on the country by the European Union (EU), the United States and the Commonwealth could hardly allow any regime to succeed. In light of this reality, the administration took certain necessary and corrective measures to right the wrongs of the past. This became necessary to move Nigeria from a pariah state to international recognition and companionship some of these measures included: Immediate and unconditional release of all political detainees, and overall reconstruction of the nation's foreign policy. This he did through fashioning a new phase of interactions with the Western countries. The removal of visa, restrictions, high-level visits of US officials, discussion of future assistance and charting a new level of cooperation. Consequently, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Emeka Anyaoku and the UN counterpart, Kofi Annan paid official visits to Nigeria in recognition of the new friendliness approach of the Abubakar regime. In his reconciliatory moves, Abubarkar paid visits to both Britain and the US where he met with the duo of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton respectively. He also addressed the 53rd session of the General Assembly of the UN, where he intimated the world of the positive changes going on in the country. His efforts at repositioning the nation and restoring its acclaimed leadership in the sub region was captured this way by Madeleine Albright: the remarkable progress that Abubakar has made in a very short period of time in restoring Nigeria's international standing by releasing many political prisoners and embarking on a credible transition programme, and taking some very
difficult economic decisions. On a general note, the Abubakar's administration embarked on reconciliation with the world community to correct the dark era and the state of repudiation and isolation, which Nigeria was brought into by the Abacha regime. Abubakar's administration succeeded in returning Nigeria to its rightful position, and redeemed her image in the international system (Arowolo, 2008).

From 1999-2007, General Abdulsalami Abubakar transition programme ushered in Olusegun Obasanjo as a civilian president. This regime proposed that it shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and other international bodies. That the country shall continue to honour existing agreements between Nigeria and other countries. It also resolved to restore Nigeria fully to her previous prestigious position in the community of nations. Nigeria’s foreign policy after the successful transition to democratic governance was more of shuttle diplomacy beyond Africa embarked upon by President Obasanjo in order to win over a world that had overlooked Nigeria and would rather not have anything to do with her. Thus, the foreign policy this period extends far beyond the concern for the well-being of the African continent and the debt burden, for instance, is not an exclusive African predicament, many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and South America face similar problems, hence the need for the harmonization of efforts. This was corroborated by the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido’s comments that while it may appear improper to dismiss Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the core issue in contemporary international relations, which is economic, makes that prevailing doctrine inappropriate. Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy in this era, rooted in support of democratic values, the principle of self-determination, human rights, rule of law, was bound to strengthen and institutionalize the culture of good governance and democratic culture at the domestic level. At the regional level, Nigeria did not move away from her traditional Afro-centric stance. Africa should remain the centerpiece of our foreign policy. The renewed determination of African leaders, our strengthening of regional economic communities, the restructuring of the OAU into the AU, and a better global disposition towards Africa, the AU and the AU’s programme, NEPAD, are indicators that we are indeed n a new Africa. The Africa that should be united, integrated, devoid of conflicts and violence, especially in the contemporary global system where there is no chronic conflicting ideological divide (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010)."

Thus, Nigeria created structures that would help in further bringing the country into greater reckoning in Africa, thereby making for peace and development in the continent. This was done through the creation of such important offices as the constitutional provision for the promotion of African integration and support for African unity – shown through the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa; and maintenance of peace and security in the West African sub-region shown by Nigeria’s leadership role in the formation of ECOMOG, and her membership of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Also, Nigeria played a key role in the conceptualization of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and shifts its focus from conflicts to economic development.

The shuttle diplomacy of the Obasanjo government ensured that some sort of economic development came the way of Nigeria, although it is arguable whether the President’s globe-trotting yielded as much foreign investments as he made Nigerians believe. However, the fact
was that a greater percentage of Nigeria’s foreign debts were radically reduced through outright cancellation and rescheduling, foreign investments started coming into Nigeria and jobs were created and people began to feel the impact of good foreign interactions with other states in the international system. Under Obasanjo, Nigerian foreign policy was made to focus on wooing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with the federal government’s establishment of a one-stop investment agency - Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) and the initiative of encouraging Nigerians in the Diaspora to become involved in national development. However, this was done through a half-hearted foreign policy that was centred on the domestic policy of core values of transparency, accountability, good governance, and the protection of fundamental human rights. Moreover, given that Obasanjo tended to overshadow his foreign affairs ministers, the progress made in foreign policy during his era was overshadowed by his attempt to stay put in office through various means which eventually did not succeed and which made him lose some of the respect the international community had for him at the inception of his administration in 1999 (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010).

From 2007-2008, the foreign policy under this new administration may not be enough for serious academic exercise and intellectual arousal but the short period of one year could lay a good foundation for robust foreign policy. As earlier pointed out, the preceding administration of Obasanjo had already laid a solid foundation in terms of external relation. Although, Yar’adua’s administration is tried to build on the legacies of Obasanjo's administration but the level at which it was doing that was rather too slow and discouraging. The level of passivity inaction and muted response to international issues can be yield from two angles; one the administration seems to have legitimacy crisis arising from electoral fraud and forceful imposition of a selected candidate on Nigerians. Two, the failing health of the President may have caused his inaction. For one year of the administration, The President was unable to make any successful significant impact on the international plane. It took the administration more than six months to put its cabinet in place and close to eight months to have Ambassadors who will represent Nigeria in other nations and Solidify her relationship with outside world. Nevertheless, the administration tried to build on the legacy of the immediate past administration by visiting some great powers. Shortly after his, swearing-in, President-Yar’adua paid a visit to President George Bush of America; he travelled to Germany where he told the whole world that the election that brought him into power was not credible. He also attended meeting of the Head of State and Government of the African Union, and several other steps have been taken towards cementing Nigeria's relationship with the outside world.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you discuss the origin and development of Nigeria's foreign policy?

3.2 Constitutional Provisions and Modification of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives

Both section 19 of the 1979 constitution and section 20 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria under the 'Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy'. For instance, section 19 of the 1979 constitution states that:

The state shall promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive of the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and
friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.

The section 20 of 1999 spells out goals of the foreign policy as follows:

- Promotion and protection of national interest;
- Promotion of African integration and support of African unity;
- Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations;
- Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestation;
- Promotion of a just world economic order (FRN, 1999:13).

The above goals are similarly captured in the section 19 of 1999 constitution. Thus, the 1979 and 1999 constitutions enshrine the same foreign policy objectives, particularly the promotion of a just world economic order being the only additional on in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions. In spite of this slight adjustment, the substance of the foreign policy objectives generally has not changed. Whatever differences that exist therefore cannot be attributed to changes in substance but rather in the emphasis placed on the specific objectives as well as the style adopted by particular regime in executing the objectives.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you briefly explain the constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss the origin and development of Nigeria's foreign policy; as well as the constitutional provisions and modification of Nigeria's foreign policy.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit reveals the origin and development of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence in 1960 to 2008 as well as the constitutional provisions and modifications of country's foreign policy objectives.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the origin of Nigeria's foreign policy?
ii. Explain the constitutional provisions and modifications of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives?
iii. Identify and explain the principles of Nigeria's foreign policy?
7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 3: FACTORS THAT DETERMINE NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 The national Interest
   3.2 Structure of the nation’s economy
   3.3 Strategic location of the country
   3.4 Political structure of the country
   3.5 cultural influences
   3.6 Personal idiosyncrasy of the political leadership
   3.7 Military factor
   3.8 Demographic factor
   3.9 Domestic political situation
   3.10 Impact of exogenous or external influences.
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Certain basic combinations of factors influence a nation's foreign policy, Nigeria is not an exception. As scholars have clearly demonstrated, "the foreign policy of a country is a product of environmental factors both internal and external to it" (Northedge, 1961). Therefore, this unit provides you with in-depth explanations on the various factors that have impacted, influenced or shaped the Nigeria's foreign policy choices since independence in 1960.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain how Nigeria's national interests have help to determine her foreign policy choice;
- justify with examples that the structure of the Nigeria's economy is a determinant of her foreign policy;
- explain why the strategic location of Nigeria is a determinant of her foreign policy;
- explain how the political structure of the Nigeria is a determinant of her foreign policy;
- briefly explicate how socio-cultural influence is a determinant of foreign policy;
- Explain personal idiosyncrasy of political leadership of Nigeria as a determinant of her foreign policy;
- explain how the military constitute a foreign policy determinant;
- discuss substantially why demography is a determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- briefly explain the impact of domestic political situation as a key determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy; and
• discuss the impact of exogenous or external influences on the Nigeria's foreign policy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The National Interest

National interest is the local or domestic interest of a country, which determines her activities and position in international matters. Nigeria's fundamental principles of foreign policy have been fairly consistent shortly after independence in October 1960 (Ashiru, 2013). Oshuntokun (1987:1) provides good insight into what constitutes Nigeria's national interest. According to him, it include internal cohesion, national unity, the creation of a happy and egalitarian society, the creation of a state where career is open to talents and where there is employment for those who want to work and where there are the traditional freedoms of speech, political association, religion and equality before the Law, coupled with this is the defense of the humanity and rights of all black men through deliberate action and policies. Once we agree about our national interest then it follows that these national interests are worth defending. However, it is important to note that Nigeria's national interests have been largely determined and defined by the various leaderships, according to Ajayi (2004) and Olukoshi (1992), the following broadly spells out what constitutes the national interests of the country:

"(i) The defence of her sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; (ii) The creation of the necessary political and economic condition in the country, Africa and the rest of the world, which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development; (iii) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; (iv) The promotion and defense of justice and respect for human dignity especially the dignity of the black man; and (v) The defence and promotion of international peace and security."

Our concern here is to identify how national interests has influenced, affected or determined the Nigeria's foreign policy choices. One of the national interests as stated above is the defence of her sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, internal cohesion and national unity and this have shaped the Nigeria's foreign policy preference. For instance, during the civil war (1967-1970), as Nigeria fought to defend her territory against the threat of Biafra secession and possible disintegration of the country population and territory, when Britain who has been the major source of Nigeria's arms supply refused to supply offensive weapons to Nigeria on the protest of humanitarian grounds, Nigeria found herself in a difficult position. France, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the United States also followed Britain unwillingness example. On national interest ground, Gowon's regime has no any other choice left than to turn to the Soviet Union and her satellite states for the supply of offensive weapons. This singular act was due to her national interest, to defend her territory and maintain her full sovereignty on the entire entity called Nigeria, by so doing Gowon's regime altered radically the direction of Nigeria's foreign policy (from pro-Western attitude, inherited from Balewa and which it had been willing to follow (Dauda, 2006:16). Hence, this has given credence to scholars who viewed Nigeria's national interest as "anything that will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security"
and "foreign policy, if it means anything is the strategy of defending a nation's national interest through diplomacy and when diplomacy fails the same interest may be defended through war and the force of arms" (Akinboye in Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999:365; Oshuntokun, 1987:1). Contrarily to the opinion of some foreign policy analysts that over the years, the national interests have not affected the Nigeria's foreign policy choices, the above example stands out. On the contrary note, as Ade-Ibijola (2013) pursuits there seems to be agreement among critics that Nigeria's foreign policy lacks nationalism. Generally, Nigerians do not even enjoy social welfare, and basic fundamental rights within the country. Yet, Nigeria spent billions of dollars to restore peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia without any concrete benefits economically, socially or politically to the country. Instead, Nigeria displays a hearty profile of peace keeping experience, yet at home the word 'peace' is far from being a reality. In reality, Nigeria, over the years has overstretched itself to maintain peace in other countries, while at home it is obvious that all is not well. This explains the social decadence, infrastructural backwardness, and growing insecurity that manifests in Boko Haram insurgency, militancy in the Niger Delta and incidences of high-profile kidnap. Accordingly, Asobie (2007) pointed that Nigerians in other African countries alone reportedly suffer rejection, deportation, brutalization and recrimination. For instance, there was the infamous case of the death of Master Amara Iwuchukwu Tochi in Singapore, Malaysia. The eighteen-year old boy was arrested on November 27, 2004 at the Changi Airport for being in possession of capsules containing diamorphine. Unfortunately, he was sentenced to death by hanging after three (3) years of trial, precisely January, 2007. In spite of the several pleas for mercy from both international and local human rights group, the Nigerian government only found it essential to act when the issue had gone sour.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Explain how Nigeria's national interests have help to determine her foreign policy choice;

3.2 Structure of the Nation's Economy

The economic structure is significant determinant of a nation's foreign policy choices. The birth of the Nigerian state in 1960 marked the beginning of conscious efforts as a country to position itself on a pedestal relative to the world. Nigeria assumed independence with a single or mono-economy based on agriculture production. The structure of the Nigerian economy was basically on the production of raw materials - cash crop production such as cocoa and coffee, an export based economy, which sales were determined by the world market price. Olaniyan (1988:105-108) confirms this, when he stated that in the state’s infantile days, Nigeria aggressively began programs that would make it relevant regionally and in the world. The agricultural sector as at then formed the bulk of Nigeria's exports. According to Ofoegbu (1980:163-164) until the country's Third National Development Plan, the financing of the country's development plans was dependent on private economic and financial investments and the major source of private investment was foreign, and these foreign investors came from Britain, USA, the Netherlands and Western Germany, that is from western powers. The structure of Nigeria's international trade at independence in 1960-1961, and ten years after independence 1969-70 discloses heavy dependence in the West for 92.6 per cent (1961 exports), 81.8 per cent (1971 imports). The economy structure reflects a predominant British share of the trade both at independence and ten years thereafter. It shows a pro-western economic foreign policy choice. Similarly, Adedipe (2004) observes that at independent in October 1960, agriculture was the dominant sector of the
economy, contributing about 70% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employing about the same percentage of the working population, and accounting for about 90% of foreign earnings and Federal Government revenue. The early period of post-independence up until mid-1970s saw a rapid growth of industrial capacity and output, as the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP rose from 4.8% to 8.2%. According to Adedipe (2004) this pattern changed when oil suddenly became of strategic importance to the world economy through its supply-price nexus. Over-dependence on petroleum oil was more vivid in the external sector trends. The penchant for imports reflects in the account balances, whose oil component expanded by an annual average of 57.7% during 1971 to 1980, 43% in 1981-1990 and 40.3% in 1991-1998. The account balance grew with the oil revenue trend, reflecting import expansion as oil earnings grew.

One of the positive impacts of the oil economy boom for instance, as Aluko (1981) points out, is that efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbors and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were facilitated by Nigeria’s boom. The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, Nigeria was attracting increased foreign direct investment. The Federal Government of Nigeria used this new income to pursue a more ambitious sub-regional economic foreign policy action. For instance, Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbours, with the aim of weaning them off dependence on France. In 1974, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to its energy-poor neighbors. Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence. The Head of State, General Gowon (1967-75) promoted bilateral trading pacts, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) economic bodies, and the establishment of a new international institution for regional integration: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence. The Head of State, General Gowon (1967-75) promoted bilateral trading pacts, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) economic bodies, and the establishment of a new international institution for regional integration: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Local francophone states initially hesitated to participate in a Nigerian-led organization. However, Gowon decided to move forward with the scheme by starting with Anglophone states like Togo. He gained greater francophone confidence by leading negotiations for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to gain observer status with the European Economic Community (EEC). The resultant Lomé Convention was signed on February 28, 1975. ECOWAS came into existence three months later (Abegunrin, 2003). Within ECOWAS, sub-regional rivalries have always threatened to undermine the organization’s potential. Of the sixteen ECOWAS member States, five are Anglophone, nine are francophone, and two are Lusophone. With some 90 per cent of the sub-region’s population and a significant market share, Nigeria leads the Anglophone bloc. Among the Anglophone ECOWAS members, Ghana also vies for a leadership position. The francophone States - led by Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal - have long been suspicious of Nigeria’s intentions. They sought to frustrate Abuja’s hegemonic ambitions by withholding support for certain Nigerian-led “ECOWAS” initiatives. In addition, the Francophone States created rival economic organizations (Berman and Sams, 2000/3).

Moreover, Adedipe (2004) stresses that Nigeria’s debt capacity expanded with oil earnings and its future prospects. Credits or loans of all kinds were extended to Nigerian Governments and
commercial enterprises, some under Government guarantee. These culminated in *burgeoning debt burden* that was sustained by a combination of factors including: *High propensity to consume imports* – Nigeria is reputed to be a major market for the products of certain global companies; *Strong cash flow from crude oil sale* that boosted confidence of creditors in Nigeria’s capacity to service credit facilities and repay; *Capitalization of interest payments that were past due*; *Debt rescheduling that multiplies the debt burden eventually*. However, the effort at repayment and debt servicing was insufficient to bring a drop in the debt stock, which ranged from $27.09 billion to $33.36 billion during 1991 to 2003. This observation made President Obasanjo remarked that Nigeria’s foreign policy commitment to debt obligations over the years has not brought about a reduction in the debt stock and its cost implications. However, this has to do more with lack of external support in debt reduction, than with the punitive capitalization of unfulfilled interest obligations. Hence, the mono-economy nature of the country, *over-dependence on petroleum oil and debt burden* perpetually made the country economy to remained dependent on the western economy, and has in turn, *inhibited the country from playing a decisive foreign policy*.

Nevertheless, the essential of an economic diplomacy foreign policy framework was inspired by the economic pressures that were exerted on the Nigerian economy as a result of the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 during the Ibrahim Babangida's administration. The focus was on export promotion, encouragement of direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling, embracing of neo-liberal economic measures and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist international political economy. The political wing of economic diplomacy agenda was that Nigeria will ingratiate itself and cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the leading countries of Europe, North America and Japan. However, because of the mono-nature of the Nigeria economy, the country lacked the economic infrastructure to use economy as a major instrument of diplomatic engagement. This is so because the productive forces in the economy are grossly underdeveloped, there is the dearth of capital, a lack of entrepreneurial ingenuity; the economy is mono-culturally dependent on oil, politicized, corrupt and rent oriented. It is part of the problem that Nigeria has not been able to make economic gains from her foreign policy adventures, particularly in the sub-region. Again, no foreign policy agenda can succeed on the basis of reliance on a single factor, such as the economy. Foreign policy is borne out of a multiplicity of factors, such as: culture, politics, history, patriotism, geography, military power, etc. indeed, the very basis of embarking on foreign policy of economic diplomacy in the first place was the inability of the Nigerian economy to withstand pressures of the international political economy (Pine, 2011).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you discuss the impact of Nigeria's economy structure on her foreign policy since independence?

### 3.3 Strategic Location of the Country

Nigeria location between *West African sub-region* and *Central Africa* with a coastline bordering the Atlantic Ocean on the West Coast of Africa places her in between friendly and unfriendly states. Nigeria's proximity to the Atlantic Ocean in the South and her southern location within the Gulf of Guinea impacted the country's foreign policy preferences.” For instance, in the initial
years after independence, Nigerian government pursued *modest foreign policy aims*. The Prime Minister Balewa’s foreign policy was limited to upholding the principles inscribed in the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 1963 Charter: non-interference, the legal equality of states, and boundary inviolability (Ogunbadejo, 1980). All of these interests were encompassed by the broader *Nigerian policy preference for “good-neighborliness.”*

Regionally, the country was overshadowed by Ghana, governed by the charismatic President, Kwame Nkrumah (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria was also resisting *French encirclement*; all of Nigeria’s geographic neighbours are francophone states strongly influenced by their former colonial super powers, even after they achieved formal independence. As such, this French encirclement impacted on Nigeria foreign policy actions. For instance, the Nigeria’s efforts to secure local influence were limited to the creation of cooperative multilateral governing bodies, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the River Niger Commission (Aluko, 1973). Increased efforts to achieve a more prominent *regional leadership role* was hindered during the civil war 1967-70, the Nigerian state was actively opposed by France, the Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal and South Africa. The civil war revealed the dangers of continued European involvement on the continent, as well as the importance of securing sub-regional allies, particularly the country's francophone neighbours. The *danger and impact of French encirclement* was reveal when during the civil war, the Island of Equatorial Guinea was used by the Red Cross to ferry food, (and as claimed by Nigerians) arms and war materials to Biafra. Equally significant was the use of the Island by the French government to provide covert military aid, weapons, ammunition and supplies to Biafra in spite of incessant protests by the then Nigerian government (Oshuntokun, 1992). Consequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria’s non-aligned foreign policy status previously demonstrated, which was solidly pro-Western preference, began to encourage more active foreign policy engagement with the USSR and China (Gambari, 1975).

However, the *Post-civil war leadership of Nigeria* also went to greater lengths to reduce France’s influence on Nigeria’s African neighbours and to reconcile with other states in the sub-region, including civil war enemies, such as Côte d’Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria needed to be less isolated. The *principle of good neighborliness became a security concern*, as well as a normative principle (Aluko, 1981). Hence, efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbors and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were facilitated by Nigeria’s oil boom. The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, Nigeria was attracting increased foreign direct investment. The Federal Government of Nigeria used this new income to pursue a more *ambitious sub-regional economic foreign policy action*. For instance, Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbours, with the aim of weaning them off dependence on France. In 1974, as earlier mentioned, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to its energy-poor neighbors (Aluko, 1981).

Recently, in the 2012 Mali crisis, the impact of encirclement of Nigeria by francophone countries was revealed in the politics of intervention. For instance, francophone dominated and allowed France to wield great influence among the conflict’s major players. Blaise Compaore, Burkinabe leader who positioned himself as a key mediator in regional conflicts, it was argued, hosted French gazelle helicopters in his country before they were deployed for military combat in Mali in January 2013. The Chairman of ECOWAS since February 2012 was Alassane Ouattara, leader
of Côte d’Ivoire, whose presidential mandate had been largely restored by the French army. The ECOWAS president since February 2012 was former Burkinabe prime minister and a member of Compaore’s Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) Party, Kadre Ouedrogo. All three individuals were, in a sense, closely aligned with France and can be seen as French Trojan horses within ECOWAS. This placed Nigeria in tight corner since it was diplomatically encircled and linguistically different than its Francophone neighbors. Apart from the power play that has always manifested between France and Nigeria in West Africa, Nigeria’s interest in intervening in Mali was to curtail the perceived links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda’s northern African wing. In the words of President Goodluck Jonathan, “We believe that if we stabilize northern Mali, not just Nigeria but other countries that are facing threats will be stabilized. The terrorists have no boundaries. They don’t respect international boundaries” (Madike, 2013). Beyond this claim, however, has been Nigeria’s attempt in furthering her leadership position in Africa, to serve the strategic best interest of the country (Oluwadare, 2014:113).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss how the strategic location of Nigeria has influenced and impacted on her foreign policy choices?

3.4 Political Structure of the Country

Nigerian state was a product of 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates by Lord Lugard. There were no concrete objective criteria for the amalgamation except for the administrative and exploitative tendency of the colonial powers. Tafawa Balewa has observed that since amalgamation of Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country on paper, it is far from being united. Nigeria unity is only British intention for the country (Osuntokun, 1979). Hence, there have being changes in the political structure of Nigeria through balkanization from three regions at independence to 36 states today. By definition, a state is a politically organized body of people inhabiting a geographical entity with a well legitimate government. At independence in 1960, Nigeria was politically demarcated into three regions, North, East and West, with Lagos as the federal territory. By 1963, the Mid-West region was carved out of the Western region. Scholars have observed that Nigerian leaders started by creating states to redress federal imbalance, but ended up with greater imbalances, Gen. Yakubu Gowon tried to reconcile North and South parity by creating six States in the North and six States in the South, but General Murtala Mohammed established the Northern supremacy by creating ten States in the North and nine in the South. General Babangida later consolidates on the disparity in 1989 with eleven states in the North and Nine in the South. The second edition of Babaginda’s State creation gave sixteen states to the North and fourteen to the South. In 1996, General Abacha strengthens the Northern lead with nineteen states and seventeen in the South, making a total of thirty six states including Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Over time therefore, the northern ascendancy has become strengthened. This mindless proliferation of states informed President Obasanjo comment that: the number of state has tripled from twelve to thirty-six since without addition to the land area of Nigeria. Overtime, the North domination over other ethnic group in Nigeria has been established (Oluwatobi, 2013).

However, it is important to note that the internal domestic politics has helped to define the foreign policy choices and actions. Nigeria as an amalgam of different ethnic nationalities
adopted a federal system of government imposed on it by the British. This federal system has its attendant consequence of citizenship and nationality questions. Ibrahim Gambari has made it clear that foreign policy formulation, articulation and implementation reflects the needs and aspirations of national elites of political, business, bureaucratic, military and traditional ruling groups. These groups of elite are never cohesive; they are deeply divided along ethnic, regional, religious and ideological lines. Thus, there is lack of consensus on critical foreign policy issues, for instance, the membership of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973 (Ottoh, 2012). General Ibrahim Babangida from the northern region Hausa speaking part of the country took the rap for Nigeria's sneaky upgrade to full membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). This foreign policy tailored to satisfy regional or religious affinity of the government. As captured in a study on Nigeria funded by the US Defense Department in the early 1990s, Buhari, who also was from the Northern region during his first tenure as country's president, without any regard whatsoever for the sensibilities of Nigerians of other regions or other faiths, submitted application to upgrade Nigeria's membership from the observer status it had enjoyed since the Gowon regime to full membership. The OIC's review of the application was concluded after Babangida's palace coup. Rather than reverse Buhari's action, Babangida quietly allowed Nigeria's new status as a full-fledged member of the OIC to stand given credence to the lack of consensus on foreign policy choices, influenced by the nature of Nigeria federal structure (Ottoh, 2012).

This lack of consensus on foreign policy choices has further been exemplified by the recent alleged move by President Muhammadu Buhari for Nigeria to join the Saudi Arabia led coalition of Muslim countries against terrorism. President Buhari stated this in an interview with Aljazeera Television:“We are part of it because we have got terrorists in Nigeria that everybody knows which claims that they are Islamic,” the Nigerian president said in reference to Boko Haram, the group whose activities has caused the death of about 20,000 people since 2009. President Buhari’s decision to push Nigeria into the coalition announced by Saudi Arabia last December appears to have been taken after a meeting with Saudi King, Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz, though, according to a statement by his spokesperson on February 23, 2016, the Nigerian leader had expressed reluctance to join the coalition when he met the Saudi king. “Even if we are not a part of it, we support you,” he was quoted to have said at the meeting held in Saudi Arabia in February (Oluwatob, 2013). Therefore, in the words of Njoku and Nwafor (2005), Nigeria's federal structure reflects a multi-ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious setting, as such, the political elites who have almost unrestricted control of the country's foreign policy are products of the multi-ethnic and traditional forces, that their perception and choices of foreign policy is therefore a reflection of domestic realities.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
In what ways have the political structure of Nigeria been a determinant of her foreign policy?

3.5 Socio-cultural Influence

Nation-states with the same racial, cultural, and social standing often maintain friendly ties or relations among themselves (Umeh, 2015). Cultural determinants constitute both inheritances and the impact of these on elite orientation. Cultural inheritance from colonialism affected the thinking of Nigeria's elite on issues of foreign policy. For instance, At independence, the civil
service, armed forces, judiciary, university, the professions and the chambers of industry, commerce and mines were all dominated by Nigerians leaders whose way of life, whose value and attitudes, and whose judgments on right and wrong were largely British (Ofoegbu, 1980:164-165). These cultural affinity no doubt informed why at independence in 1960, Nigeria foreign policy was largely pro-western as the Balewa, the then prime minister largely depended on Britain for consultation on foreign policy issues, not until the disappointment received from non supportive posture of Britain during the civil war (1967-1970).

Also, it is generally believed that the manner of the formulation and implementation of a nation's foreign policy is considerably influenced by the nature of its culture. For instance, it should be recalled that in the foreign policy statement submitted to the House of Representatives on August 20, 1960 by Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime minister of the Federation, specifically stated that:

> Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find solution to its problem and to foster the growth of a common understanding among all the nations, and especially among the new nations of the continent. We are determined to encourage the development of common ties between all states. The difficulties which will confront us in promoting the friendly association of independent countries of Africa are fully appreciated, but we believe that they can be overcome if a start is made by emphasizing and building upon the cultural and economic links which already exist (in Chibundu, 2004:56-57).

Thus, Africa, in ipso facto, became the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy due to cultural affinity. As a clear manifestation of this policy, the Ministry of External Affairs quickly established a full pledged directorate of African Affairs to deal specifically with matters relating with African countries, and the prime minister of the Federation appointed late Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe in May, 1961 as his personal Adviser on African Affairs. Besides, the government lost no time on establishing diplomatic relations with all independent African countries and appointed ambassadors, high commissioners and consuls-general as appropriate to cover relations with those countries (Chibundu, 2004:57). The extent to which culture became an influencing factor in the foreign policy formulation and implementation of the Balewa administration and successive federal governments was also reflected in the stand against the apartheid regime and colonialism in Africa as well as the huge financial and material supports given to Liberation Movements operating in affected areas in the entire continent. It also on record that culture played a major role in Nigeria accepting to host Conference of Inter-African and Malagasy States in Lagos on 25th January, 1992. Addressing the opening session of the Lagos conference, His Excellency, the Right Hon. Dr. Nnamed Azikiwe, Ex-Governor General of Nigeria (now deceased) categorically stated: The importance of this continent to the world cannot be over-stressed. Africa is regarded by authorities as the birthplace of the human race. Africa is also regarded by them as the cradle of human civilization. In fact, we have at this conference the Emperor of Ethiopia, whose empire dates back to antiquity and was contemporaneous with Egypt, Nubia, Assyria and Phoenica. Thus as a hub of human culture and treasury of natural resources, Africa became a magnet that attracted Greek intellectuals, Roman adventurers, European and American explorers, missionaries, empire builders, story-tellers and
soldiers of fortune. Up to the period of the great discoveries made by European explorers, several empires and Kingdoms flourished in Africa at all points of the compass. The use of culture to promote foreign policy at global level was again manifested by the participation of the federal government in the World Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar, Senegal in 1964. In fact the federal government was so enamoured by the principal objectives of the festival that it accepted to host the next one. Hence, "the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture" (FESTAC) in Lagos, which due to the civil war did not hold as soon as expected but eventually staged on 15th January -12th February, 1977, during the era of General Olusegun Obasanjo's as the Head of State (Chibundu, 2004:59-61).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Explain how socio-cultural affinity serves as a determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy?

### 3.6 Personal Idiosyncrasy of Political Leadership

A major determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy is the character of the political leadership at the federal level be it under the civilian or military rule. The degree of dynamism or otherwise of the country's foreign policy is dependent on the type of leadership the country has at a given time. Foreign policies of Nigeria or, indeed that of any other nation could largely be determined by the disposition or perception of the country's leader. Obi (2006) stated that for students of politics to understand the leader’s idiosyncrasy dimension of foreign policy is reading the lips of the President. They gave a good example of how the idiosyncrasy of the political leaders influence or determine the foreign policy of the nation was the attitude of Tafawa Balewa to the Angola crisis which was antithetical to the attitude meted to the same country by Murtala Mohammed (Okeke, 2000:9). Similarly, Gen. Sani Abacha vigorously pursued diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Asian countries in disdain to Western countries that were critical of his dictatorial tendencies and alleged human rights violation. President Obasanjo's foreign policy disposition, on the other hand, is largely pro-West. Thus, the idiosyncrasy of the leader is a determinant factor that shapes the foreign policy of a nation. This is also applicable to Nigeria.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Substantiate how personal idiosyncrasy of the political leadership of Nigeria is a determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy?

### 3.7 Military Factor

A fundamental aspect of Nigeria's national interest is the nation's security which thus makes the military factor an important determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy. The Armed Forces as an entity is crucial in understanding the country's character and behaviour. The Armed Forces of Nigeria have grown appreciable in size and equality. The military strength of the country during the First Republic was very low. It consisted primarily of 'officer' cadre that was engaged mainly in ceremonial functions. The fratricidal civil war of (1967-70) however propelled the expansion of the military establishment. This also enhanced its strength, resources and capability. The arm forces have help influence Nigeria foreign policy choice positively. For instance, Nigeria through her military might has been able to play the Afro-centric foreign policy big brother role, specifically in achieving peace, stability, decolonization and ending apartheid objectives for
African countries. And this has projected Nigeria in the World as Africa supper power. For instance, Nigeria's soldiers participated in peacekeeping operation in Liberia. Nigeria contributed immensely to the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an interventionist mediation force to end the persistent Liberian civil war. Nigeria shared the joy of the return to democracy by Liberia (Yakubu, 2011:101). Also, was the role the country played in peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone? Following after a long period of military rule, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected president of Sierra Leone on March 17, 1996. Little more than one year later, on May 25, 1997 he and his democratically elected Government were overthrown in a bloody coup led by dissident military officers and rebels from Sierra Leone’s long standing insurgency. In March 1998, a peace keeping force under Nigerian leadership with considerable help from a British/Africa mercenaries from a local paramilitary entered Freetown, and restored Kabbah and his government. The motives of the Nigerian intervention were two-fold: there was a natural desire for regional security, but General Sani Abacha also wanted international legitimacy for his regime which was being discredited by the international community (Yakubu, 2011). At the peak of the operations, ECOMOG had 13, 000 troops in the country which conducted the operations. Late in 1999 the disputants in the Sierra Leonean conflict signed an agreement in Lome, Togo to end the crisis; thus paving the way for United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Anifowose,1999; Peter, 2008).

Nevertheless, many other examples of peacekeeping mission in which Nigeria involved and has projected her image globally include: Sending a battalion to Congo 1960-1964; Military observers to new Guinea 1962-1963; battalion to Tanzania by bilateral agreement 1964; Military observers during the India-Pakistan conflict 1965-1966; battalion and staff officers to Lebanon, 1978-1983; battalion and staff officers to Chad (Harmony I, via bilateral agreement) 1981-1982; brigade to Chad (Harmony II, under the auspices of OAU) 1982-1983; military observers during Iran-Iraq conflict 1988-1991; division to Liberia 1990 to date; military observers for Iraq-Kuwait 1991, and to Angola 1991-1992; training teams for Sierra Leone 1992-1995; military observers to Namibia 1989-1990; to western Sahara 1991; and to Cambodia 1992-1993. The country also contributed a battalion and staff officers to Somalia 1992-1994; battalion and staff officers to the former Yugoslavia 1992; military observers to Mozambique 1992; a battalion to Rwanda; 1993; training teams to the Gambia 1993; military observers A ouzo strip 1994; and to Israel 1995; Liberia 1987; Sierra Leone 1996; Darfur 2003 (Hamman, Mustafa, and Omojuwa, 2014). In sum, Nigeria has been able to maintain good diplomatic relations with other sovereign nations of the world; she has been able to contribute immensely, human resources (Arms forces) towards the security and peace in Africa and the world through her active participation in peacekeeping operations at various times under the ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations Organizations (Echikwonye, 2016). Therefore, the military factor since independence has made Nigeria to play a decisive role in international community, particular in her pursuit of foreign policy of peace and security in Africa, and in the rest of the world.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How does the military factor constitute a foreign policy determinant?
3.8 Demographic Factor

Population constitutes an important indicator of a country's power potential and thus influences its foreign policy. The question of human resources in country affects, in one way or the other, the foreign policy of the country. The quality of the population is even more significant. The articulate nature of the citizenry for instance influences the kind of foreign policy decision that is taken on certain sensitive issues (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005). Nigeria, officially known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a country that is located on the western coast of Africa. The country features 36 states including its Federal Capital Territory, which is known as Abuja. The country of Nigeria features over five hundred different ethnic groups, many different languages, and declared its independence from the United Kingdom (Britain) on October 1, 1960. The total population of citizens in Nigeria was around 166.2 million people (Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). In 2016, it is estimated to have over 178.5 million people although United Nations projections have placed the population as high as 186 million. Nigeria is the largest geographical unit in West Africa, with land area of 910,802 square kilometers (World Population Review, 2016). Nigeria's has three largest ethnic groups each with a population of over ten million, these include the Hausa-Fulani in the North; the Yoruba in the West; and the Igbo in the East. The others are called the 'minorities' of which the Kanuri, Tiv, Jukun, Idoma, Zar etc (in the North); the Edo, Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri (in the West) and the Annang, Efik, Ibibio, together by force as manifested by the civil war of 1967-1970 (Dauda, 2006:1-2).

However, it became quite obvious to Nigeria at independence in 1960, that she has a prominent and a leading role a Africa, because regional perspective on her population advantages was palpable. Comparatively, Nigeria's population was twice that of Egypt, three times that of South Africa and twelve times that of Zambia. Nigeria alone constitutes 25% of the total African population. In area, Nigeria is roughly equivalent to France, Italy, Belgium and Holland put together. From Lagos, a city in the South-west, to Maiduguri a state capital in the North-east is equivalent to the distance between London and Warsaw in Poland. These imply how strategic Nigeria occupies in Africa and what should be her new role in stabilizing Africa and to make it a force to reckon with. Following her independence, Nigeria came of age to engage in intercourse with other actions of the international system (Umeh, 2015). Hence, it has been noted that the population of the Nigeria and that of her West Africa neighbouring countries was a considerable factor in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation choices at independence. For instance, Fawole (2003) points out that:

it was evident at independence that Nigeria was not having the intention to dominate or jeopardized the integrity of any country despite her demographic and enormous resources advantage over neigbours. This prompted Nigeria to see it as a necessity to assure its immediate neigbours that these advantages notwithstanding, it would not pursue policies that would interfere in their internal affairs, neither would it harbour any territorial or expansionist designs against the its smaller and weaker neigbours. Nigeria alone is half the entire prominent in West Africa, a sub-region of sixteen states which harbours most of Africa mini-states. This is a sub-region where Nigeria alone is half the entire population and thus stands out as an indisputable colossus. Nigeria assure its immediate neigbours that it would respect their equality and thus avoid any tendency to
interfere with their domestic affairs. Balewa thus assured the neighbouring states not to feel threatened by Nigeria's size, population and natural endowments, saying "we shall never impose ourselves upon any other country and shall treat every African territory, big or small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis of equality that peace can be maintained in our continent."

This foreign policy decision was taken as Nigeria did not only because her African neighbouring states would feel threatened, but also for them not to fall into the embrace of any of the great power rivalries. In all, this has informed the Nigeria good neighbourliness foreign policy choices and actions towards the African countries.

Therefore, with a relatively large size population comprising of diversity groups, Nigeria has enormous human, potentials for rapid economic and social development. Nigeria has and still assisting some African countries by providing them well-trained manpower through technical aid programme. Moreover, the country has the largest and most formidable army in Black Africa Nigeria army has maintained enviable reputation for her diligent services in peace-keeping operations not only in Africa, but in other parts of the world as pointed out earlier. Thus, the relatively large size of the population of the country coupled with her diversity and considerable human potential all have great impact on her foreign policy (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you assess the impact of demography factors in Nigeria's foreign policy?

### 3.9 Domestic Political Situation

Nigeria's domestic political situations is a key determinant in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation Nigeria as an independent country have been characterized by two main phases of either authoritarian military rule or democratic transitional civilian rule, with all the attendant characteristics and contradictions that this involves. A stable political system is imperative for pursuing a dynamic and coherent foreign policy. During the civilian regime of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1960s, Nigeria experiences a state of political instability and could not play any active role in global politics. The same experience has continued to be witnessed since 1993 when the freest and fairest democratic election ever conducted in the country was annulled by the military regime of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (Arowolo, 2008). The first military coup in the country might have brought about a radical change in Nigeria foreign policy if it was successful as leaders of the coup espoused socialist principles. Its failure ushered Nigeria into a significant era in its foreign policy. The event of the civil war compelled leaders to widen the scope of Nigeria’s foreign policy beyond pro-Westernism. Britain came to disagreements of some policies the Nigerian government attempted to pass such as the blockade of the waters around the Bonny to prevent Biafra from getting oil revenue and prevent arms and ammunitions from being imported through the ports. It was clear to Nigeria that the position of Britain was basically influenced by self interests. Another fact was when Britain placed an embargo on the sale of arms to the federal government of Nigeria from 1986. It was the Soviet Union that came to supply the federal government with much needed arms. This thus brought Soviet Union to the fore front of Nigeria’s foreign policy choice, a country which it had refused in the past (Arowolo, 2008).
Babangida regime gave a lethal blow to Nigeria’s image abroad and its foreign policy in particular, due to human rights abuses and the cancellation of the June 12, 1993 election at a time when every country, in particular the G7 and most OECD countries had made democracy, good governance, and human rights essential determining elements in international politics and in their relations with developing countries. It is worth noting that since the famous La Baule speech by President Mitterrand of France in 1983, democracy became a determining factor in relations between France and developing countries, in particular, African countries. This applied to other Western states also. Worse still, after its cancellation, no official inside Babangida's government was capable of giving cogent reasons for the annulment of the June 12 elections and accusations concerning human rights violations. The international community, therefore, rightly believed our top military officers were up to something. The aftermath was nothing to write home about. That was the beginning of Nigeria's misunderstanding with the international community – notably the UK, USA, Canada, the Commonwealth countries, and the European Union (Okpokpo, 2000). For instance:

On June 24, 1993, the Britain government suspended all new military training courses for members of the Nigerian armed forces in the United Kingdom (UK) as well as all assistance to National War College. Entry visa to the UK was suspended for members of the armed forces, the National Guard and state security service. Government officials going to the UK were not to be given preferential treatment in the issuance of visa. There were also moves to freeze an outstanding 14.5 million pound aid package due to Nigeria. Britain foreign office had described the annulment of the election as regrettable. British and other international observers present during the election found that the election provided Nigeria with a sincere and adequate opportunity to exercise their choice for a future democratically elected president. Hence, commenting on the effects of the annulment on Nigeria's foreign image, the then British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd said it was pathetic that while other African countries were moving towards democracy, Nigeria was rapidly destroying the emerging structure of democracy. According to him: In country after country in Africa (he told the BBC) countries much smaller and less experienced than Nigeria are moving to democracy, you see the discussion in South Africa; you see what is happening in Malawi, is Nigeria really going to fall back right to the end of the Queue and content itself to be ruled by solders indefinitely? (Dauda, 2006:93-94).

The issue of June 12, 1993 had not been resolved when General Sani Abacha pushed the transition President Chief Ernest Shonekan out and took his seat without any agenda on how to improve relations between Nigeria and the international community, outside its traditional African brother countries. That coup d’état worsened the international image of Nigeria. No creditworthy transition programme was published; instead General Abacha embarked upon a self-aggrandizing effort that led Nigeria to the brink of war because of the most flagrant human rights abuses any military regime had ever committed in the country since independence. Nigeria became a pariah state with whom none, except compliant African countries talked to. It was at this time that experienced diplomatic advice would have saved Nigeria but none was given a chance (Okpokpo, 2000:2). Under General Abacha, foreign policy was cruelly mishandled. Records show that Nigeria was like a country without a foreign minister and a foreign policy
during that period. It appears that there was no _useful policy advice_ to General Abacha during the time. Otherwise, the regime should have been capable of foreseeing the devastating effects of the hanging of the "Ogoni nine", including Ken Saro Wiwa, and lastly, why there was no government official capable of making the regime to shift the horrible decision to hang the Ogoni activists until the end of the Commonwealth summit. The regime unjustly imprisoned many people, including the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo, and hung Ken Saro Wiwa when all Commonwealth Heads of State and Government were meeting in Australia. These were all _terrible acts_ and _diplomatic blunders_, because they underrated the importance of internal policy including _democratic reforms_ and the place of _human rights_ in international relations and diplomacy. Nigeria’s diplomacy was grounded during the Babangida-Abacha era. This explains why the Obasanjo's government recalled all ambassadors and designated new ones during his administration. In Foreign Minister Lamido’s words, it is in recognition of the important roles played by heads of missions that they recalled them to dismantle the "old order". The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections and the hanging of the "Ogoni nine" were two _lethal blows_ that those regimes gave to Nigeria’s image abroad (Okpokpo, 2000:2-3). These domestic political situations made the country's foreign policy to suffer international reputation. Therefore domestic factors at that period great impacted on Nigeria foreign policy and relation.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you explain domestic political situation as a key determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy?

### 3.10 Impact of Exogenous or External Influences

There is no doubt that external factors have impacted on the Nigeria foreign policy choices since independence. These factors include among others:

- Great powers and ideological military blocs
- The French factor
- World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF)

**Great Powers and Ideological Military Blocs:** According to Umeh (2015) in the preparation towards independence, the British Government named Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa the first Prime Minister of the soon to be independent nation. In a radio address broadcasted to Nigerians in September 1957, Balewa accepts his new appointment and outlines the political future of the soon-to-be independent nation. Balewa eventually became the Head of Government and he was to carry out the job of conducting Nigeria’s foreign relation as the Prime Minister. On this note, Fawole (2003) made it clear that the subscription to the foreign policy principle of non-alignment was not really a matter of choice, but rather based on a realistic assessment of the prevailing trend of world politics. The reality that the world was dangerously divided into two opposing poles of power, with two antagonistic ideological of capitalism and communism being championed by the world's only two great or superpowers, namely the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU). The power configuration was also affected by the fact that the two acknowledged superpowers were also the spearheads of the two gigantic military alliances of National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact respectively. The choice that was open to newly independent states including Nigeria at the time was either to join the West (capitalist bloc) or the East (socialist bloc) or to remain objectively neutral from ideological
power rivalries. Non-alignment foreign policy offered the countries a suitable alternative that would allow her to be friends to all and enemies to none in order to keep away from being direct victims of great or superpower conflicts. Nigeria made the sensible choice not to align with any of the power blocs, for to do otherwise would have amounted to being partisan and that would have exposed it to victimization from the opposing side. This is however not to conclude that Balewa, the architect of Nigeria’s foreign policy of non-aligned worldview, followed the dictates of the principle to the letter. His government was so rabidly pro-British and concomitantly pro-Western that it demonstrated open hostility towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and showed overt abhorrence for anything communist. For instance, he signed a bilateral defence pact with Britain which would allow the Britain to have a military base in the country. This pact had to be abrogated in January 1962 under severe and sustained pressure including violent protests by student organization, opposition in the parliament and public opinion.

However, during the civil war (1967-1970), Balewa shaped the pertain of Nigeria's foreign policy which Britain continued to occupy prominent position in Nigeria foreign relations as countries of the Eastern bloc were not reckoned within the Nigeria’s foreign relation under Balewa. Even the time USSR wanted the open an Embassy of in Nigeria, they were turned down with an excuse of not accruing enough resource to reciprocate by opening an Embassy in Moscow. Meanwhile, Balewa’s non-alignment was basically on Anglo-Nigerian defence pact of 1960. Balewa showed a glaring performance for relations with the Western powers and avoided the Eastern bloc. His government was related with the Western powers especially Britain and USA and its cold war and offer hostile attitude to the communist powers and also refused to recognized the republic of China and he saw communist as evil. Even their willingness to support Nigeria economy but was not welcomed. However, Nigerian has supported on most cold war issues such as Berlin Crisis of 1961, American Nuclear Testing of early 1962. Emotionally and mental attachment of Nigerian leaders to West especially Britain at that period was so much that it was not possible to uphold her foreign policy of non-alignment in practice, therefore, Balewa’s regime from (1960-1966) though non-alignment in principle, was pronouncedly pro-West in ideological learning (Umeh, 2015).

The French factor: French factor has shaping the Nigeria's foreign policy. As earlier noted, few years after independence, Nigerian government pursued modest foreign policy aims. The Prime Minister Balewa’s foreign policy was limited to upholding the principles inscribed in the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 1963 Charter: non-interference, the legal equality of states, and boundary inviolability (Ogunbadejo, 1980). All of these interests were encompassed by the broader Nigerian foreign policy preference for “good-neighborliness.” However, it must be noted that all of Nigeria’s geographic neighbours are francophone states strongly influenced by their former colonial great or superpowers, even after they achieved formal independence. As such, this French encirclement impacted on Nigeria foreign policy actions (Aluko, 1973). For instance, the impact of French encirclement was revealed during the civil war (1967-1970), the Nigerian state was actively opposed by France, the Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal and South Africa. The civil war revealed the dangers of continued external involvement on the continent, as well as the importance of securing sub-regional allies, particularly the country's francophone neighbours. The danger and impact of French encirclement was reveal when during the civil war, the Island of Equatorial Guinea was used by the Red Cross to ferry food, (and as claimed by Nigerians) arms and war materials to Biafra. Equally significant was the use of the Island by the French
government to provide covert military aid, weapons, ammunition and supplies to Biafra in spite of incessant protests by the then Nigerian government (Oshuntokun, 1992). Consequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria’s non-aligned foreign policy status previously demonstrated, which was solidly pro-Western preference, began to encourage more active foreign policy engagement with the USSR and China (Gambari, 1975).

Nevertheless, the post-civil war Nigeria’s leaders also went to greater lengths to reduce France’s influence on Nigeria’s African neighbours and to reconcile with other states in the sub-region, including civil war enemies, such as Côte d’Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria needed to be less isolated. The principle of good neighborhood became a security concern, as well as a normative principle (Aluko, 1981). Hence, efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbors and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were facilitated by Nigeria’s oil boom. The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. The Federal Government of Nigeria used this new income to pursue a more ambitious sub-regional economic foreign policy. For instance, Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbors, with the aim of weaning them off dependence on France. In 1974, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to its energy-poor neighbors (Aluko, 1981).

Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence. The Head of State, General Gowon (1967-75) promoted bilateral trading pacts, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) economic bodies, and the establishment of a new international institution for regional integration: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Local francophone states initially hesitated to participate in a Nigerian-led organization. However, Gowon decided to move forward with the scheme by starting with Anglophone states like Togo. He gained greater francophone confidence by leading negotiations for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to gain observer status with the European Economic Community (EEC). The resultant Lomé Convention was signed on February 28, 1975. ECOWAS came into existence three months later (Abegunrin, 2003). Within ECOWAS, sub-regional rivalries have always threatened to undermine the organization’s potential. Of the sixteen ECOWAS member States, five are Anglophone, nine are francophone, and two are Lusophone. With some 90 per cent of the sub-region’s population and a significant market share, Nigeria leads the Anglophone bloc. The francophone States - led by Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal - have long been suspicious of Nigeria’s intentions. They sought to frustrate Abuja’s hegemonic ambitions by withholding support for certain Nigerian-led “ECOWAS” initiatives and created rival economic organizations (Berman and Sams, 2000/3).

Recently, in the 2012 Mali crisis, the politics of intervention, francophone dominated and allowed France to wield great influence among the conflict’s major players. Blaise Compaore, Burkinabe leader who positioned himself as a key mediator in regional conflicts, it was argued, hosted French gazelle helicopters in his country before they were deployed for military combat in Mali in January 2013. The Chairman of ECOWAS since February 2012 was Alassane Ouattara, leader of Cote d’Ivoiré, whose presidential mandate had been largely restored by the French army. The ECOWAS president since February 2012 was former Burkinabe prime minister and a member of Compaore’s Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) Party, Kadre Ouedrogo. All three individuals were, in a sense, closely aligned with France and can be
seen as French Trojan horses within ECOWAS. This placed Nigeria in a tight corner since it was diplomatically encircled and linguistically different than its Francophone neighbors” (Madike, 2013). It evidently clear that French factors as greatly frustrated Nigeria’s foreign policy aimed at ensuring regional integration and to further her leadership position in Africa.

**International Monetary Fund (IMF):** By 1981 in the wake of the world oil glut, the need to restructure the economy became necessary. The precursor of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Austerity measures was introduced in 1981 with restrictions in import, quota systems, cutback on subsidies and reduction in public spending. The results were not all that encouraging although it succeeded in reducing public sector deficit from 11.6 per cent, to 2.9 per cent between 1981 and 1985. However, the overall implications on the economy were grave. The restriction of raw-materials and machinery inputs for the entire manufacturing sector and at the same time a number of consumer items were placed under prohibited list of import, while trade in oil decreased and in 1986 oil prices fell from 28 per cent to 25 per cent. Unemployment, scarcity of supply and galloping inflation, urban migration became rampant. This negative trend reveals the structural problem in the economy, which requires fundamental adjustment measures. Consequently, the federal government adopted a SAP in 1986 with the aim of restructuring and diversifying the productive base economy, bring about short term balance of payment and liberalize the economy to allow accelerated balance growth. Foreign policy of economic diplomacy became an instrument to advance this course of national economic recovery (Akinsoya cited in Dauda, 2006).

However, the impact of International Monetary Fund on this domestic and foreign policy choice was greatly felt when the country tried to adopt the foreign policy of economy diplomacy during General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime (1985-1993). The policy of economic diplomacy, which was aimed at achieving the economic recovery, self-reliance, development, reduction of importation of finished goods and to reduce the level of dependency on the Western economy among others. But Okeke (2014) observes that this new foreign policy posture was through implementation of IMF’s endorsed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as the country needed to obtain loan from this international financial institution to successfully implement the economy adjustment - SAP. This new economy posture was greatly determined by the external factor, as the country have to negotiated for loan and to get the loan is to accept the IMF conditionalities on the implementation of same. The implementation of SAP of the IMF was however, haphazardly implemented leading to demise of economic diplomacy by 1990 as IMF disengaged from Nigeria. However, the disengagement of the IMF may be due to the serious pressure mounted on President Babangida by the Nigerians not to implement a SAP based on the IMF's loan conditionalities (Ibeme, 2014). As far as the IMF was concerned on SAP, countries will experience recovery but not self reliance. For the IMF, the countries embarking on SAP are primary product exporters and/or fuel exporters. For instance, Nigeria must import the finished goods from the developed industrialized countries of the world, which was contrary to the initial intention of SAP. Hence, the IMF view of implementation of SAP is to deepens dependence especially through its granting of loan with conditionality (financing aspect) which makes SAP anti economy recovery, anti-self-reliance and anti-development (Ukah, 2014).
In response to the anti-IMF loan public sentiments, the government of Babangida at the time opted for the adoption and implementation of a home-grown SAP, which nonetheless was IMF inspired. In connection with this, Babangida according to Ibeme (2014) announces:

*after due consideration of all the opinions expressed by Nigerians and other residents, as embodied in the Interim Report on the IMF loan, government has come to the conclusion that for now the path of honour and the essence of democratic patriotism lies in discontinuing the negotiations with IMF for a support loan. This is clearly, the will of majority of our people on the issue. We have therefore decided to face the challenge of restructuring our determination of our own people to make all the sacrifices necessary to put the economy on the path of sustained growth, doing so at our own pace and on our own preference.*

Subsequently, the influence of IMF on the country's policy of economic diplomacy staged a comeback under Obasanjo’s civilian regime (1999-2007) when the IMF reengaged Nigeria in 2001. This time around the *policy of economic diplomacy* was specifically targeted at obtaining *debt relief*, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and soliciting for more loans through implementation of IMF's conditionalities. Nigeria began to implement the World Bank and the IMF endorsed National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS).

However, economic diplomacy as a strategy of economic recovery or development border on how to manage relations with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or donor agencies like World Bank/IMF, etc. in order to bring Nigeria to the path of economic development. It was this that Babangida’s regime (1985-1993) engaged in when it adopted/implemented SAP and Obasanjo’s regime (1990-2007) when it embarked on the task of debt relief and attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This shaped the country's foreign policy choice under Yar’ Adua's regime, as Okeke (2014) noted that following the reform of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Yar’ Adua’s regime in 2007, the country adopted citizenship diplomacy in order to correct anomalies of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Citizenship diplomacy was geared towards achieving the country’s foreign policy objectives and national interest that suffered under foreign policy of economic diplomacy.

From the above however, it is crystal clear that the international financial institutions impacted on the Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy choice targeted towards achieving economic recovery for sustainable development.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you discuss the impact of external factors on the Nigeria's foreign policy choices?

**4.0 CONCLUSION**

In this unit, we have been able to identify and explain the factors that determine Nigeria foreign policy choices including: the national interest; structure of the nation economy; strategic location of the country; political structure of the country; socio-cultural influences; personal idiosyncrasy of the political leadership; military factor; demographic factor; domestic political situation; ideological inclination as well as the influence/impact of external factors.
5.0 SUMMARY

The points identified and discussed in this unit showcase the factors that determine Nigeria's foreign policy. However, with close look at them one may summarized them into internal (domestic) and external factors.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Explain how Nigeria's national interests have help to determine her foreign policy?

ii. Justify with examples that the structure of the Nigeria's economy is a determinant of her foreign policy?

iii. Explain why the strategic location of Nigeria is a determinant of her foreign policy?

iv. Discuss how the political structure of the Nigeria is a determinant of her foreign policy?

v. Explicate how socio-cultural influence is a determinant of foreign policy?

vi. Briefly explain personal idiosyncrasy of the political leadership of Nigeria as a determinant of her foreign policy?

vii. In what way does the military constitute a foreign policy determinant?

viii. Assess the impact of demographic factors in determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy?

ix. Explain the impact of domestic political situation as a key determinant of Nigeria's foreign policy?

x. Discuss the impact of external influences on the Nigeria's foreign policy?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


Ottoh, O. F. (2012) “Theoretical Approaches to the understanding of the impact of Domestic Factors to Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” A paper presented at a Conference organized by
Nigerian Society of International Affairs, held at Lead City University, Ibadan, 6\textsuperscript{th} -8\textsuperscript{th} April.


UNIT 4: FORMULATION AND MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

CONTENTS

1.0  Introduction
2.0  Objectives
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   3.1  Institutional Framework for Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria
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6.0  Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0  References/Further Reading

1.0  INTRODUCTION

The quality of policy making and implementation is determined by the quality of the institutions and the manner of structural arrangement and relationship between the ministries/institutions that are statutorily recognized and responsible for policy advice, policy making and policy implementation. Therefore, this unit provides you with in-depth explanations to enhance your understanding on the formulation and mechanisms for implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy issues.

2.0  OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation;
- broadly discuss the significant role of think tanks in enhancing the quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making and implementation; and
- identify and explain instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy?

3.0  MAIN CONTENT

3.1  Institutional Framework for Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria

Created in 1960 and successively known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (1960-1963) and the Ministry of External Affairs (1963-1992), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it is presently called, is the central statutory machinery for the conduct and management of Nigeria’s external relations. Historically, it has always been organized partly on a geographical and partly on a functional basis. From 1960 to 1962, it had eight Divisions (geographical and functional) with the Foreign Minister as the political head of the organization and the Permanent Secretary as the chief administration and accounting officer. Since 1960, three major re-organization exercises had been carried out. In 1972, re-organization led to the
creation of ten Departments on both geographical and functional lines, with each department headed by a Director. The Foreign Minister and the Permanent Secretary remained respectively the political boss and administrative head of the Ministry. Ten years later, presumably to achieve a greater degree of decentralization in the conduct of foreign policy, a second major re-organization was carried out, leading to the creation of five Directorates with each headed by a Director-General wearing the rank of a Permanent Secretary. Charged with the responsibility of horizontal coordination among the five Directors-General was the Director General for Service Matters who accordingly held a primus inter pares standing among his other colleagues. This organizational structure was abandoned in 1988 with the implementation of the Civil Service reform which required all Ministers to adopt and put in place an eight-department pattern of internal organization, but which allowed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to have a ten-department pattern presumably to accommodate its expanding global responsibilities and its new thrust in and preoccupation with international economic diplomacy (NIIA, 2005).

However, the MFA is only one, but the senior, of the two integrated components collectively referred to as the Foreign Service. The other related institutional component is the collectively of the country’s diplomatic Missions abroad, the main responsibility of the Missions abroad is to implement Nigeria's foreign policy and, by acting diligently and professionally as the country’s ears and eyes abroad, to gather information. The relationship between the MFA and the Missions abroad is that between the headquarters and outposts, both of which jointly constitute an integrated Foreign Service. But, as Olu Adeniji has pointed out, the relationship between the MFA and its outposts abroad is really not one-way traffic in which the Missions merely receive instructions from the headquarters, which they carry out, but a two way exchange which permit the Missions to contribute towards the enrichment of policy formulation and the strengthening of their own capacity for policy implementation. Nigeria’s diplomatic Missions abroad are generally organizationally structured, like the MFA pyramid, for policy advice and policy implementation, with an advice making process similar to that at the headquarters in Abuja. The Head of the Mission, Embassy or High Commission, as the case may be, is Ambassador or High Commissioner who, as the chief representative of the Government and people of Nigeria in the country or international organization of accreditation, personifies the Nigerian state. Usually at the bottom of the institutional hierarchy are the Attaches in different functional fields (NIIA, 2005). With respect to the flow of information, decision-making and administrative processes within the country’s Missions abroad, what was said of the Nigerian Embassy in Ethiopia in 1990 is descriptive of all Nigeria’s diplomatic Missions abroad:

There is...consultation between the head of Mission and very senior officers whose inputs is relevant for particular policy issues and matters. Decision-making and recommendations on such policy issues go through the process of ad-hoc political discussion and consultation between the Ambassador and his appropriate top-level staff before ‘dispatches’, based on the consensus and recommendations that emerge, are forwarded to the Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos (Akindele, 1990).

In designing the strategy for the conduct of Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the MFA relies a great deal, as it should, on advice from and action by the country’s Missions abroad. This explains why it becomes necessary for such Missions to be so organized and funded
to enable them cope with their diplomatic tasks, particularly policy implementation under the watchful eyes of the MFA. All indications are that the internal reorganization exercise of 1972, 1981 and 1988 in the MFA, which addressed them to the general and specific institutional problems within the Ministry have, by and large, created a potentially resourceful institutional instrument for both policy implementation in foreign affairs (NIIA, 2005).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you discuss the institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation?

### 3.2 The Significant Role of Think Tanks in Foreign Policy

In stable democracies, foreign policy articulation, formulation and pursuit are carried out by the government in collaboration with relevant research institutes and think-tanks. Think-Tanks are relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues devoid of undue governmental and political parties’ influences. They are relatively autonomous, although they are often in resource-dependent relationships with other research organizations and international institutions. Funding may come from government, but they strive to maintain their research freedom. Thus, Think-Tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through intellectual arguments and analysis, rather than direct lobbying. It is any organization that conducts research and engages in advocacy in areas such as social policy, political strategy, economy, science or technology issues, economic policies and defence policy. A Think-tank is also a public policy research, analysis and engagement institution that generates policy oriented research analysis and advise on domestic and international issues. Think-tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through intellectual arguments and analysis rather than direct lobbying (Ahmadu, 2015).

Some Think-Tanks are highlighted below and their roles in policy advice, research and formulation are discussed below:

**Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)**

Like every other foreign policy, the Nigerian foreign policy is a complex process. Its formulation process involves the specialization and inter-play of different bodies/agencies. As such, NIIA was established in 1961, following the efforts of some prominent Nigerians with the aim of providing a nursery of ideas on what direction Nigeria should take on international affairs. Since inception, the Institute has been organizing conferences, roundtables and lectures with aim of addressing current foreign policy issues and anticipating others still on the horizon. The Institute is a *specialized instrument* of foreign policy formulation in Nigeria. It serves as an intellectual base upon which decision-makers rely for informed opinion and expert advice in order to make rational choices between contending policy options. However, the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, after necessary consultation with the Regional Premiers, proposed the membership of the Governing Council of the NIIA on 11th October, 1961. The Board held its first meeting on the 13th of December 1961 thus started the Journey of the NIIA (Banjo, 1986). As the Prime Minister, declares, in support of the founding of the NIIA: “If Nigeria is to acquit herself honourably and to take her rightful place in resurgent Africa, she requires to be fully
Within a decade of NIIA’s establishment and existence, Nigeria witnessed a changed and unstable political sector. From experiencing a turbulent political crisis and a disastrous civil war, the military assumed power. National experiences at the time exposed huge foreign influences in national issues, thus the Federal Military Government (FMG) embarked on nationalization of establishments in Nigeria. The NIIA was not spared of this policy action, as in 1971 the FMG through the promulgation of Decree No. 35 of 18th April, 1971 established the NIIA as a corporate body, in order to ensure adequate funding for its activities and to ensure that the body is in every sense a Nigerian institution with little or no foreign influence so as to be able to use it effectively as an instrument of public policy. This meant that, it should not indulge in idle pursuits unrelated to national policies and preoccupation, in effect its research output must to a large extent be policy oriented, by and large reflecting the broad strands in the country’s foreign policy. The statutory arrangement therefore transferred ownership of the institute to the Federal government along with its responsibilities, in addition to empowering the NIIA with policy advice role in the making of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Nwauba, 2014).

The roles of NIIA's in foreign policy process includes

**Research Role:** The essence of NIIA’s existence is the serving of varying responsibility to Nigeria’s foreign policy in general, without which its corporate existence would have lost its value. Thus, among the NIIA’s varying inputs is the research role. The NIIA’s status as a think tank of foreign policy makes research its primary role to the Nigerian foreign policy process. It is no coincidence part of its objectives spells: To provide and maintain means of information upon international questions and promote the study and investigation of international question by means of conferences, lectures and discussions, and by the preparation and publication of books, reports or otherwise as may be desirable opinions world affairs, in addition to its functions providing for “promotion and encouragement of the study and research into all aspects of international affairs.” Thus, the institute through different research methods contributes to the Nigerian foreign policy process. The NIIA’s research function is conducted through invitation and participation in crucial meetings of national and international levels. Examples of such include; the overseas exchange of tours between the teams of researchers and other sister institutes, the conduct of lectures, seminars, conferences, workshops and symposia on wide areas (Olusanya, 1990). In addition to special briefings and Ambassadorial fora on topical and serious national, continental and global issues, the research meetings are not simply for public enlightenment but particularly for leadership designs. It is on record that, such lectures, seminars and symposia etc., lead to the production of communiqués, recommendations and other publications e.g. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Nigerian Forum and Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs among others, which are resource materials for the best interest of the national objectives by the institutes. These forms of roundtable sessions are aimed at socializing foreign policy and drawing lessons from experts in the fields of international relations and strategic studies, Nigerian foreign policy, international law and diplomacy, serving and retired Nigerian ambassadors, diplomats, media practitioners and top level military officers on trends of global developments so as to make specific recommendations to the Nigerian government. In addition, the body of knowledge gathered serves at all times as reference to government, the
general public - scholars, analysts/ commentators and students of International Relations alike. It must be stressed however that though the institute in its various activities is mindful of theory building in international relations, its research and studies department has overtime given priority of policy oriented research in international affairs as a way of ensuring it made relevant contribution to the foreign policy process (Akinterinwa, 2004).

**Technical Role:** Among the NIIA’s corporate input to Nigeria’s foreign policy process is her technical input. It is about the most sensitive NIIA feed in into the foreign policy process. Although this role is somewhat differentiated from research, technical input stems from research input, since technical input basically connotes expertise input and recommendations generated following intensive research or knowledge building. Technical role basically centers around feeding into decision making process, expertise advice, policy advocacies and information on the consequences of pursuing a range of foreign policy options in general, through the preparation of policy papers on request of government or its agencies for use by government either in direct negotiations with foreign governments or bodies or as background information for such negotiations. Moreover, parts of NIIA’s technical efforts to Nigerian foreign policy include the teaching of officers of the Foreign Service Academy, (an arm of the Foreign Ministry) by members of the Research staff, even at the Masters Degree program, which contemporarily is affiliated to the University of Lagos. This is in continuation of an arrangement which has seen the NIIA within the period 1979-1982, design and run a nine month Post-graduate Diploma program for the country’s Foreign Service officers before the MFA established its Foreign Service Academy. Besides, part of the NIIA’s technical input come in the form organizing routine workshops, conferences, lectures, symposia, brainstorming sessions among others. on topical issues in international relations, which staffs from different government departments/ministries including the MFA and participants from varying walks of life and sectors; including featuring/participation by staff of the institute in capacity building or routine training of staff varying government departments (including NIIA), schools, industries, groups and so forth, through which expertise knowledge of issues are impacted into random participants (Agbu, 2000).

**Personnel Role:** NIIA like every other think-tank involves in providing a steady stream of experts to serve in incoming administrations, such that it has overtime gained a reputation for supplying government with expertise especially with regard to foreign affairs. Agbu affirms to this, stating that the NIIA has produced or been associated with individuals who have played very important indirect roles in Nigeria’s foreign policy making. A number of past NIIA Director Generals have served in high placed positions in government especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Agbu, 2000). For instance: Dr. Lawrence Fabunmi went back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after heading the NIIA, served as Nigeria’s High Commissioner to Zambia, Ambassador to Turkey, and Poland with concurrent accreditation to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while Professors Ibrahim Gambari (1984-1985) and Bolaji Akinyemi (1985-1987) became Nigeria’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs, after their leadership of the institute, including Professor Joy Ogwu (2006-2009). In the same vein, Dr. Femi Aribasala and Dr. (Professor) George Obiozor once served as Special Advisers to Professor Bolaji Akinyemi and General Ike Nwachukwu then foreign ministers. In addition, Professor George Obiozor has served as Nigerian Ambassador to Israel and United States, 1999-2003 and 2004-2008 respectively, including being Nigeria’s High Commissioner to Cyprus (Nwauba, 2014). Also, NIIA’s present Director General has served as
Special Assistant to two former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON and Chief Ojo Maduekwe, CFR in the past. In addition to serving as a Special Assistant to the Honourable Minister for Internal Affairs, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, when he was redeployed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (later Ministry of Interior). It is also on record that Professors Gambari and Ogwu have served and continue to serve in the UN under differing capacities. It is on record that Gambari has served as the Under Secretary General of the United Nations for the Department of Political Affairs (2005-2006) and has been appointed by the Vice-Chairperson of the Africa Union Commission as the joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, effective from January 1, 2010; including serving as the Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq and other issues for the secretary General of the United Nations, as well as serving as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Myanmar and Angola (2002 and 2003), in addition to serving as Nigeria’s longest serving Permanent Representative to the UN between 1990-1999. On another hand, Professor Ogwu has served as the chairperson of the Board of Trustees the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); including serving in 2008 as Nigeria’s Permanent Representative for the UN and President of the UN Security Council in July 2010 and in October 2011, in addition to currently being the President of the UN Women Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (Nwauba, 2014).

Moreover, the institute has made and continue to make direct personnel input into Nigeria’s external policy process, through participation by its members in crucial discussions and decision making at various levels, the highest…and significant being the membership of the Director-General of the ad hoc Committee on Foreign Policy. The Director General also serves in a number of Committees and Task forces set up by the government to look into one aspect or another of our external relations (The Presidential Advisory Committee on International Relations (PACIR) is a contemporary example). Besides there are now developments which add another dimension to the direct involvement of the institute in policy making process and that is, the participation of members of the research staff of the Institute on various inter-ministerial meetings organized by the Ministry of External Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to deal with specific issues as well as membership of the Director-General on the Crisis Management Committee of the Ministry Also, the inclusion of the Director-General and Research Officers in government delegations to crucial diplomatic missions such as the United Nations General Assembly sessions, including the participation of Research Fellows in various inter-ministerial committee meetings organized by the ministry of foreign affairs or agencies aimed at addressing specific foreign policy issues is another way the NIIA participates in foreign policy-making. Further to this, at other times, various other categories of research staff have served in one capacity or the other, rendering immeasurable services to the country and the foreign policy process on ad-hoc basis and sometimes as Special Assistants. The Institute at various times has its staff seconded to the Presidency, Military establishments and various Government Parastatals (Nwauba, 2014).

**National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS)**

The emergence of NIPSS as a government ‘think tank’ was associated with the need to coordinate the ever-increasing complexity in government activities as cited by the Udoji Public Service Review Commission Report of 1976. A Research and Coordination Unit, established in
the then Cabinet Office, and later developed into the National Policy Development Centre (NPDC) or ‘Think Thank’, in April 1976. The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) was established by Decree No. 20 of 1 January 1979 (now NIPSS Act CAP 262 of 1990) to conduct policy research for government and train senior executives in policymaking and implementation skills.

**The roles of NIPSS in Policy Research and Policy Advice and Formulation:** It will be difficult to separate the research, training and advice roles of NIPSS in policy process. The three roles are interconnected discussed here: NIPSS conduct *policy research* for government and *train* senior executives in policymaking and implementation skills. Addresses issues associated with government business through action research and training of senior executives in the art of making policy and strategy. NIPSS undertake policy research and analysis of interest of government; *develop new ideas* and policy guidelines; Provide *advice* or suggest new dimensions to existing policies; conduct in-depth studies of society in general; continuously review government policies and measures from time and draw attention to those that are inconsistent with overall government objectives; and *monitor plan implementation*. It carry out *policy research* in-depth into the social, economic, political, security, scientific, cultural and other problems facing the country; and *formulate* and *present* in usable form, the available options for their solutions. However, *policy inputs* are *developed* from *research* findings, communiqués of conferences, workshops and seminars; results of simulation exercises; resolutions of retreats and interactive sessions; and other related activities. These are *made available* to policymakers *in both public and private sectors* *in form of policy options*, executive briefs, memoranda and publications. The Institute Library serves as a *data bank*; and the Seminar and Publication Unit, as a publishing *house for policy* related materials. Thus, the role of NIPSS in the policymaking process in Nigeria includes *direct contribution of ideas* through the *findings* of its policy research activities and the *training* of top-level policymakers in policy and strategy, at the same time serving as a data bank and publishing house for policy related materials. Section 3(1) of NIPSS Law CAP 262, 1990, reveals that the Studies Department, conducts training of senior executives, through the Senior Executive Course (SEC) programme. The participants of the programme are nominated from top-level policymakers at the apex of their profession with considerable experience and access to policymaking arena and apparatus. The programme of training is at strategic level, thus the status of participants also falling within leadership equation in Nigeria’s national affairs. Participants undertake individual essays, group studies, interactive sessions and concluding seminars. Other activities include strategic, local, African and World tours out of which reports and recommendations are made to government (Ahmadu, 2015).

Policy research findings of projects and communiqué of workshops, conferences, seminars, and interactive sessions for examples, projects on The Nigeria’s Border Security and Defence Project (1987); The Nigeria Defence Policy Conference (1981); The Technical Aid Corp (TAC) 1987; Other minor and major issues or interventions were regularly treated by In-house seminars, workshops, conferences, colloquiaums and roundtables to develop ‘policy papers’ serves as *supportive or guiding documents* for *policy making* in the country (Ahmadu, 2015).

**Nigeria's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)**

Since political independence 1960, the country has had governments with low capacity for people-driven and inclusive development programming options. In many of these governments,
decisions on the type, location and timing of a development intervention was a function of the whims and caprices of policy makers who hardly understood the interface between development and conflict, especially in the heterogeneous society of Nigeria. Numerous development projects were poorly conceived, and as a consequence, impacted negatively on the people. Needless to say that development challenges bordering on issues of human rights, political and economic inclusion were part of the causal factors of the Nigerian civil war. Between 1967 and 1970 Nigeria was engulfed in a civil war that had phenomenal impact on development in the entire country and put the nation’s corporate existence at great risk. The establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) was a strategic response by the federal government of Nigeria towards tackling conflict disorders in the country. IPCR was established in February, 2000 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its objective is primarily a research centre, a think-tank and an agency to strengthen Nigeria's capacity for the promotion of peace, conflict prevention, management and resolution (Uyi, 2012:1).

**The roles of IPCR in Policy Research and Policy Advice and Formulation:** The mandate of the Institute requires it to conduct in-depth research into the root causes of conflict, leading to the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflict. To meet its broad mandate, the Institute carries out intervention programmes including field studies, desk top research, conflict awareness and sensitization campaigns, capacity building, seminars/conferences, publications and provision of library services. It collaborates with state and non-state actors towards the realization of its institutional objectives. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution consists of six departments and three units, and is supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following the merger of the former Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IPCR is well known for its conduct of the research that led to the publication of Nigeria's first Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) in 2003, which earned a UN Resolution 1625 of October, 2005. Following that impressive report, which formed the basis for its subsequent research works, the Institute updated the SCA in 2008 and in 2012 in view of the fast changing conflict dynamics in Nigeria (IPCR, 2013). Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), collaborated to provide this generic framework. The framework will enable development planners and programmers bridge the gaps that account for much of the negative impact of development activities on peace and conflict in Nigeria. The hope of the IPCR and UNICEF is that this framework will ultimately help to facilitate a conflict-sensitive, people-driven and sustainable development regime in Nigeria. The outcome of this institutional partnership is also expected to contribute to the attainment of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria as contained in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and other development tools. The framework is responsive to human rights-based approaches to development programming (Uyi, 2012).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you broadly discuss the significant role of think tanks in enhancing the quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making and implementation?
3.3 Instruments for Conducting Nigeria's Foreign Policy

**Diplomacy:** There is no doubt that no state could survive in isolation. In the world politics diplomatic relations is not only vital for states diplomats to find solution to the problem affecting their states but those affecting the entire globe. Global challenges including, climate change, terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, HIV/AIDS, food insecurity, imbalance trade, corruption, boundary conflict, human trafficking and soon on require bilateral and multilateral collaborations. Arowolo (2008:9) agrees that diplomacy is the most frequently and widely used instrument in the international system. It connotes representation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation. Essentially, diplomacy represents a peaceful and most important technique in resolving crisis and issues in the international system (Anifowose, and Enemuo, 1999). For example, Nigeria through negotiation with Cameroon resolved over a long disputed Bakassi Peninsula, an international boundary between the two neighbours by signing the Green Tree Agreement 2006 and peacefully handed over to Cameroon in 2008. Nigeria have been engaging in bilateral and multilateral interactions with China, India, United States etc. and have through her engagement with European Union, Commonwealth of Nations, ECOWAS, African Union, United Nations, and so on, achieve or resolve important policy issues.

**Military Instrument:** Military instrument is highly essential in foreign policy implementation. It is a major weapon for conducting inter-state relations. Indeed, military capability of a state determines to a large extent, the position of that state among the comity of nations. The military as an institution serves as an external defence mechanism that can be used in advancing foreign policy either as tool of pressure or that of negotiation to achieve a particular end (Arowolo, 2008:11). For instance, in the history of Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations dates back to 1960 in the Congo just few days after her independence, wherein she not only contributed troops, but also commanded the UNOC operation. Since then, Nigeria has been involved in many UN peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world some of which are in Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, Beirut, India and Pakistan. Nigerian troops are still serving in many UN missions in places like Kuwait, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. By December 2000, Nigeria had 3404 troops serving under the UN, making her the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in the world after Bangladesh with a total contribution of 6040. Over 100,000 Nigerian troops have served in UN peacekeeping missions around the world since her first participation in 1960 and four of these missions have been commanded by Nigerian senior military officers (Congo, Angola, and Beirut). The first major peacekeeping role however was that of Chad (1979-82) which Nigeria undertook under the auspices of the OAU. That operation cost Nigeria about $82m which had to be written off. Nigeria has also been, for a long time, the chair of the UN Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations. Finally, her leadership both as Chair of the Security Council at various times, as well as in other areas in the UN System has given her the opportunity not only to build peace, but also to push for positions favourable to Africa. Consistent participation in peacekeeping operations has given Nigeria’s military sufficient exposure and experience that is valuable not only to the country but also to the entire sub-region (Kuna, 2005).

As in peace building, the role of Nigeria in the resolution of actual conflicts has been vigorous. In the specific case of conflict resolution, various protocols endorsed by Heads of State and
Government provide an effective institutional framework for the resolution of disputes. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention mentioned earlier, the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED, 2002), the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (1981), and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) are all mechanisms for the resolution of both domestic and regional conflicts. Some of these protocols have lead to the establishment of specialized institutions such as the Mediation and Security Council, Defence and Security Commission, ECOMOG, the Council of Elders, and the office of Political Affairs, Defence and Security (PADS). While these mechanisms have a number of shortcomings, their value in creating a framework for the early detection and resolution of ongoing conflicts is inestimable. Some of these mechanisms created the grounds for intervening in some of the conflicts in West Africa such as those in Liberia (1990-98), Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire. In the case of Liberia, the situation by December 1989 was serious with Charles Taylor’s offensive launched from Cote d’Ivoire’s border with Liberia. By early 1990, there was real possibility that Liberia would slide into anarchy. With the refusal of the United Nations, the United States and the rest of the International Community to intervene, it was left to ECOWAS at the instance of Nigeria to quickly act to stem the threat to law and order not only in Liberia, but also throughout the Mano River Union, and possibly across West Africa. The Standing Mediation Committee established after ECOWAS’s Banjul meeting failed to address the crises, and it had to later that year raise a 3,000 strong army constituted of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia to intervene in the Liberian crisis. These troops helped to stabilize that situation that culminated in the Liberian warlords negotiating for peace that led to the elections of July 1997. In monetary terms, it contributed well over ten (10) billion U.S Dollars in maintaining her troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone (1996-99), ECOMOG forces first intervened early in 1998 to reinstate President Ahmed Kabbah. At the peak of the operations ECOMOG had 13,000 troops in the country which conducted both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Late in 1999, the disputants in the Sierra Leonean conflict signed an agreement in Lome, Togo to end the crises, thus paving the way in 2000 for UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) (Kuna, 2005).

Economic Instrument: This constitutes another instrument for conducting inter-state relations. Rather than resorting to war in order to resolve a conflict situation, certain economic devices could be used. These include trade boycott, withdrawal of aids and most importantly economic sanctions. For instance, in May 25, 1997, a military junta led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s one-year old democratic government of national unity. Nigeria and other ECOWAS members imposed economic sanctions against the Major Johnny Paul Koroma led military government in Sierra Leone for illegally seizing power from a democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Anifowose, and Enemuo, 1999; Peter, 2008).

Dynamism was injected into the nation's foreign policy in the latter part of 1970s when Nigeria's economy was in a buoyant state following the increase in the price of oil. Murtala/Obasanjo's regime maximized the opportunity posed by the 'boom' period to pursue an active, dynamic foreign policy (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005).
According to Federal Military Government's (FMG) statement in 1974, during the launching of the Second National Development Plan, "the overall objective of Nigeria's foreign policy is to tie up external relations with development needs of the country. This central guiding principle of serving the national interest in external relations continues to be followed by successive administration. Therefore, during the oil boom, (increase n the price of crude oil), petroleum resources and finance became the principal tools for achieving foreign policy goals. The most notable examples of this occurred during the General Muhammed and Obasanjo periods: The celebrated "African Has Come of Age" speech of General Murtala Muhammed at the OAU Special Summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976 was a direct challenge and defiance of the United States' position on Angola. The speech laid the basis of Angola Policy, which was carried on by General Obasanjo after the assassination of General Muhammed. Then in July 1979, at the height of the controversy over Britain's handling of the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) decolonization process, the Obasanjo regime nationalized British Petroleum and took over all its assets in Nigeria. These two decision taken in vigorous pursuit of Nigeria's commitment to decolonization where decisive for Angola's and Zimbabwe's independence, indeed shows that, General Muhammed and Obasanjo saw the national economy as an instrument for pursuing foreign policy decolonization goals, as well as for the economic benefit of the country. Both leaders were willing to take risks that directly confront the largest importer of Nigerian petroleum and her more important trading partners. The situation mentioned were most spectacular example of employing economic assets as leverage for achieving foreign policy objectives (Abegunrin, 2003:170).

In addition, at the beginning of the oil boom after the civil war, the Gowon administration started using oil wealth to pursue foreign policy goals by cultivating Africans in the Diaspora and pursuing a leadership role in the West African sub-region and in the continent. This took the form of financial assistance to poor countries in the Caribbean, specifically Grenada, for budgetary support and to some government in West Africa, particularly during the drought that devastated the Sahelian zone countries. This financial assistance was formalized by Obasanjo military regime when, in 1978, a Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) with initial capital of $80 million was established at the African Development Bank (ADB) for financing development project in African countries. The establishment of NTF was not the only thing that marked Nigeria leadership role in the ADB; she also insisted that the character of the bank remain fundamentally African. In the same vein, the country's took advantage of her oil revenue economic performance in the 1970s, as instrument to project the dynamic Pan-Africanism and black cultural renaissance of Nigerian foreign policy by hosting the World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture encouraged by the Gowon regime but staged by the Obasanjo in February 1977 (Abegunrin, 2003:170).

Also, Nigeria intended to use oil as leverage against the Western investors in Southern Africa the way the Arab governments used it against the West in 1974 over the Palestine question. During Obasanjo's state visit to the U.S. in October 1977 he warned the Western countries and their multinational corporation doing business in Nigeria and South Africa that all such double-dealers will have to chose between our (Nigeria's) hospitality and their adventurism by which they prop up the oppressive regime in South Africa. With specific actions, the Federal Military Government (FMG) underscored its intentions. For instance, at the August 1977 World Conference for Action against Apartheid, held in Lagos, Obasanjo announced the creation of
special Nigerian Economic Intelligence Committee that would report directly to him. The committee was to formulate policies and strategies for discouraging investment and trade with Apartheid South Africa. It would also recommend any necessary actions against collaborators with the South Africa regime “who also availed themselves of the Nigerian hospitality and magnanimity of the Nigeria people and benefits of the Nigerian economy. One of the recommendations of this committee was that Western corporations with investments in Nigeria and South Africa would have to do business in either Nigeria or South Africa, but not both countries. In line with this recommendation, the FMG required the insertion of clause in all major contracts to certify that the company did not do business with South Africa (Abegunrin, 2003:173).

However, the Nigeria lacked the economic infrastructure to use economy as a major instrument of diplomatic engagement. This is so because the productive forces in the economy are grossly underdeveloped, there is the dearth of capital, a lack of entrepreneurial ingenuity; the economy is mono-culturally dependent on oil, politicized, corrupt and rent oriented. It is part of the problem that Nigeria has not been able to make economic gains from her foreign policy adventures, particularly in the sub-region. Again, no foreign policy agenda can succeed on the basis of reliance on a single factor, such as the economy. Foreign policy is borne out of a multiplicity of factors (Pine, 2011).

**Cultural Instrument:** This is becoming increasingly useful in conducting inter-state relations. It is often used as a major political weapon in sports and other cultural activities. For instance, in 1976, Nigeria led other members of the OAU to boycott the Montreal Olympic Games to protest the tour of apartheid South Africa by New Zealand Rugby players and the refusal of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to exclude New Zealand. Similarly, in 1978, Nigeria led other African countries in the Commonwealth of Nations to boycott the Edmonton Commonwealth Games to protest New Zealand's sporting links with apartheid South Africa which contravened United Nations embargo on such links. Most recently, Nigeria in 1996 boycotted the African Nations Cup (ANC) competition held in South Africa to protest that country's hard-line posture towards the killing of Saro Wiwa and his other Kinsmen (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005); (Anifowose, and Enemuo, 1999). The use of culture as instrument in promote foreign policy at global level was manifested by the participation of the Nigeria federal government during Balewa regime in the World Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar, Senegal in 1964. In fact the federal government was so enamoured by the principal objectives of the festival that it accepted to host the next festival. Hence, "the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture” (FESTAC) in Lagos, which due to the civil war did not hold as soon as expected, but eventually staged on 15th January -12th February, 1977, during the era of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo's as the Head of State (Chibundu, 2004:61). This particular event was staged to project the dynamic Pan-Africanism and black cultural renaissance of Nigerian foreign policy (Abegunrin, 2003:170). Also, in other to promote Africa Unity, which is one of her foreign policy interest of the country graciously accepted and hosted the 8th All Africa Games were 5–17 October 2003 in Abuja and 53 countries participated in the games. Nigeria has since the inception of All African Game in 1965 been participating to foster Africa unity.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you identify and explain instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy?
4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss the institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation; assess the significant role of think tanks in enhancing the quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making as well as explain instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

The institutional framework for policy making and implementation in Nigeria; policy advice, policy making and policy implementation; significant role of think tanks in foreign policy and instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy have been discussed.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the institutional framework for Nigeria's policy making and implementation?

ii. Assess the significant role of think tanks in enhancing the quality of Nigeria's foreign policy making and implementation?

iii. Discuss instruments for conducting Nigeria's foreign policy?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


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MODULE 2:  NIGERIA'S AFRO-CENTRIC POLICY

INTRODUCTION
This module is significant as it help you to have good understanding on the origin of Nigeria's Afro-centric bent including the factors that necessitated Nigeria's foreign policy of Afro-centeredness, Nigeria's Afro-centric policy objectives; Nigeria's role in the eradication of apartheid policy and decolonization, Nigeria's contribution towards the unity, economic integration and development as well as Nigeria's efforts in the promoting peace and security in African continent.

However, the module is made up of four interesting and revealing units listed below:

Unit 1: Origin and Necessity for Nigeria Afro-centric Policy
Unit 2: Nigeria's Effort in Ending Apartheid and Decolonization of Africa
Unit 3: Nigeria's Effort Towards the Unity and Economic Development of Africa
Unit 4: Nigeria's Effort in Promoting Peace and Security in Africa
UNIT 1: ORIGIN AND NECESSITY FOR NIGERIA'S AFRO-CENTRIC POLICY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Origin of Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy
   3.2 Factors that Necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the first Prime Minister of Nigeria; Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa gave a sense of direction to the country in the foreign policy agenda which he laid before the parliament on August 30, 1960. In that policy speech, Balewa stated that “very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa. We shall make every effort to find a way to unite our efforts and prevent Africa from becoming an area of crisis and world tension”. This was further expatiated upon by the Prime Minister in his address to the United Nations General assembly in New York on 7 October 1960 and which later became the basic principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The main thrust of that address included, among others:

the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other states; respect for existing boundaries which must, in the interest of peace in Africa, remain the recognized boundaries until such a time as the peoples concerned decide of their own free will to merge into one unit or redraw boundaries; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration; equality of States, no matter their size, population, military or economic might; and promotion of functional cooperation throughout Africa (Ashiru and George, 2013).

This pronouncement laid the basis of our foreign policy thrust from 1960 till the present time. It is against the background of this policy thrust that Nigeria's contributions towards ensuring unity, development, peace and security in African continent, must be fully appreciated (Ashiru and George, 2013). However, it must be pointed out that African reality at the time of the country's independence helped to sustain Nigeria in a parochial appreciation of African Affairs. Most African States suffered from a colonial heritage which created consideration difficulties for intra-African political, economic and cultural transitions. Therefore, Nigeria's awakening to this Afro-centric policy stance was a gradual and evolutionary process. At this stage, it is necessary to know how this policy was evolved, and the extent to which it has progressed. In other words, is the policy in any way borne out by practical action or it is just a policy formulated by mere pronouncement or putting it on paper which bears little or no relevance to practical realities? (Imobighe, 1981). Hence, this unit provides you with the origin of Nigeria's Afro-centric bent and the factors that necessitated the Afro-centric policy, particularly how the experience during
the civil war helped a lot in putting Africa at the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy. However, in the subsequent units we shall look at the Nigeria's Afro-centric bent in practical terms.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the origin of the Nigeria's Afro-centric bent;
- explain the factors that necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric policy; and
- state the Nigeria's Afro-centric policy objectives.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origin of Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy

Despite the foundational statements at independence, Balewa would hardly take any major foreign policy decisions without first consulting the British government. One notable feature of the period was that it was consistently pro-African and pro-Commonwealth in tune with Nigeria's British slant. All sectors of the economy were not only controlled by the West, but were entirely dependent on their capitalist orientation for the country’s consumptive patterns and developmental efforts. This was the prevalent option as chosen by Balewa. There were lots of inconsistencies and contradictions in country’s foreign policy as could be seen from the following actions he took within the period:

- severing relations with France over their testing of an atomic bomb in the Sahara desert in 1961 just three months after independence;
- refusal to attend the maiden conference of the Non-aligned Movement in Belgrade;
- prevarication over the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc until December 1961;
- acceptance of the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact until he was forced to abrogate it by students and the opposition;
- refusing to train armed militia for Angolan national fighters waging a war against Portuguese colonialists despite Nigeria’s avowed resolve to rid the continent of colonialism (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010).

The above backdrop shows that while the African policy was still intact, there were still a lot of other inconsistencies of the government which contradict its definite foreign policy thrust. According to Ekenedirichukwu (2010) during the period 1960 - 1966, Nigeria’s foreign policy was conservative, reactionary, pre-Western under an uncertain and timid administration that was totally aligned to the West in every trade and diplomatic relations. In connection with this, Imobighe in (NIPSS, 1981:12) observes that a vigorous and assertive African policy by the Balewa regime was difficult to sustain due to the absence of domestic political unity and stability, and the material resources that could be supportive of such a posture. He also points out that there was little or no regard was paid to intra-African trade relations. For instance, In 1962 about ninety percent of the continent's recorded trade was done with countries outside Africa. Then there was also the remarkably undifferentiated economy as a result of which African neighbouring economies were more competitive than complementary. Equally important was the
poor development of intra-Africa communications. Even though African realities tended to suggest the need for joint planning to deal with some of these problems, in the early years of independence, very few African leaders like Kwame Nkuruma of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Ben Bella of Algeria, braved the situation and tried to bridge the mutual isolation of African states created by their colonial experience. Regrettably Nigeria leaders did not share in the vision of these few early African statesmen. While it is correct to say that maintenance of traditional ties (with the western countries) was uppermost in the mind of the rulers of the First Republic, it must be pointed out that before the end of that Republic the situation started to change gradually. The policy by which Anglo-Nigerian ties were to be retained and strengthened and in which involvement in African affairs was to be kept to the minimum gradually ceased to enjoy the unanimous support of the country political elite. The changed position of the Action Group opposition party and the upsurge of radicalism among the youth were remarkable. Certainly pressure was mounted on the government to adopt a dynamic African Policy in order to prevent Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from stealing the show. This pressure began to have an impact from 1962 when the government abrogated the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact it signed barely a year before. The adoption of a republican constitution in October 1963 was another measure taken by Nigeria this time to relax her strong attachment to Britain. However, throughout the First Republic, there was foreign policy but no deliberate policy articulation which put Africa at the centre of the country's foreign policy.

It is clear that it was from General Yakubu Gowon's regime Africa became the focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The remarkable feature of this new policy stance include the following: First, Africa received greater attention then hitherto. Second, the Nigerian Head of State developed closer relationships with his counter-parts in the continent. Third, there was notably increase in the amount of financial and technical assistance Nigeria gave to other African states. Fourth, there was greater Nigerian involvement in the liberation struggle in Africa. The moral and material support, South Africa and Portugal gave to the secessionist regime during the civil war increase Nigeria's resolved to work towards the early liquidation of Portuguese and apartheid regime in Southern Africa. Hence, Africa as the center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy is a foreign policy thrust which primarily and persistently accords utmost attention, total concentration and exclusive recognition to Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy making and implementation before thinking of the outside world (Imobighe, in NIPSS, 1981:13). It is important to stressed that this regime battled with a domestic environment characterized by civil war, but it did not deter Gowon from focusing more on African issues and problems in his foreign policy initiatives. However, the country's experience during the civil war helped a lot in putting Africa at the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010). In fact from 1970, Nigeria’s commitment to Africa became more pronounced as it declared Africa the centre piece of its foreign policy. The Africa-centric drive of Nigeria's foreign policy was better articulated during the Mohammed/Obasanjo's regime. In September 1975, just a little over one month of their coming to power the regime set up a high level panel to review the country's foreign policy. The result of this review was a well articulated policy in which Africa became the "centre-piece." The main objectives of the new foreign policy (Afro-centric policy) were stated as follows:

- First, the defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;
- Second, the creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial
integrity of all African countries while at the same time fostering national self-reliance, and rapid economic development;

- Third, the promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world;
- Fourth, the promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of the Blackman;
- Fifth, the defence and promotion of world peace (Imobighe in NIPSS, 1981).

When announcing the above new principles to the nation in June 1976, the then Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo made it clear that "these objectives are to be pursued with the realization that the centre-piece of our foreign policy is Africa"; and added that Nigeria was committed to the total liberation of all oppressed black people in Africa and indeed anywhere else in the world. The Mohammed/Obasanjo study was Nigeria's first thorough articulation of her foreign policy. From Obasanjo's statement of 22nd August 1977, during the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid" held in Lagos, it was obvious that Nigeria foreign policy would be mobilized to promote the country's African interests. As he put at that time: "We find it difficult to fraternize with enterprises and organizations that are party to the system that holds our brothers and sisters in Southern Africa in bondage. We cannot continue to cooperate with those that benefit from us, while at the same time, reap large profits from the sweat and blood of our brothers and sisters held in slavery. It is our sovereign duty to review our relations with them and take appropriate action. In this regard we are compiling information on all those governments who pretend to be Africa's friend but allow them to be used as a weapons laundry for South Africa- All for limited economic advantage. We are mounting surveillance on all those enterprises that depend on our raw materials and markets, but continue to help our enemies. Such enterprises must decide now to choose between us and our enemies and all that goes with their choice" (Imobighe in NIPSS, 1981).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you discuss the origin of the Nigeria's Afro-centric bent?

3.2 Factors that Necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric Policy

The country's experience during the civil war helped a lot in putting Africa at the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010). According to Fafowora in (NIPSS, 1981:31):

the over-riding objective of Nigeria's external relations during the civil war was the necessity to secure overwhelming African support for its position as an insurance against disintegrative forces. It became necessary for Nigeria to seek a more involvement in African affairs, and to lobby the OAU member states for support against the secessionists. The OAU became a major theatre of operation for Nigeria's policy objective which was clearly to secure the organization's opposition for the secessionists and the endorsement of the federalists. In the end, there can be no doubt that the overwhelming support which the federal Government of Nigeria enjoyed among OAU member states was of crucial importance to its war efforts to ensure the survival of the nation.
Hence, though the previous administration gave Africa a pride of place in Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust, it was however in the Gowon’s regime that Africa was first identified as the centre-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy in practical terms.

Another external dimension of the civil war which has had a profound impact on Nigeria's attitude to African issues was the involvement of some foreign powers in the civil war on the side of the secessionists. Such was the case with France, Portugal and South Africa which all actively supported the secessionist cause. Even Nigeria's traditional ally, Britain, prevaricated at the initial stages of the war, before committing itself, ultimately, in support of the Federal cause. Even then its decision to throw in its weight behind Lagos was based on its own enlightened self-interest, namely, the necessity to retain access to the lucrative Nigerian oil industry. The upshot of the international involvement in the civil war was that it taught Nigeria many lessons, the most important of which was the need for self-reliance and a corresponding reduction in its economic dependence on its traditional Western allies. In fact from 1970, Nigeria’s commitment to Africa became more pronounced as it declared Africa the centre piece of its foreign policy. As Imobighe in (NIPSS, 1981:12) succinctly put it:

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was firm in its support for Nigeria’s existence as a corporate entity. The OAU’s enlightened approach to the crisis was evident in three key measures it took. First, the Organization insisted on non-interference in the crisis by foreign powers. Second, it gave firm recognition to the Federal Government as the only legitimate authority in the country. Third, it set up a Commission which worked closely with the Federal Government. These OAU measures effectively checked any open or direct big power involvement in the crisis. Thus after the war, the Gowon’s regime was so impressed that it declared Africa the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

In addition, there were also major economic developments that were favourable to a more assertive posture in Nigeria's external relations, particularly with regard to the development of a more outward looking posture in African policy. In the first place, Nigeria's ability to fight a costly civil war without recourse to external borrowing amply demonstrated the basic resilience of the Nigerian economy. It was in this period that the revenue from oil began to increase by 1970, Nigeria's GNP had increased to N2.5 billion. By 1972, oil production had surpassed the magic figure of 2 million barrels per day thus making Nigeria the sixth largest oil-producing country in the world.

This highly favourable political and economic factor altered the environment against which Nigeria's African policy had, in the past, been formulated. With its new economic prosperity, Nigeria began to assume the role of leadership in Africa affairs to which it was entitled by virtue of its huge size and material resources. Through the commission of economic cooperation agreement with its neighbour Nigeria sought to widen its influence, particularly in the West African sub-region. More importantly, Nigeria's basic commitment to inter-African economic cooperation was demonstrated by its active and successful campaign for the creation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the economic corollary of its commitment to the political unity of Africa. This new commitment showed in Nigeria’s determination to rid the continent of colonialism and white supremacist regimes. Prior to this
period, Nigeria did not back liberation movement with arms and ammunition and other logistics. Against the racist regime in South Africa, Nigeria led the African boycott against South African participation in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games in Germany. Also in trying to identify with the plight of a fellow African nation, Nigeria in sympathy with Egypt, cut diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973, despite the fact that she had no direct problems with Israel. In playing the big brother role, Nigeria decided in 1974 during the oil boom to sell oil to African nations at concessionary prices, thus losing a substantial amount of money in the process. Also considerable efforts were made by Gowon to enhance Nigeria’s trade relations with other African countries while Nigeria led the struggle for collective bargaining between Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Economic Commission (EEC). This effort led to the signing of the Lome convention in 1975. It is instructive that the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific team was led by Nigerian Ambassador to the EEC, Olu Sanu. In fact, it was part of this policy of more closeness to its neighbours that made Nigeria’s leaders at that time to believe that a West African integration scheme would offer a rational outlet for external aid to African nations and provide an institutional framework for Nigeria’s leadership and the erosion of France’s political and economic influence. Nigeria therefore set itself on a mission of forming an economic union in the West African sub-region. According to Gowon; There was a ‘new Nigeria’ that recognized its role in West Africa and realized that the gigantic task of economic and political regeneration in which it is engaged will be of little avail unless it was attuned to the requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa particularly West Africa. Hence, on the 28th May 1975, history was made when fifteen West African states assembled in Lagos and signed the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria’s efforts at regional integration thus materialized (Nwanolue, and Victor, 2012).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the factors that necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric policy?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, you have seen how Afro-centric policy became a reality, the factors that necessitated the policy preference, particularly how the experience during the civil war helped a lot in putting Africa at the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy. It have been seen how the out-break of the civil war in Nigeria and the consequent threat to Nigeria's national survival compelled the nation to become more outward looking in its African policy as well as the positive influence of economic factor - the increase in oil boom enabled vigorously pursuit of the African policy. However, subsequent units, further discuss how Nigeria pursue the Afro-centric policy in practical terms.

5.0 SUMMARY

The origin of the Nigeria's Afro-centric bent including the Afro-centric policy objectives and the factors that necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric policy preference have been discussed in this unit accordingly.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the origin of the Nigeria's Afro-centric bent?
ii. State the Nigeria’s Afro-centric policy?
iii. Explain the factors that necessitated Nigeria's Afro-centric policy?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 2: NIGERIA'S EFFORT IN ENDING APARTHEID AND DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Nigeria's role in the eradication of apartheid policy and decolonization of Africa
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

One of the practical ways Nigeria pursues her Afro-centric policy bent can be seen in the struggle to dismantle the obnoxious apartheid system and the struggle to maintain the dignity of the Black race all over the world. This defines Nigeria's foreign policy from independence. This was most noble, given the fact that Nigeria is the most populous Black nation; one out of every five black people is a Nigerian (Mahmood, 2013). Therefore, this is significant as it provides you with further discussion on Nigeria's Afro-centric policy bent, particularly her vigorous role in the eradication of apartheid and in decolonization of Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to: discuss the Nigeria's role in the ending apartheid policy and decolonization of Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.2 Nigeria's Role in the Eradication of Apartheid Policy and Decolonization

The Afro-centeredness of Nigeria's foreign policy manifested in practice when country decided to take vigorous action towards eradication of apartheid policy and to decolonized African countries that where suffering under colonial domination and racial segregation. For instance, in March 1960, about 69 black people were massacred in Sharpeville, South Africa, by the white apartheid police. That same year, Nigeria successfully liberated itself from many years of British occupation by colonialism. The new Nigeria’s leaders’ reaction to the Sharpeville massacre changed everything in South Africa from then on. Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa sent a letter to the African National Congress (ANC) militants on April 4, 1961. It was supposed to emphasize Nigeria’s commitment to fight against apartheid in South Africa. Immediately after sending the letter, Sir Balewa lobbied for the effective expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961. Balewa was the first leader to provide a direct financial aid to the ANC from the early 1960s. Nigeria set up the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) as early as in 1960. The committee’s mission was to disseminate the evils of the apartheid regime to all Nigerians from primary schools to universities, in public media and in
markets, through posters and billboards messages. The NACAP was also responsible for the coordination of Nigeria’s government and civil society joint anti-apartheid actions and advising of policy makers on anti-apartheid decisions. For over three decades, the NACAP had successfully built alliances with labor movement, student groups, progressive elements and other international grassroots organizations within Nigeria for effective anti-apartheid activities. In fact, until 1960s, the ANC fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa was yielding very small results. The whole world was quite indifferent to the suffering of the black South Africans. Moreover, Western countries strongly supported the apartheid regime providing it with technologies, intelligence and favourable trade agreements. Things started changing dramatically only after African countries became independent in the 1960s. Nigeria unequivocally took over leadership of the anti-apartheid movement worldwide. Despite the volatile nature of Nigeria’s politics and the passage of numerous military and civil leaders, Nigeria has never abandoned its unwavering commitment to the freedom of the blacks in South Africa (Koutonin, 2008).

From 1960 to 1995, Nigeria has alone spent over $61 billion to support the end of apartheid, more than any other country in the world, according to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). The country has never let go of any opportunity to denounce apartheid, from the boycott of Olympic Games and Commonwealth Games to the nationalization of British Petroleum assets in 1979. At the height of the liberation movement in the 1970s, Nigeria alone provided $5-million annual subvention to the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). In 1976, Nigeria set up the Southern Africa Relief Fund (SAFR) destined to bring relief to the victims of the apartheid regime in South Africa, provide educational opportunities to them and promote general welfare. The military administration of General Obasanjo contributed $3.7 million to the fund (Koutonin, 2008). Moreover, General Obasanjo made a personal donation of $3,000, while each member of his cabinet also made personal contributions of $1,500 each. All Nigeria’s civil servants and public officers made a 2% donation from their monthly salary to the SAFR. Students skipped their lunch to make donations, and just in 6 months, in June 1977, the popular contribution to the fund reached $10.5 million. The donations to the SAFR were widely known in Nigeria as the ‘Mandela tax’. As a result of the fund’s work, a first group of 86 South African students arrived in Nigeria in 1976, following the disruption of the education system in South Africa. It happened after the massacre of 700 students by the white police while the former were protesting against the decision by the apartheid regime to change their education language to Afrikaans. Hundreds of South African students benefited from the fund’s activity having come to study in Nigeria for free. Beyond welcoming students and exiles, Nigeria had also welcomed many renowned South Africans like Thabo Mbeki (former South African president from 1999 to 2008). He had spent 7 years in Nigeria, from 1977 to 1984, before he left to the ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. For South Africans, who could not travel abroad because the apartheid regime had withdrawn their passports, Nigeria’s government issued more than 300 passports. Along with fellow African countries, Nigeria lobbied for the creation of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and chaired it for 30 years, longer than any other country. Between 1973 and 1978, Nigeria contributed $39,040 to the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, a voluntary trust fund promoting education of the black South African elite. As for trade, Nigeria had refused to sell oil to South Africa for decades in protest against the white minority rule. Nigeria had lost approximately $41 billion during that period (ibid, 2008).
Interestingly, in pursuit of this goal of eradicating apartheid, the President Shehu Shagari's administration (1979-1983) reiterated Nigeria's commitment at the UN General Assembly. He also made Nigeria's position known when he visited President Carter of America. He said "Nigeria was seriously against the apartheid South African regime" Shagari supported imposition of sanction as a non-violent option for bringing pressure on South Africa, and where this failed; he submitted "armed struggle was inevitable, as it was the triumph of the oppressed" (Arowolo, 2008). Ashiru and George (2013) revealed that in pursuance of its decolonization policy of Africa, as a leader in the continent, Nigeria gave its weight behind the fight against white minority rule in South Africa and other countries in Southern Africa. Many steps were taken to achieve this. One of these steps was the sponsoring of World Conference of action against Apartheid in Lagos. Nigeria vigorously pursued anti-apartheid policy. As earlier mentioned, in 1978, Nigeria boycotted the Commonwealth Games because New Zealand's sporting contacts with the South African government were not considered to be in accordance with the 1977 agreement on same. Nigeria also led the 32-nation boycott of the 1986 Commonwealth Games because of Britain Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's ambivalent attitude towards sporting links with South Africa, significantly affecting the quality and profitability of the Games and thus thrusting apartheid into the international spotlight. In the decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle, Nigeria's dogged contribution has been influenced by the assertion made by Balewa that our independence will be meaningless as long as a single Blackman remains under colonial yoke. The strident financial and other moral assistance given to many countries in Southern Africa in the struggle to gain political independence, have certainly led to freedom for millions of Africans. Nigeria's assistance to these countries was provided in a purely altruistic manner and in the belief that Nigeria's independence was meaningless when millions of our fellow Africans were still under colonial oppression.

Furthermore, sequel to the selfless contributions and robust leadership provided Nigeria for African continent in the anti colonialist and anti apartheid struggle, the country was conferred with an honorary membership of the Frontline States, even though she was located almost four thousand miles away from the then apartheid enclave of South Africa. Nigeria, successively, and for many years, occupied the position of Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, a honour rarely bestowed on any country in United Nations Committees or organizations. In this connection, we must also not fail to acknowledge that it was Nigeria, under the late General Murtala Mohammed who changed Africa's course and shaped the continent's policy towards the recognition of the Movement Popular Liberation Angola (MPLA) and which led to the eventual independence of Angola. The important address to the 1976 OAU Summit, titled Africa Has Come of Age still resonates with many African nationalists. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is always proud of the writing skills of one of its own, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji in crafting that powerful speech that was brilliantly delivered by an equally charismatic leader of Nigeria to Africa's leaders gathered in Addis Ababa. Also, it was Nigeria's action in nationalizing the assets of British Petroleum which forced a change in the United Kingdom's attitude and which eventually led to the independence of Zimbabwe (Ashiru and George, 2013). In addition, the World Factbook (1991) confirms that Nigeria had played a role in the independence of Zimbabwe and in the late 1980s was active in assisting in achieving independence of Namibia. In the latter case, it contributed about US$20 million to assist the South West Africa People's Organization in the 1989 elections and other preparations for Namibian independence. The country also contributed financially to liberation movements and
the independence of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe from Portuguese colonial and or apartheid South Africa's grip are equally commendable.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you discuss the Nigeria's role in the eradication of apartheid policy and decolonization of Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss the Nigeria's Afro-centric policy bent with special reference to her vigorous role in the eradication of apartheid and in decolonization of Africa. Therefore, you have seen the efforts made by Nigeria in ending apartheid as well as decolonization in South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique's.

5.0 SUMMARY

The Afro-centeredness of Nigeria's foreign policy in practice, was revealed in her struggled against apartheid and decolonization of Africa countries from the whites domination and racial discrimination, particularly, the African countries that were still under colonialism as at the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960. This effort boasted Nigeria image globally and afforded her an international recognition as a major power in African continent.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the Nigeria's role in the eradication of apartheid and decolonization of Africa?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


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UNIT 3: NIGERIA’S EFFORT TOWARDS THE UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Nigeria’s Effort towards Africa Unity
   3.2 Nigeria’s Effort towards Economic Development of Africa
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

One of the major policy thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy of Afro-centeredness is that of ensuring unity in African continent and the country has actively pursued it. While Nigeria's early efforts at the establishment of unity in African continent were negatively affected by the raging ideological rivalries, Nigeria remained undeterred. Nigeria's primary objective was to do everything to foster cooperation and a systematic and pragmatic progress towards unity in the continent, as well as the emancipation of all African countries, a majority of whom were still under colonial rule as at that time. By the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960, efforts had certainly commenced in this direction, efforts which was doubled, after the civil war reveals the necessity for good neighbourliness policy that would foster unity and economic development in the continent of Africa. Therefore, this unit, provide you with discussion on Nigeria's efforts towards the unity and economic integration for the development of Africa, despite the challenges and the frustration from the francophone neighbours, due to France influence as well as from other great powers.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the efforts of Nigeria towards establishing unity in Africa; and
- explain the efforts of Nigeria towards economic integration and development of Africa

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nigeria's Effort towards Africa Unity

Nigeria's approach to African or continental unity was a cautious one and this sense of direction was succinctly put forward by late Chief Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance while presenting the budget to the House in April 1961. He clearly recognizes that dangers laid ahead in the balkanization of Africa, just as there were problems that must be tackled. He therefore made the case first, for satisfactory economic relations and the development of economic existence and
cooperation among African countries before a political union. Such a Union, he asserted, should not be dominated by one country and must be under a leadership that is voluntarily accepted. This statement is no doubt prophetic, considering the radical views expressed by some of the then leaders of Africa and also, the domineering efforts of late Muammar Ghaddafi between late 1999 and early 2010. Ghaddafi tried to impose himself on Africa as its leader, including his efforts to force the political union of the continent (Ashiru and George, 2013).

Even though Nigeria’s cautious approach came under criticisms, events proved the adroitness of that policy. By 1962, three main divisions had developed in Africa with different views of what the continental organization should be. The radical Casablanca Group stood for immediate political union of all African countries and the establishment of an African High Command to prosecute the anti colonial struggle. The Brazzaville Group, made up exclusively of ex-French colonies, was concerned with maintaining the French influence. For Nigeria, this fundamental division of Africa into two main divisions represented a serious blow to the envisaged goal of African unity. Therefore, in the effort to bridge the gap between the two diametrically opposing groups, Nigeria took the initiative which led to sponsoring the Monrovia Conference of six African states, considered as moderate, on May 8, 1961 and which led to the formation of the Monrovia Group. The Monrovia Group advocated functional cooperation, equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, as well as opposition to forced political union of the continent. These were principles enunciated by Nigeria’s Prime Minister at independence. Even though the meeting was boycotted by the radical Casablanca Group, Nigeria did not give up and made another effort in Lagos in January 1962 at uniting the Groups. This unsuccessful effort was due primarily to the intrusiveness of the Casablanca Group. The Lagos meeting however presented the reconciliation forum for these divergent views on African or continental unity and, happily, led to the adoption of the Lagos Charter. Interestingly, it was this charter that subsequently defined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) agenda as the promotion of African unity and solidarity, the eradication of all forms of colonialism and the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states. These were clearly Nigeria’s views. The Lagos Charter was subsequently adopted as the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963. In effect, Nigeria dictated the agenda for the then young organization (Ashiru and George, 2013). Nigeria’s continued recognition of Africa as the centre-piece of her foreign policy, which also reflected in President Obasanjo’s support for and key role in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), an initiative of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. Obasanjo who was the first chairman of the Union embarked upon the duty of bringing the pitiable condition of Africa to the attention of the outside world which eventually attracted debt pardon from the foreign loaners such as the IMF, Paris Club and the London Club (Nwanolue, and Victor, 2012). Due to the nation’s African policy, Nigeria as founding member of the OAU was a major driving force behind the formation of the African Union in 2002 (Al-Hassan, 2016).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you discuss the efforts of Nigeria towards establishing unity in Africa?
3.2 Nigeria's Effort towards Economic Development of Africa

With regards to the agenda on Africa's economic transformation, Nigeria has been in the forefront. She provided the effective leadership that culminated in the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Economic Community (AEC). It was Nigeria's diplomats, under the late Ambassador Gabriel Ijewere, who crafted the documents that eventually led to its adoption and which today provides the continent with the direction it follows. Indeed, in promoting the view of functional cooperation, Nigeria, along with Togo, gave leadership to the formation of the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS) in 1975, which aims at promoting economic integration of the sub-region, economic development and to reduce the members’ dependency on former colonial powers (Ashiru and George, 2013). However, the history of ECOWAS is, in large measure related to the dramatic redefinition of Nigeria's national interest, vis-a-vis its position in West African sub-region, as a result of the civil (1967-1970). Nigeria's experiences during the civil war had exposed the country's vulnerability to external threat and interference through its immediate neighbours, especially Republic of Benin and Republic of Cameroon. The lesson of the civil war therefore dictated that Nigeria cannot afford to be indifferent to the economic and political situation of the sub-region. The postwar foreign policy of the country had to therefore focus fully on the West Africa as its immediate environment of concern. Nigeria diplomacy in the sub-region then quickly began to stress and make practical moves towards greater political understanding and economic cooperation between her and the rest of the West African states including even those that supported the Biafran rebellions that led to the civil war (Dauda, 2006). Therefore, in the effort at achieving continental integration, Africa has adopted the approach that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as building blocks. ECOWAS, with the leadership of Nigeria, has been the most successful of these RECs and has provided the example to be followed by them (Ashiru and George, 2013). However, taking into cognizance fundamental role of economic integration among contiguous states and given the very small nature of many West African states in terms of population and economic output, Nigeria, under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon spearheaded the formation of a 16-member regional integration body of ECOWAS - the treaty of which was signed on May 28, 1975 (Al-Hassan, 2016).

Moreover, the Olusegun Obasanjo administration (1999-2007), as a return and reappearance of civilian/ democratic rule marked a new face of the Nigeria’s foreign policy which clearly focused on economic diplomacy which is highly defined in terms of attracting foreign direct investments/ partnerships from the West in order to engender economic development. However, Nigeria continued the recognition of Africa as the centre-piece of her foreign policy. In fact, Nigeria demonstrated a strong determination towards the success of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Though the initiative for NEPAD has been attributed to Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Bouteflika of Algeria, but it has been observed that NEPAD is not entirely an African initiative. According to him, the Millennium Action Plan for African Recovery (later named NEPAD), was a response by Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, who said he would want to see a comprehensive development scheme for Africa by Africa themselves. Consequent upon this, Mbeki with Obasanjo and created a team that developed the plan which was approved by the OAU Summit at Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001, and subsequently presented to the G-8 at their Genoa, Italy Summit by Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Obasanjo on behalf of Africa. However, as the chairman of NEPAD Implementation
Committee of Heads of States, President Obasanjo has constantly been in touch with the ‘New Partners’ of Africa towards the successful implementation of the scheme (Nwanolue, and Victor, 2012).

The initiative developed from a common vision and a shared conviction by these African leaders that there is a pressing duty to eradicate poverty from, and place the continent on a path of sustainable growth and development. Nigeria, along with a few other countries, eventually worked tirelessly to develop the initiative which was finally adopted at the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 as the pre eminent development strategy for the African continent. Another contribution to this African initiative was the fact that Nigerian officials gave the final name that was adopted, out of the several that this wholly African initiative and economic blueprint was known and associated with over almost two years of its conceptualization. NEPAD has since become the United Nations successor policy framework for Africa's economic development (Ashiru and George, 2013). It is therefore essential to note that the phenomenal contributions made by Nigeria in the two organizations mentioned above have greatly contributed to the economic prosperity and political independence of many African countries. It could therefore be noted that Nigeria's role and initiative in drawing up the Constitutive Act of African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism have greatly engrossed the country even more deeply in African Affairs. Also under NEPAD, Nigeria initiated Joint Africa/G8 plan to enhance Africa capability to undertake Peace Support Operations (Al-Hassan, 2016).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the efforts of Nigeria towards economic integration and development of Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss the effort of Nigeria towards establishing unity in Africa; as well as explain the effort of Nigeria towards economic development of Africa. This two concept constituted major aspect of her Afro-centric foreign policy. However, this effort should be replicated to develop implementable policy that will address the on-going economic recession and provoke economic development and improve standard of living of the people in the country.

5.0 SUMMARY

The effort of Nigeria towards establishing unity and economic development of Africa has been discussed respectively in this unit.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the efforts of Nigeria towards establishing unity in Africa?
   ii. Explain the efforts of Nigeria towards economic integration and development of Africa?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 4: NIGERIA’S EFFORT IN PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Nigeria's Contributions to the Promotion of Peace and Security in Africa
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The regularity of conflicts in Africa has become one of the distinct characteristics of the continent. However, there cannot be reasonable continental unity, economic integration and development without creating an environment for peace and security to thrive. One of the ways Nigeria pursued her Afro-centric foreign policy in this direction is evident in her efforts in promoting peace and security in African continent since political independence in 1960. Interestingly, this unit further provides you with discussions on the contributions of Nigeria in promoting peace and security in the continent.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to: discuss the Nigeria's contributions to the promotion of peace and security in Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nigeria's Contributions to the Promotion of Peace and Security in Africa

When it comes to the promotion of peace and security in Africa, Nigeria's role on the continent has been unrivalled. In fact, was the enviable record in peace keeping, in the continent and beyond, was flagged off barely two days after independence on October 1, 1960 as a sovereign nation when Nigerian military and police contingents were deployed to the Congo, now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Nigeria's late General Aguiyi-Ironsi was the Commander of the UN Forces, while the experience gathered by the country's young soldiers during that operation has made the difference to Nigeria's robust contributions, over the years, to peace-keeping. Also, a contingent of military personnel was sent to Tanzania in 1964, following a mutiny in the country, to quell the insurgency and restore normalcy. Even Africa's first experience at collective peacemaking, carried out in Chad in 1982, was spearheaded by Nigeria. Apart from providing the leadership of the OAU Peace Keeping Force (OAUPKF), in the person of Major General Geoffrey Ejiga, Nigeria single-handedly financed this unique effort by Africa at returning peace and stability to the country. Even though the promise was that Nigeria would be reimbursed for its financial outlay by the continental organization, which cost almost forty
million US dollars, this was not done. With the controversial admission of the SADR in February 1982 and the consequent crisis following this admission, a crisis which almost caused the breakup of the continental organization developed. Only Nigeria worked flat out and openly to prevent this situation. The shuttle diplomacy to several countries, aimed at promoting what became known as the Nigerian 'compromise' formula to solve this crisis and save the organization from disintegration, was only scuttled at the last minute by the meddling role and arrogant behaviour of Muammar Ghaddafi, through financial inducements made to several African countries (Ashiru and George, 2013).

Beyond these, Nigeria has played prominent roles in the peaceful resolution of various conflicts, including assisting in resolving the long-running conflicts in Sudan, as well as in Eritrea/Ethiopia and Ethiopia/Somalia disputes. Nigerians were members of several OAU Commissions on Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration charged with dealing with other disputes on the continent of Africa. This was in pursuit of the dreams of the founding fathers of the OAU of the need for Africans to play the major role in resolving conflicts on the continent. Nigeria's efforts in the final restoration of peace and democracy to both Liberia and Sierra Leone have been acknowledged internationally, especially the unrivalled enormous financial, material and human sacrifices made by Nigeria in these countries. The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone cost the country the whooping sum US$ 10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace. In Cote d'Ivoire, our principled stand and dogged efforts under the leadership provided by President Goodluck Jonathan, have no doubt led to the emergence of a democratic government that is working to return the country to its enviable position as a haven of peace in the sub-continent. Indeed, Ivoirians expressed the conviction that this dogged devotion to the promotion of democracy has saved their country from bloodbath that would have flowed from that crisis (Ashiru and George, 2013; Al-Hassan, 2008).

Nigeria's active contributions led to the early restoration of democracy in Sao Tome and Principe in 2003 and Guinea Bissau when unconstitutional changes of governments occurred in these countries. It was the strong statement by Nigeria in the wake of the coup in Sao Tome and the resolve to reverse the coup, in line with Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union which forbids the seizure of power by extra constitutional means, that set the tone for the all round condemnation from various quarters, even beyond the African continent. Nigeria's dogged commitment to this article also led to the leadership position to oppose the accreditation of Marc Ravalomanana at the 38th and last Summit of the OAU in Durban, South Africa in 2003. The latter, despite the disagreement that arose over the winner of the Presidential election in Madagascar, had taken power unconstitutionally. It is this principled position at that first summit of the AU to ostracize any person who takes power by unconstitutional means, that has, no doubt, ensured that this provision of the Constitutive Act is scrupulously adhered to ever since. This certainly represents a discouragement for those who would prefer to come to power through unconstitutional means (Ashiru and George, 2013).

Nigeria's contribution to the adoption of ECOMOG in 1998, as the preferred framework or mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peace keeping in West Africa, was another example of note. The success of this mechanism provided both encouragement and example for the adoption of the Peace and Security Commission in the new
AU Commission and even in the envisaged creation of an AU Standby Force to intervene, when necessary, in crisis situations in Africa. Indeed, it was Nigeria that solely produced the *draft Protocol on Peace and Security*, apart from the initial *draft Rules of Procedure* of the Executive Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Statute of the AU Commission which were finally adopted with minimal additions. The leadership provided by Nigeria in developing the operational guidelines and mechanisms of the AU Commission, was unassailable, just as we did with the predecessor OAU. In the efforts to transform the organization from the OAU to AU, Nigeria's leading and galvanizing role must be duly acknowledged. Regrettably, many people erroneously believe that it was Brother Ghaddafi that played the leading role. There was no doubt that the idea of an African Union was mooted by him at the 4th Extra Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya on September 9, 1999. However, this idea would have been immediately killed, if not for the convincing and moderating role played by Nigeria's President Obasanjo. Obasanjo latter argued and convinced his peers that rather than an outright dismissal of Libya's proposal, it should be considered as an opportunity to accelerate the implementation of the Abuja Treaty, which was designed for the economic integration of the continent aimed at subsequently leading to Africa's political integration. President Obasanjo must therefore be fully credited with the idea of utilizing the opportunity of Libya's recommendation to advance the implementation of the African Economic Community Treaty (AEC), which was at that time seriously lagging behind in implementation. The attraction of an economic argument promoted by him definitely convinced his peers and has led to the progress made in this direction (Ashiru and George, 2013).

Furthermore, it was Nigeria that provided the leadership that enabled Africa to see clearly the way forward in establishing the African Union. The powerful and sovereign supra-national entity, which Libya proposed and tried to promote, subsequently became tempered and was replaced by the gradualist approach of a European Union model to continental organization, favoured by Nigeria and a majority of member states. A Nigerian, Professor Adele Jinadu, was one of six experts that produced the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union. Even at the Experts level, Nigeria's voice was clear, consistent and equivocal, enabling most countries to support a balanced position put forward by our delegation. During Ministerial debates, Nigeria, along with four others, ensured that Africa was not saddled with an unworkable Union as intended by its initiator. When debates became deadlocked, it was Nigeria that mostly provided the compromise solutions that saved the day. Today, the AU and its institutions is stridently marching forward, thanks to the clear and consistent direction provided by Nigeria in the process leading to the transformation. There was no doubt that in all these, Nigeria's principled stand was anchored on the importance which the country had always attached to the unity of Africa and the forging of solidarity among its peoples (Ashiru and George, 2013).

Nigeria has been deep involvement in African affairs; a pursuit that had cost the country huge financial and human resources could be seen from other endeavors undertaken by the country in other African states. Let's take for example Nigeria's involvement in the ECOWAS military intervention group, ECOMOG. As desirable as it was to bring peace and stability to the West African sub-region, the venture had cost the nation enormous financial recourses and unspecified number of troops who lost their lives. He further emphasized that this does include the sum of about US$ 90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of US$ 800 million Nigeria Trust
Fund established under African Development Bank, ADB, to assist African countries obtain soft loan to execute vital projects. Nigeria's enviable commitment towards solving African problems could also be seen in various peace and mediation talks she hosted; these include hosting of mediation talks between Sudanese government and Darfurian rebel factions. She also mediated severally between various rebel factions in the Liberian crisis and eventually granted asylum to the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Before this, Somalia's Siad Barre was granted asylum here in Nigeria. Yormie Johnson of Liberia also found a home in this place. Further to this, the restoration to power of the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Mr. Frederique Menezes, after military take-over in July 2003 was largely credited to Nigeria under the leadership of President Obasanjo. In a similar vein, Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo, after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in February, 2005 (Al-Hassan, 2008).

More importantly too, the country’s capital territory, Abuja was made a diplomatic nest for peaceful settlement of many intra and inter-state conflicts involving African nations. This made Obasanjo to create an office in the presidency on conflict resolution with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and special Envoy on Conflict Resolution in Africa. Obasanjo himself was involved more than any other leader in Africa in ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’, travelling all over Africa in search of reconciliation for many troubled lands in Africa and beyond. Akindele (2003) noted this when he asserted that: Nigeria’s foreign policy has not restricted the need to build and strengthen capacity for conflict resolution and security management to the West African sub-region and the entire continent of Africa alone. It has always emphasized the imperative of capacity building and enhancement for the maintenance of peace and security all over the world. More specifically, Nigeria’s enviable commitment towards solving African problems could also be seen in various peace and mediation talks she hosted; these include hosting of mediation talks between Sudanese government and Darfurian rebel factions. Nigeria also mediated severally between various rebel factions in the Liberian crisis and eventually granted asylum to the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Before this, Somalia’s Siad Barre was granted asylum here in Nigeria. Yormie Johnson of Liberia also found a home in this place. Further to this, the restoration to power of the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Mr. Frederique Menezes, after military take-over in July 2003 was largely credited to Nigeria under the leadership of Obasanjo. In a similar vein, Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo, after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in February, 2005. In fact, the Nigerian Army and police were massively deployed on peace keeping missions in different parts of Africa all in a bid to help bring peace and security in Africa. Thus, in the 2000, the sum of N1.8 billion was approved for a contract to supply equipment and facilities to the Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while only the sum of N0.95 billion was proposed by the Federal Military of Finance for all the three arms of the Nigerian armed forces (Nwanolue, and Victor, 2012).

Due to Nigeria role in promotion of peace and security in Africa, Abuja was made a diplomatic nest for peaceful settlement of many intra and inter-state conflicts involving African nations. This made Obasanjo to create an office in the presidency on conflict resolution with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and special Envoy on Conflict Resolution in Africa.
SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the Nigeria's contributions to the promotion of peace and security in Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION
In this unit, we have been able discuss on the contributions of Nigeria in the promotion of peace and security in Africa. We have seen how Nigeria has been committed financially, materially and have made human sacrifices to ensuring peace and security in many countries of Africa. However, the peace and security efforts of Nigeria in the continent of Africa have helped to project the image of the country globally. But Nigeria must replicate the some in addressing internal insecurity emanating from the Boko Haram terrorist attacks, the Niger Delta Avengers and inter-tribal conflicts.

5.0 SUMMARY
In the pursuit of her Afro-centric foreign policy, Nigeria has vigorously contributed to the promotion of peace and security in Africa: Nigerian military and police contingents were deployed to the Congo, now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1960. Contingent of military personnel was sent to Tanzania in 1964, following a mutiny in the country, to suppress the insurgency and restore normalcy. In Africa's first experience at collective peacemaking, carried out in Chad in 1982, was spearheaded by Nigeria, apart from providing the leadership of the OAU Peace Keeping Force (OAUPKF), in the person of Major General Geoffrey Ejiga, Nigeria single-handedly financed this unique effort by Africa at returning peace and stability to the country. Nigeria played prominent roles in the peaceful resolution of various conflicts in Africa, including assisting in resolving the long-running conflicts in Sudan, as well as in Eritrea/Ethiopia and Ethiopia/Somalia disputes. Nigerians were members of several OAU Commissions on Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration charged with dealing with other disputes on the continent of Africa. This was in pursuit of the dreams of the founding fathers of the OAU of the need for Africans to play the major role in resolving conflicts on the continent.

Nigeria's efforts in the final restoration of peace and democracy to both Liberia and Sierra Leone have been acknowledged internationally, especially the unrivalled enormous financial, material and human sacrifices made by Nigeria in these countries. In Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria principled stand and dogged efforts under the leadership provided by President Goodluck Jonathan, have no doubt led to the emergence of a democratic government that is working to return the country to its enviable position as a haven of peace in the sub-continent. Indeed, Ivoirians expressed the conviction that this dogged devotion to the promotion of democracy has saved their country from bloodbath that would have flowed from that crisis. Nigeria's active contributions led to the early restoration of democracy in Sao Tome and Principe in 2003 and Guinea Bissau when unconstitutional changes of governments occurred in these countries.

Nigeria's contribution to the adoption of ECOMOG in 1998, as the preferred framework or mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peace keeping in West Africa, was another example of note. The success of this mechanism provided both encouragement and example for the adoption of the Peace and Security Commission in the new
AU Commission and even in the envisaged creation of an AU Standby Force to intervene, when necessary, in crisis situations in Africa. Nigeria single-handedly incurred the financial resources need by the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. Nigeria's enviable commitment towards solving African problems could also be seen in various peace and mediation talks she hosted; these include hosting of mediation talks between Sudanese government and Darfurian rebel factions. She also mediated severally between various rebel factions in the Liberian crisis and eventually granted asylum to the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo.

Nigeria also mediated severally between various rebel factions in the Liberian crisis and eventually granted asylum to the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Before this, Somalia’s Siad Barre was granted asylum here in Nigeria. Yormie Johnson of Liberia also found a home in this place. Further to this, the restoration to power of the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Mr. Frederique Menezes, after military take-over in July 2003 was largely credited to Nigeria under the leadership of Obasanjo. In a similar vein, Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo, after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in February, 2005. In fact, the Nigerian Army and police were massively deployed on peace keeping missions in different parts of Africa all in a bid to help bring peace and security in Africa. Thus, in the 2000, the sum of N1.8 billion was approved for a contract to supply equipment and facilities to the Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while only the sum of N0.95 billion was proposed by the Federal Military of Finance for all the three arms of the Nigerian armed forces.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the Nigeria's contributions to the promotion of peace and security in Africa?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


MODULE 3: NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS

INTRODUCTION
This module is significant as it help you gain knowledge on the Nigeria relations with Great powers. It familiarize you with the Nigeria relations with United Kingdom (Britain); United States (America); USSR (Russia) and France respectively. More importantly, it identifies and addresses issues in the changing relations between Nigeria and each of the Great powers.

You will find the comprehensive discussions of this module under the following units:

Unit 1: Nigeria Relations with United Kingdom (UK)
Unit 2: Nigeria Relations with United States (US)
Unit 3: Nigeria Relations with Russia
Unit 4: Nigeria Relations with France
UNIT 1: NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH UNITED KINGDOM (BRITAIN)

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Nigeria’s relation with the Britain has been cordial, particularly before the civil war. However, at independence in October 1960, when Balewa became the first Prime minister of the country, the foreign policy of Balewa's regime took a pro-Western posture, as the regime would hardly take any foreign policy decision without consultation with her former British colonial master. Nigeria was at the period of independence under the imperialist influence of the Britain. However, a careful examination of the relationship between the two countries particularly at the early stage of the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war and thereafter reveals that their relationship has been soured at one time and at another time cordial, given credence to the realists theory, that in international politics, there cannot neither be permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but permanent interest. This unit identified and explains to you some issues in the relationship between Nigeria and the United Kingdom (UK), otherwise called the Great Britain as well as how the issues have affected their relationship.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss how the experience of the civil war affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Britain;
- explain how the abortive coup d'etat affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Britain;
- discuss the Anglo-Nigerian tit-for-tat diplomatic relations;
- explain how election annulment and the hanging of Ogoni activists affected diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Britain; and
- discuss the economic aspects of Nigeria-Britain bilateral relations
3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Civil War and Nigeria-Britain Relations

At independence in 1960, Balewa became the first Prime minister of the country. As earlier noted, the foreign policy of the Balewa's regime took a pro-Western posture as the regime would hardly take any foreign policy decision without consulting with the British colonial master (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010). However, during the initial stages of the civil war (1967-1970), Nigeria greatly felt Britain's unnatural neutrality to be an unfriendly cut from a nation that Nigeria had classified as a permanent friend. And there was also the conviction that it was Britain's lukewarm attitude that infected American attitude too (Fawole, 2003). According to Ofoegbu (1980) following the civil war in Nigeria, dramatic changes in Nigeria's foreign policy relations stares the West in the face. Nigeria's expectations of military assistance from Britain and the USA yielded nothing, except traditional small arms and offensive anti-aircraft weapons. Despite the attitude of Britain, the cordiality of bilateral relations and friendship was not entirely jeopardized as the British later changed their minds and came back to support Nigeria because of the fear of totally losing Nigeria to the Communists. This perhaps guaranteed Britain a still favourable rating in Nigeria's estimation. Besides, the fundamentally pro-British orientation and inclination of Nigeria's ruling civilian and military elites was too deep-seated to be easily done away with. If anything at all, such long-standing relationship was not going to be carelessly sacrificed on the altar of 'simple misunderstanding that was in any case promptly corrected. As a testimony to the restoration of cordial bilateral relations, General Yakubu Gowon paid a state visit to Britain where the British rolled out all the pomp or pageantry and all the lavish entertainment they could muster to host him. He also invited the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II to visit Nigeria. Nigeria was also willing to pull out all the stops to host her. All arrangements were at an advanced stage when Gowon was suddenly overthrown in a bloodless putsch on July 29, 1975 - The visit was diplomatically postponed indefinitely by the succeeding Murtala Muhammed regime (Fawole, 2003).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss how the civil war affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Britain?

3.2 The Abortive Coup D'etat and Nigeria-Britain Relations

The traditional cordiality of Anglo-Nigeria relations was put to sever test in February 1976 when Britain was accused of involvement in the abortive coup d'etat that resulted in the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed. The reason for this accusation of British involvement had to do with the fact that while the coup was still in progress, in the morning of Friday, February 13, 1976, the leader of the rebel, Colonel Bukar Suka Dimka, visited the British High Commission in Lagos. While there, he allegedly requested for the assistance of the diplomatic mission to contact overthrow Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon who was at the time in political exile in London. There is no information in the public domain whether or not the British High Commission assisted him in the quest to contact General Gowon who was overthrown in July 1975 - But this at least created the impression, that the British knew about the coup plot and did nothing to warn the Nigerian government, an act generally regarded as unfriendly by the Nigerian public. Without waiting for a clarification of the reasons for Colonel Dimka's visit to
the embassy it was already widely assumed in the country that the coup was planned and executed principally to reinstate Gowon as head of state. No greater confirmation was required for this widespread belief other than that both the coup leader and some of his associates were ethnic minorities from the same middle belt as Gowon, They were assumed to be uncomfortable with Muhammed as head of state and thus planned the putsch to bring Gowon back from exile and install him as head of state once again. A series of events then occurred which further soured bilateral relations between the two friendly countries. In a fit of anger, a mob of protesting Nigerian youths mostly students of tertiary institutions invaded and vandalized the British High Commission premises, including burning the Union jack atop the building. This mob action and government’s apparent inability or unwillingness to protect the diplomatic compound later compelled the then British High Commissioner Sir Martin le Quesne to demand compensation for the damage. This demand and the sheer effrontery of it infuriated the new Obasanjo government so much that it promptly requested Britain to recall the High Commissioner, Sir Martin le Quesne on grounds of his “personal unacceptability” a request that London complied with. This soured bilateral relations was to last the entire tenure of General Obasanjo (Fawole, 2003).

Ordinarily, the High Commissioner’s request for compensation was a normal diplomatic practice; after all, a host country has responsibility to protect diplomatic premises from such attacks. Perhaps, what angered the Nigeria government was the timing of the request: it came during the period national mourning officially declared by the government. Coming at a time when the nation was mourning the dastardly murder of its beloved head of state, Sir Martin’s diplomatic request for compensation was considered an insensitive and unfriendly act, thus justifying his being declared unacceptable to continue to represent his government in Lagos, in the meantime, the new government was also enjoying tremendous public sympathy and support, so it’s tough posturing against the former colonial master was a bold move befitting its character. The succession of unfolding events in Nigeria in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt further drove a wedge into Anglo-Nigerian relations. With the information that the coup plotters desperately wished to contact Gowon, the new government requested Britain to send back the former military head of state to Nigeria to face the military to answer charges of his involvement and complicity in the February 1976 coup. The British authorities denied the request for extradition (send back) on the grounds that no bilateral extradition treaty existed between Nigeria and Britain, and more importantly on the consideration that the prevailing sentiment in Nigeria was unfavourable to fair trial. It was true, that the mood at that time could only have been relieved by blood atonement. There was every indication that Gowon would not have received a fair and impartial trial. The wisdom in British thinking notwithstanding, the refusal to extradite Gowon further worsened relations as it merely fuelled anti-British sentiments in Nigeria. Though, it would seem that the actions towards Britain, during that period could be justified as direct reactions to perceived British ‘insensitivity’ to a nation that had just lost its respected and beloved leader, caution was perhaps thrown to the wind because of the personal friendship and closeness of Muhammed and Obasanjo, and plausibly because the new regime needed such massive public support for legitimacy. Those brave reactions to Britain received popular acclaim at home but evidently soured relations until Obasanjo quit power in 1979 (ibid, 2003).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain how the abortive coup d'etat affected relationship between Nigeria and the Britain?
3.3 Anglo-Nigerian Diplomatic Tit-for-Tat

It would seem that the entry of General Buhari to power after overthrowing a civilian government was not particularly welcomed by the British. Thus, Anglo-Nigerian relations took off on the wrong footing right from the onset. In the first instance, it was Britain that had given sanctuary and asylum to scores of the ousted politicians who had been accused of looting the national treasury. This did not particularly endear the British to a government that inherited a badly depleted economy and required every assistance to recover the stolen money. Nigeria had indicated from the beginning that it would seek the extradition of these fugitives but it was very clear that it should not expect much cooperation from the British government. Not getting enough cooperation or sympathy from the IMF over loan negotiations, Nigeria had to embark on countertrade, i.e., exchanging crude oil for essential imports. This angered Britain which also produced a similar grade of crude oil in the North Sea and believed that Nigeria's resort to barter trade was capable of driving down the price of the low sulphur crude oil. Nigeria, which had always regarded Britain as a friend, expected some sympathy from Britain, but that was not forthcoming: Buhari was uncomfortable with perceived British insensitivity to Nigeria's economic woes. Thus, positions on both sides became hardened from the beginning. This was reminiscent of the Obasanjo era which also got onto a bad start with the British, with bilateral relations remaining cold throughout the Buhari tenure was set to report the same process as it never got along well with the British throughout its 20-month tenure (Fawole, 2003).

The failed abduction in London and Nigeria-Britain relation one incident that soured the relationship almost beyond repair was the abduction of Nigeria's former Transport Minister, Alhaji Umaru Dikko in London. The news broke on July 5, 1984 that Umaru Dikko was abducted from his home in Porchester Terrace, drugged and put in crate marked for delivery to the Federal Ministry of External Affairs, Lagos. It was to be shipped to Nigeria by a Nigerian Airways Boeing 707 cargo plane that had been waiting patiently for several hours at Stansted Airport outside London. The British police altered an and a manhunt was immediately launched. The crates were discovered at Stansted, opened and the drugged Dikko was freed. Two Nigerian officers and two Israeli citizens were implicated in the failed kidnap and thus began a new era of diplomatic tit-for-tat reminiscent of the Obasanjo period. The first reaction of the Nigerian government, as was to be expected, was a flat denial of any involvement in what was obviously an act of violation of international law. The British government' was not convinced, but then Buhari and other top officials of his government put up a brave face and refused to blink. The government launched a verbal attack on Britain for providing sanctuary for Nigerian dissidents who were planning to topple the new military government, Umaru Dikko, more than any of the other political exiles had availed itself of the facilities' of the British mass media (newspapers, radio and Television) and freedom of speech to attack the Buhari junta, and threaten to organize a jihad to topple it. Angered by Britain's apparent complicity in Dikko’s attacks, the Buhari government then verbally threaten carry out a comprehensive review of its relations with Britain (Fawole, 2003).

Fearlessly, the British Government impounds the Nigerian Airways cargo plane that was to have transported the crated Umaru Dikko and detained it (Dauda, 2006). The British Foreign office followed this up by announcing the expulsion from Britain of two Nigerian diplomats, Peter
Oyedele (Counselor) and Edet Okon (attache) for acts incompatible with their diplomatic status. Nigeria promptly retaliated by seizing a British Caledonian jumbo jet en route London with 221 passengers and a crew of 22. The passengers were treated as "guests" of the Nigerian government for 15 hours, put under armed guard although treated with utmost courtesy. Lagos also reciprocally expelled two British diplomats, John Harrison (head of chancery) and Stewart Evans (an attache), recalled its High Commissioner in London, Major General Halidu Hananiya, for 'consultations' and asked London to recall his counterpart in Lagos, Sir Hamilton Whyte. The government's actions were among Nigerians at home, the regime received a lot of bad publicity from around the world especially for the seizure of aircraft and detention of its passengers and crew. The act amounted to hostage-taking, an action that was generally frowned at since the civilian passengers were not even remotely connected with the Dikko kidnap episode. Emboldened by popular endorsement at home for the tough posturing against imperial Britain, Buhari later demanded the extradition of Alhaji Umaru Dikko to face corruption and abuse of office charges, but the British, expectedly, turned down the request (Fawole, 2003). Nevertheless, Dauda (2006) describes the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Britain was far from being normal as both countries did not only recalled their respective High Commissioners from Lagos and London, but the Nigerian public demanded for tougher measures against the British. Such as nationalizing British investments in the country and withdrawing from the commonwealth which was seen as a relic of colonialism.

This was similar to the refusal to extradite Gowon to face charges of complicity in the February 1976 coup. Again, just like in the era of Muhammed and Obasanjo, Nigeria looked the British eyeball to eyeball and refused to blink, and bilateral relations took a plunge for the worse. There is no doubt that the "Dikko affair" as it came to be known was atrocious enough to sunder Anglo-Nigerian relations, particularly because of Buhari's tough posturing and unwillingness to see Nigeria humiliated by Britain. Wise counsel prevailed because the Nigerian External Affairs Minister, Ibrahim Garnbari, was pragmatic enough to realize the need to minimize damage to bilateral relations. So, while both General Buhari and Prime Minister Thatcher were slugging it out in the court of public opinion, the respective Foreign Ministers were engaged in constant dialogue to find amicable resolution. For example, Nigeria posted a new High Commissioner to Britain and the British did the same as part of the mutual efforts at amicable resolution. Anglo-Nigerian relation was able to survive this ugly episode largely because of the realization that both sides needed each other and should not allow this event to sunder relations. Both were prominent members of the Commonwealth and principal trading partners. Nigeria was Britain's largest trading partner in Africa with a balance of trade in Britain's favour British export to Nigeria was reportedly worth between £500 million and £800 million. Besides, there were not less than 12,000 British nationals in Nigeria and over 70,000 Nigerians resident in the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, mutual suspicion and mistrust punctuated bilateral relations throughout until Buhari was overthrown in August 1985 (Fawole, 2003).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you discuss the Anglo-Nigerian tit-for-tat relationship?
3.4 Effects of Election Annulment and Hanging of Ogoni Activists on Relations

Another issue that have soon made Nigeria diplomatic relations with the Britain to go soured was the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election. The election which was globally viewed to be the most free and fair election the country ever had since independence in 1960. The annulment of the election attracted immediate reactions from the international community. For instance, Britain rejected the annulment saying that it would harm the relationship between the two countries. Twelve days later, the Britain took actions against the country. According to Dauda (2006) on June 24, 1993, the British government suspended all new military training courses for members of the Nigerian armed forces in the United Kingdom as well as all assistance to the National War College. Entry visa to the United Kingdom (UK) was suspended for members of the armed forces, the National Guard and state security service, government officials going to the UK were not to be given preferential treatment in the issuance of visa. There was also move to freeze an outstanding 14.5 million pound aid package due to Nigeria. The British foreign office had earlier described the annulment of election as regrettable. Douglas Hurd, the then foreign secretary called it a coup against the Nigerian people. According to him the time has passed when this kind of coup if that is what is being attempted has any kind of credibility. It does not. So before it is too late, I do hope that Nigeria will go back to democracy and respect the elections which were free and fair and set on with solving its own problems in a Nigerian way by listening to what the Nigerian people have said. However, instead of taken a bold step to correct the annulment, the then President Ibrahim Babangida responded by accusing the Britain for plotting against Nigeria. He maintained that the administration did not and cannot accept that foreign countries should interfere in Nigeria's internal affairs and undermine her sovereignty. He added, the decision was for annulment was embarked upon independently by the government of the Nigeria and for the interest of the country.

However, another human rights abuse issue further soured the two countries relationship for instance the hanging of the Ogoni activists in 1995 by Abacha's regime. These activists – and their leader, writer Ken Saro Wiwa - were hanged because of their persistent campaign for justice and fairness for oil producing regions conflicted with the interests of oil multinationals and the Nigerian government. This two major domestic human rights issues made the Great powers including Britain to put a hold on bilateral relationship with Nigeria as Abacha refuse to show remorse. However relationship was restored with the returned to democratic rule in 1999, when Obasanjo assumed leadership as a civilian government. Nigeria’s foreign relation after the successful transition to democratic governance was more of shuttle diplomacy, in order to win over a world that had overlooked Nigeria and would rather not have anything to do with her (Ekenedirichukwu, 2010).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain how the election annulment and hanging of activists affected diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Britain?

3.5 Economic Aspect of Nigeria-Britain Relations

*Trade relations:* Trade relations between Nigeria and the UK have also remained cordial. Key trade items include oil and gas, financial services and agriculture. In August 2010, the Deputy
Chief Executive of UK Trade and Investment, Susan Haird, noted that trade in services from the UK to Nigeria in 2008 amounted to approximately GBP 1.27 billion, while exports from Nigeria to the UK, in 2009, stood at about GBP 600 million. These figures reflect the towering significance of the UK’s trade advantage over Nigeria. It is alarming that of the GBP 600 million exports from Nigeria to the UK, only a miserable GBP 12 million was derived from non-oil exports. These are agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, tea and spices. Exports from the UK to Nigeria, in 2009, increased to GBP 1.3 billion; while exports from Nigeria to the UK remained at GBP 600 million, the bulk of which continued to be oil and gas. UK exports to Nigeria are about double Nigeria’s exports to the UK. Goods exported from the UK to Nigeria were GBP 1.235 billion in 2009. The increase in trade seems to be a result of both countries’ realization of the potential to explore new areas in their relationship. The advent of democracy in Nigeria has encouraged improvement in their trade links. In February 2011 the British Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, challenged staff at the British High Commission in Abuja, Nigeria to double trade between Nigeria and the UK over the next four years. Figures are already showing an upward trend, with UK exports up 85% in the first two months of 2011, and Nigeria’s exports to the UK up by 69% over the same period. Many UK companies continue to operate in Nigeria while many Nigerians are engaging in different economic enterprises in the UK, including restaurants, cab offices and solicitor firms (Alao, 2011).

**Politics of debt relief, financial assistance and the recovery of looted money:** The UK has been one of the key countries that has supported Nigeria’s clamour for debt relief. It has also been involved in providing financial assistance to promote good governance and help Nigeria achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The UK has supported endeavours, including malaria prevention, girls’ education and reform in the justice sector. Nigeria has also worked closely with the UK on efforts to recover money held in UK banks by corrupt Nigerian politicians. Both Nigeria and the UK acknowledge that relations have changed and that the UK’s position of dominance in trade with Nigeria has decreased. However, they also agree that their future relations can be further strengthened on the basis of their positive history (Alao, 2011).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you discuss the economic aspects of the Nigeria-Britain relations?

**4.0 CONCLUSION**

We have been able to discuss how the experience of civil war impacted on the Nigeria relations with the Britain; explain how the abortive coup d’etat affected the Nigeria relations with the Britain; discuss the diplomatic tit-for-tat in the Anglo-Nigerian relations; explain how the annulled election and hanging of activists affected diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Britain as well as discuss the economic perspective of Nigeria-Britain bilateral relations.

**5.0 SUMMARY**

The experience of the civil war; the abortive coup d’etat, the various diplomatic tit-for-tat, the annulled election, hanging of activities as well as the economic aspects and how these has affected the Nigeria-Britain bilateral relations has been discussed. Most issues that soured relationship between Nigeria and Britain are majorly political, but economic interest has
harmonized the two countries given credence to the realist theorists who pursue that in international politics there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but permanent interest.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss how the civil war affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Britain?

ii. Explain how the abortive coup d'etat affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Britain?

iii. Discuss the diplomatic tit-for-tat in the Anglo-Nigerian relations?

iv. Explain how the annulled election and hanging of activists affected diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the Britain?

v. Discuss the economic aspects of Nigeria-Britain relations?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 2: NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES (US)

CONTENTS

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2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
  3.1 Effect of Angola Liberation on Nigeria-US Relations
  3.2 Annulment of Election and Its effect in Nigeria-US Relations
  3.3 Human Rights Abuse and the Effect on Nigeria-US Relations
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  3.6 Debt Relief and Financial Assistance Aspects of Nigeria-US Relations:
  3.4 The Issue of Terrorism and Nigeria-US Relations
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Bilateral links between Nigeria and United States (US) was a more recent phenomenon compared to historical links with Britain. Nigeria and the United States enjoyed a cordial relationship until the disappointment of the civil war (Fawole, 2003). However, this unit identifies and explains some of the issues that affected the relationship between Nigeria and the US (America). The issues include among others: African issues, annulment of election, human rights abuses, trade and investment, debt relief, and financial assistance as well as the issue of terrorism. While some of the issues have soured relationship between two countries, others have encouraged friendly diplomatic ties between them.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain how African issues affected Nigeria-US Relations;
- discuss how the annulment of the June 12 presidential election affected the relationship between Nigeria and United States;
- examine how human rights abuses affected Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States;
- assess the trade and investment aspects of Nigeria-United States relations;
- explain briefly how Nigeria achieve her foreign policy pursuit on debt relief and financial assistance through bilateral relation with the US Relations; and
- discuss how the issue of terrorism had impacted Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 African Issues on Nigeria-US Relations

As mentioned earlier, bilateral links between Nigeria and United States (US) was a more recent phenomenon compared to historical links with Britain, Nigeria and the United States enjoyed a cordial relationship until the disappointment of the civil war. This initial cordial relationship was based on the fact that America was the leader of the capitalist world to which Nigeria had been incorporated long before its independence in 1960 (Fawole, 2003). The period 1975-1979 laid the foundation for active Nigeria-US relations than the previous years. According to Robert (1991) Nigeria, Africa and the US from Kennedy to Regan, prior to 1995, Nigeria has never exercise any significant degree of control on its African neighbours including Angola; it has never played a dominant role in any international issue area. However, Nigeria did play an important role in mobilizing support for the popular movement for the liberation of Angola in 1975. On this note, Murtala Mohammed (1975-76) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-79) advanced a more assertive, activist foreign policy. Murtala and Obasanjo implemented a more militant pan-African foreign policy that, in particular, aimed to challenge the minority rule regimes of Southern Africa (Aluko, 1981). It was on the pursuit of this policy that the relationship between Nigeria and the US experiences confrontation. For instance, in the celebrated "African Has Come of Age" speech of General Murtala Muhammed at the OAU Special Summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976 was a direct challenge and defiance of the United States' position on Angola. Nigeria flatly rejected the attempt by US to link the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The speech laid the basis of Angola Policy, which was carried on by General Obasanjo after the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed. Hence, Nigeria relations with the United States of America took a bad turn right from the inception of the Obasanjo era in February 1976. Nigeria intervened in the Angolan civil war, supporting the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the US-supported National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Abegunrin, 2003). While the US was opposed to the Marxist-oriented organization, Nigeria on the other hand told the US to mind its own business... The unfriendly trend in their bilateral relations continued until the emergence of a new US government of President Jimmy Carter which showed greater sensitivity to the feelings of Africans on the issues of apartheid and racism (Fawole, 2003). From 1977, the relationship began to normalize as Nigeria make close ties with the US (Ofoegbu in Oyediran, 1979).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Explain how African issues affected Nigeria-US Relations?

3.2 Annulment of Election and Its effect on Nigeria-US Relations

Annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election was another domestic political issue which received global condemnation and soured relationship between the country and the Great powers. Just as this issue soured relationship between Nigeria and Britain, so it was with the relationship between Nigeria and United States (US), starting from the court decision and the eventual annulment of 1993 election. First and foremost, on the eve of the presidential election, it was said that an Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) which has been described as a small
unrepresentative group sought for and obtained a High Court injunction presided over by the late Justice Bassey Ikpeme, an injunction to prevent the June 12 election from taking place, on alleged corrupt practices during the presidential primaries of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), one of the parties to contest in the election. However, the ruling of Justice Bassey Ikpeme provoked a diplomatic stress between Nigerian government and the US in a swift reaction to the last minute order that would have stopped the June 12, 1993 presidential election. In an earlier statement to the sought court injunction, Michael O. Brien, the then Director of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Nigeria said "we are awaiting the federal military government's reaction to this decision. However, any postponement of the election would cause grave concern to the United States government." Nigeria did not take kindly to this statement which was first aired on the Cable Network News (CNN) four hours before the National Electoral Commission (NEC) decided to ignore the court order (Dauda, 2006).

The government protested to William Swing, the then American Ambassador in Nigeria and demanded the recall of Brien within 72 hours. Mathew Mbu, the then secretary for foreign affairs did not view the Brien's statement in a good light as he reacted to this episode in the following words: Such a blatant interference in Nigeria's internal arrangement is most unacceptable. The transition programme as well as the operation of the legal system in Nigeria are both internal which cannot be the subject of such uncalled for statement by the agency of a foreign government in Nigeria. Hence, the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) which supervised election monitors withdrew accreditation from Helen Weinland, the Consul-General of the American Embassy in Kaduna and seven others in the American election monitoring group. Professor Omo Omoruyi the then CDS Director-General explained that the American statement violated international codes for election observers which admonished them to show respect for the people, culture and government of the country he continued: The action of American government could be seen as the beginning of interference in Nigeria's political process as distinct from their role of simply observing and reporting what they have observed. Eventually, President Babangida decided to annul the June 12, 1993 presidential election. Just as Britain, the US also announced some measures against Nigeria for the cancellation of the election. Reacting to the annulment, Mike McCurry spokesman for the US State Department announced the stoppage of four hundred and fifty thousand United States Dollars ($450,000) aid to Nigeria. The US also expelled Nigeria's military attache to the US. The United States also suspended the postings of a defence attached in Nigeria and stoppage of all assistance under the foreign assistance act, except one given on humanitarian grounds. US citizens planning to visit Nigeria were advised against such trips (Dauda, 2006).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss how the annulment of the June 12 presidential election affected the relationship between Nigeria and United States?

3.3 Human Rights Abuses and the Effect on Nigeria-US Relations

Apart from the above election incident, shortly before the country return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria again experiences soured relationship with United States (US) due to the abused of human rights by military government of Nigeria. One of the serious abused for instance made the US imposed a travel ban and sanctions on the Abacha's regime for hanging the Ogoni activists in
1995. These activists – and their leader, writer Ken Saro Wiwa - were hanged because their persistent campaign for justice and fairness for oil producing regions conflicted with the interests of oil multinationals and the Nigerian government. The US ban on the Abacha regime won the support of civil society activists in the country, but brought the regime in clear opposition to the US government. However, the confidence of Nigerian civil society groups in the offices of the US suffered when Moshood Abiola, the winner of the annulled June 1993 election, died during a meeting with US officials under circumstances many in Nigeria considered suspicious. Nigeria-US relations after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa became colder. The United States recalled its ambassador Walter Carrington. The United States imposed new sanctions on Nigeria apart from existing ones imposed after the annulment of the June 12 1993 election. The US banned the sales and repairs of military goods and services to Nigeria. In addition the country extended ban on visas imposed in 1993 on senior military officers, and senior government officials and their families to now include military officers and civilians who actively formulate, implement or benefit from the policies that aborted Nigeria's transition to democracy. Under the US imposed sanctions, Nigeria officials visiting the United Nations or the international financial institutions are to remain within 25 miles of those organizations (Dauda, 2006).

Further on the above, the US continued to oppose IMF loans and credits and debt relief for Nigeria. US Government also stopped all government to government military assistance and training as well as rejected application for new licenses for commercial export of defence materials and services to Nigeria. Apart from stopping the issuance of visa to senior government officials and their families and relations, the US government requested for withdrawal of Nigeria's defence attache to the country. Following this, the US introduced what was known as the 'Nigeria Sanctions Bill' in the United States Senate in November 1995, immediately after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Bill sought to strengthen the ban on foreign assistance to Nigeria at the international financial institutions, continued suspension of flights between the US and Nigeria and visa ban on the Nigeria leadership and members of their families as well as sought multilateral sanctions against Nigeria. However, these tensions were ultimately dispelled when President Obasanjo was sworn in, marking a new phase in US–Nigerian relations and continued under the Yar’Adua and Jonathan administrations (ibid, 2006).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Examine how human rights abuses affected on Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States?

### 3.5 Trade and Investment Aspect of Nigeria-US Relations

Nigeria has prioritized trade in its relations with the US. Since the return of democracy in 1999, there have been increased trade links between the two countries. Optimizing the relationship to improve Nigeria’s economy is central to Nigeria’s policy. There have also been persistent calls for US investments in Nigeria. Presently, key US investors in the Nigerian oil sector include Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Western Geo-physical. Other US multinationals in Nigeria include the British American Tobacco Company, in the tobacco enterprise, and CitiBank, in the banking sector. As expected, oil is at the centre of most of the country’s trade with the US, and Nigeria continues to be one of its major oil exporters. Nigeria has also been involved in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This was established by the US in May 2000 to provide duty-free and quota-free market preferences for approximately 6 400 products from sub-Saharan
African countries to US markets until 2015. Nigeria’s leading AGOA non-oil products to the US include cashew nuts, shea butter, shrimps, ginger, gum Arabic, cocoa products and local foods. However, it seems that Nigeria has not benefited as much as it should from AGOA. This is because the country’s products are not economically competitive in the US. The difficulties involved in registering a company in Nigeria also appear to have affected its chances of benefiting from this initiative. The World Bank 2010 report stated that it costs 80% of an average Nigerian’s annual salary to register a company, compared with approximately 4% of an average Mauritian’s annual salary. Also, infrastructural challenges such as power, transport and delay in ports increases production cost, which makes the goods less competitive in US markets. Nigeria ranks eighth out of the 40 AGOA beneficiary countries in 2008 exports of agricultural products to the US. For a country with Nigeria’s resources and potential, this can be significantly improved (Alao, 2011).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Assess the trade and investment aspects of Nigeria–United States relations?

3.6 Debt Relief and Financial Assistance Aspects of Nigeria-US Relations:

With the advent of democracy, Nigeria expected to receive dividends in the form of debt relief. At the time it owed approximately $35 billion, largely to the group of countries known as the ‘Paris Club.’ The realization of this goal was a major foreign policy objective in its relations with the US. Successive US presidents have shown considerable interest in addressing Nigeria’s debt question. During a visit to Nigeria in August 2000, President Clinton announced a $100 million aid package to the country. This was aimed specifically at improving primary education and health care. In 2006, Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, secured the US Treasury Department’s assistance to persuade the Paris Club to write off $18 billion of Nigeria’s foreign debt. The Bush administration was also involved in the sponsorship of many health-related issues in the country. Interestingly, Barrack Obama considered debt relief for Nigeria even before he became president. As Illinois senator, he made it clear on the floor of the senate that he would be a strong advocate for debt relief for Nigeria, if the country could hand over Charles Taylor - the Liberian warlord who was granted amnesty in Nigeria – who had by then been indicted by the International Court of Justice. He stated: I strongly believe that Nigeria is a worthy candidate for debt relief and a key US partner in West Africa. When Charles Taylor is turned over, there is no doubt in my mind that I will be a forceful advocate for debt relief for Nigeria. Nigeria’s success in alleviating its foreign debt remains, to date, one of the most important achievements in its engagement with the global powers since the return of civilian rule. The expression of friendship between Nigeria and the US was affirmed in the signing of the first US–Nigeria Bi-national Commission, in April 2010. This aimed to establish a mechanism for sustained, bilateral, high-level dialogue to promote and increase diplomatic, economic and security co-operation between the two countries. The commission’s main objectives are the following: Promote and co-ordinate the diplomatic, economic, military, commercial, technical, social and cultural co-operation between the two countries. Address areas of mutual interest and/or concern and develop strategies for tackling these issues with assistance and co-ordination from both governments. Assist in the implementation and follow-up of agreements and all other legal instruments already concluded between the governments. Create favourable conditions to carry out co-operation programmes and projects as may be decided by mutual consent, and help to
resolve any difficulties that may arise in carrying out any such programmes and/or projects. Evaluate the development of co-operation between the two countries as well as initiatives from each government aiming to expand co-operation to new areas (Alao, 2011).

The commission’s main focus was for the US government to work with Nigeria on a number of key domestic issues. These include good governance, electoral reform and preparations, transparency and anti-corruption, energy (electricity supply) reform and investment, as well as food and agricultural development. In addition, the commission seeks to promote co-operation in efforts to resolve conflict in the Niger Delta, including issues of security and counterterrorism. Underlying this is the US oil and energy security and the protection of US oil multinationals operating in the turbulent Niger Delta (Alao, 2011).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Explain how Nigeria achieve her foreign policy pursuit on debt relief and financial assistance through bilateral relation with the US Relations?

### 3.4 The Issue of Terrorism and Nigeria-US Relations

Again, a major setback in the relations between the US and Nigeria came in December 2009, when a young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was arrested during a failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253, flying into Detroit from Amsterdam. Although the US was aware of Nigeria’s vulnerability to religious radicalization, no one expected the country national to be involved in any activity of this magnitude. The immediate reaction of the US was to place Nigeria on its ‘Terror Watch List.’ The Nigerian government expressed outrage at this response, which some commentators referred to as pigeon-holing a country on the basis of insufficient information. The US, however, insisted that its actions were objective and without prejudice to Nigeria. Removal from the watch list became a foreign policy priority for Nigeria. After several diplomatic appeals from Nigerian government, the US agreed to remove Nigeria from the list in March 2010, on the following conditions that Nigeria should publically condemn acts of terrorism wherever they occur in the world; take urgent steps to address security lapses at its airports; be party to an agreement to deploy Air Marshalls on all US-bound flights originating from Nigeria and Nigeria’s anti-terrorism bill, pending before the Nigerian National Assembly should be passed into law. After the country was able to convince the US, Nigeria was removed from terror watch list, but the United States announced to implement a new airline security measures to replace mandatory screening of air travelers from 14 countries, a step that had angered some allies. Under the new measures, all travelers to the US will be affected and not just travelers from Nigeria and 13 other countries that were short listed by the US last January as either “sponsors of state terrorism” or “countries of interest”. Reacting to the new measures announced by the US, Nigerian Ambassador, and Professor Adebowale Adefuye, said: “It is very heart-warming coming so soon after my visit to President Obama on behalf of Acting President Goodluck Jonathan. It shows how sensitive the US is to Nigeria's plight and interest. Taking alongside the forthcoming signing of the bi-national commission agreement, the decision will improve and strengthen the quality of relations between the US and Nigeria. We are very grateful to the Obama government (Ameh and Ibrahim, 2010 ).
SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss how the issue of terrorism had impacted on Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to explain how African issues, the annulled election; human rights abuses affected on Nigeria's foreign relation with United States; we has also assessed the trade and investment aspects of Nigeria-United States relations; how Nigeria achieve her foreign policy pursuit on debt relief and financial assistance through bilateral relation with the US relations as well as how the issue of terrorism had impacted on Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

Nigeria-United States relationship has in the past experiences confrontational and harmonious times. Most issues that soured relationship are political. But economic interest has harmonized the two countries given credence to the realist theorists who pursuit that in international politics there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but permanent interest. It most also be noted that the era of democratic government in Nigeria has favoured harmonious relationship between Nigeria and United States, than the era of military government in the country.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Explain how African issues affected Nigeria-United States relations?
ii. Discuss how the annulment of the June 12 presidential election affected the relationship between Nigeria and United States?
iii. Examine how human rights abuses affected on Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States?
iv. Assess the trade and investment aspects of Nigeria-United States relations?
v. Explain briefly how Nigeria achieves her foreign policy pursuit on debt relief and financial assistance through bilateral relation with the US Relations?
vi. Discuss how the issue of terrorism had impacted on Nigeria's foreign relation with the United States?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 3: NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The period between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria was fighting to contain the threat of Biafra secession and possible disintegration, and foreign policy was dominated by the one primary consideration of maintaining the unity of the country. There was also considerable activity in the area of explaining the Nigerian situation to the international community. The most interesting development of the civil war years was in the area of Nigeria's foreign policy orientation. Before the outbreak of the war, Nigeria's position in the international system had not moved beyond Balewa's pro-Western attitude and cautious attachment to tested and predictable relationship. But these were to change as a result of the war. However, the change was not as a result of radical review of the foreign policy, but due to circumstances. Therefore, this unit provides you discussion on how the experience or situation of the civil war Nigeria fought shortly after her independence opened her relationship with the USSR or Soviet Union or Russia as the case may be, and the subsequent changes in their relationship. Other factors that have also interplay in the relationship between Nigeria and USSR will be addressed accordingly.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss how the experience of the civil war influences and affected Nigeria-USSR (Russia) relations; and
- explain the economic aspects of Nigeria-Russia Relations

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Civil War and Nigeria-USSR Relations

The civil war (1967-1970) marks a significant era in the relationship between Nigeria and USSR (Russia). According to Dauda (2006), at time Britain, the major source of Nigeria's arms supply refused to supply offensive weapons to Nigeria on the pretext of humanitarian grounds, and Nigerian found herself in a difficult position or circumstances. Britain, France, the Netherlands,
Czechoslovakia and the United States also followed Britain unwillingness example. However, Ofoegbu (1980) citing from John de St. Jorre's book titled ‘The Nigerian Civil War' stressed the most significant facts and how the war created a diplomatic opportunity and the Soviet Union cleverly exploited to the embarrassment and vexation of the Western powers and acted in favour of the Federal government of Nigeria. To understand the situation better, Ofoegbu observes that;

as both Nigeria and Biafra were pressed to get arms sells to them, Britain maintained neutrality but continued its traditional (small arms, armoured cars, etc) and purely defensive (anti-aircraft guns) supplies to Nigeria. It resisted federal pressure to sell aircraft, bombs tanks and heavy field guns. The US government was confident that Britain would hold the Western line against Soviet Union penetration in Nigeria, hence it declared a formal arms embargo against both sides. Because of this sad experience, Nigeria looked for an unsentimental nation or power ready to do business by selling weapons and receiving cash. Nigerian Missions went to Moscow (capital of Russia), negotiated arms and cultural agreements and by August 1968, broke with tradition as two Czech Delpin L-29 jet fighters with Nigerian air force insignia painted on their tail refueled in Accra on their way to Nigeria. Four more followed later; Kano airport was abruptly closed to civilian traffic; and Soviet Antonov freighters roared in with twenty crated MIG-15 fighter-trainers on board. Two hundred Soviet technicians poured into Nigeria to assemble and test the aircrafts. By the end of August the jets were in the air, piloted by Egyptians - rocketing and introducing a new political element into the war. The refusal of the Americans and Britain to supply the arms which Nigeria requested, and the USSR's assessment of the likely outcome of the war at the end of July when the Nigerian Mission went to Moscow, turned the USSR fully towards Nigeria.

In any case, it was Nigeria that requested for aid and trade. Yet barely five years after the war in Nigeria, it became evident that Nigeria-Soviet relations turned soured. The USSR had calculated that the goodwill and friendship resulting from Nigeria's dependence on her during the civil war, as well as the gratitude flowing from the loan of N120 million (a large amount by Nigerian standards in 1968) which she offered Nigeria for Nigeria's Iron and Steel project and plan for the Russians to build the Iron and Steel complex, would established the USSR as the dominant foreign power in Lagos after the civil war (Ofoegnu, 1980).

By the time the war ended in January 1970, Nigeria had become a lot wish in the game of international politics where there are no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests. Having been deserted by its traditional friends and allies in the West, It was forced to reassess its situation and change its hitherto pro-Western stance in favour of a more flexible and diversified external relations that cut across the various ideological cleavages. Relationship with the Soviet Union became more cordial and friendly, with General Gowon paying a high-profile state visit Moscow to personally express the country's gratitude for timely Soviet assistance at the critical period. The early 1970s witnessed influx of soviet diplomats and nationals doing business in the country. Cheap Soviet- made automobiles such as Lada, Moskvitch and Volga became common on Nigerian roads while other consumer items from behind the iron curtain also flooded the country's market. All the earlier restrictions placed on the movement and activities of Soviet
personnel had been removed. The Soviets were awarded the contract for the construction of Nigeria's multi-million dollar Iron and Steel Industry at Ajaokuta in Kogi State. This was in addition to a range of bilateral commercial, cultural and educational agreements that blossomed in the early and mid – 1970s (Fawole, 2003).

However, Ofoegnu (1980) further observes that the fact that, soon under General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria drifted back to Britain and the USA frustrated the Russians exceedingly. Even when the second military government in Nigeria was overthrown and USSR expected the creation of those conditions, which it had long anticipated for friendship with Nigeria, it was disappointed by (i) the strenuous efforts of the leaders of the third military government to explain that they would not impose any ideology on the people of Nigeria and would not adopt socialism as their working philosophy; (ii) economic and fiscal measures which reassured capitalists of predominant roles in the Nigerian economy; (iii) government measures that weakened the working class and their union as a worker movement; (iv) open hostility towards Russians in parts of Nigeria which accused the USSR of favouring the quick-kill rather than the peace talks policy during the civil war, particularly as there was no ideological explanation for the USSR's actions in Nigeria; and by the fact that (v) the USSR's role in Angola was ignored by Nigeria because Nigeria concentrated on what the Angolans were doing and what Nigeria did to help them, and took no steps to explain the USSR's role in Angola and present her to the rest of Africa as a friend of Africa (Ofoegbu, 1980).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss how the experience of the civil war influences and affected Nigeria-Russia relations?

Nigeria-Russia Relations: Economic Aspects

Russia has always held a special place in the hearts of most Nigerians as the country that supported Nigeria during its bitter civil war between 1967 and 1970. Although no form of extreme cordiality in relations was developed after the civil war, the Soviet Union (and later Russia) continued to feature prominently in Nigeria’s diplomacy. In March 2001, President Obasanjo visited Russia and both countries signed a Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership, and a Programme on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation. The relationship continued to progress, and in 2008, the two countries signed a series of Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs). The first of these agreements was to regulate the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while the second envisaged the participation of Gazprom, the Russian-based energy corporation, in the exploration and development of oil wells and gas reserves in Nigeria. By 2009, both countries had begun talking about further developing their relationship. Nigeria’s former foreign minister, Ojo Maduekwe, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, met to discuss various areas of collaboration. Specifically, Russia was interested in projects related to the development of Nigeria’s infrastructure, the ferrous and nonferrous metals industry, electric power generation, including nuclear energy, and the extraction of hydrocarbon and other raw minerals. For its part, Nigeria was interested in the electricity sector. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Nigeria in 2010, the first such visit from a Kremlin leader to Africa’s most populous nation, boosted their relationship significantly. Both countries signed a deal to co-operate in developing nuclear energy, especially for the purpose of electricity. Another major project of interest to the Russians was the Trans-Saharan Gas pipeline,
a project aimed at sending Nigerian gas to Europe, and supported by the EU as a way to diversify its energy resources. This is of considerable interest to Gazprom because of its belief that it is far behind its foreign competitors in Africa, especially when compared with companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon Mobil (Alao, 2011).

By 2010, both Nigeria and Russia had also started exploring discussions on space technology, nuclear energy and partnership in other technical fields. The countries have signed a nuclear agreement between the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) and the Russian State Atomic Corporation (RSAC) to explore and develop gas and hydrocarbon related projects in Nigeria. In the same year trade, between the two countries reached $300 million, and Nigeria became Russia’s second-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa. However, this amount is relatively insignificant compared with the relationship developing between Nigeria and the emerging powers. It is believed that Russia’s main focus in its relations with Nigeria is on nuclear energy, gas and oil exploration. Russian President Medvedev pointed out, during his visit to Nigeria, that if his country carries out its plans, ‘Russian investment in Nigeria can reach billions of dollars.’ Indeed, figures provided by the Russian Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexander Polyakov, in January 2010, reflected that the balance of trade between Nigeria and Russia reached the $1.5 billion mark in 2009 (Alao, 2011).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the economic aspects of Nigeria-Russia relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss how the experience of the civil war influences and affected the Nigeria-USSR relations and explain the economic aspects of Nigeria-Russia bilateral relations. However, scenario shows that in international politics there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but permanent interest as propounded by the realist theorists of international relations.

5.0 SUMMARY

Nigeria-USSR experiences a changing bilateral relation from harmonious to unfriendliness situation and it keeps on like that, until the return to democracy.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss how the experience of the civil war influences and affected Nigeria-Russia relations?

ii. Explain the economic aspects of Nigeria-Russia relations?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 3: NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Following Nigeria’s independence in October 1, 1960, Nigeria and France established diplomatic relations. Since then, relationship between the two countries has been characterized by confrontation, harmony and uncertainty. In Nigeria’s foreign relations, France is a significant given its historical relations with Africa, especially Nigeria’s neighbours with which Nigeria has enjoyed a tumultuous, sometimes co-operative and permanently revengeful relations (Kolawole, 2005). However this unit gives you an insight into the changing bilateral relations between Nigeria and France, particularly the cases of confrontation, harmony and uncertainty.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify and discuss the cases of confrontation in the Nigeria-France relations; and
- discuss the cases of harmony and uncertainty in the Nigeria-France relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nigeria-France Relations: Cases of Confrontation

Traditionally, bilateral relations between France and Nigeria have always been lukewarm. It has never been especially cordial in the nature of the relations between France and Senegal or between the United States and Great Britain. And this was because the colonial hegemonial rivalry and suspicion between France and England were naturally inherited by the ex-colonies. Consequently, Nigeria's Relations with France during the first period of independence was essentially a period of politics of confrontation. Certain factors have contributed to making Nigeria-France bilateral relations to be confrontation. First, the case of atomic bomb testing shortly after Nigeria became independence in 1960, the very act that makes the relationship between Nigeria and France to be confrontational was the atomic bomb explosion in part of Algeria. According to Damilola (2011) and Kolawole (2005) on this issue confirmed that one instance when the Balewa government as a demonstration of its commitment to the defense of
Africa’s interest was when it broke diplomatic relations with France in 1961 following nuclear test in the Sahara desert in utter disregard for the opposition of African states to the test the bomb. This very act was carried out by France occurred on January 5, 1961, just three months after Nigeria became independence. However, Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with France over France’s explosion of atomic bomb in Reggan in Algeria in the Sahara desert. Indeed, the Nigerian government gave a 48-hour ultimatum to the then French Ambassador in Nigeria, Raymond Offroy, and his embassy staff within which they were to leave Nigeria. Additionally, French aircrafts and ships were also barred from Nigeria's air-field and sea ports. However, due to these reactions against France by Nigeria, during Nigeria’s initial negotiations as an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963, France which was an important power in the EEC bloc, did everything to prevent or frustrate Nigeria’s successful admission to the community.

Secondly, the case of the civil war, the era of confrontation in the bilateral relations between the two states came to its serious point, during the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967 when the French government under the late President Charles de Gaulle adopted an openly pro-Biafran position and encourage other Francophone African states notably Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon to follow suit. This was done not only to payback the humiliation inflicted upon France by Nigeria's affront in breaking relations, but as a geo-strategic policy to dismember Nigeria which France has always believed posed a threat to other neighbouring francophone states of West Africa as a result of its wealth and enormous population (Kolawole 2005).

Thirdly, the case of geo-strategic policy the act of confrontation was also evident as it was observed that it was a calculated geo-strategic policy by the French governments and foreign policy makers at Quid d’Ossaiy (French ministry of foreign affairs) that a united and oversized Nigeria constituted a threat to other neighbouring, francophone neighbours in the sub-region because of Nigeria’s large population and enormous wealth” (Martin 1995, cited in Omole 2010). In view of this, despite the ubiquitous presence of French companies in Nigeria economy following 1971 oil boom and general economic prosperity for Nigeria, France worked to undermine the establishment and success of ECOWAS spearheaded by Nigeria and Togo which would comprise Lusophone, Anglophone, and Francophone countries. In bad faith, France immediately provoked Ivory coast and Senegal to start establishment of a purely French speaking economic union called Communique Economique d’afrique de L’ouest (CEAO) which is a rival to the Nigerian backed ECOWAS (Omole 2010). Indeed, most of the problems ECOMOG encountered in its formation and peace-keeping operations were as a result of reluctance of the Francophone states with the quiet support of France to an overall Nigerian authority and their failure to pay their voluntary contribution to the up keep of ECOMOG (Fawole 2004).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Identify and discuss the cases of confrontation in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations?

3.2 Nigeria-France Relations: Cases of Harmony and Uncertainty

The end of the civil war in January 1970 was to mark a positive turn in the bilateral relations between France and Nigeria. This new relationship between the two states was marked by the
exchange of ambassadors in mid-1970, a credit of over 110 million Francs was extended to the Nigeria government by France and in February 1973, the French Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, Betten Cout, paid an official visit to Lagos. This was reciprocated the following year by the then Nigeria's Minister of external Affairs, Okoi Arikpo (Omole in Kolawole, 2005).

An important development that also marked this era on convergence and consolidation was that economic and trade relations boomed between the two states. Indeed between 1972 -1983, Nigeria became one of the principal economic partners with France. For instance, the total value of imports of Nigerian petroleum doubled for instance, from 1,667 million French francs in 1973 to 3,518 million French francs in 1976 (Nwokedi, 1986). Indeed this phenomenal growth in commercial exchange was the pattern between the two countries until 1984 when the austerity measures introduced by the Nigerian government affected all sectors of the economy. To this should be added the various commercial and trade surplus experience by many French multinational companies in the banking construction, pharmaceutical, steel and automobile sectors of the economy.

When the activities of France especially in its relations with Nigeria on the political, and economic sphere are examined closely, between 1993 to 1997, it would be seen that France was not only deceitful as she failed to match her world with her deeds as Nigeria is concerned on the matter of debt forgiveness, but has been, uncertain and Machiavellian in her political relations with Nigeria. The uncertainty in France's relations with Nigeria and her failure to write off Nigeria's debt should not be seen as a rule that applied to other African-states, especially Franco-African states. For instance, the French treasury between December 1992 and July, 1993 expended over 1.5 billion French francs either by providing direct budgetary support or by paying arrears to the IMF and World Bank on behalf of states like Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal which were on the verge of bankruptcy. And July 1993, and additionally 650 million French francs was allocated to Cameroon alone. As for Nigeria however, it should be noted that in spite of the remark made by Roland Dumas on his visit to Nigeria in 1992 regarding the fact that the debt burden was too much for the country, France neither cancelled the debt that Nigeria owned her nor include her in the 'Dakar interests' (i.e. cancellation of interests over debt owed France by African states nor in the 'Toronto Talk' that is, the cancellation of both the principal and interests of debt of African states. Therefore, if this sole is used, France's avowed commitment to Nigeria on the question of debt was in reality only rhetorical (Omole avowed commitment to Nigeria on the question of debt was in reality only rhetorical (Omole in Kolawole, 2005)..

France relation with Nigeria which since 1993 had come under a totalitarian and autocratic regime where basic human rights were grossly abused and criticized by democratic and opposition forces in Nigeria. It has been described as being anti-Nigerian people, and selfish. This, it has been argued, is all because of the necessity for France to make economic profits in Nigeria while she closes her eyes to the evils of the regime. With the cancellation of the 1993 presidential election, the 1995 murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni 9, as well as the observation that the Nigerian government did not want to democratize, the European Community of which France is an import member imposed various economic, political to military sanctions and sporting restrictions on Nigeria. However, since 1993 when the United States, a few African states like South Africa and Uganda and many European states have vigorously enforced these sanctions on Nigeria, France has
continuously under one pretext or the other, broken the sanctions. The world-wide democratic wave which started in Eastern Europe precisely in Poland and 1980 gradually blew over into Africa especially the Francophone states in the mid-1980s where agitation for political pluralism, civil liberty and human rights suddenly heightened. However, in order not to be seen as running against the tide of history, France, at the June 1990 Francophone summit in La Baule (France), initiated a policy of political conditionality which must be adhered to by African states before they can enjoy France's economic and financial support. In practice, this policy established a linkage between the provision of economic and financial assistance and the initiation of political reforms leading to liberal multi party democracy. According to the late French President Mitterand, French aid to Africa, will be lukewarm toward authoritarian regimes and more enthusiastic for those initiating a democratic transition. The reality in Nigeria-France relations since 1993 is that the French government has made a political turn in its pronouncement. At various times in December 1997 and 1998, the French Ambassador to Nigeria, Monsieur Pellitier has not only embraced Abacha's transition programme which consistently excluded the critical and authentic segments of the political class that is opposed to the policies of the junta until Abacha died on June 8,1998, the Ambassador has also openly canvassed for a double democratic approach, when he said that Nigeria should be left to develop her own democratic and human rights values (Omol in Kolawole, 2005).

Additionally, the unannounced breaking of ranks by France from the European Union in its imposition of sanctions on Nigeria brought about a big economic wind fall to France in spite of the lamentable economic conditions in Nigeria. For instance, while big Anglo-Saxon, especially America multinational companies are being denied mouth-watering multi-million dollar contracts in the petrochemical construction and pharmaceutical industries, French firms have been systematically favoured. An example is the award of the turn-around maintenance contract for the Nigerian oil refineries worth millions of dollars to a French conglomerate in January, 1998. Added to this, is that important Nigerian military and sporting officials that are the target of the visa restrictions have been allowed into France under one guise or the other. Thus, what can be said of France’s relations with Nigeria from 1993 to 1997, is that it has been marked by hypocrisy, uncertainty and enlightened self-interest on the part of France (Omol in Kolawole, 2005).

In a major strategic move that began under President Jacques Chirac and which has been pursued by President Nicholas Sarkozy, economic interests, rather than historical sentiments, are now key to French foreign diplomacy. Consequently, its former African colonies have slipped down the French priority list. Indeed, former President Chirac’s visit to Nigeria in July 1999 was the first by a foreign head of state to the country after its return to democratic rule. President Obasanjo returned the visit in February 2000. Relations between the two countries rose to the level of strategic partnership in June 2008, when late President Yar’Adua visited France. Trade links between Nigeria and France have improved considerably and Nigeria has welcomed French multinational investors. Nigeria is the largest recipient of French exports and its second-largest trading partner in Africa. France is also Nigeria’s second largest foreign investor. French companies in Nigeria are mainly in the fields of oil and gas, automobile and construction industries. The most prominent of these include Total, LaFarge and Peugeot. Nigeria is the leading exporter of oil and related products to France. In recognition of this, President Sarkozy pledged that Agence France de Développement (Agency for France Development) would increase the line of credit available to Nigerian and French companies conducting business in the country. France has always had more economic interests in Nigeria than in all other Francophone
West African countries put together. As of April 2011, bilateral trade between Nigeria and France had reached 5.5 billion euros. In a somewhat ironic twist France, which had formerly tried to ensure that Nigeria did not interfere in the internal affairs of other Francophone West African countries, later encouraged it to find ways of bringing other West African countries together to address the instability in Côte d’Ivoire. The constitutional impasse that ultimately occurred as a result of former President Gbagbo’s refusal to step down after losing the election resulted in greater collaboration between Nigeria and France. Both countries maintained a resolute position that Gbagbo should respect the wishes of Ivorians. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and French President Sarkozy seem to have established a good friendship. This was reflected in the Nigerian leader’s invitation to attend the 25th Africa-France Summit in Nice, in May 2010. This attained the desired result with the swearing in of Côte d’Ivoire’s President Ouattara in May 2011 (Omole in Kolawole, 2005).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Discuss the cases of harmony and uncertainty in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to identify and discuss cases of confrontation in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations as well as the cases of harmony and uncertainty in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations. Before the return to democratic rule Nigeria has experience a changing relations with the Great powers, from confrontational to harmony, from harmony to confrontation. On the whole, Nigeria has maintained a cordial relationship with France and other Great powers since the return of democratic rule to Nigeria.

5.0 SUMMARY

Nigeria-France relationship was characterized by politics of confrontation and harmony. While cases such as the atomic bomb testing, the civil war, geo-strategic policy, the cancellation of the 1993 presidential election, the 1995 murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni 9 soured Nigeria-France relations. We have seen that Nigeria and France have also built political and economic diplomatic ties that were beneficial to both countries.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Identify and discuss the cases of confrontation and retaliation in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations?
ii. Discuss the cases of harmony and uncertainty in the Nigeria-France bilateral relations?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


MODULE 4: NIGERIA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION
This module is interesting as it helps you increase knowledge and to appreciate Nigeria’s contributions in international organizations. It familiarizes you with: the contributions of Nigeria to the effective functioning of United Nations Organization (UNO), what Nigeria as a member has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the UNO. How Nigeria has contributed to the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations (CONs); what Nigeria has benefited from the activities of the CONs. The reasons why Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); what Nigeria has benefited as a member of OPEC. Nigeria in the formation and transformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU), the roles of Nigeria in the activities of OAU/AU. The contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS.

You will find the comprehensive discussions of this module under the following units:

Unit 1: Nigeria in United Nations Organization (UNO)
Unit 2: Nigeria in Commonwealth of Nations (CONs)
Unit 3: Nigeria in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Unit 4: Nigeria in Regional Organizations (OAU/AU, ECOWAS)
UNIT 1: NIGERIA IN UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (UNO)

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Nigeria's Contributions to the UNO
   3.2 Nigeria’s Benefits as a Member of UNO
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is very important to remind you that one of the basic principles of Nigeria's foreign policy is seeking membership of both continental and global multilateral organizations for their functional importance to Nigeria. Therefore, in connection with this principle, this unit provides you with substantial discussions on Nigeria in UNO, particularly her contributions and benefits as member state since independence in 1960.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- clearly state and explain the contributions of Nigeria to the effective functioning of the UNO; and
- discuss what Nigeria as a member, has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the UNO.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nigeria's Contributions to the UNO:

Nigeria has been a member of the UNO since 1960 when she secured her independence from Britain. Since then, Nigeria has been actively involved in the United Nations activities. Nigeria has made immense contributions towards the survival, substances and effective functioning of the organization. Some of the Nigeria’s contributions to the United Nations are hereby highlighted and discussed below:

i. *Obedience to the principles of the United Nations Charter.* Nigeria is known to have shown great respect and obedience to the United Nations principles as enshrined in its Charter. Besides, she has great respect for international law, which forms the integral part of the United Nations system.

ii. *Regular payment of dues.* Nigeria is also committed to its obligations to the United Nations. In this respect, she has been paying her dues promptly as a demonstration of her
respect and commitment to the objectives of the world body. Emeh (2005:11) stated that apart from Nigeria being one of the financiers of the United Nations up to the tune of 0.70 percent, the country has demonstrated immutable commitments to international obligations, including the United Nations Charter of 1945.


iv. Nigerian nationals have also occupied strategic positions in UN peacekeeping. Three Nigerians – Prof. Ibrahim Gambari (Joint AU-UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in Darfur [UNAMID]), Olu Adeniji (Central African Republic (CAR) and Sierra Leone), and Margaret Vogt (CAR), have served as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. In addition, six Nigerians have served as UN force commanders: Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Irons (ONUC Congo), Major General Chris Garuba (Angola), Lt. Gen. Isaac Obiakor (UNMIL Liberia), Major General Joseph Owonibi (Liberia), Gen. Martin Luther Agwai (UNAMID Darfur), and Maj. Gen. Moses Obi (UNMIS South Sudan). Generals Obiakor and Agwai also served as Chief Military Adviser and Deputy Military Adviser at UN Headquarters respectively (Adeniyi, 2015).

v. Active participation in the United Nations committees. Nigeria has not only actively participated in the activities of many United Nations’ Committees, but has chaired some of these committees. For examples, a Nigerian, Major General Joseph Garba was the chairman of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid (UNCAA). (Njoku, 2005).
vi. **Intellectual contributions to the United Nations.** Nigeria is known to have made high level intellectual contribution which undoubtedly has helped to shape the policy of the United Nations. Eminent Nigerians such as the late Dr. Teslim Elias was President of International Court of Justice, while two others Daddy Onyeama and Bola Ajibola serves on the World Court. Joseph Garba was President of the 44th Session of General Assembly. The Presidency of the Security Council was occupied, a number of times by Nigeria's Permanent Representatives to the United Nations. Scholars such as Professors Bolaji Akinyemi and Dr. Ibrahim Gambari have served the United Nations in various capacities made valuable contribution in terms of ideas which have helped to shape the policy of the world body (Arowolo, 2008; Ogwu, 2005).

vii. **Contribution in the campaign for a new world order.** Nigeria as a member state of the United Nations has been in forefront in the campaign for a new world order. With the changing configuration of the International system after the cold war conflict in the 1990s, Nigeria as a developing country with charisma, political weight and enormous economic potential has become a force to be reckoned with in the international arena. She, in cooperation with other developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America has been campaigning for a new world order. This includes reforms in international organizations such as the United Nations, International monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). Nigeria, for example, is presently seeking for a permanent seat in the Security Council alongside with some with some other member states of the United Nations, and campaigning for a new World economic order that would be beneficial to the Third world countries in an increasingly globalized economy (Njoku, 2005).

viii. **Nigeria gives aid support of the United Nations work and activities.** Nigeria makes substantial contributions in form of financial aid to various agencies of the United Nations. These include UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO, UNHCR etc. it also gives both political and diplomatic support for these agencies that operate in the country. Additionally, Nigeria performs certain humanitarian functions to complement the effort of the United Nations. For instance, Nigeria established National Commission for refugees (NCR) and founded National Refugee Centre (NRC) at Oru, Ogun State where thousands of refugees from different countries of Africa were resettled (Njoku, 2005).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you state and discuss the Nigeria's contributions to UNO?

### 3.2 Nigeria’s Benefits as a Member of UNO

Nigeria has not only contributed to the UNO, but there are many benefits, which Nigeria has enjoyed from her engagement in the activities of UNO as a member state. These include:

i. **The membership of the United Nations enhances Nigeria’s image:** Nigeria joined the membership of the United Nations in 1960, after her independence from Britain. This enhanced her image in the international community as a sovereign nation. Today, Nigeria enjoys considerable international prestige partly as a result of her membership of the United Nations.

ii. **The United Nations provided relevant political forum and security to Nigeria:** As an international political institution, the United Nations provides much-needed forum for...
Nigeria to interact with other nations in the international arena. Besides, it provides necessary security to the country in a world characterized by intrigues, wars, arms race. Thus, in a world of big, powerful and fear-mongering states Nigeria, like other small powers, takes refuge under the United Nations in order to make their presence felt in the international system.

iii. **Health and social welfare:** Nigeria has benefited tremendously in form of loans, aid and equipment for the implementation of her health and other social development programmes. Through the World Health Organization, an agency of the United Nations, Nigeria has benefited in terms of aid for successful implementation of the nation’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), supply of vaccines for the eradication of river blindness, polio mellitus, and HIV/AIDS control etc. Besides, other United Nations agencies such as the UNICEF and UNESCO have been playing active roles in educational development and poverty alleviation for the well-being of Nigerian citizens (Njoku, 2005).

iv. **Benefits in form of technical assistance:** Nigeria as a member state has benefited tremendously from the technical programmes of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. This is especially in the areas of agriculture, erosion control, food processing and preservation and rural development are partly financed by the United Nations agencies operating in the country.

v. **Technical assistance for educational and industrial development:** As a developing nation, Nigeria requires technical assistance for industrial purposes. Some agencies of the United Nations such the UNESCO, UNDP and UNICEF have been rendering invaluable assistance, and help to train and retrain Nigeria citizens and, above all, provide financial grants for effective implementation of programmes.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you highlight and discuss what Nigeria has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the UNO?

4.0 **CONCLUSION**

In this unit we have clearly stated and explained the contributions of Nigeria to the effective functioning of the UNO as well as discussed what Nigeria as a member, has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the Organization.

5.0 **SUMMARY**

Nigeria as a member of the UNO has actively contributed towards the survival, substances and effective functioning of the organization: Nigeria has been obedient to the principles of the United Nations Charter; Regular payment of dues; has contributed immensely in peace-keeping operations of the United Nations; Nigerian nationals have also occupied strategic positions in UN peacekeeping; Active participation in the United Nations committees; Intellectual contributions to the United Nations; Contribution in the campaign for a new world order and Nigeria gives old in support of the United Nations work and activities. Nigeria makes.

Nigeria has not only contributed to the UNO, but has benefited from her engagement in the activities of UNO: The membership of the United Nations enhances Nigeria’s image; The United
Nations provided relevant political forum and security to Nigeria; Health and social welfare; Technical assistance as well as technical assistance for educational and industrial development.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. State and discuss the Nigeria’s contributions to UNO?

ii. Highlight and discuss what Nigeria has benefited from her active involvement in the activities of the UNO?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 2:  NIGERIA IN COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS (CONs)

CONTENTS
1.0    Introduction
2.0    Objectives
3.0    Main Content
   3.1    Nigeria membership and contributions to CONs
   3.2    Nigeria's benefits as member of CONs
4.0    Conclusion
5.0    Summary
6.0    Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0    References/Further Reading

1.0    INTRODUCTION

Nigeria can be said to have been a member of the Commonwealth even as a colonial territory of Britain. At that time, Nigeria’s membership was obligatory because of its colonial subordination to the British Grown. After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the Balewa administration maintained very close diplomatic relations with Britain and was seriously committed to the goals of the Commonwealth of Nations. However, this unit provides you with discussions on what Nigeria has contributed and benefited as a member of the organization.

2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss how Nigeria has contributed to the activities of the Commonwealth; and
- explain what Nigeria has benefited from the activities of the Commonwealth.

3.0    MAIN CONTENT

3.1    Nigeria Membership and Contributions to CONs

Nigeria as a member of Commonwealth of Nations since her independence has actively contributed in the following ways:

i. In 1961 Nigeria played a key role in the events that led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the membership of the Commonwealth, despite Britain’s active support for the apartheid country. In subsequent Commonwealth meetings Nigeria maintained her strong opposition against re-admission of South Africa into the Commonwealth until she dismantled the apartheid system. Nigeria’s stance against the apartheid system in South Africa within the Commonwealth of Nations helped immensely in stepping up opposition against the despicable system, which eventually led to its collapse in 1994, and the enthronement of majority rule in that country under President Nelson Mandela.
ii. Nigeria has contributed intellectually to member countries of the Commonwealth particularly when Chief Emeka Anyaoku was the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG). For instance, intellectually assisted member countries in strengthening democracy, accountable administration and the rule of law, observer mission to parliamentary and presidential elections, and training in constitutional drafting and particularly in securing the end of apartheid in South Africa. Other important role played include preparation of many declaration, some of which are Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice 1979; the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action on Southern Africa 1987 and the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa 1985 which was later known as Nansan Accord played a pivotal role in the pressure to end apartheid, through the establishment of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and initiating multi-lateral agreement on the imposition of economic sanctions (Novick, 1986; Ekenedirichukwu, 2010).

iii. Further on the above, General Olusegun Obasanjo as a member of Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in 1979 participated in facilitating South Africa transition to non-racial democracy through. EPG existed before 1985-1986 as means to kick start dialogue and negotiations in relation to the apartheid regime in South Africa, Obasanjo was a co-chairman of the EPG in 1986, to report situation in South Africa and determine way forward; He acted as adversary body to and on behalf of the Commonwealth EPG that was re-established in 2009 and also advice on potential reform in 2011 (Novick, 1986; Colleen, 1995; Compell, 2013; Ekenedirichukwu, 2010).


SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How has Nigeria contributed to the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations?

3.2 Nigeria’s Benefits as Member of CONs

Nigeria has benefited from participating in the activities and as a member in the following ways:

i. Nigeria membership of the commonwealth has been beneficial to the country in terms of economic and technical assistance and financial aid for development from developed members of the commonwealth.

ii. Nigeria membership of the commonwealth places her on a vantage position over Biafra during the Nigeria Biafra war of 1967-70. For instance, Britain and some other member nations of the Commonwealth provided necessary diplomatic and military support to Nigeria which largely resulted in the victory against Biafra. It can therefore be said that Nigeria’s membership of the Commonwealth of Nations as helped her to maintain the unity and corporate existence of the country.

iii. Above all, Nigeria’s commitment to the ideals and sustenance of the Commonwealth was demonstrated when she hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) at Abuja in November 2003. The successful hosting of CHOGM was not only diplomatic victory for Nigeria, but has greatly enhanced the prestige of the country among the member states of the Commonwealth and, indeed, in international community. It
significantly marked the country’s re-entry into the world community on an equal and friendly basis. It can also be rightly stated that the hosting of CHOGM by Nigeria in 2003 was a grand diplomatic design by President Obasanjo’s administration to begin to seek new relevance for the country in the international community. It must be noted that the necessity of charting a new course by hosting CHOGM and upholding the ideas of the Commonwealth stemmed from the immediate past diplomatic experience of the country, especially during the successive military regimes of the 1984–1999 when Nigeria acquired the status of a pariah state in the face of international hostility. Nigeria, for example, was suspended from the membership of the Commonwealth in 1995. This was during General Sani Abacha’s regime. General Sani Abacha’s regime attracted international hostility against the country when it decided to hang Ken Saro Wiwa and his other eight Ogoni kinsmen accused of murdering fellow five Ogoni citizens suspected to be sabotaging their efforts of attracting sympathy for the Ogoni cause (Uneke, 1999:23).

iv. Besides, the combative posture of Nigeria’s foreign relations during the successive military regimes, particularly during General Sani Abacha’s regime alienated the country from the international community. The country’s diplomatic relations was then described as “combative diplomacy” or “tear-gas diplomacy”. The hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting by Nigeria in 2003, which was attended by Queen Elizabeth II, the titular head of the Commonwealth, and most member states was therefore a great milestone in the effort of President Obasanjo’s regime to return the country to the path of honour, integrity and trust in the international community (Uneke, 1999:23).

v. The membership of the Commonwealth has helped to sustain the prestige of Nigerian nation in the international community. It has not only created permanent political and diplomatic links between Nigeria and other member states of the Commonwealth, but has helped to project the image of the country in international arena. Quite recently, for instance, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria, Mr. Richard Gozney listed Nigeria as “one among 20 most important countries to the United Kingdom” (Okwor, 2005:10).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What has Nigeria benefited from the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss Nigeria's contributions to the activities of the Commonwealth as a member and explain what Nigeria has benefited from the activities of the organization.

5.0 SUMMARY

Nigeria as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, has not only been committed and contributed to the activities of the organization, but has benefited from participating in the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. How has Nigeria contributed to the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations?

ii. What has Nigeria benefited from the activities of the Commonwealth of Nations?
7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


UNIT 3: NIGERIA IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Why Nigeria joined the OPEC
   3.2 Nigeria's benefits as a member of OPEC
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In 1971, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This unit provides you with discussions on the aims of Nigeria for joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and what the country has benefited as a member of the organization.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the reason why Nigeria joined the OPEC; and
- discuss what Nigeria has benefited as a member of OPEC.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Why Nigeria Joined the OPEC

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) came into existence in Baghdad, Iraq on 14th September, 1960. Thereafter, Iraq, Venezuela, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia met in Caracas, Venezuela in January 1961 to ratify the decision taken in Baghdad in 1960. The formation of OPEC was necessitated by the domination of the oil industry by seven major oil companies namely; Shell, Mobil, Texaco, Esso, British petroleum and Golf California standard. This multinational oil companies control all aspect of petroleum oil, prospecting, production and making to the disadvantage of the developing countries that own the petroleum oil resources. Nigeria was not a founding member of OPEC. By 1960/1961 when OPEC was established, Nigeria had not started producing crude petroleum oil at a commercial level. She joined the organization in 1971 when crude oil production had reached commercial levels, and the country had been recognized as oil producer in the international community. By 1973, when the Arab-Israeli war had tremendous effect on the prices of oil, OPEC had positioned itself as a powerful cartel. Nigeria as a member of OPEC experienced increase in her revenue from oil as a result of
high prices of oil in the international market (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005). What are the aims of Nigeria’s for joining OPEC? The aims of Nigeria in joining OPEC include to:
i. protect her national interest through a cautious utilization of her oil wealth;
ii. use oil wealth to project Nigeria’s image in the international scene;
iii. ensure her stable economic growth based on oil and divorced from the manipulations of outside economic forces;
iv. use oil wealth in ensuring greater economic cooperation especially among the developing states in the international system; and

The extent to which has achieved her aims of joining OPEC is debatable. However, Nigeria has remained a moderate member of the organization and has, in most cases, tried to abide by the decisions and agreements of OPEC without disregard to her national interest. The economic problems of the 1980’s had transformed Nigeria from a moderate member to a more radical posture within the OPEC. This is to guarantee the economic survival of the country and to protect her economic interest. The major objective of the formation of OPEC is to achieve common price level and stabilize production in the interest of member states.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
Discuss why Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971?

### 3.2 Nigeria’s Benefits as a Member of OPEC

Nigeria has benefitted a lot from her membership of OPEC. These benefits include the following:

i. Nigeria, acting in cooperation with other OPEC member states have succeeded in stopping the exploitative tendencies of the multinational oil companies which prior to the information of OPEC had solely determine both the production ceiling and prices of crude oil in the international market. This had kept the prices of oil very low to the detriments of the economic interests of the producer nations. But today, OPEC decisions influence oil prices (Vanguard, global Business Reports, February 21, 2005:20).

ii. Nigeria membership of OPEC has afforded the country the opportunity to learn some developmental strategies from other member nations. For instance, when Nigeria decided to invest in refineries outside her shore, this lesson was learnt from other OPEC member countries.

iii. Nigeria as a member nation of OPEC benefit tremendously from the increase in oil price. It has made it possible for the country to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserve. Besides, it has also made it possible for the various levels of government to implement their annual budgets effectively.

iv. As Member State of OPEC, Nigeria is in a vantage position to seek and obtain loan from the OPEC Fund for International Development. The OPEC fund for international Development was set up by OPEC to assist less developed countries to embark on meaningful project that will stimulate rapid economic and social development. The OPEC fund has been approved for various projects and activities particularly in the areas of technical assistance, food aid emergency research by 2004, a total of 676 grants had
been approved for various projects and activities in many developing countries (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
What has Nigeria benefitted from her membership of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)?

**4.0 CONCLUSION**
In this unit, we have been able to clearly explain the aims of Nigeria for joining Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971 and discuss what Nigeria has benefited as a member of the organization.

**5.0 SUMMARY**
The aims of Nigeria for joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and what the country has benefited as a member of the organization has been discussed accordingly in this unit.

**6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT**

i. Discuss why Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971?

ii. What has Nigeria benefitted from her membership of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)?

**7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING**

UNIT 4: NIGERIA IN THE OAU/AU AND ECOWAS

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
   3.1 Nigeria in the Organization of African Unity/African Union
   3.2 Nigeria in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provide you with vital discussion on the formation and transformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU); the roles of Nigeria in OAU/AU; contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as what Nigeria has benefited as members of ECOWAS.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- briefly discuss the formation and transformation of OAU into AU;
- explain the roles of Nigeria in the OAU/AU
- discuss the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of ECOWAS
- explain Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nigeria in the Organization of African Unity/African Union

Formation and Transformation of OAU into AU: As most African countries started to secure their independence from their colonial masters, beginning with Ghana in 1957, there was a dire need to establish a formidable continental political organization that would come together to discuss their common political, economic, and socio-cultural problems. This gave rise to the meeting of all-African Heads of Independent States under the chairmanship of Emperor Hile Salessie 1 of Ethiopia in May 1963. Nigeria was one of the thirty-two member states that initially signed the charter establishing the OAU in 1963. However, the transformation of OAU into AU was first initiated at the extra-ordinary session of OAU Heads of State held at Sirte, Libya in 1999 for obvious reasons: before the meeting, many African leaders felt very uncomfortable about the slow pace of progress made by the OAU in addressing the multifarious problems confronting African continent. It was widely felt after many years of its existence, the OAU had not been able to encourage greater integration of African state as was the case in Europe under
the European Union (EU). Besides, there were greater problems confronting the continent in the areas of poverty, misery, diseases, conflict, wars and debt burden than was the case in the 1960s when most African countries secured their independence from their colonial masters. Thus, most African leaders felt that though their efforts under the OAU yielded little success, but did not actually provide concrete solutions to the multifarious problems confronting the continent. Consequently, there arose the need for a more vibrant, purposeful and integrative organization that will help tackle more vigorously the problems confronting African continent to ensure a better tomorrow (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005: 167).

During the Sirte, Libya extra-ordinary session of the OAU Heads of State in July 1999, the Libya Leader, Muammar Gaddafi proposed the setting up of AU with the objective similar to that of EU (Adio, 2005:22). Hence, in the efforts to transform the organization from the OAU to AU, Nigeria's leading and important role must be duly acknowledged. Regrettably, many people erroneously believe that it was Gaddafi that played the leading role. There was no doubt that the idea of an African Union was mooted by him at the 4th Extra Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999. But, this idea would have been immediately killed, if not for the convincing and moderating role played by Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo. The latter argued and convinced his peers that rather than an outright dismissal of Libya's proposal, it should be considered as an opportunity to accelerate the implementation of the Abuja Treaty, which was designed for the economic integration of the continent aimed at subsequently leading to Africa's political integration (Ashiru and George, 2013:11). However, the AU did not take-off in the real sense of the word not until the African Heads of State in Lome, Togo adopted its constitutive act in 2001. The road map for the new organization was drawn up for implementation during the Lusaka, Zambia Summit in 2001. When the first executive session of the AU assembly convened in Durban, South African in 2002, most Africans felt a sign of relief, hoping for a better tomorrow (Adio, 2005:22). The formation and take-off of the AU was described as “a new beginning for the troubled continent.”

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you discuss the formation and transformation of OAU into AU?

**Nigeria's Role in the OAU/AU:** Nigeria made significant contribution in her support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) since the formation in 1963. When the OAU was transformed into African Union (AU) in 2001, Nigeria continued to play active role not only in sustaining the new organization, but also in ensuring that it realized its objective of economic integration of Africa through its numerous programmes. The role of Nigeria as active member of the OAU (now African Union) can be considered under the following:

i. Nigeria was the founding member of the OAU. Besides, she played a key role in the transformation of the OAU into African Union in 2001. By this effort, Nigerian wanted a more purposeful organization that will meet the need of Africa in the 21st century.

ii. Since independent in 1960, Nigeria has regarded Africa as the centerpiece of her foreign policy. By this, it is meant that Nigeria's foreign policy is geared towards solving Africa problems. Nigeria has been committed toward solving political, economic and social problems in Africa, often committing both human and materials resources to that end.

iii. Nigeria as the founding member of the OAU has spearheaded all the peaceful settlements. For instance, between 1963 and 1964, Nigeria served on the *ad hoc*
committee of the OAU to effect peaceful settlement of the Algeria/Morocco border conflict, between Mali and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.

iv. Nigeria plays a key role in restoring peace and stability in crisis-ridden African countries. This is through her peacekeeping efforts. For example, Nigeria has played significant role in peacekeeping operations in the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea. She has been instrumental to the formation of the ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which played significant role in the restoration of peace and stability in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Liberia. Nigeria is known to have made enormous sacrifice in term human and material resources in the effort to restore peace and stability in West African sub-region (Daily Independent, October 13, 2005, pA5).

v. Nigeria’s role in the promoting of African unity and stability has been manifest. For instance, in 1977, she hosted the black Festival Arts and Culture (FESTAC). This was to promote the world black and African cultural heritage.

vi. Nigeria's primarily African commitment was to liberate the continent from the last vestiges of colonialism and to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. Therefore, Nigeria has provided both diplomatic assistance and economic aids to the liberation movements in Africa. For instance, Nigeria is member of the six frontline states not by virtue of proxy but by political and economic commitment. She is known to have played crucial role in the 1970s decolonization of Angola and Namibia. It contributed about 20million dollars to assist the Southwest Africa People’s Organization in the 1989 elections and other preparations for Namibian independence (Kolawole, 2005).

vii. Nigeria played important role in enthroning majority rule in South Africa and the liquidation of the apartheid system. During the era of the apartheid regime in South Africa, Nigeria granted political asylum to South Africans fleeing from the cruelty and persecution of the apartheid regime. The country also trained many students of South African origin as her assistance in the struggle against apartheid.

viii. Moreover, Nigeria has been hosting refugees from many African countries in the spirit of both the OAU and the AU. By the year 2003, not less than 7,392 refugees from various countries of Africa were residing in Nigeria. In 1990, Nigeria established a Refugees Camp (aka Oru Refugee Camp) in Ogun state to cater for the welfare of the refugees from different African countries (Kasa, 2010:7).

ix. One of the major vigorous roles Nigeria played in AU could be seen in the ways she handled Darfur crisis, Nigeria's intervention in Darfur was through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). As early as 2004, Nigeria and Rwanda sent a total of 300 troops to Darfur. By October 25, 2004, the second accord was signed in Abuja. Still undaunted in its commitment to peace especially on the continent, Nigeria sent a battalion of 680 troops to Darfur on Wednesday, July 13 2005 (Arowolo, 2008:130).

x. Nigeria has also played crucial role in assisting weak African nations in terms of defense and economics aids. In 2005, for instance, Nigeria donated various items of goods worth millions of naira to the Niger Republic, which was grappling with the problem of food crisis.

xi. The country has also been at the fore-fronts in rendering financial support to both the OAU and the African Union. This is to ensure their effectiveness as purposeful international organizations working in the interest of African continent.
Above all, Nigeria has been spearheading the implementation of various programmes aimed towards enhancing growth and development of Africa. For example, Nigeria has been encouraging other West African countries to adopt and implement the programmes of the New Partnership for African development (NEPAD). The NEPAD programme is aimed at ushering the African continent into “a cosy phase of economic growth and socio-political stability” (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005:181).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
How would you explain the roles of Nigeria in OAU/AU?

3.2 Nigeria in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Nigeria's Contributions to the Formation and Activities of ECOWAS: ECOWAS formally and officially came into being with the endorsement of the charter in Lagos, Nigeria on 28th day of May 1975 with fifteen (15) countries as the foundation members, while the Cape Verde Island joined the organization in the year 1976 to make up membership to sixteen (16). The member states include: Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger Republic, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cape Verde Island (Nkolo, 1999: 51-52). The position of Nigeria in the formation and operations of ECOWAS, no doubt, generated remarkable impacts on the growth and development of the sub-region. Her leadership role in the formation episode precisely can see her as the architect of ECOWAS. Nigeria has made enormous sacrifice in terms of human and material resources in the sustenance of the operations of ECOMOG in the West African sub-region.

In 1990, when there erupted an uncontrollable civil war in Liberia, it was Nigeria who pooled ideas and forces together with Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Gambia to form the ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group – ECOMOG. However, with the greater proportion of Nigerian soldiers who formed the ECOMOG, the activities of ECOMOG yielded positive results in controlling crises in the sub-region. Nigeria had about 70 per cent of the total composition of ECOMOG soldiers, in addition to about 80 per cent of the cost of troops’ deployment. The Chief of Staff since inception has always been a Nigerian (Njoku and Nwafor, 2005).

One would claim that Nigeria is the father of ECOWAS as she has since its inception been accommodating the headquarters of the organization now at Abuja.

Despite the economic position of Nigeria, she is still the highest contributor to ECOWAS. As at 1991, it was estimated that she contributes over 33 per cent of the entire organization's fund. (Enem and Aneke, 2004:109). The trade liberalization policy of ECOWAS has generated smooth business operations in the sub-region. With the provision this policy, Nigeria has been exporting petroleum, agricultural and manufactured products to member states in the sub-region. For example: Nigeria had since 1978 commenced supply of petroleum products to some Member States including Senegal, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Benin, Togo and Ghana to help them meet their domestic energy requirements and to further expand Nigeria’s oil market. Nigeria also exports Peugeot, Volkswagen, Leyland and Mercedes cars and trucks assembled in the country to Member States of the Community so as to alleviate their transportation problems and to stimulate the Nigerian enterprise. Besides, Nigeria has been exporting gas to Benin, Togo and Ghana.
through the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGPP), which came into fruition in 2000 (Bassey, 2015:28).

Nigeria also plays a crucial role in the training of security personnel in the West African, sub-region. For instance, the Nigeria Mobile Police Training School, Gwoza in Borno State trained 300 Liberian National Policemen on specialized courses as part of the steps to sustain peace process in that country (Nigeria Tribune, Tuesday, September 20, 2005:19).

Nigeria is at the forefront in initiating and implementing programmes aimed towards enhancing economic growth and social development in the West African sub-region. For instance, Nigeria has been encouraging other member states of ECOWAS to remain committed towards the implementation of ECOWAS/NEPAD programmes. The plan of action is based on the principle of partnership and shared responsibilities, first and foremost, among ECOWAS and its member-countries, but also between West Africa and the World Bank (the Guardian, Tuesday, March 23, 2004) The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), for instance, has been described as “a holistic integrated strategic development plan to enhance growth and poverty reduction in Africa by addressing key social, economic and political priorities in a coherent and balanced manner” (Nwoju, 2003:18). Nigeria encourages other West African countries to adopt and implement both ECOWAS/NEPAD programmes in order to usher in a new era of economic growth and sustainable social development in the sub-region.

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

How would you discuss the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of ECOWAS?

**Nigeria's Benefits in the ECOWAS:** Nigeria's peace keeping efforts in West African sub-region has some significant benefits for the country: One, it shows Nigeria's faithful commitment to the objective of the UN in the area of maintenance of international peace. Two, the ECOMOG operation in the sub-region once again demonstrates in practical terms Nigeria's leadership in West Africa. Three, the ECOMOG experience in Liberia was the first regional military arrangement to manage regional conflicts. Thus it boosted Nigeria's credential in the area military capability. Four the varied peacekeeping assignments have continued to benefit the Nigerian military with necessary experience in actual combat and administration of peacekeeping and logistics (Ajayi 2004).

Nigeria has been able to register some commendable presence in West Africa because of her power which is unrivalled. Two instances are palpable, one, upon the assumption of office by General Murtala Muhammed in 1975, the secretariat of ECOWAS which was temporarily based in Abidjan was immediately moved to Lagos because the late Head of State had threatened to withdraw Nigeria's support from the organization should it fail to move its secretariat to Lagos. Of course, the secretariat has since been moved to Abuja. Two, the celebrated ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra-Leone were made possible by the inspiring attitude of Abuja (Saliu, 2010:162).

The fact that no country can be absolutely independent from interaction and services of each other, it appears symbiotic as the country’s membership of ECOWAS has afforded her the
opportunity to engage in joint business partnership with other states. One important example is the Nigeria-Benin Joint Cement industry in the Benin Republic.

The trade liberalization policy of ECOWAS has provided opportunity for Nigeria to sell her petroleum, agricultural as well as manufactured products to member states in the sub-region. For example: Nigeria had since 1978 commenced supply of petroleum products to some Member States including Senegal, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Benin, Togo and Ghana which further expand Nigeria’s oil market. Nigeria also exports Peugeot, Volkswagen, Leyland and Mercedes cars and trucks assembled in the country to Member States of the Community has also boasted the Nigerian enterprise and foreign earnings. The economic benefits derived by Nigeria from the ETLS were underscored by the former Nigeria Minister of Finance Chief Olu Falae who served in the Babangida’s military regime, when he said: we (Nigerians) in the sub-region now realize that our economic survival rests squarely in our own hands and is to be found in the (market) integration that the ECOWAS offers trade liberalization scheme was launched in January (1990) and already Nigeria has a number of products listed as being qualified for export to other countries in the sub-region. We intend to hold meetings with the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria to get more of their members to take part in the scheme. The scheme provides for import duty which is lost by the importing country through the (ECOWAS) Secretariat. This will enable our products to move more freely within the sub-region at highly reduced duties, and it also ensures that importing country does not lose revenue as a result of intra-regional trade. So ,I see (this) as… creating a wider market for Nigerian goods (Bassey, 2015:28-29).

In addition, with the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975 and the subsequent introduction of ETLS in 1990, pioneered by Nigeria, the hitherto negligible value of intra-West African trade is now history. There are increases in both the volume and value of imports and exports into and from the ECOWAS member states. Nigeria’s imports from other ECOWAS Member States increased from $14 million in 1989 to $44 million in 1993 and $98 and $120 million in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Within the corresponding period, Nigeria’s exports increased from $456 to $592 million, $618 million, and $699 million respectively. Other ECOWAS member states have in the like manner witnessed remarkable increases in the volume of trade within the sub-region: Cote D’Ivoire’s import from other West African countries increased from $44 million in 1989 to $550 million in 1993, and to $597 in 1996, while her exports also increased from $444 million to $720 million and to $817 million within the corresponding years (Bassey, 2015:28-29).

**SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**
How would you explain Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS?

**4.0 CONCLUSION**

We have been able to explain the formation and transformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU); explain the roles of Nigeria in OAU/AU; discuss the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as explain Nigeria’s benefits in the organization.
5.0 SUMMARY

The formation and transformation of OAU into AU; roles of Nigeria in OAU/AU; the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as explain Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS have been discussed.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i. Discuss the formation and transformation of OAU into AU?
ii. Explain the roles of Nigeria in OAU/AU?
iii. Discuss the contributions of Nigeria to the formation and activities of ECOWAS?
iv. Explain Nigeria’s benefits in the ECOWAS

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING


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